Staff Sgt. Paul Lincoln Olmstead was the second Green Beret to drown during dive-related training in 2021. An airman also drowned at his service’s dive school in 2020 under circumstances similar to those of Olmstead.

The new programmable vests ― which are found on the civilian market ― automatically inflate using carbon dioxide, or CO2, cartridges when a swimmer sinks below a set depth.

That could have saved Olmstead’s life after he went unconscious for unknown reasons and drowned Sept. 21, 2021, according to an investigation report obtained by Army Times through a Freedom of Information Act request.

Investigators found that the “primary contributing factor” to Olmstead’s death was the “inadequacy of the Aqualung Scout Swimmer Vest,” which requires a drowning victim to be conscious to activate the CO2 cartridges in their vest.

Investigators also raised concerns about other practices at 5th Special Forces Group’s Maritime Assessment Course, which prepares soldiers for formal combat diver training.

Although instructors running the course weren’t negligent or in violation of any regulations, the risk mitigation measures “were not adequate to prevent SSG Olmstead’s death,” the report reads. “Specifically, allowing swimmers to swim without a buoy attached contributed to the instructors’ and students’ inability to locate SSG Olmstead after he had gone subsurface.”

Because Fort Campbell’s Joe Swing Quarry is such a confined space, 5th SFG abandoned the use of buoys years ago, the report added. An unnamed individual from 5th SFG said in the report that the buoys risked causing swimmer entanglement.

Previous deaths

Olmstead’s death came months after another Green Beret, Staff Sgt. Micah Walker, drowned at the Army’s combat diver school in Key West, Florida, and a year after an airman drowned at the Air Force’s combat diver school in Panama City, Florida.

None of the deaths involved breathing compressed gas or actual diving.

Walker’s death occurred during a water treading exercise, according to a dive official with John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The official spoke with Army Times days after the death on condition of anonymity due to an ongoing investigation.

Safety swimmers had Walker out of the pool within three to five seconds of losing consciousness and slipping underwater, the official said in July 2021. He also disputed an Army Safety Center press release that called Walker’s death a drowning.

However, Army casualty records prepared this summer and obtained by Army Times via a Freedom of Information Act request stated that Walker’s death was indeed a drowning.

Maj. Rick Dickson, a spokesman at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, declined to comment further on the incident and said the investigation into Walker’s death remains ongoing.

A third recent drowning death in Panama City involving Air Force Special Tactics trainee Airman 1st Class Keigan Baker occurred during an open ocean swim.

Similar to Olmstead’s case, investigators found no indication that Baker attempted to activate his CO2 cartridges before drowning, meaning he likely was unconscious. Also like Olmstead’s case, investigators did not definitively determine why he went unconscious, though overexertion was one possible explanation.

Wear and tear

After Baker’s death in 2020, the Air Force Special Warfare Training Wing tested several commercially available automatic inflating swim vests, said wing spokesman 1st Lt. Xiaofan Liu.

However, the wing ultimately decided not to acquire any of them.

“The automatic inflating swim vests that the Special Warfare Training Wing initially tested were not designed for the continual wear and tear of the combat swimming conducted by trainees at the Air Force Combat Dive Course,” Liu wrote in an emailed statement.

“These automatic inflating swim vests were designed to save someone if he or she were to fall overboard from a vessel or aircraft … [and] didn’t hold up well to the strenuous activities conducted by the trainees,” Liu added, which include “open water swims, water jumps from fixed-wing aircraft, hoisting patients out of the water, and fast-roping into the water.”

The Air Force did implement some changes, though, because there were problems found after Baker’s death that also echo issues later found in Olmstead’s case.

The investigation into Baker’s death found that instructors had special tactics trainees conduct a 2,000-yard open water swim without lines tethering them to swim buddies to ensure they didn’t become separated.

The Air Force now requires dive trainees to swim within six feet of a swim buddy at all times so a teammate can inflate a distressed swimmer’s vest if they go unconscious. Trainees also must wear buoys during swims after it took hours to find Baker’s body.

Olmstead was also lost for some time underwater despite vigorous efforts by teammates to locate him.

The investigation into Olmstead’s death stated that he was close to finishing the quarry swim when he drowned. An instructor spotted Olmstead pass by his boat, then turned to observe other students.

“When he passed by, it was clear he was putting out incredible effort, typical of students sprinting the last couple hundred meters of the swim when close to cut off time,” an instructor’s witness statement reads. “The noise was typical of a soldier exerting great physical effort. It was not a sound of distress.”

When the instructor looked back at where Olmstead had been, he realized the student was missing. Instructors dove underwater and students waded in the shallow areas in search of him. The fire department and scuba teams were called in to sweep the quarry for him.

Olmstead’s scout swimmer vest was “without defect” and inflated as designed when investigators later manually activated the CO2 cartridges to test it out. Investigators determined that Olmstead most likely went unconscious before drowning.

In addition to recommending new swim vests, the investigation called out how difficult it had been for soldiers to find Olmstead in a timely manner, which may have saved his life. Army special operations officials said they’ve reviewed those findings and made changes.

“At this time, the command is looking at acquiring the recommended vests for further testing and evaluation to determine suitability,” said Maj. Russell M. Gordon, spokesman for 1st Special Forces Command. “In the meantime, the command took immediate action to mitigate risks by requiring students to wear an attached buoy for easy identification in the water, increase the number of safety boats, and increase the number of safety swimmers and also safety personnel outside the water.”

“The loss of SSG Paul Olmstead was an absolute tragedy, and he will always be a valued member of our Army special operations family,” Gordon added.

But after reflecting on the Afghans left behind to live under the Taliban, the 10 civilians the U.S. killed on its way out, and the 13 Americans who died by an Islamic State suicide bomber at Abbey Gate, serious thought should be paid to how much the U.S. simply got wrong about the war from the very start.

A new book by Dutch journalist Bette Dam chronicles some of those missteps, such as President George W. Bush’s administration’s decision to reject a Taliban surrender in December 2001, and the dubious Afghan warlords the U.S. allied with over the two decades that followed.

