{"id":71098,"date":"2022-11-17T21:12:38","date_gmt":"2022-11-17T21:12:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/airforcetimes\/uncategorized\/2022\/11\/17\/afghan-government-didnt-think-us-would-actually-leave-report-finds\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T15:03:53","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T15:03:53","slug":"afghan-government-didnt-think-us-would-actually-leave-report-finds","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/airforcetimes\/news\/your-air-force\/2022\/11\/17\/afghan-government-didnt-think-us-would-actually-leave-report-finds\/","title":{"rendered":"Afghan government didn\u2019t think US would actually leave, report finds"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Six main factors led to the collapse of the Afghan government as the U.S. drew down its last troops<\/a> in the country, according to a report released Wednesday<\/a>. Chief among them was key Afghan officials\u2019 refusal to believe the U.S. would keep its promise to leave the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s the conclusion from a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction<\/a>, commissioned by Congress after Afghanistan\u2019s fall to the Taliban in August 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cEven as the United States officially expressed its desire to exit Afghanistan in the years leading up to its departure, contradictory messaging by U.S. officials undermined efforts to convey the seriousness of U.S. intentions to Afghan officials, who optimistically believed that alternative scenarios were possible,\u201d the report found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, as President Joe Biden\u2019s September deadline drew nearer, the report continues, \u201cThe result was that the Afghan government was fundamentally unprepared to manage the fight against the Taliban as the United States military and its contractors withdrew.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The State Department\u2019s response to SIGAR\u2019s findings refutes that claim, calling into question whether the report evaluated the U.S.\u2019s role in both Afghanistan\u2019s reconstruction and its conduct during the withdrawal properly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAround the world, the United States aids in combatting corruption, advocates for representative government, and supports accountability mechanisms among the various initiatives based on democratic values and human rights,\u201d Erik Schnotala, acting director of State\u2019s Office of Afghanistan Affairs, wrote in his review of the report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWhether a country is successful or not in making progress in these areas is ultimately a reflection its own efforts,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The other top two reasons for the fall of Afghanistan\u2019s democratically elected government had more to do with the way the U.S. chose to negotiate its exit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That negotiation came in a series of talks with Taliban leaders that excluded the Afghan government as a stakeholder, the second primary issue. That was at the Taliban\u2019s request, the report points out, but the U.S. hoped that settling with the Taliban would be a starting point to fulfilling the Afghan government\u2019s wish that the Taliban be integrated into its governing structure \u2015 the third issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cInstead, the Taliban reinvigorated its battlefield campaign against the Afghan government, which was weakened by its exclusion from U.S.-Taliban talks and the perception that the United States was withdrawing its support,\u201d according to the report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In some ways, these good-faith efforts might not have mattered, the report found, because the fourth reason for the fall was that the Taliban wasn\u2019t really interested in compromising.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After negotiating a drawdown timeline with the U.S., the Taliban turned its efforts to beating down Afghan national forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cBy April 2021, a U.S. intelligence community assessment had concluded that \u2018the Taliban is confident it can achieve military victory,\u2019 ” according to the report. \u201cOver the next 2 months, the Taliban\u2019s offensive accelerated as the insurgency rapidly gained control of half of Afghanistan\u2019s 419 districts. On August 15, 2021, Kabul fell.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reasons five and six dealt more specifically with the Afghan government and the way it was run.<\/p>\n\n\n\t