{"id":12708,"date":"2018-10-25T14:24:10","date_gmt":"2018-10-25T14:24:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/armytimes\/uncategorized\/2018\/10\/25\/armys-detailed-iraq-war-study-remains-unpublished-years-after-completion\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T01:40:56","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T01:40:56","slug":"armys-detailed-iraq-war-study-remains-unpublished-years-after-completion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/armytimes\/news\/your-army\/2018\/10\/25\/armys-detailed-iraq-war-study-remains-unpublished-years-after-completion\/","title":{"rendered":"Army\u2019s detailed Iraq war study remains unpublished years after completion"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Three years after its completion, a lengthy study of the Army\u2019s role in the Iraq war remains unpublished, some say because of how it both praises certain Army leaders while also airing some \u201cdirty laundry\u201d regarding wartime decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A detailed account of the study\u2019s history and current efforts to have it published was reported by the Wall Street Journal<\/a> this week.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In that article, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told the newspaper <\/a>that he hopes to have the study published by the end of the year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe owe it to ourselves as an Army to turn the lessons learned as quickly and as accurately as we can, understanding that they are not going to be perfect,\u201d he told the Journal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The study, dubbed \u201cThe United States Army in the Iraq War,\u201d was commissioned by then-Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno in 2013.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Army Times contacted the Office of the Chief of Public for more information on when the study would be published and why it wasn\u2019t conducted by the Army Center for Military History.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThis paper is not an official history and it is expected to be published by the Army War College in mid-November,” Cynthia O. Smith, Army spokeswoman, said in an email.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Days after the Journal report, Reps. Jakie Speier, D-California, and Ruben Gallego, D-Arizona, sent a letter addressed to both Milley and Army Secretary Mark Esper about the study.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a press release accompanying the letter the representatives blasted Army leadership for the delay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThis is simply the Army being unwilling to publicly air its mistakes,\u201d Rep. Speier said. \u201cOur military, Congress, and the American people deserve nothing less than total transparency on the lessons the Army has identified so that we may use those lessons to avoid costly, and too often deadly, mistakes of the past.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIt\u2019s no secret that the Army and, frankly, our entire defense establishment, made serious mistakes and miscalculations in Iraq since 2003,\u201d Rep. Gallego said. \u201cWe must not endanger the best interests of our country or the lives of future Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines simply to protect the careers and egos of Army brass. This report should be released.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In June 2016, the two-volume, 1,300-page study was complete. But before it had been read outside of Army circles, it already was under fire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shane Story, a historian for the Army\u2019s Center for Military History, authored a memo asking whether the study was an attempt to \u201cvalidate the surge,\u201d which would benefit Odierno and retired Gen. David Petraeus, who led U.S. and coalition forces for much of the surge and was widely credited, along with Odierno, for turning around the dire conditions on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Story also noted in his memo that the way in which the report was compiled did not follow typical methods of relying heavily on primary documents. He had recommended major revisions before publication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Retired Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Dan Allyn told the Journal <\/a>that delays in releasing the report began after Odierno retired.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cClearly, there were senior leaders who were in position when these things happened, and there were concerns on how they were portrayed,\u201d Allyn said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Though the first volume of the study was set to publish in October 2016, Milley said he planned to read the entire study and write a foreword. He also instructed the team to expand its research by interviewing former ranking officials, he told the Journal<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The study team was initially headed by then-Col. Joel Rayburn, who previously worked for Petraeus in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Retired Col. Frank Sobchack took over as study team director as the team completed its findings. He told the Journal that the team worked \u201ctirelessly for three years\u201d on the study to capture the war\u2019s lessons in a readable narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThat the Army was paralyzed with apprehension for the past two years over publishing it leaves me disappointed with the institution to which I dedicated my adult life,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report praises the 2007 troop surge, which Odierno and Petraeus oversaw. As the study was being conducted, some in Army ranks foresaw problems if it wasn\u2019t published before Odierno retired, the Journal <\/a>reported.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The chief of the historical services division for the Army Heritage and Education Center at the Army War College, Conrad Crane, reviewed the study in July 2015.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an email to the team, he told them that publication needed to happen quickly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cYou need to get this published while you still have GEN Odierno as a champion. Otherwise I can see a lot of institutional resistance to having so much dirty laundry aired,\u201d Crane wrote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Six outside reviewers later described the study as fair and recommended publication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report points out mistakes made by top leaders during the early stages of the war. Throughout that period, officials assumed that military operations would end within 18 to 24 months and therefore didn\u2019t deploy enough troops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Top leaders failed to create a strategy that would limit Iranian and Syrian support for militants inside Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Journal<\/a>, which conducted numerous interviews and reviewed internal memorandums and emails, highlighted some of the specific mistakes mentioned in the history. They include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n