Dam, who lived and worked in Afghanistan for 15 years, may draw ire for the unorthodox findings in her book, “Looking for the Enemy: Mullah Omar and the Unknown Taliban,” especially her reporting on the elusive life and final resting place of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s lodestar.

But if her work makes one thing clear about Afghanistan, it’s how little U.S. leaders, including top generals, diplomats, and politicians, understood about the situation there for 20 years.

U.S. leadership was consistently caught flat-footed, failing to deliver on their perennial promise to “turn the corner” in the war. The same leadership was again shocked by the Taliban’s breezy sweep across the country in summer 2021. Taking stock of the war will require humility at the top echelons of American power, and they could start by reading a book that challenges much of their orthodoxy.

Editor’s note: This interview has been edited for length and clarity

One of the biggest top lines from your work is the assertion that Taliban founder Mullah Omar lived out his final days close to a U.S. military base in his native Zabul Province in Afghanistan, and not, as the CIA and other experts have long argued, in Pakistan. How did you come to a conclusion so different from the mainstream here?

Early on, I couldn’t believe Mullah Omar was not in Pakistan. I describe in the book how already in 2012 people from Zabul, whom I knew from my first book, told me one evening when they were visiting friends in Kabul to go and look in Zabul, because it was Omar’s father’s land. I thought, ‘No, that’s not possible,’ and searched in Pakistan.

I made the same assumptions as the CIA, but after five years, my investigation forced me to say: Omar was indeed in Afghanistan. I went in May this year to the location of Omar’s house in Zabul, and indeed the U.S. Camp Wolverine is within walking distance.

The U.S. military even had one of these intel-gathering balloons hanging on top of the base, so they were able to see Mullah Omar sit in his garden. Except, they were not looking. They themselves had a strong bias towards Pakistan. That’s understandable. Most of the Taliban tried to live there. But understanding the underlying narratives of the Taliban would also have led the CIA to Mullah Omar.

What is an example of one of those underlying narratives?

The overall distrust of the Taliban leader, and his men, towards Pakistan, could have led to broader intel-gathering also in Afghanistan. While the U.S. government states that the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban is very good, I didn’t see that in the field. I saw nervousness, distrust.

What should the media, intelligence community and military have done differently, on a day-to-day level?

We too often have secondary sources, we cling to the elite, who mostly speak English — that works the fastest — and most media stayed in Kabul. Traveling into the countryside didn’t happen enough, even though the resistance started in the villages. Surely, we reported criticism — too many civilian casualties, human rights abuses, torture, corruption in elections. We reported on emotion, like the pain of attacks or the pain of war. That’s important. But the more independent questions were not asked enough: ‘Was this a war? Was this terrorism? Is the military necessary here?’

One of the more jarring parts of your book is the scene in which Mullah Omar gives his blessing for a Taliban surrender in December 2001. I didn’t realize this offer occurred or that the U.S. rejected it. Do you think that deal could have succeeded?

It’s unforgivable that we have overlooked such a massive peace offer from the Taliban in 2001. It requires systemic self-reflection. Would it have succeeded? Many of the U.S. officials I spoke to say, ‘Oh, of course not. Kabul would not have been able to hold this peace deal together.’ I find that arrogant.

What we know is that the U.S. singlehandedly blocked the deal. Yes, it’s difficult to say anything in hindsight, but, to me, there is no doubt there would have been a longer moment of calmness.

The soon-to-be president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, would have gone to Kabul, and would have had a solid base to start the new government. He was trying to be powerful and to be in contact with his natural enemies, Northern Afghans, who had already taken Kabul, but had agreed to share power (like many Taliban, Karzai is a Pashtun from Southern Afghanistan). To set up this very sensitive balance of shared power is not easy, and requires patience and time. Sharing power is difficult in any country, let alone in a country with the pain of 40 years of war.

One theme running through your book is how Afghanistan’s complicated tribal relations and business rivalries colored the conflict. How much do you think top Western leaders understood these dynamics?

I think we gave the space to these Afghan leaders to act like that because of our lack of knowledge. What we sometimes forget is that these Afghans have a history, as human beings have. One aspect is decennia-long rivalries, and especially in the first four years, 2001-2004, when there was not a strong Taliban, the U.S. goal ‘to kill Taliban,’ was misused by these leaders to solve rivalries and competition.

The U.S. should have cross-checked their allies much more. But the U.S. knew it all better. Figures like Asadullah Khalid were ‘the strong fighters’ and ideal ‘for killing terrorists’ and these Afghan leaders became supermen. (Khalid is a former Afghan defense minister who was accused of ordering the bombing of a U.N. convoy to protect his narcotics interests).

Mid-level State Department and Pentagon personnel knew something was wrong. But somehow knowledge was not always valued by the top. Ideology pushed it away, and instead, the binary idea of us-versus-Taliban prevailed.

If we had a more independent press, who would have systematically said that the Asadullah Khalid figures in Afghanistan, our allies, are killing rivals, that our U.S. soldiers die because of local rivalry fights and not Taliban, I think that it would have cracked the binary thinking. That would have taken away the urge for military use. The lack of this critical thinking among the American elites is extremely worrying to me, especially since we are now engaging in Ukraine with the same press, a country we also push in this binary, uninformative narrative.

What was an example you saw of the U.S. using force and it clearly not working?

Most leaders who were installed after Sept. 11, 2001, were given carte blanche to attack the enemy, while Taliban had surrendered. Tribal fights and competition between individuals were solved under the banner of terrorism. Police commander Abdul Raziq in Kandahar was proven by in-depth articles a spoiler and created more conflict than necessary. While those feature articles were strongly sourced, the U.S. government didn’t adapt.

It was truly painful for me to see how often the U.S. military let itself be misled in its selection of the enemy in Afghanistan. The intel-gathering was poor. The wrong people were killed, and their families ran immediately to the Taliban. This was systemic, from 2002-on. … The U.S. picks an ally, and puts its arm around it and says, ‘We are in this together.’

In late July, a U.S. drone strike killed al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul. Your book describes how the relationship between Osama Bin Laden and Taliban leaders was nuanced in the years before Sept. 11, 2001, and their ties weren’t strong. But some see the presence of Zawahiri in Taliban-controlled Kabul as both a violation of the Doha agreement and an indication that the Taliban and al-Qaida remain close.

