At Camp Courtney and Kadena and Yokota Air Bases in Japan, investigators with the Defense Department Office of Inspector General found “visible corrosion, visible mold, visible fire damage, visible cracks on the building exterior and interior, visible concrete spalling and exposed rebar, water intrusion, lead‑based paint, asbestos‑containing material and inoperable communication connections.”

The findings came during an audit of Pacific Command infrastructure, during which IG investigators visited 11 PACOM bases in May 2025. They examined operations and communications infrastructure, as well as base housing.

Though the report is heavily redacted, the descriptions — and the photographs — show some structures on the verge of collapse, including two photos of homes at Kadena with crumbling ceilings and living room furniture strewn with debris.

“DoD officials told us that in some areas, falling debris — ranging from small fragments to large slabs — poses an ongoing risk to personnel safety,” the report states.

The audit was originally aimed at assessing the state of “mission-critical systems,” such as operations and communications infrastructure. Investigators determined that housing and water infrastructure are “critical to support the Service members in the USPACOM AOR as they complete their mission.” Their examination of those facilities revealed numerous problems.

Photos of a 50-year-old pier at Camp Courtney show corroded steel fenders and damaged concrete beams.

One Kadena building had eight inches of standing water on the roof, asbestos and cracked pillars and walls.

A Kadena aircraft hangar had holes in the walls.

A 50-year-old water pipe at Kadena had a 12-foot crack. Broken pipes at Kadena and Yokota have caused flooding and collapsed sidewalks.

At Kinser Tower base housing at Kadena, concrete damage has affected 544 homes, according to the IG.

Sebille Manor Housing at Kadena received 100 reports of mold, and dozens of Kadena residents were forced to move due to mold and concrete concerns.

DoD officials told IG investigators that “aging infrastructure, construction choices, or environmental conditions caused accelerated degradation.” In addition, facilities in Japan experience the effects of typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis.

DoD officials also blamed the problems on a lack of funds and the high cost of services in places like Japan.

They said that while the Japanese government provides host-nation funding, often it can’t be used to fix infrastructure. Instead, these funds tend to be allocated to new construction, or to “broader strategic objectives, such as reducing the impact of U.S. forces on the people of Okinawa.”

The IG recommended that various base commanders in mainland Japan and Okinawa submit a list of priority repairs. But this raises some interservice issues. For example, Army officials said that while Fort Buckner is used only by Army units, the Marine Corps is the real property owner.

The IG also recommended that the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force — as well as the commanders of PACOM and U.S. Forces Japan — conduct a root-cause analysis of infrastructure problems and find funding to fix them. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Infrastructure Modernization and Resilience concurred with the IG’s recommendations.

Dilapidated military facilities are not confined to the Pacific. A 2022 Government Accountability Office report estimated an infrastructure maintenance backlog of $137 million as of 2020. Housing on military bases in the United States has long been afflicted by issues like toxic mold.

The goal is to “integrate a 50mm ammunition solution to effectively track, engage, and defeat Class 1, 2, and 3 UAS threats,” according to the Army’s Sources Sought notice. The deadline is Aug. 31.

While the notice from the Army’s Project Manager, Maneuver Ammunition Systems office does not provide any technical specifications, it signals the Army’s interest in a rapid-fire cannon for counter-UAS, or C-UAS, defense.

In particular, the Army will conduct a live-fire demonstration using Northrop Grumman’s XM913 Bushmaster 50mm chain gun, with companies supplying 50mm ammunition for testing.

Contractors are asked to provide “a detailed description of the company’s capabilities pertaining to C-UAS, proposed C-UAS system architecture, fire control/sensor integration, detailed draft test or demonstration plan, and how the platform will successfully employ the 50x228mm ammunition against the specified target set. In addition, the response shall provide a detailed, estimated timeline and schedule to design, integrate, and deliver a weapon system ready for a live-fire demonstration.”

The cannon is intended to destroy a broad range of drones, from Group 1 to Group 3. This includes tiny quadcopters all the way to medium-sized UAVs weighing up to 1,320 pounds and traveling at 250 knots.

Such drones have emerged as perhaps the biggest threat to armored vehicles, which have been largely driven off the front lines of the Ukraine war because of masses of UAVs.

The XM913 is slated to be the primary weapon on the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, which is intended to replace the M2 Bradley. In 2023, the Army awarded contracts to American Rheinmetall and General Dynamics Land Systems to develop prototypes for the XM30, formerly known as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle.

