{"id":45379,"date":"2018-06-14T20:40:32","date_gmt":"2018-06-14T20:40:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/smg.go-vip.net\/armytimes\/uncategorized\/2018\/06\/14\/commentary-wanted-leaders-we-can-believe-in\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T03:31:39","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T03:31:39","slug":"commentary-wanted-leaders-we-can-believe-in","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/armytimes\/opinion\/commentary\/2018\/06\/14\/commentary-wanted-leaders-we-can-believe-in\/","title":{"rendered":"Commentary: Wanted: Leaders we can believe in"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Editor\u2019s note:<\/b> This commentary was written by an Air Force officer using a pseudonym. Military Times typically does not allow this, but we made an exception in this case to protect the author from serious ramifications to his career. The writer is not employed by Military Times, and the views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of Military Times or its editorial staff.<\/i><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Boy, have there been a lot of firings<\/a> lately, or is it just me?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I didn\u2019t plan it, but the timing of my previous article couldn\u2019t have been much better. Say what you will, but \u201cA Call for Senior Officer Reform in the Air Force: An Insider\u2019s Perspective<\/a>,\u201d published last month in War on the Rocks, has generated a good bit of discussion \u2014 including among the Air Force\u2019s general officers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I argue that the Air Force promotion system<\/a> for lieutenant colonel<\/a> and above is broken because it relies on \u201chigh-potential officer\u201d designations that are made when officers are captains. A \u201chigh-potential officer\u201d means more senior officers have decided a junior officer has the potential to achieve general officer rank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I believe the system is making those calls too early in an officer\u2019s career to be accurate, and it does not provide an off ramp for bad officers short of criminal misconduct.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Look at all of the firings<\/a> recently. How many were promoted below-the-zone? Nearly all, because high-potential officers are the predominant demographic in wing command. I don\u2019t think an \u201con-time\u201d wing commander has been fired this decade. If there is one, it is a rare exception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is not to say that all high-potential officers are somehow corrupt, because they aren\u2019t. I also never intended to suggest the entire system needs to be scrapped, but I do think it needs changing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The current system does some things extremely well. It does a good job of identifying intelligent, hardworking and driven officers. It does not identify all of them, but those descriptors do apply to the vast majority of high-potential officers. What the current system does not do is identify good leaders or weed out the bad ones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One thing most high-potential officers have in common is they worked directly for a general officer. If they do well, these officers get a number one stratification in a large population pool from the general, and their future is set before they take their first guidon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regrettably, there is no meaningful mechanism to assess leadership performance once an individual is in command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But what about command climate surveys? Aren\u2019t they required at least a few times during an officer\u2019s time in command?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Precious few officers take command climate surveys seriously. Additionally, commanders use the same generic evaluation forms as everyone, and 360-degree evaluations do not exist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

High-potential officers know what to say and how to act in front of their superiors, so how is the rater supposed to assess subordinate commander leadership?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, I suggest the Air Force take the following steps:<\/p>\n\n\n\n