We do know from more independent research that there has been a consistent, as I call it, ‘gray area policy’ of the Taliban towards the Arabs present in the country, some of whom are in al-Qaida and some of whom are not. The Taliban’s rule is hospitality until justice proves you are guilty, but you need to lay low and not cause trouble, as Bin Laden did in the late 1990s when he was convicted by the Taliban for giving press conferences against their wishes.

At the moment, a lot is unclear about what happened with Zawahiri. I am not in Kabul at the moment, so I, unfortunately, can’t figure it out. We see that the intel fluctuates.

(Dam pointed to a U.S. intelligence community assessment from mid-August indicating that al-Qaida has not reconstituted in Afghanistan and Zawahiri was the only key al-Qaida figure who tried to reestablish himself in the country since U.S. forces withdrew.)

In the U.S., the overall analysis is that al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul is proof that Taliban are close allies of al-Qaida and a threat for international security. Is that so? You could also include the complexity I describe in the book. … Learn from history and investigate if it was a way for the Taliban to keep al-Zawahiri silent.

International Crisis Group expert Jerome Drevon talked to sources within al-Qaida recently, who said that al-Qaida agreed with the Taliban to be silent, and not active.

A good portion of your book discusses the international isolation the Taliban faced in the 1990s, and you suggest that this was a mistake. Do you think the Biden administration is making the same mistake today by withholding billions of dollars in Afghanistan’s U.S.-held frozen assets?

I was with a Western journalist in Kabul recently: the journalist tried their best, but at the same time almost lectured the Taliban instead of interviewing. It was only Western narratives the journalist pasted on the country. That’s a small example of something bigger. The West finds listening to the other difficult. … True, we do have so much to offer. We have peace, money, power to change for the good.

But the Taliban have realities, too, that are as true as ours. … Taliban is fractured, Islamic, not as anti-western as Hamas or al-Qaida, arrogant, uneducated, extremely tribal, predominantly pro-girls’ education, willing to rebuild Afghanistan, but demanding autonomy.

Would you really say the Taliban are ‘predominantly’ pro-girls’ education? Currently, there is a ban in Afghanistan on girls attending secondary education. Although there is opposition to that ban — and even defiance from some Taliban — it’s still in force.

After my return from Kabul in May I would say the news headline on girls’ education could well be, ‘80% of the Taliban-leaders want girls’ education.’ Or, ‘Taliban-leaders openly revolt against their top leaders who are a minority in stopping girls’ education.’

There is a bigger part of the Taliban leadership who are more pro-girls’ education than anti-girls’ education. What should be investigated is the stubbornness of three or four Taliban leaders in Kandahar. Why are they against this? How big is their leverage? I don’t see calm reporting. I see emotion. Judgmental tweets of diplomats, where any knowledge or reflection lacks.

Final thoughts?

We, as Western media, embraced the War on Terror, and for that, the enemy of the U.S. government became the enemy of journalism. That is unethical if you look at it from a journalistic perspective. The War on Terror was a creation of the U.S. government and needed cross-check. Also, the media doesn’t have enemies; we have to try to talk to all sides. But because we embraced the War on Terror ideology, we only minimally interviewed the Taliban; mostly, we called their spokesman who had to deny or embrace an attack. That’s amplifying the propaganda channels. How many ‘jihad-watchers’ do not simply retweet Taliban and ISIS channels on Twitter? I find that irresponsible. PR from U.S., from the Taliban, from any organization, needs cross-checking if you take your audience serious. That did happen in feature articles or in some books. But these insights didn’t reach the mainstream narratives the big agencies — like Reuters, AP, etc. — were producing every day.

The 800-soldier unit racked up at least 60 misconduct offenses, including incidents with alcohol, drugs and adultery; a battalion commander was fired; members of one advising team are facing punishment for their behavior in Colombia; and another team’s actions in Honduras are under investigation, according to internal records and interviews conducted by Army Times.

Advisors deployed to Central and South America were told in late 2021 to behave amid a rise in sexually transmitted diseases among married and single troops, and a Colombian officer had to ask that advisors not use drugs at their hotel. Reports of advisors drinking against regulation, violating curfew and using dating apps also concerned 1st SFAB leaders, according to unit emails.

It’s an eye-popping amount of bad behavior from just one of the six SFABs created five years ago as a key initiative of then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SFABs were championed as a novel way to build professional foreign militaries using top-notch U.S. soldiers. But it is U.S. professionalism that now concerns leaders at Security Force Assistance Command. And it comes at a time when bad behavior in Latin America could be especially risky, as left-wing parties — historically more suspicious of the U.S. military — sweep national elections in the region and China makes inroads.

The problems at 1st SFAB prompted the command to order all units to send detailed data on punishments meted out against advisors.

“Advisor misconduct remains the largest strategic and organizational risk for the SFAC,” a tasking order sent in July stated. “Recent media attention of Advisor misconduct requires proactive reporting of accurate misconduct statistics to HQDA (the Department of the Army’s Pentagon headquarters).”

The allegations corroborated through investigations include 21 offenses involving alcohol, six drug-use incidents, seven cases of adultery and six instances of counterproductive leadership, according to a 1st SFAB legal brief chronicling April 2021 through April 2022.

Given how spread out units were in places like Colombia, not every incident may have been reported or properly investigated.

“I would actually say those numbers are conservative,” said one SFAB officer. “The majority of the brigade does the right thing, but you do have a lot of teams that go over there that have some sort of issue.”

The crux of the problem, advisors told Army Times, boils down to immaturity among some of the small, 12-soldier advising teams that began fanning out across foreign countries to mentor local forces in 2020.

When 1st SFAB was founded in 2017, early missions to Afghanistan were mostly positive. But as the unit shifted to solely focus on Latin American missions, like counter-drug operations, the quality of soldiers selected to join dropped, four advisors said. That’s possibly due to the larger manpower woes across the Army, as well as the slow trickling out of experienced veterans from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“When you bring in one bad apple, that can create 15 bad apples,” said one advisor.

Colombia, where much of the known misconduct occurred, may be a particularly sensitive situation. The longtime U.S. ally recently elected its first leftist president — Gustavo Petro, a former mayor of Bogotá and a guerrilla fighter in his youth.