The XM913 weighs 692 pounds and can fire single shots, bursts, or up to 200 rounds per minute. It will fire the XM1203 Armor Piercing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot with Trace, or APFSDS-T. More significant for targeting agile and fast drones, the XM913 will use the XM1204 High Explosive Airburst with Trace, or HEAB-T.

HEAB-T “will most likely be the standard ammunition, replacing the High Explosive (HE) ammunition in service today that relies solely on a point detonating fuze capability,” claimed a 2020 Army news release.

HEAB-T will use a programmable fuze with point detonate, point detonate delay and airburst modes.

“Today, a gunner uses high explosive rounds fired from the 25mm M242, and has to walk rounds into each target to achieve the desired effects,” the news release said. “With the HEAB-T, the gunner can depart from this type of engagement. By using airburst mode, the round will be programmed with range to the target — and other important factors — for maximum lethal effect with an order of magnitude fewer shots.”

While “flak” was once thought obsolete because of surface-to-air missiles, armies are turning to cannons and machine guns as cheaper alternatives to using $4 million missiles — or wearing out manned fighter jets — to destroy a $20,000 drone.

Ukraine has had some success in creating dense belts of short-range anti-aircraft cannons and mobile machine guns to stop Russian drones.

The Next Generation C-sUAS Missile project comes as the U.S. and other nations are pursuing lasers, microwaves and other alternatives to kinetic anti-drone weapons, such as missiles and cannon, which are seen as too expensive and in short supply.

The Army wants to quickly develop an “extended-range, quick-response missile to defeat Group 2 and Group 3 small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) threats,” according to the Army’s Sources Sought notice. The deadline is August 20.

The initial specifications are for a missile that can intercept a drone flying at 6 kilometers altitude, at a range of more than 16 kilometers. The ultimate goal is to destroy drones flying 8 kilometers high, at a range of more than 25 kilometers. Missile guidance would be via a radar seeker.

NGCM appears intended as a step up — but still compatible — with the Army’s Coyote C-UAS missile system.

“The Army is looking for NGCM to be produced and integrated into the existing Coyote Launch System to provide extended range, rapid launch time, and reduced time-to-target over current effectors,” the notice said.

The weapon is intended to stop Group 2 and 3 drones. Group 2 drones have a maximum gross takeoff weight of 21 to 55 pounds, fly below 3,500 feet and have a speed of less than 250 knots, according to the Department of Defense’s UAV classification system. This includes models such as Boeing’s ScanEagle. Group 3 drones, such as Insitu’s RQ-21 Blackjack, have a takeoff weight under 1,320 pounds and fly below 18,000 feet at a speed of less than 250 knots.

The NGCM missile should take less than five seconds to leave the launcher after the operator gives the fire command.

“The missile must be compatible with the Coyote Launcher with minimal to no modifications,” the notice said.

In addition, the missile must also fit with existing air defense systems, including the Sentinel A3/A4, LTAMDS and TPQ-53 radars.

The Army envisions the NGCM missile system in two versions. The fixed-site version would be equipped with a variety of sensors. A mobile version would be “mounted on tactical vehicles for employment at the halt and on-the-move, providing a scalable capability at the tactical edge.”

The Army is aiming for Technology Readiness Level 7 — prototype testing in the field — by the end of fiscal 2027. Contractors will need to have 50 missiles ready for operational assessment by the beginning of 2028.

Significantly, the Army desires missiles costing less than $150,000 apiece as part of a bulk purchase of 5,000 missiles. While that’s a bargain compared to a $4 million Patriot air-defense missile, critics may still question the economics: An Iranian Shahed-136 drone costs around $35,000.

That’s one reason for the drive to develop anti-drone lasers that, theoretically, cost only pennies per shot. On the other hand, missiles can function in bad weather that disrupts laser beams.

But as America celebrates the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, it is easy to forget that independence was not guaranteed. As they shivered at Valley Forge in the winter of 1778, George Washington and his troops would have scoffed at the notion that victory would come on a silver platter.

For the American Revolution to succeed, the colonists had to create an army. Whether the Continental Army was defeated on the battlefield — as it frequently was — mattered less. As long as the United Colonies could keep an army in the field, Britain would be forced to continue what seemed like a forever war.

“American Revolutionary War” is a computer wargame that depicts the battles of the American Revolution, or what the British call the War of American Independence.

