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They were exonerated, eventually, after the Marine Corps convened a rare court of inquiry lasting three weeks to examine the allegations and more fully understand what led to Fox Company\u2019s failure. The three senior officers overseeing those proceedings determined that Galvin and his men acted appropriately when, in the frantic minutes following a suicide attack on their convoy, they used measured and justified force while responding to an ensuing enemy ambush. A three-star Marine general ultimately agreed with that conclusion, and the highly publicized case soon disappeared from the headlines \u2014 though it still haunts many of these men to this day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\tREAD PART 1: <\/strong>The tragic betrayal of an elite American commando unit<\/a> What has emerged only now is a troubling picture of the institutional dysfunction and adversity that thwarted these Marines from the outset. Neither the Defense Department nor SOCOM offered the Marine Corps much guidance as it endeavored to get MARSOC off the ground, according to a recently declassified report detailing the court of inquiry\u2019s findings. Galvin provided that document to Military Times along with approximately 1,500 pages of newly available courtroom testimony. The report and testimony make clear that Fox Company\u2019s Marines were sent to war without the overarching direction and ground-level logistical assistance they would need to sustain themselves in theater and prove effective on the battlefield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This dynamic was a major impediment for MARSOC and Fox Company, the report concludes. Politics internal to the Marine Corps made matters worse. And as the court\u2019s three officers would conclude, the conditions were overwhelmingly such that MARSOC\u2019s first commandos never stood a chance in Afghanistan. Task Force Violent was destined to fail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Everything started with Rumsfeld, who was determined the Marine Corps would establish a special forces component even though the service\u2019s leaders thought that doing so was a misguided waste of everyone\u2019s time. The prevailing logic inside the Corps was \u2014 and is \u2014 that Marines are inherently special, members of a force whose very mission and history was providing unique and diverse capabilities within the U.S. military\u2019s broader portfolio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rumsfeld got his way, of course. MARSOC was activated Feb. 24, 2006, expanding the capabilities provided by Navy SEALS, Army Green Berets and other elite units. This was his logic: U.S. commandos offered the agility and precision needed to pick apart the complex terror networks taking root in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond, and the specialized training to help fledgling foreign militaries enhance their own capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n America\u2019s long-term strategy would need to be surgical and stealthy, Rumsfeld foresaw. It would require more manpower, the latest weaponry and cutting edge technology, and greater commitments from all services \u2014 especially the Marine Corps, which had avoided full-scale involvement since the advent of Special Operations Command in the late 1980s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI believed then, as I believe now, that special forces would have a growing role in U.S. national security affairs,\u201d Rumsfeld told Military Times. \u201cThe addition of the Marine Corps to that activity was one element of a broader approach. Exactly how they fit in, I assumed would evolve. I wasn\u2019t in a position to look at that from a micro standpoint. But from a macro standpoint, the Marines had significant capabilities, and it seemed to me that they would find a niche.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201dRumsfeld, who served as defense secretary from 1975 to 1977 and again from 2001 to 2006, acknowledges there was resistance to his initiative. His top military advisers at the Pentagon offered a range of input, he said. Some were for it, others against it. The Marine Corps\u2019 brain trust, he noted, felt strongly that the service \u201cdidn\u2019t need to be diluted\u201d with a special forces component.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI decided that on balance it made sense to go forward with MARSOC, he said. \u201cAnd in retrospect, I\u2019m not uncomfortable with that decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201dThe individual components that compose SOCOM viewed MARSOC as one more mouth to feed, another organization that would compete for funding and missions. Within the Marine Corps, though, Rumsfeld\u2019s directive was heresy and those in charge undermined progress. Senior leaders nitpicked the construction of MARSOC\u2019s North Carolina compound and initially sought to deny its commandos the monthly cash stipend all special forces rate. Those matters would be remedied but not without a substantial fight that robbed MARSOC\u2019s planners of valuable time and resources they could have used to focus on bigger issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe service early on didn\u2019t believe in the idea of MARSOC and threw up any roadblock it could to slow it down,\u201d said a source familiar with efforts to stand up the command who, like many interviewed for this series, asked not to be identified. \u201cThe naysayers lashed out at everything imaginable.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018THE MARSOC ANIMAL\u2019<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n MARSOC\u2019s foundation was the service\u2019s Force Reconnaissance companies, a nimble force highly trained to conduct missions behind enemy lines. These Marines have long filled a limited special operations role for Marine commanders, and in 2003, when the service activated Marine Special Operations Command Detachment 1 as a proof of concept, Force Recon provided the operators. Det. 1, as it was known, made a successful deployment to Iraq in 2004 and was then disbanded as plans took shape for MARSOC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By December 2005, Galvin, an infantry officer by training, had been a Force Recon platoon commander for a combined six years between two separate units. He was qualified as a terminal air controller, authorized to direct combat airstrikes from the ground. He\u2019d also served as an instructor at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1, the Corps\u2019 equivalent to the Navy\u2019s fabled Top Gun. Few others possessed the rank and experience required to lead a special operations company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another name discussed was Maj. Doug Zembiec. A decorated Marine whose exploits in Iraq earned him the nickname The Lion of Fallujah, Zembiec had other aspirations. He was working for the Marine Corps\u2019 Special Operations Training Group in 2005 before being chosen for an assignment with the CIA\u2019s Special Activities Division, a revelation recently brought to light by the Washington Post<\/a>. Tragically Zembiec was gunned down in Baghdad while leading a small troop of Iraqi forces in May 2007. Four years later, MARSOC established a leadership award in his honor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Headquartered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, MARSOC would stand up with two battalions, one there on the East Coast and another out West at Camp Pendleton in southern California. Fox Company would be first out of the gate, its nucleus comprising personnel from Lejeune\u2019s 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635615811798247416-2-hawthorne-nv-2006jpg.jpg\")
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