{"id":44512,"date":"2017-08-15T16:23:50","date_gmt":"2017-08-15T16:23:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/armytimes\/uncategorized\/2017\/08\/15\/why-didnt-sanctions-stop-north-koreas-missile-program-commentary\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T23:38:41","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T23:38:41","slug":"why-didnt-sanctions-stop-north-koreas-missile-program-commentary","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/armytimes\/opinion\/commentary\/2017\/08\/15\/why-didnt-sanctions-stop-north-koreas-missile-program-commentary\/","title":{"rendered":"Why didn’t sanctions stop North Korea\u2019s missile program? [Commentary]"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

North Korea\u2019s long-range missile program has made significant technological advances in the past few months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For most of the past 20 years, the international community has struggled to stop this kind of progress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un\u2019s plan to target four test missiles approximately 20 miles off the coast of the U.S. territory of Guam shows just how destabilizing this rapidly advancing ballistic missile program can be. North Korea\u2019s plan \u2014 which Kim claims will be finalized later this month \u2014 follows last month\u2019s two successful tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile with the capability to hit the U.S.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

My research on how states illegally obtain missile technologies and my experience conducting outreach related to U.N. sanctions give me some insight into the methods North Korea used to make illicit procurements and the limitations in using technology-based sanctions to prevent them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Technology-based sanctions<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2006 \u2014 following North Korea\u2019s first nuclear test \u2014 the U.N. Security Council prohibited the \u201csupply, sale or transfer\u201d of \u201citems, materials, equipment, goods and technology\u201d that could contribute to the country\u2019s missile program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Efforts to prevent North Korea\u2019s acquisition of missile technology by certain nations \u2014 notably the United States \u2014 had been underway since the 1990s. However, the U.N. sanctions went further by placing standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the development of North Korea\u2019s weapons of mass destruction programs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These sanctions are \u201cuniversal\u201d \u2014 obligatory for all states around the world. Each nation is responsible for implementation within its borders. Missile, nuclear and military technologies are regulated through national export control systems. Exports of certain goods and technologies need to be granted an export license by the government. This allows governments to do a risk assessment on transactions and minimize the diversions to undesirable uses, such as WMD programs or human rights abuses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In theory, all countries should have the capacity to implement technology-based sanctions. Having an export-control system has been mandatory for states since the passage of U.N. Security Council resolution 1540 in 2004. However, more than a decade after this resolution was passed, many nations \u2014 particularly developing ones \u2014 are still struggling with implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has led to uneven execution of missile-related sanctions on North Korea. A recent report has described the U.N. sanctions regime as a \u201chouse without foundations,\u201d noting that not a single element of the sanctions regime \u201cenjoys robust international implementation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\t