With 148 scenarios, from small engagements like Hubbardton and Kettle Creek, to larger battles such as Princeton, Brandywine and Saratoga, American Revolutionary War is part of publisher Wargame Design Studio’s Musket & Pike series. These games depict warfare from the 15th through the 18th Centuries, an era where polearms were gradually replaced by gunpowder weapons, such as muskets.

By the 1770s, the pike had been replaced by the bayonet, and the primitive arquebus by more reliable flintlock muskets including Britain’s “Brown Bess.”

With a 114-page user manual, American Revolutionary War is not exactly casual entertainment. It is a highly detailed simulation not just of 18th Century European-style warfare — but also how difficult it was to conduct armies’ European-style warfare in the 18th Century North American wilderness.

The game depicts battles at the grand tactical scale, with battalions and companies of infantry, as well as batteries of artillery and the occasional horse soldier (cavalry was much rarer than the later Napoleonic and American Civil Wars). The American have Continental regulars and local militia, while the Crown fields a polyglot force of British regulars, German mercenaries, Loyalist troops and Native American allies.

These units maneuver across a 2-D hex-grid map of eastern North America in its pre-industrial glory. The terrain is studded with forests, fields, marshes and streams.

Units are rated for how many troops or guns they have, and their weaponry (musket, 3-pounder artillery, etc.). Most important is a quality rating from A to F, which affects combat proficiency and movement. The British regulars tend to be quality As and Bs, while the Continentals tend to be Cs and Ds, and the American militias Fs.

Players alternate taking their turns, with each turn representing about 15 minutes of real time. Each player conducts movement and fire combat, followed by a melee phase to resolve assaults. Combat inflicts casualties as well as “fatigue,” which saps morale and effectiveness until units break or rout.

Western battlefield tactics in the 18th and 19th Centuries centered on assuming the right formation in an era when troops fought shoulder to shoulder. Column formation was used to expedite movement, though at the cost of firepower and presenting a juicy target. When engaging in a firefight, infantry would assume line formation, standing in two or three ranks.

Units in line that move through rough terrain, or obstructions, such as walls, run the risk of becoming “disordered,” with movement and fire penalties. On the other hand, a densely packed column can take heavy casualties from enemy troops deployed in line. Dispersing troops into open order makes them less vulnerable to enemy fire, but penalizes them in melee.

One myth is that the conflict “was fought by the British in a strictly linear fashion, while the Americans were primarily in skirmish,” Mike Cox, designer of American Revolutionary War, told Military Times. Both sides were capable of assuming a variety of formations, though this presented challenges for under-trained Continentals.

“The Americans often tried to fight linearly, too,” added Cox. “It just didn’t often work out well.”

Particularly useful are the detachments of light infantry.

“Learning to master your light troops is extremely important,” Cox said. “When to deploy as skirmishers to delay or scout, or recall and use them to effectively melee to push back the enemy and take and hold ground.”

Command and control has always been the glue that binds armies, but especially so in the pre-radio era, when commanders personally led their troops.

American Revolutionary War features historical commanders, rated from A (George Washington) to F, that form chains of command in each army. Leaders can rally broken troops and provide morale bonuses, though they can also be felled by enemy fire.

“Keeping units in range of their leader and their leader in range of the next higher echelon makes an army work well,” Cox explained. American commanders will need to stay close to their militia: “Keeping them in command and preventing their disruption and breakdown is an art.”

One fascination of playing historical wargames is seeing how they model the little things. For example, the British Army’s Scottish Highlanders are given a bonus during melee combat “to reflect their impact on the minds of American troops, and their reputation for relishing close combat,” the game manual notes.

But ultimately, the question comes down to: How accurately does the game depict the battles that determined the fate of the American Revolution? And, how well does it capture the essences of a professional army versus a more amateur — but also more inspired — citizen army?

American Revolutionary War fares well on both questions.

The unit quality, morale and command systems model the capabilities of both sides, including how the Continental Army improved over time due to combat experience, as well as the tutelage of European instructors like Baron von Steuben.

“British forces are often outnumbered,” said Cox. “They need to learn to stretch their lines or get outflanked. They will usually have some high-quality troops and have the advantage of picking the point of attack.”

“The Americans usually have a high number of units. However, quality and strength can vary wildly. The Americans need to know when to give ground and when to hit hard.”

Perhaps what is most striking is the theater of war.