“You’ve got a new president coming in who is not anti-American but certainly has less enthusiasm for this really tight mil-to-mil relationship,” said Adam Isacson, director of defense oversight for the nonprofit Washington Office on Latin America. “And if you want to give them a reason to say, ‘Hey, let’s put this on hold,’ this sort of behavior does that.”

‘Extremely embarrassing’

Officials declined to make leadership, including SFAC boss Maj. Gen. Donn Hill or 1st SFAB boss Col. Chris Landers, available for interviews.

SFAC spokeswoman Lt. Col. Melody Faulkenberry said the command “is taking steps to investigate all allegations of misconduct.”

Faulkenberry confirmed some investigations are underway at 1st SFAB, but declined to say their purpose or scope. She also declined to confirm how many of the offenses detailed in the legal brief occurred among 1st SFAB advisors who were deployed, rather than at home on Fort Benning, in Georgia.

But there has certainly been some trouble overseas.

An advising team sent to Honduras remains under investigation after members violated no-drinking orders and got into an argument with other forces in-country, a senior advisor said. Another advising team in Tolemaida, Colombia, was accused by an Army spouse early this year of visiting prostitutes, staying out all night and partying, according to unit records.

The spouse shared a picture of several advisors in a Colombian family’s home without commanders’ permission, prompting a formal investigation that determined the team was leaving base without approval and drinking.

Emails also show that 1st SFAB leaders were aware of reports that advisors across the brigade had been misbehaving.

In an email to 1st SFAB team leaders this fall, a senior enlisted soldier warned that he had been hearing of undisciplined acts “across the formation.”

“We have all now been in country for about two months and I am hearing that we have advisors that have broken the GO#1 no drinking policy without approval,” Command Sgt. Maj. Christopher J. Williams wrote Oct. 24, 2021. “(W)e have advisors that have violated curfew policy, we have married advisors that have TINDER accounts, advisors that have been hitting on hotel staff and we have teams that are not following all rules and guidelines.”

Williams also warned in the emails that there had been a rise in STDs among married and unmarried troops since his soldiers started missions in Central and South America, “and it is in mostly advisors that have been deployed.”

Then there was an incident in which a Colombian officer asked Williams to ensure his troops did not use drugs at a hotel or a nearby military base.

“‘I am not judging your Soldiers, but could you make sure that if your Soldiers want to smoke marijuana or do hallucinogen drugs please ask them not to do them on Canton Norte or in the Hotel,’” the Colombian said, according to Williams’ email.

“That was extremely embarrassing that a (Colombian) would ask that I ensure we don’t do illegal drugs when illegal drugs are forbidden in the Army,” Williams wrote in his email.

Several troops who spoke with Army Times said they were aware of rumors that advisors had used drugs, including cocaine, overseas. Faulkenberry said the SFAC is aware of the allegations, but “has no credible evidence of such activities occurring.”

The issues Williams was trying to tackle existed before his battalion rotated into Latin America and were brigade-wide, several advisors said.

“Williams was trying,” an advisor who served with him added. “But it was really hard to crack down because we were so spread out throughout the country.”

Colombia has long been an anchor for U.S. policy in Latin America. This spring, the White House designated Colombia a major non-NATO ally, a label that “lays the groundwork for us to work together even more closely,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said at the time.

Petro’s recent election as Colombia’s first leftist leader likely won’t herald any seismic shifts in that relationship. But even prior to his ascension, Colombian lawmakers questioned the purpose of SFAB deployments.

In 2020, the Colombian Defense Ministry had to answer to the Colombian Congress about who would supervise the SFAB teams and what operations they’d be carrying out.

“The senator who had asked for that (Iván Cepeda) is a leader of the incoming governing party,” said Isacson, of the Washington Office on Latin America. “So, Iván is on this and he’s a very big critic of the SFAB. He’s about to become more powerful.”

Colombia has hosted misbehaving Americans before. In 2015, the Justice Department reported that DEA agents in the country had “sex parties” with prostitutes hired by drug cartels. And the Secret Service, along with some U.S. military personnel, suffered a similar scandal in Colombia in 2012.

“We’re getting a reputation here,” said Isacson. “This is a military that the United States claims they want to help professionalize, and they’re doing it with all these examples of really unprofessional behavior.”

Drug warriors

Milley and other Army leaders championed SFABs as a way to provide professional advisors to train foreign partners so regular infantry, armor and aviation units could perform traditional duties elsewhere. The effort raised some eyebrows, since training foreign forces has typically been a role relegated to Army Green Berets, who have also had their share of scandals in Latin America.

“Special Forces is very good at training tactical-type units. They’re very good at accompanying tactical-type units,” Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said in 2020. “But SFABs build a professional military force, which is different. How do you do logistics. How do you maintain vehicles. How do you build a professional military.”

After a maiden deployment advising Afghan forces in 2018, the SFABs began preparing to go elsewhere in the world. By 2020, each SFAB was assigned to a different U.S. combatant command with distinct geographic areas of responsibility. Soldiers from 1st SFAB were tasked to U.S. Southern Command.

From the start, 1st SFAB had a counter-drug mission.

Advisors were dispatched to locations designated by Colombia as “priority areas,” SOUTHCOM officials said at the time, and helped with logistics, intelligence and information sharing.

Advisors in SOUTHCOM have received praise for their counter-drug work, said Faulkenberry, the SFAC spokeswoman. She pointed to the establishment of a new Colombian military unit that synchronizes counter-drug efforts across the country.

“Early last year, former Colombian President Iván Duque specifically acknowledged the value of our military partnership and thanked 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade advisors for their contributions following the Colombian Counter Narcotics Trans-National Threats Division activation ceremony,” Faulkenberry said.

Teams from 1st SFAB were particularly focused on increasing coca eradication, according to a U.S. Combined Arms Center report from April 2021.

“The biggest challenge faced by Colombian partners was the flow of intelligence and receipt of targeting-related products. Specifically, units lacked updated imagery of their AO, making planning efforts difficult,” the report reads.

