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<\/figure>\n\n\n\nAs detailed in this series\u2019 first two installments, the attack and subsequent ambush involved 30 members of what was then the Marine Corps\u2019 brand-new commando force, MARSOC, which conducts high-speed, low-key missions at the direction of U.S. Special Operations Command. They were assigned to Marine Special Operations Company Foxtrot, the first MARSOC unit ever deployed into combat. And over the next year their lives would become a living hell as military investigators zeroed in on seven of these men, and prosecutors built a case to put them in prison for the alleged deaths of nearly two dozen innocent Afghans. Eventually they were cleared of wrongdoing during the ambush. No one went to prison. The Marine Corps convened a rare court of inquiry to fully examine why Fox Company\u2019s deployment was brought to such a quick and inglorious end. That court would determine that while the unit\u2019s leaders exhibited poor judgment in the days after the attack, the Marines responded correctly to the ambush and ultimately became victims of their higher headquarters\u2019 indifference, incompetence and impatience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court\u2019s proceedings, overseen by a panel of three senior Marine Corps officers, spanned three weeks in January 2008. Its findings are outlined in a newly declassified 98-page report provided to Military Times \u2014 along with nearly 2,000 pages of supplemental materials \u2014 by Fox Company\u2019s commander on that deployment, Maj. Fred Galvin, who retired from the service in 2014. Additional insights were gleaned through interviews with Fox Company Marines and others familiar with their case, many of whom agreed to share their stories on the condition of anonymity as some still hold sensitive jobs within the Defense Department and elsewhere in the federal government. Others cited lingering fears of violent retaliation by enemies affiliated with those they encountered on the battlefield eight years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fox Company had a call sign, \u201cViolent,\u201d derived from the Marine Corps\u2019 doctrine on warfighting. \u201cThe essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent and irreconcilable wills,\u201d the manual states. It references the term more than two dozen times, Galvin noted. To Galvin, that encapsulated what Fox Company would need to understand and embrace about its mission in Afghanistan. \u201cWar is very active,\u201d he said. \u201cIt\u2019s not clean or precise. The enemy can hurt you. It needed to be understood by our men that this is what we were going to do. It\u2019s not a lovely thing when you\u2019re fighting another human being who\u2019s trying to kill you.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Galvin\u2019s superiors disapproved of the name and told him to change it. \u201cBreak stuff and kill things, sure, that\u2019s the Marine Corps\u2019 mantra. But special forces is different,\u201d said a senior MARSOC officer critical of Galvin\u2019s selection to the lead the command\u2019s first combat unit. Special operations forces, he said, are expected to be quiet professionals. \u201cFred gets his shot and comes up with \u2018Task Force Violent\u2019? What message does that send to our partners and counterparts in whose area we have to operate?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Maj. Gen. Christopher Haas was a colonel in 2007 when he led the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Afghanistan. Friction between his staff and Fox Company precipitated the Marines\u2019 eventual ouster from the war zone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Fox Company, those areas were overseen by Army Col. Christopher Haas, commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force for Afghanistan, and Army Col. John Nicholson, commander of Task Force Spartan. Haas directed all special forces activity in theater. Nicholson owned the \u201cbattle space\u201d surrounding Afghanistan\u2019s border with Pakistan, where Task Force Violent would operate. Both men are generals now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Haas and his staff with the CJSOTF (pronounced \u201csee-juh-so-tiff\u201d) had operational control of Fox Company, meaning they approved Galvin\u2019s missions. But the Marines couldn\u2019t go anywhere without coordination with Nicholson\u2019s team, which had \u201cveto power\u201d over any proposed activity in its area of responsibility. This arrangement proved problematic for everyone, and a major reason for the confusion and frustration that preempted Fox Company\u2019s eviction from Afghanistan, the court of inquiry determined. It was further hampered by Fox Company\u2019s liaison to the CJSOTF, Marine Maj. Scott Ukeiley, whose alleged failures and communication deficiencies contributed significantly to Fox Company\u2019s rotten relationship with Haas and Nicholson, the court\u2019s report shows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fox Company arrived in early February 2007, transiting through Bagram Airfield where the CJSOTF was headquartered. There was immediate friction between the two staffs, the court\u2019s report notes. Haas and his team were nearing the end of their deployment and intently focused on providing a smooth transition for their replacements. Compounding this, senior leaders within Special Operations Command made a late decision to employ Fox Company in Afghanistan \u2014 so late, in fact, that when the destination was finally announced, the unit and its equipment were already loaded on the Navy ships bringing them overseas. As a result, the court concluded, Haas and his staff \u201cdid not fully understand its capabilities and limitations and therefore did not understand how to properly employ\u201d Fox Company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Haas, now a two-star general serving as director of force management and development at SOCOM headquarters in Florida, agreed to address questions via email and through a spokesman. The CJSOTF had no information about Fox Company\u2019s force structure or core capabilities before the Marines arrived, he said. The Marines\u2019 mission was \u201cto fill a critical gap in southern Nangarhar Province for Task Force Spartan by replacing the French special operations task force\u201d that had moved out several weeks prior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Haas said he and his staff gave Galvin and his leadership team a detailed briefing explaining the missions they\u2019d be assigned while in Afghanistan. In order of priority they were: reconnaissance, counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense (i.e. training Afghan security forces), and direct-action special-reconnaissance operations \u2014 that is, the pursuit of high-value enemy operatives. Through his spokesman, Haas said they were together at Bagram about one week. Galvin says the CJSOTF staff made clear that his Marines were to conduct \u201caggressive combat operations.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635609798478380340-christopher-haas-1jpg.jpg\")