The announcement gives operational shape to the so-called “Drone Deal” signed on June 9 between Kulbergs and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the Nordic-Baltic Eight summit in Tallinn, the first meeting between the two leaders. Latvia is the sixth country to join Ukraine’s bilateral drone cooperation framework.

Under the agreement, Ukraine will supply Latvia with strike drones, ground robotic complexes, and maritime drone systems, while Latvia will supply Ukraine with domestically produced anti-drone systems, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and his Latvian counterpart Raivis Melnis previously confirmed during a meeting in Kyiv on June 13. No specifics were offered.

The Latgale region, where the new drone factory is to be built, is historically one of Latvia’s most economically disadvantaged. Kulbergs said the area needs investment and jobs, and that his government would “do everything necessary” to site the plant near the Russian border. Construction should start this year.

Moscow has been publicly outraged at the Baltic states’ alleged role in Ukraine’s drone warfare against the Russian hinterland, accusing the three small republics of opening their airspaces to Ukrainian drones on their way to strike targets over a thousand kilometers from Kyiv in Russia’s Baltic region and the St. Petersburg area.

More outlandish Russian claims have even included accusations that the Baltic States are allowing Ukraine to launch drones from their territories. The Russian foreign intelligence service SVR, which is renowned for making unsubstantiated and wildly escalatory claims regularly, published a press release with this accusation earlier this year.

The opening of the drone production facility will surely face criticism from Moscow and is all but certain to be seen as an escalatory move. It may also strengthen Russian propaganda’s case for singling out the small Baltic states as particularly hostile − and a particularly urgent problem − for Moscow.

Key details − including the plant’s precise location, cost-sharing arrangements between Riga and Kyiv, and which drone types will be produced − have not been publicly disclosed.

In addition to the joint drone factory, the Latvian prime minister also announced that counter-drone systems will begin operating along Latvia’s borders with Russia and Belarus in July and August − removing the need, he said, to scramble fighter aircraft in response to every drone incursion. “In the event of a threat from drones, we won’t have to take aircraft into the air every time, which is a very expensive and effective solution, but not the best and most productive,” Kulbergs said.

A top Latvian official previously described to Defense News a system of launch canisters stationed along the border.

Yesterday’s announcement comes against a fraught political backdrop in Riga. A suspected stray Ukrainian drone that entered Latvian airspace from Russia exploded at an oil storage facility in Rēzekne on May 7, damaging four empty fuel tanks. The incident triggered the resignation of both the defense minister and Prime Minister Evika Siliņa within days. Kulbergs took office shortly thereafter.

The snazzily branded platform, called TrophyLab and accessible at trophylab.mod.gov.ua, currently catalogs more than 115 samples of seized Russian equipment across 79 categories. Users who pass a vetting process gain access to blueprints, component analyses, schematics, and the findings of Ukrainian state laboratories and intelligence agencies − more than 225 studies at present, according to the ministry.

Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the launch on social media Thursday, framing the platform as a strategic tool for “the entire civilized world.” Among the listed items available for study are, for example, a Kinzhal hypersonic missile and a T-90M tank.

“Every missile, drone and vehicle seized on the battlefield is now a source of knowledge for the free world,” Fedorov wrote.

Beyond digital access, the platform allows verified partners to request the physical hardware itself for non-destructive inspection, disassembly or full destruction testing, a provision that could prove particularly valuable for nations developing electronic countermeasures or seeking to harden their own platforms against specific Russian threats.

Access is not public. Eligible users include Ukrainian defense forces and manufacturers, foreign defense ministries, partner-country defense companies meeting MoD requirements, and accredited scientific institutions. The vetting requirement reflects the sensitivity of the material − some of the captured systems have not been publicly disclosed in technical detail − but also limits the platform’s reach to states and firms already embedded in Ukraine’s defense cooperation network.

The initiative fits into a broader pattern of Kyiv institutionalizing battlefield knowledge as a transferable asset. Among similar moves, Ukraine has previously shared countless hours of frontline drone footage to train allied AI systems and signed a bilateral agreement with Germany − the so-called Brave Germany program − to jointly support startups to develop deep-strike weapons based on lessons learned in the field. Last month, Kyiv also established a formal legal framework for using captured Russian equipment in international defense cooperation.

Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defense minister, announced at a press conference in Berlin that Germany is developing a European Space Component Command alongside a Weltraumakademie − a multilateral space training academy − and insisted that partner nations will be “embedded in the design phase” rather than presented with finished structures.