Advisors coached Colombian troops to stop using old Google imagery for planning missions and helped them access updated imagery. They also taught Colombian troops to “conduct historical analysis of cocaine yields, adjust eradication goals by unit and area, and allocate forces appropriately for the next calendar year,” the report reads.

“Moreover, other South and Central American countries took notice, submitting their own requests for advisor teams,” the report added. “The increase in advisor capabilities across South and Central America allows 1st SFAB to focus advising efforts in both the source and transit zones of narcotics operations.”

However, not all was well.

“Due to a political environment questioning the legality of our presence and pending Colombian congressional approval, advisor teams were told to cease activities within weeks of arrival to the outstations,” the 1st SFAB report reads. “Teams constantly competed with negative social media posts, tweets, and articles. They remained focused even after receiving threats by known in-country bad actors.”

Despite 1st SFAB’s efforts, cocaine production in Colombia was near record levels in 2021. And Colombia’s new leftist president has promised to rethink drug policy to promote development rather than coca eradication.

“The new defense minister who is about to come in is one of Latin America’s best known anti-corruption crusaders,” Isacson said. “This is going to be the big fight of the next year. … So, you’re really focusing on breaking links with organized crime, doing a lot of counterintelligence about your own people, fighting corruption on your forces.”

‘Big boy rules’

Three advisors with whom Army Times spoke said their early time with 1st SFAB was positive.

“What drew me in was the big boy rules — not needing to be told how to do something or when to do it, which, in the end, bit 1st SFAB in the ass,” one advisor said.

Small teams spread out over a large area, far from the command flagpole, can be difficult to manage. And although SFABs are supposed to be comprised of experienced soldiers, lower-ranking troops could still attend the Military Advisory Training Academy at Fort Benning and automatically promote to sergeant under certain circumstances.

“Many of the NCOs in the SFAB are young. They’re wild still,” one advisor said. “Your senior NCOs in the SFAB, it’s a smaller number than you’d think.”

Advisors are also under General Order #1 while deployed to SOUTHCOM, meaning drinking, except under specific circumstances, is off-limits.

“People are going to say they were trying to build camaraderie by going out drinking, but 90% of the partner forces want to go home at the end of the day,” an advisor said. “As a U.S. soldier in South America, you’re going to want to go out and explore, but your partner forces, they live there. It’s nothing new to them.”

Accusations of married troops using Tinder accounts and dating overseas also abounded at the unit, according to sworn statements compiled as part of an ongoing investigation and the emails.

“It can compromise a mission,” an advisor said. “You don’t know where these women are from or who they know, if they even support us. It can cause a lot of problems internally that shouldn’t be there.”

The division-level SFAC has been probing 1st SFAB, Faulkenberry confirmed. But she declined to share the exact nature of the investigations.

“We cannot comment on open investigations, however, earlier in the year the SFAC completed an investigation into a battalion commander’s leadership which resulted in their relief due to loss of trust and confidence in their ability to command,” Faulkenberry said.

She declined to say which battalion commander was relieved and why, other than it was for counterproductive leadership. Sources in the unit said it was 1st SFAB’s 2nd Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Joshua W. Brown, who declined a request for comment. His battalion owned the advising team that was removed from Colombia.

Advisors said the command needs to do a better job vetting personnel to ensure they’re mature enough to head overseas. Some changes to how the SFAC assesses and selects advisors were already implemented this spring, according to Faulkenberry.

“In March 2022, we increased the length of our Assessment and Selection course and added performance elements to more comprehensively assess Advisor candidates,” Faulkenberry said. “Some of the additions include proficiency exams, ethical assessments, physical tests, peer reviews, board interviews and cadre observational feedback.”

SFABs are, at the end of the day, a small part of the larger effort by the U.S. to keep its influence up among its southern neighbors. But there’s some anxiety within SOUTHCOM that its influence is slipping, or at least facing competition.

China has made economic investment overseas a priority through its Belt and Road Initiative. Latin America, though not the primary theater of the approaching U.S.-China showdown, is nevertheless an important area to watch.

“China is playing chess; they have a long term view,” SOUTHCOM boss Gen. Laura Richardson said July 20. “They are setting the theater. … When I show a map of the region where 21 of 31 countries have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, it covers almost the entire region.”

Colombia is not a member of the Belt and Road Initiative, but it has flirted with joining, and Chinese firms have already scored big contracts in the country, including a regional railway and 5G infrastructure projects.

After the coronavirus pandemic devastated regional economies, that type of investment, rather than military training, is particularly useful. Then there’s Colombia’s recent swing to the left, which echoes similar electoral outcomes in Peru, Chile and Honduras — and potentially Brazil soon.

“You have leaders coming in who might not be as interested in that sort of high profile level of (U.S. military) cooperation,” Isacson said. “Even if they’re happy to have exercises and exchanges and small courses and stuff, 100 (SFAB) guys in your country for four months is super high profile and it can be controversial if your ruling coalition includes people who are on the left or people who are historically suspicious of U.S. meddling.”

Several of the advisors Army Times spoke with were pleased to see the SFAC taking a hard look at all the brigades by requesting data and carrying out investigations. Others worried that the desire to preserve the SFAB mission would come first, and any problems found by internal investigations would be papered over.

“I think you need an outside agency, to be honest,” one advisor said. “Is anything major going to happen? No. Remember, this is a premier unit. It’s got to keep going.”

The Leahy Law was intended to prohibit U.S. security assistance from going to foreign units that have committed gross human rights violations, but two Defense Department programs — Section 127e and Section 1202 — are currently exempt from any vetting.

Legislation introduced this week by Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., and Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., would close that loophole, shutting off funds to specific units found to be committing atrocities, while also expanding the reporting requirements under which the two notoriously secretive programs are subject.

Section 127e funds partners who conduct counterterrorism missions, sometimes with U.S. special operations troops directing them as a surrogate force in combat, such as raids on militant compounds. It started with a small budget of $10 million in the mid-2000s, but grew to about $100 million per year more than a decade later.

Section 1202 was modeled after that program in recent years, but is intended for irregular warfare in the grey zone. This authority was “purpose built” for the shift to great power competition, the former U.S. assistant defense secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict said in 2019.