WDS has published almost 120 historical wargames that cover gigantic battles, such as Waterloo, Gettysburg, Kursk and the Battle of the Bulge. In these games, the maps are packed with masses of troops.

In American Revolutionary War, the maps are often big, while the armies are small. One can begin to appreciate how British soldiers and colonial settlers must have felt about fighting in a vast, untamed land.

As Americans mark the Declaration of Independence, this is a reminder of how far our nation has come.

The Defense Department has put out a solicitation for robot boats that are capable of launching small attack drones — with technology mature enough to be deployed to the field within 120 days.

The goal for the Suitable Warfighting Adaptive Payloads, or SWAP-USV, project is to find “mature, market-ready [unmanned surface vessels] fully integrated with two or more mature, market-ready aerial drones to detect, identify, track, and defeat hostile threats,” according to the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation. The call out set a response deadline of Aug. 10.

To make this happen, DIU created a year-long contest backed by $100 million in prize money. DIU wants to “partner with established maritime manufacturers, autonomy developers, sensor manufacturers, and UAS developers to execute a multi-phase Prize Challenge.”

The SWAP-USV project is billed as a solution to a problem that has also plagued missile and drone defense on land: the economics favor the offense.

“The cost-exchange ratio for detecting and neutralizing asymmetric maritime threats in contested environments is heavily skewed in favor of the adversary,” the DIU solicitation states. Nor can the U.S. military continue to rely “on exquisite, multi-million-dollar naval and aviation assets to intercept these inexpensive targets.”

The solicitation paints the picture of a drone boat that can carry, launch and control at least two small UAVs. The UAVs together should be capable of conducting kinetic strikes with a combined payload of at least 2 kilograms, or just over 4 pounds.

DIU wants a mix of recoverable and one-way attack drones that can patrol ocean, coastal and riverine waters, and loiter on station. The drones, according to the solicitation, should “support one or more operational effects, including ISR, comms relay, electronic warfare, payload delivery, or precision engagement of moving or stationary, as applicable, under operator command.”

The Pentagon also wants the system to be mobile enough to fit into a standard cargo container, on road trailers or on C-17 and C-130 transports.

“Solutions that can launch from unimproved locations or provide additional launch flexibility, i.e. remotely from a container, will be looked upon favorably,” DIU noted, adding that the UAVs should be “technically mature and have an established production line.”

Interestingly, among the maritime threats the DIU solicitation cites are “‘go-fast’ smuggling boats, and semi-submersibles.” Drug cartels have used semi-submersibles to transport contraband from South America to the U.S., and such pseudo-submarines are hard to detect.

The SWAP-USV project calls for robot craft capable of “autonomous surveillance and interdiction of defined maritime operating areas, maximizing operational coverage, probability of detection, interdiction effectiveness, and time on station while minimizing daily operating cost, logistics burden, and required personnel.”

The surveillance elements of the solicitation state that the drone boat must be able to “autonomously follow or shadow a vessel of interest, and autonomously intercept a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel. Autonomous execution of these functions is desired but not required.”

The SWAP-USV Challenge, meanwhile, comprises three “sprints,” or phases, each with separate prize money. To sweeten the pot further, companies that pass the test in each phase will be eligible for procurement contracts backed by a $200 million budget.

Sprint 1 calls for in-water testing in fall 2026, with a goal of deploying a system in the field within 120 days.

“Solutions must include a complete mission ready USV with integrated drone capability system available for testing and evaluation within 29 days of down-selection for Sprint 1,” the solicitation specified. There will be $40 million in prize money.

Sprint 2 will have a fall 2026 deadline and in-water testing in early 2027, with the focus on “expanded payloads, upgraded autonomy, and multi-vendor integrations.” The prize money for that timeframe will also be $40 million.

Sprint 3 will take submissions in early 2027, with in-water testing in summer 2027. The goals of this phase will be announced later, but there will be $20 million in prizes.

Companies must specify which phase they want to join. “The government reserves the right to assign applicants to [Sprint] cohorts based on technical and manufacturing maturity,” the solicitation noted.

But this time, the Pentagon is in a hurry. The Iran war has exposed the problem of relying on costly long-range missiles such as the Tomahawk. To remedy that, DoD is putting out a call for long-range, autonomously guided Ground-Based Affordable Mass, or GBAM, weapons that cost less than $250,000 apiece.