The meeting, billed as the first “DACH+L” format, expanding the traditional German-Austrian-Swiss defense dialogue to include Luxembourg, served as a platform for Pistorius to demonstrate traction on Germany’s €35 billion ($40.7 billion) military space investment pledged last fall. That program spans encrypted low-earth-orbit satellite constellations, military-grade launch capacity, and an expanded Space Command within the Bundeswehr.

Austria’s Defense Minister Claudia Tanner reaffirmed that Austria plans to put three operationally designated military satellites plus a test object into orbit next year, developed partly with Austrian startups. The program centers on two projects: LEO2VLEO, a joint initiative with the Netherlands covering imaging and navigation in very low Earth orbit, and BEACONSAT, an Austrian navigation satellite built for under €1 million ($1.16 million). Tanner said the satellites would be made available to partners and framed the push as essential for communications independence in a crisis.

Austria is neutral by constitution, though some have questioned how its deepening defense ties with European neighbors can be squared with this tradition and legal requirement.

Luxembourg’s Defense Minister Yuriko Backes, attending a DACH meeting for the first time, pointed to her country’s niche: established SATcom and Earth observation expertise that Luxembourg is “very willing to make available to allies and partners.” She and Tanner both referenced a forthcoming cooperation deal between the two countries on satellite use in July, without elaborating.

Swiss Federal Councilor Martin Pfister noted that there is no domain where Europe faces a greater dependency on non-European technology providers than in the space domain. “It is not possible for one country to solve this alone,” he said, though he called out Swiss state-owned company Beyond Gravity as a potential industrial contributor to a European solution.

Switzerland, too, has bent the limits of its longstanding neutrality to deepen its integration into European defense projects since the war in Ukraine. The joint accession of both Austria and Switzerland to the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative in 2023 was a prime example of this new thinking.

The latest moves signal a further deepening of these Central European defense ties. The conference alone was a remarkable signal, expanding the more established German-Austrian-Swsiss DACH format to Luxembourg as a fourth member.

What Monday’s meeting produced in concrete terms was modest: a reaffirmation of existing cooperation threads, a cyber exercise result − Luxembourg, together with the three other German-speaking countries, placed second at NATO’s Locked Shields event under German leadership in April − and political momentum behind space initiatives that remain largely conceptual. But the message was still clear: German-speaking Europe is serious about wanting to become a player in space, and the push for independence from the U.S. has gained additional momentum.

On May 7, two drones entered Latvia from Russian airspace, hitting a fuel depot. Nobody was injured. As early as March of this year, there had been incidents of Ukrainian drones crashing into Baltic allies’ territory, with one hitting a power plant chimney.

Following the latest incident, Latvia’s prime minister, Evika Siliņa, said that defense minister Andris Sprūds had lost her trust and “that of the public,” calling on him to resign. He did so on Sunday, being replaced by Col. Raivis Melnis of the Latvian Army.

Also on Sunday, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, confirmed that the drones that struck Latvia were sent by his country, though not aimed at the Baltic republic. The fact that the drones missed their targets and crashed in friendly territory instead, he said, “was the result of Russian electronic warfare deliberately diverting Ukrainian drones from their targets in Russia.”

When a series of drones hit all three Baltic states earlier this year, there had been speculation that Russian electronic warfare may be to blame, and that Russia was deliberately re-routing the aircraft “back to sender” − but toward Europe.

The new statement by a top Ukrainian official provides the strongest public confirmation yet that this is a tactic employed by Moscow.

So far, there have been no deaths or injuries reported from wayward Ukrainian drones, but the accidental air strikes have laid bare the inadequate state of air defense even at NATO’s most exposed frontier, with the lack of fatalities seemingly mostly a matter of luck.

In Thursday’s strike, which took place 40 kilometers into Latvian territory from the Russian border, four empty oil storage tanks were damaged, and firefighters had to extinguish a smoldering area of around 30 square meters. Schools in Rēzekne were closed, air raid alerts were declared across three municipalities, and residents reported hearing explosions. French NATO Baltic Air Policing jets were scrambled during the alert.

Latvian officials initially said the drones were not shot down because the safety of civilians and infrastructure could not be guaranteed. Sprūds then reversed that stance entirely, saying: “Drones must be shot down — that’s the responsibility of the head of the Armed Forces and myself, as the political leader.”

