{"id":83883,"date":"2023-08-14T10:00:00","date_gmt":"2023-08-14T10:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/airforcetimes\/uncategorized\/2023\/08\/14\/how-f-16s-for-ukraine-could-harm-russia-without-taking-a-single-shot\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T00:59:06","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T00:59:06","slug":"how-f-16s-for-ukraine-could-harm-russia-without-taking-a-single-shot","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/airforcetimes\/opinion\/2023\/08\/14\/how-f-16s-for-ukraine-could-harm-russia-without-taking-a-single-shot\/","title":{"rendered":"How F-16s for Ukraine could harm Russia without taking a single shot"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

With F-16 fighter jets expected to be provided to Ukraine<\/a> over the coming months, opinions of their usefulness spans from a gamechanger in the war with Russia to a total waste of resources. But there is one way that these aircraft will harm Russia even if they never shoot down a missile, fighter jet or helicopter: They will cost the Russian Aerospace Forces precious aircraft life. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, possessed roughly 900 tactical aircraft<\/a> before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine<\/a>. These included fighter, attack and fighter-bomber aircraft. Since the invasion, it has lost between 84<\/a> and 130<\/a> of those to air defenses, fighter aircraft and crashes<\/a>. That\u2019s only a portion of total losses, however. Overuse of these aircraft is also costing Russia as the war drags on. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a conflict\u2019s early stages, what matters is total combat power from all active platforms; that represents the maximum firepower that can be directed at the opposition from the onset. In a protracted war, where one force tries to exhaust the other, it\u2019s the total longevity of the military force that matters. And that\u2019s where the VKS finds itself now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By my calculations, the extra hours that it\u2019s pressed its aircraft into service since February 2022 have effectively cost it an additional 27 to 57 aircraft in imputed losses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aircraft have a life span. They are designed with a total number of expected flight hours, which are used roughly evenly over the life of the aircraft and segmented with periodic maintenance and inspection. For example, if an aircraft is designed for 3,000 flight hours with an expected use of 30 years, the aircraft will fly roughly 100 hours per year. If, during an inspection, wear on the plane is found to be more or less than expected, the projected remaining hours are adjusted accordingly. These numbers dictate all sorts of planning, from fuel procurement to ground maintenance to pilot training.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Imputed losses mean that the Russians have burned through more of the expected life span of their aircraft more quickly than anticipated. To make up for it, they\u2019ll have to procure more aircraft, increase maintenance, reduce operations, or accept a smaller force \u2014 or some combination of those.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The VKS is still in the process of transitioning<\/a> from Soviet-era aircraft to more modern platforms, and an estimated 18 to 36<\/a> of these newer tactical aircraft join the force every year. Almost half of the VKS force is still upgraded Soviet-era airframes.<\/p>\n\n\n\t