The Pentagon also wants the GBAM munitions to be ready for demonstration within three months, and full-scale production within 18 months.

The goal of the GBAM initiative is to supplement expensive smart munitions with “affordable, scalable long-range effects, and “enable commanders to service a broader target set, preserve exquisite munitions for their intended purpose, and sustain operational tempo throughout a prolonged conflict.”

To facilitate that, the Defense Innovation Unit has created the GBAM Challenge. Contestants will pitch ideas in the form of a pitch deck or white paper, with a deadline of Aug. 5.

Winning teams will be invited to a Phase II flight demonstration at a government test site in early November, where they will give a 30-minute presentation — and get a $250,000 cash prize.

The top Phase II contenders may receive up to $5 million “to immediately deliver operational test quantities to units.” They may also be eligible for other funds, including Prototype Other Transaction agreements, follow-on production contracts and Small Business Innovation Research awards.

“In total, the government has budgeted up to $250 million to support prize execution and follow-on transition activities associated with this effort,” DIU pointed out.

However, grabbing that pot of gold will require much work. For starters, the timeline is tight. The Pentagon wants “mature, affordable, long-range precision strike systems that can be demonstrated within 60 to 90 days, certified, and scaled into production within 12 to 18 months.”

DIU doesn’t specify whether GBAM will be a missile or a drone, though it does say GBAM will be “aligned with the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) mandate to field low-cost autonomous capabilities at scale.”

Either way, the U.S. military wants a “favorable cost-per-effect at operationally relevant ranges while minimizing the logistical, training, and sustainment burden on employing units.” This means a ground-launched weapon with a range of at least 600 nautical miles, and a minimum payload of 35 pounds while ideally allowing for 100 pounds.

It should have automatic target recognition and autonomous terminal guidance, and be “ideally mission-proven” to function in jamming and GPS-denied environments. This includes “Alternative Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) or redundant navigation capabilities suitable for GPS/GNSS-denied operations in maritime and other ‘feature-poor’ environments.”

DIU is also looking for a weapon that doesn’t require any proprietary launch equipment, with “remote and low-signature launch methods strongly preferred.”

Companies should have an “existing production capacity or credible path to producing 100+ systems monthly.” And with a price tag of “cost-per-effect below $500,000 based on system reliability and mission success rate, with a sub-$250,000 all-up flyaway cost at scale.”

In addition to GBAM, the U.S. military is pursuing other strike weapons that don’t cost as much as traditional missiles, and can be mass produced as needed. They include the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles, or FAMM-BAR, program to launch cruise missiles from cargo planes, as well as the Low-Cost Containerized Missiles hypersonic weapons program.

The “Readiness Simulation” project comes as the U.S. government is about to change its draft registration system.

Since 1940, men within a designated age range have been required to register with the Selective Service. But under a proposed rule, men aged 18 to 26 will be automatically registered starting Dec. 19, 2026. The Selective Service System will work off data contained in other federal databases.

Questions remain about how prepared the Selective Service System is to handle the change.

“SSS currently relies on manual analysis, legacy modeling approaches, outdated assumptions, and historical datasets that do not fully reflect modern demographics, communications channels, throughput constraints, or operational readiness conditions,” warned the agency in a Request for Quote for the Readiness Simulation tool.

The deadline for vendors to propose their simulation models is Aug. 14.

The computer simulation will explore multiple areas. These include evaluating staffing and resource requirements, comparing mobilization and police scenarios and assessing the operational impact of surge conditions. In addition, the system will “identify throughput risks, delays, and bottlenecks” and support executive planning and reporting obligations.

The goal is a simulation system that “models the full end-to-end SSS mobilization pipeline, supports configurable scenarios, and provides decision-support analytics necessary for leadership, planners, and operators.”

Scenarios will encompass draft registration, selection, notification, delivery and classification. They will also cover the Alternative Service Program, which includes various forms of community service as well as conscientious objectors.

Computer models will “represent MEPS [Military Entrance Processing Stations] throughput, no-shows, medical disqualification rates, claims processing, and ASP diversion,” according to the Request for Quote.

Contractors must be prepared to run the Readiness Simulation while “recognizing that legacy SSS draft data may be outdated or unreliable,” the agency said.

A draft registration system based on data compiled by — and accessed from — other federal agencies is likely to raise privacy concerns.

The computer simulation “shall operate within an SSS-designated cloud environment, use anonymized aggregate data, and support complete Government ownership and sustainment,” the agency said.