“Human rights vetting is an essential part of how we engage with other countries, but over the last several years Section 127e and Section 1202 have skirted these vetting requirements and, in some cases, been used with partners who have consistently violated human rights,” Jacobs said in a statement announcing the new legislation. “United States support for unvetted human rights abusers is not only deeply immoral and irresponsible, it is also counterproductive, leading to more unrest, instability and terrorist activity.”

Jacobs proposed an amendment to institute the same reform in last year’s annual defense bill. The amendment was adopted by the House but ultimately cut from the bill during negotiations with the Senate.

The Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act, which was introduced Tuesday, is a new attempt that comes with Senate Democrat support.

The legislation is co-led by Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., for whom the Leahy Law was named, and Sen. Richard Durbin, D-Ill. Congressmen Tom Malinowski, D-N.J., Joaquin Castro, D-Texas, and Jason Crow, D-Colo., in the House are also backing the bill. No Republicans are signed on, which could stymie the effort.

“This year, we are grateful to be partnering with human rights champions in the Senate, including Senators Van Hollen and Durbin — and especially Senator Leahy, who has championed these issues throughout his career,” an official from Jacobs’ office said in response to emailed questions about the bill’s chances. “We look forward to working with him to close this loophole before his retirement at the end of this term.”

In his own statement regarding the legislation, Leahy, who is not seeking re-election, said the Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act will ensure that the Leahy Law is applied uniformly.

“The purpose of the Leahy Law is to prevent U.S. assistance from supporting units of foreign security forces that violate human rights,” Leahy said. “Yet the Pentagon has not applied this standard to certain security cooperation programs with foreign forces. The Pentagon should have closed this loophole on its own initiative.”

Section 127e has been used to conduct operations in Somalia, Libya, Kenya, Tunisia, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania and Niger — all of which have had serious concerns raised in the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for years.

For instance, even after acknowledging human rights violations committed by an elite Cameroonian unit, the Pentagon continued to employ the force under Section 127e, the Intercept reported in March. The unit’s atrocities included torture and extrajudicial killings at a base where detainees testified to seeing and hearing uniformed Americans, according to Amnesty International.

Between 2017 and 2020, U.S. special operations forces conducted at least 23 separate 127e programs across the world, the Intercept reported in July.

In addition to forcing the Pentagon to conduct human rights vetting for Section 127e and Section 1202 recipients, the legislation would require biannual reports and assessments of how support to partner forces advances U.S. national security priorities.

Those concerns came to a head in January, when a military spouse anonymously texted a senior enlisted leader in 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade and directly accused an advising team in Tolemaida, Colombia, of debauchery, including soldiers partying and sleeping around. That triggered a formal investigation, according to internal records obtained by Army Times.

But two emails from last fall suggest problems went beyond that one team of nine troops, who are currently facing punishment.

“There have been a up tic in STDs within the BDE [brigade] since we started deploying to Central and South America in both married and unmarried Soldiers,” Command Sgt. Maj. Christopher J. Williams wrote Sept. 24 in an email to 1st SFAB team leaders. “This is extremely concerning and wanted all advisors to be aware that the health stats are going up and it is in mostly advisors that have been deployed.”

A month later, Williams sent another email chiding the teams once again. He had been hearing of undisciplined acts “across the formation,” including among soldiers in Colombia and Honduras.

He noted in the email that some of this is rumor, “but I am hearing more and more as the months and weeks go by.”

“We have all now been in country for about two months and I am hearing that we have advisors that have broken the GO#1 no drinking policy without approval,” Williams wrote Oct. 24. “[W]e have advisors that have violated curfew policy, we have married advisors that have TINDER accounts, advisors that have been hitting on hotel staff and we have teams that are not following all rules and guidelines.

“We are here on mission, not a vacation or trying to find a significant other,” Williams added. “I am asking if you/or have team members that are doing unethical, unprofessional or intentional wrong behavior stop immediately. I trust you, but I also don’t want to get burnt because I do trust you. I expect leaders to uphold the discipline.”

The emails provide a glimpse into the internal headaches SFABs face as they dispatch small teams, typically led by a captain, to foreign countries where there is very little U.S. military presence and oversight.

SFABs are staffed by experienced soldiers, not the young grunts well-known for misbehaving overseas, and so they’re expected to act more professionally when far from the command flagpole. In general, that appears to be the case, as advisors have visited tropical islands like the Maldives and cities with bustling nightlife like Bogota with no other public reports of misconduct.

On any given day in 2021, there were roughly 800 advisors on missions to 41 countries. That’s expected to grow to 1,000 soldiers deployed at any one time in the coming years, as the SFAB enterprise tries to woo foreign countries with promises of advanced U.S. military training.

But even isolated incidents of misconduct can have severe consequences in sensitive foreign countries where the SFABs may be still trying to prove the U.S. is a better partner than, say, Russia or China.

The investigation into one advising team from 1st SFAB began after Williams received anonymous text messages complaining that the soldiers were staying out all night, drinking alcohol against regulations, and soliciting prostitutes and masseuses for sexual gratification.

The anonymous texts were received Jan. 17, Williams told investigators in a sworn statement, and appeared to be from one of the soldier’s spouses. The command initiated an investigation that same day.

The probe ended in May. It found that nine soldiers had been leaving their assigned installation without proper approval and violating no-drinking orders, but it did not find evidence that they had visited sex workers.

Security Force Assistance Command spokesperson Lt. Col. Melody Faulkenberry told Army Times that these were isolated incidents.

“The SFABs have served honorably and represent the nation well,” Faulkenberry said in response to a series of questions. “When allegations of misconduct occur, it is investigated and founded claims go through due process whereby service members are held accountable.”

Faulkenberry also said context was missing from the emails Army Times obtained, including one bizarre request Williams related to SFAB teams in the September email.

Williams said a Colombian in charge of a hotel where advisors were staying had asked him to ensure his troops did not use drugs at the establishment or on a nearby military base. It’s unclear what sparked that request.

“‘I am not judging your Soldiers, but could you make sure that if your Soldiers want to smoke marijuana or do hallucinogen drugs please ask them not to do them on Canton Norte or in the Hotel,’” the Colombian said, according to Williams’ email.

“That was extremely embarrassing that a COL [Colombian] would ask that I ensure we don’t do illegal drugs when illegal drugs are forbidden in the Army,” Williams wrote to his advisors. “We are supposed to be a high discipline and professional unit. Make no mistake, the [battalion] commander and I do not condone the use of illegal drugs at any time.”

Faulkenberry said that the hotel heads-up was preemptive and not based on any actual drug use.

“For those allegations which were substantiated, the unit is currently in the process of taking appropriate UCMJ and administrative actions,” Faulkenberry said. “We take all allegations of Soldier misconduct with the utmost seriousness and the overwhelming majority of Security Force Assistance Brigade advisors conducting worldwide missions represent the Army and the United States with honor and distinction.”

In the emails, Williams appears to make the same point. He wrote in both messages that he believed most soldiers were behaving. But he also warned that it doesn’t take much to cause a snafu for all advising teams.

“One awe shit will take away 100 ad-a-boys,” Williams warned in the October email to advisors.

The indictment against Chief Warrant Officer 3 Christopher Hammond chronicled $1.8 million worth of wire transfers allegedly connected to illegal sales deposited into a checking account separate from the one his military paychecks went into.

The illicit funds were later parceled out to investment accounts at Charles Schwab and Robinhood, the indictment stated. Hammond’s wife, Army Maj. Heather Hammond, was also named in the indictment and accused of helping set up the investment accounts and aiding her husband.

A spokesman for 1st Special Forces Command, which oversees 3rd Group, confirmed the charges.

“Yesterday, CW3 Christopher Hammond self-reported to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to his federal indictment on multiple charges,” Maj. Rick Dickson told Army Times in a statement. “As always, all soldiers are presumed innocent until proven guilty.”

No other members of 3rd Group “have been arrested or charged at this time in relation to these charges,” Dickson added.

Hammond, who specialized in armament systems maintenance, managed small arms repair in his unit, replaced broken equipment and was able to request supplies through the Defense Department’s sprawling logistics network. He used this position, according to prosecutors, to request government-owned items and then resold them or kept them for personal use.

The list of stolen items included weapons parts and accessories, optics, firearm magazines, guitars, welding equipment, metal working equipment, all-terrain vehicles, tools and toolboxes, according to the indictment.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Barbara D. Kocher, the lead prosecutor listed in court filings, did not respond to a request for comment regarding how much of that equipment, especially the weapons-related items, has been recovered. An email to Kocher’s office was forwarded to spokespeople.

“Unfortunately, we are not able to comment outside of the public record, and the information in the indictment you reference is all the data we can provide at this time,” said Justice Department public information officer Don Connelly.

This is not the first time gear has been stolen from supply shops at military bases, but the illegal sales allegedly pocketed by the Hammonds are quite large. It’s also noteworthy that a similar incident involving another 3rd Special Forces Group soldier occurred during the timeframe Hammond is accused of engaging in his own scheme.

Former Chief Warrant Officer 2 Bryan Craig Allen was sentenced in 2020 to two years’ imprisonment and fined $250,000 after being convicted of stealing dozens of night vision goggles in 2018. Allen stole the devices by decreasing the electronic inventory in the unit’s property books and claimed the items were transferred to another unit.

In Allen’s case, the stolen devices were sold to a military surplus store outside Fort Bragg and later auctioned on eBay. But it’s unclear from the indictment how exactly the Hammonds resold the items they allegedly stole.

A civilian, who the indictment only named as M.S., wired large payments to the Hammonds, but the document does not further detail who they are or their relation to Hammonds. M.S. ran into trouble when they tried to get a manufacturer to repair two dozen rifle scopes under a warranty given to the government for the items.

The manufacturer placed the request on hold on July 26, 2021, and asked M.S. to speak with them through a U.S. government email account. Hammond sent an email to the manufacturer that same day claiming, “I had one of my units that was out conducting training give a contractor a bunch of Leupold optics to return for service. [A company employee] is holding them up from service. Can you get this resolved for me as I am out of the country with no access to military email.”

It’s unclear from the document whether or not that suspicious exchange sparked the investigation that ultimately ended in the Hammonds’ indictment. But Mr. Hammond was ultimately charged with theft of U.S. government property, wire fraud and crimes related to money laundering. His wife was charged with spending laundered money and aiding and abetting him.

An attorney for Mr. Hammond is not yet listed on court filings and he could not be reached for comment. Mrs. Hammond’s attorney did not respond to inquires made Wednesday morning.

Families of those slain soldiers have argued for years that blame for the botched Oct. 4, 2017, mission was unfairly placed on the 11-man Army Special Forces team that fought through the unexpected attack, rather than the senior officers who greenlit the operation.

Sgt. 1st Class Jeremiah Johnson’s mother, Debra Gannon, said helmet camera footage that militants took from the Americans’ kit helped trigger an upgrade for her son’s award, which was previously a Bronze Star with Valor. But the military’s accusation that the team went off-script on the mission still bothers her.

“I still would like to have somebody get up and apologize and tell everybody that [the team] didn’t go rogue and they damn well performed above and beyond what they had to do,” Gannon told Army Times. “But I am honored that they finally decided to upgrade him.”

The new video was quietly recovered during a French operation to kill the leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara this summer. The footage shows Johnson and Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright defending a fatally shot Staff Sgt. Bryan Black as dozens of enemy fighters bound toward them, the mothers of Wright and Johnson told Army Times in November.

Both women were shown the new video by Army officials in the fall. A much shorter, edited version was disseminated by the Islamic State group a year after the ambush outside the village of Tongo Tongo, near the Niger-Mali border.

The new footage “provided a more comprehensive understanding of Johnson’s actions during the ambush, and directly led to the decision for the upgraded award,” Army spokesman Matt Leonard confirmed.

The 2017 ambush pitted the outmanned and outgunned 11 U.S. troops and their 30 Nigerien partners against scores of enemy fighters armed with mortars, truck-mounted heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

The winding tale of how the lightly armed team wound up in the melee, and why the military’s investigation placed primary blame on the ground force rather than senior leaders, has been covered extensively, including in a recent ABC documentary, 3212 UN-REDACTED.