The simulation must also comply with multiple privacy regulations.

Despite a goal of 100,000 rounds per month by October 2025, the Army had only managed to produce 36,000 rounds per month as of March 2026, according to a report published this month by the Department of Defense Inspector General.

Shell production requires first building the projectile at a metal parts factory, followed by packing the shell with explosives at another facility. But this means “projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching the 100,000 round-per-month goal for 155-mm artillery rounds,” the report noted.

The Army has not been able to forge enough metal parts to ramp up production of projectiles. In particular, “at a contractor-owned, contractor-operated facility in Mesquite, Texas, the contractor has been unable to produce any projectile metal parts that meet contract specifications,” the report reads.

After investing $469 million, the Army opened a modular metal parts factory in Mesquite, Texas in 2024. The Universal Artillery Projectile Lines facility — operated by General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems — was supposed to use “modern manufacturing practices, high levels of automation and digital data capture ability” to forge large numbers of large-caliber metal parts for shells, the Army announced at the time.

That optimism proved premature.

Officials at the Army’s Capability Program Executive Ammunition & Energetics, or CPE A&E, “issued the contract and accepted the risk associated with purchasing and adapting unique production equipment which had not been proven to meet U.S. specifications,” the IG report said.

To save time, the Mesquite factory tried to adapt manufacturing lines originally designed to make parts for the M107 155-mm shell — which dates back to 1958 — rather than the newer M795.

CPE A&E “accepted the risk associated with the contractor’s plan to purchase and adapt M107 metal part production equipment to produce a newer variant of the 155-mm projectile metal parts at different specifications,” said the report.

The report noted that some Army officials had concerns regarding an older ammunition plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania, that included “separate ongoing problems with the contractor in terms of responsiveness, equipment maintenance, and timeliness. Those officials expressed concern to the evaluation team that ACC [Army Contracting Command] did not open the contract for the Mesquite facility to competition from other contractors.”

The bottleneck at the Mesquite plant left the Army’s three existing plants in Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and Ingersoll, Canada, to try to pick up the slack.

Amid voracious expenditure of 155-mm rounds by Ukraine that depleted U.S. stockpiles, DoD issued a congressionally-mandated plan in 2022 to modernize howitzer ammunition production. DoD’s 2025 National Defense Industrialization Strategy Implementation Plan aimed at churning out 100,000 155-mm shells per month by October 2025.

The Army’s efforts have borne some fruit, with production nearly tripling to 14,000 shells per month to 36,000. By modernizing the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant and creating two new facilities in Kansas and Arkansas, the Army hopes to load, assemble and pack 140,000 155-mm rounds by December 2027.

In the meantime, the IG suggested the Army could get a refund.

The report recommended that the Army review the contract for the Mesquite facility to determine how the money was spent and whether the DoD can recoup any funds and also “determine whether the Mesquite contract was appropriately issued.”

“The trends are moving in the right direction,” Jerry McGinn, who co-authored the study for the Center for Strategic and International Analysis think tank, told Defense News.

However, the study — described as a progress report on reforms to the defense manufacturing and acquisition system — still found numerous problems with ramping up and sustaining wartime production.

For example, “according to several measures — manufacturing lead times, critical munitions and materials stockpiles, and supply chain security — the U.S. industrial base has a long way to go to achieve resilience,” warned the analysis by CSIS’s Center for the Industrial Base.

CSIS did find measurable improvements since November 2025, when Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth vowed to “transform the entire acquisition system to operate on a wartime footing.”

Hegseth also promised to “inspire American industry to become a wartime industrial base that focuses on speed and volume.”

Most striking is the number of new companies in the defense field.

“Roughly 10,000 new firms have entered the market in the past two years and nontraditional companies received over $120 billion in contract obligations in FY 2025, adding competition and innovation to the sector,” CSIS noted. “Munitions contract obligations have risen 330 percent since FY 2010. Spurred by this increased demand and depleted inventories, the Pentagon is signing multiyear agreements with munitions producers and suppliers on a historic scale.”

The military is also responding to depleted stockpiles of expensive guided weapons that have been rapidly consumed by the Iran and Ukraine wars.

The Pentagon’s 2027 budget request for munitions allocated 49% to low-cost munitions — defined as costing less than $600,000 apiece — rising to 70% by 2031.