At a 2018 Pentagon press briefing, the ambushed team was blamed for poor training and reckless mission planning in their attempt to capture Doundou Chefou, a mid-level commander for the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

The team leader, Capt. Michael Perozeni, shouldered much of the blame for the ambush until it was revealed that he asked not to continue the mission after the helicopter assault force they were supporting unexpectedly pulled out due to weather issues, according to the redacted investigation.

Perozeni was concerned because his team had been up for 18 hours and still had to travel 25 kilometers through difficult terrain under limited visibility to conduct the raid on their own, the investigation stated. Despite the concerns, the team was directed by their battalion commander in Chad to continue the mission anyway.

Amid the fallout from the ambush, scrutiny placed on U.S. Africa Command highlighted more problems across missions in the region, including poor medical evacuation capabilities and a lack of air support.

In addition to Jeremiah Johnson, Wright and Black, Sgt. La David Johnson was also killed during the 2017 ambush. La David Johnson was separated from his comrades when he and two Nigerien partners were unable to reenter their vehicle due to concentrated enemy fire.

La David Johnson received the Silver Star after firing his weapon until it ran out of ammunition, switching to another gun and making a last stand alone under a tree against an enemy truck and its heavy machine gun.

Wright also received the Silver Star after he “maneuvered multiple times across open terrain through intense and accurate fire from an overwhelming hostile force to protect and recover two of his fallen comrades,” his award citation stated.

Wright was initially recommended for the Medal of Honor in August 2018. But Maj. Gen. Marcus Hicks, who led U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa at the time, downgraded the recommended decoration to a Distinguished Service Cross in September of that year, according to award approval records previously viewed by Army Times.

Gen. Raymond Thomas III, who helmed SOCOM at the time, then downgraded the award again to a Silver Star in December 2018, the records showed.

The team leader, Perozeni, was also initially recommended for a Bronze Star with Valor. That was downgraded to an Army Commendation Medal by Thomas in early 2019.

Jeremiah Johnson’s own Silver Star medal will be presented to his parents in the coming weeks. Johnson’s mother said a new building at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is also being built for 3rd Special Forces Group — the unit her son was assigned — and that will be dedicated to him as Johnson Hall.

“I’m glad that they’re recognizing him for what he did,” Gannon said, recalling the recently recovered helmet camera footage. “I did watch the head cam. After what I saw him do, yeah, I’m glad they’re recognizing him for that.”

“Jeremiah composed himself after being shot three times and he was still helping Dustin, telling him where the [enemy] shots were coming from, and he was still shooting.”

“The deployments are one-for-one unit replacements, which will leave our overall force posture in the region — approximately 100,000 — unchanged,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters Friday afternoon. “The units being replaced will return to their home station following an appropriate turnover of responsibilities.”

The turnovers are expected to continue through the summer months. Of note, the 101st Airborne Division headquarters, out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, will replace the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has ignited debate over how many U.S. troops should be permanently stationed in Europe and even whether new bases should be established. But Kirby had no update Friday on whether any of the additional troops dispatched to countries like Poland, Romania and Germany in recent months foreshadowed a permanent presence.

“The security environment has now changed based on what Mr. Putin has done,” Kirby said. “So, we expect that we’re going to have to take a look at the permanent footprint in Europe and make an assessment about that in the future, but there’s nothing in the offing right now.”

Prior to the Ukraine war, about 80,000 U.S. troops were in Europe, either on permanent bases or rotating through to train with NATO allies. Some countries, like Lithuania, have sought a more concrete U.S. military presence to beef up security after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“My advice would be to create permanent bases, but don’t permanently station,” Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee in early April. “So, you get the effect of permanence by rotational forces cycling through permanent bases.”

“And I believe that a lot of our European allies … they are very, very willing to establish permanent bases,” Milley added. “They’ll build them, they’ll pay for them, etc.”

Although no decisions have been made on that front, the Pentagon appears prepared to continue maintaining the elevated troop presence that began when Fort Bragg-based paratroopers were flexed to Poland in February.

But, for now, those paratroopers will get to go home.

Kirby said the 101st Airborne Division’s 2nd Infantry Brigade will replace the 3rd Infantry Brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division. That turnover alone will involve about 4,200 soldiers.

Another 4,200 soldiers from 3rd Armored Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, out of Fort Hood, Texas, will replace the 1st Armored Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, which is returning home to Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Finally, the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade, which is stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, will replace the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade to support the U.S. force commitment to Atlantic Resolve, a rotational presence that has been ongoing since fighting began in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014.

During the call, Austin discussed the potential for a ceasefire and emphasized his desire to keep talking with his Russian counterpart, according to the Pentagon. It was the first time Austin and Shoigu had spoken since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24.

Austin requested the call, which lasted about an hour, a senior defense official told reporters Friday.

“Both leaders had a chance to talk back and forth with one another, but I’m not going to get anymore into the content of it,” the senior defense official said. “I won’t speak for the Russians, but I think generally our takeaway was that our message was received with respect to keeping the lines [of communication] open.”

Austin believed it was important to make the call, but “the call itself didn’t specifically solve any acute issues or lead to a direct change in what the Russians are doing and what they’re saying,” the senior defense official added.

The hour-long discussion between Austin and Shoigu comes after months passed in which Russian leaders avoided phone calls.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said in late March that Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov had “so far declined to engage” with their U.S. counterparts, despite attempts made by Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley.

However, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan did speak with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Gen. Nikolay Patrushev in mid-March.

Details of that call were not provided, other than a brief statement noting the U.S. commitment to continue imposing costs on Russia and reinforcing NATO’s eastern borders.

“One soldier was transported to a local medical facility and is currently in critical but stable condition,” 1st Special Forces Command spokesman Maj. Rick Dickson said. “The second soldier received minor injuries and was treated at the scene.”

The soldiers were trying to land on St. Mere Eglise Drop Zone when they performed the jump using static-line parachutes at about 3:30 p.m., Dickson told Army Times. He did not immediately respond to a follow-up question asking what type of aircraft the soldiers jumped from.

Following the incident, training was temporarily suspended, Dickson said. The incident is now under investigation, he added.

Dickson also expressed his gratitude to local authorities and members of the community who he said immediately responded to the incident to provide assistance.