The U.S. is also strengthening its defense supply chain, such as “multiyear procurement agreements, direct-to-supplier investments, and leaner acquisition pathways,” as well as investing in defense companies such as L3Harris Missile Solutions, according to CSIS.

However, while this signals government commitment to defense production, it “also complicates competitive dynamics within the industry as new entrants and established suppliers alike seek to meet rapidly growing demand for munitions at scale.”

Also notable is federal investment in rare earths, which has seen production soar from 95 tons in 2022, to 8,900 tons in 2025. Nonetheless, “the erosion of domestic rare earth manufacturing capacity and the rise of Chinese control took decades to unfold, however, and it will take several years of enduring effort for the United States and its allies to build, scale, and sustain the production capacity of these key defense inputs.”

Exports of U.S. arms, or cooperative multinational projects such as the F-35 fighter, have also become a pillar of America’s defense industry. Foreign Military Sales, or FMS, have more than tripled, from less than $20 billion in 2015 to more than $80 billion in 2025.

The Trump administration wants to take this further with the “America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” launched in February 2026.

“The United States will use foreign purchases and capital to support domestic reindustrialization, expand production capacity, and improve the resilience of the United States defense industrial base,” the White House executive order declared.

Ultimately, the federal government can control defense production through the products it demands, the prices it is willing to pay, and the incentives it offers.

“It’s a monopsony,” McGinn said. “Government sets the market. Government can regulate the market. So, if the government wants different outcomes, it changes how it buys.”

“DOD plans to invest over $2.4 trillion to develop and acquire its costliest weapon programs,” according to the Government Accountability Office’s 2026 annual report on major defense acquisition programs, or MDAP.

“Schedule delays persisted across MDAPs, signaling overly optimistic time frames,” according to the GAO report, which examined 104 of the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons programs. “The overall average time frame to deliver a capability increased this year to over 12 years. Further, several MDAPs have not set new delivery dates or are delaying critical interim milestones.

“By keeping delivery dates static, these programs raise questions about how realistic their estimates are. This means the 12-year average will likely increase in the future.”

If that sounds familiar, the 2025 annual report found that the DOD “continues to struggle with delivering innovative technologies quickly and within budget.”

However, the 2025 study seemed particularly concerned by rising costs of weapons due to inflation in the U.S. economy. In that regard, the 2026 analysis revealed a mixed price picture, with 46 of 72 programs reporting increases totaling $122 billion, and 16 reporting decreases totaling $47 billion.

GAO’s 2026 report seems more focused on program delays, especially in middle tier of acquisition, or MTA, projects that are intended to quickly jumpstart fielding of weapons within five years. The Pentagon is investing more than $49 billion across 23 of the most expensive MTA projects.

But GAO found that many systems are being slotted into the MTA despite the technology being too immature to be fast-tracked.

“For example, between 2018 and 2025, 18 out of 40 programs have entered the MTA pathway with immature technologies,” the report stated.

Many were lower than Technology Readiness Level 6 (prototype stage), and some were less than TRL 3 (proof of concept stage). Of eight current MTA projects, GAO deemed seven to be technologically immature, including the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile and the Next Generation Persistent Overhead Infrared sensor.

Thus, “programs are increasingly using the MTA pathway to mature technologies, when the intention of the pathway is to prototype and or field a residual capability within two to five years,” Shelby Oakley, GAO’s director for contracting and national security acquisitions, told Defense News.

“This is why we are not seeing capabilities fielded any faster,” Oakley said.

Among specific program issues, the Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based unmanned aircraft has a 2.5-year delay to “initial operational capability and a 26-month delay to the end of initial operational testing,” GAO found. Changes to the design based on testing could push deployment out even longer.

For the DDG(X) destroyer, the Navy has yet to offer an acquisition strategy that details the assumptions behind the project.

“As such, the Navy’s business case for the DDG(X) program is not apparent,” GAO said. The DDG(X) is also likely to be affected by shipyard delays in building the Arleigh Burke-class Flight III series, which are up to 55 months behind schedule.

The Air Force’s B-52 radar modernization program, meanwhile, is beset by “cost increases and schedule delays.” The Air Force is opting to enter production with “very little development flight testing completed.”

The Army’s Mid-Range Capability program, which uses mounts Navy missiles and vertical launch tubes in Army vehicles, has “identified three additional critical technologies, all of which are immature.”

There are questions on “whether the return on investment is worthwhile for the four batteries planned for production by the Army,” the GAO stated.