As in March, the Baltic states have used the incident to call for stronger air defense measures. Latvia and Lithuania jointly called on NATO to boost regional air defenses in the wake of the May 7 strike, with Lithuania’s defense minister Robertas Kaunas appealing to NATO that “Strengthening anti-drone defense in our region should be a particular emphasis, and additional capabilities are welcome here.”

Of the total, €675 million ($796 million) will support 32 capability development projects, and €332 million ($391 million) will go to 25 research initiatives. The selected projects involve 634 entities from 26 EU member states plus Norway, with small and medium-sized enterprises making up more than 38% of participants and receiving over 21% of the total funding, according to a summary of the spending plan.

The most striking cluster of projects marks a shift to 21st-century warfare, with at least four separate initiatives − EURODAMM, LUMINA, SKYRAPTOR, and TALON − devoted specifically to loitering munitions and affordable mass drone production.

The concentration reflects an uncomfortable lesson absorbed from the war in Ukraine: cheap, expendable strike drones have reshaped the battlefield, and Europe’s defense industry has been slow to catch up. Lessons learned in Ukraine are referenced repeatedly throughout the EDF’s materials on the funding round and individual projects.

That battlefield knowledge is now being plugged into the fund’s architecture. For the first time, Ukrainian entities are eligible to participate in EDF projects as subcontractors and third-party recipients, marking a significant step toward integrating Ukraine’s defense-technological and industrial base into the European ecosystem. In the coming months, Kyiv and Brussels are expected to complete the required association agreement to allow Ukraine full participation on equal terms with EU member states in the future.

The EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv, established under the European Defence Industrial Strategy in 2024, has been the institutional engine behind that push. One flagship project, STRATUS, will develop an AI-powered cyber defense system for drone swarms and includes a Ukrainian subcontractor, a model the Commission explicitly frames as bringing “direct battlefield experience” into EU-funded R&D.

More than 15 of the 57 projects are tied to the Commission’s four European Readiness Flagships, a set of priority capability areas the bloc identified last year as critical to near-term operational readiness. Project AETHER, for instance, will develop propulsion and thermal management systems in support of the Drone Defence Initiative.

To widen the industrial base, several projects focused on mass-producible drone munitions will launch sub-calls specifically for startups as well as small and medium-sized firms, including Ukrainian ones, that can receive up to €60,000 each to integrate innovations into larger consortia. It is a modest sum, but the intent is structural: to lower the barrier to entry for firms without prior defense experience at a moment when the Commission is under pressure to demonstrate that its defense spending is generating real industrial capacity outside of the usual suspects of established prime contractors.

The 2025 funding awards are separate from both the 2026 EDF Work Programme, which carries a €1 billion ($1.18 billion) budget adopted last December, and the European Defence Industry Programme, whose €1.5 billion ($1.77 billion) work program was adopted in March. Taken together, the three tranches reflect an EU defense funding environment that has expanded dramatically in scale and ambition since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and one that is now deliberately building Kyiv into its foundations.

The most serious incident occurred at 3:43 a.m. on March 25, when a drone crossing Estonian airspace from Russia struck the chimney of the Auvere power station in the eastern Ida-Viru County − located less than 50 kilometers from the Russian port of Ust-Luga, which Ukraine was striking overnight. No one was injured and the plant’s power output was not affected, Estonian energy company Enefit Power said. But the incident was enough to trigger an emergency government session in Tallinn and a nationwide alarm alert that caused confusion when it failed to specify the affected region.

The Director General of the Estonian Internal Security Service, Margo Palloson, confirmed it was “indeed a drone of Ukrainian” origin, and Estonia’s foreign minister stressed it “was not directed at Estonia.”

Estonian Defense Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Andrus Merilo said investigators were working to determine what type of drone hit the plant, but he was unambiguous about its payload. “We can say with fairly high confidence that it was not a reconnaissance drone, but rather an explosive-laden device — either an attack drone or a decoy drone,” he told reporters.

Earlier the same night, a drone entered Latvian airspace from Russia and detonated in the Krāslava region in southeastern Latvia at around 2:30 a.m., according to Latvian military authorities. Latvian Deputy Chief of Joint Staff Egils Leščinskis said the object was detected by radar roughly ten minutes before impact. “The aircraft most likely veered off course or was affected by electromagnetic warfare measures,” he said.

On Monday night, a Ukrainian drone had already come down in the Varena district of southeastern Lithuania, near the Belarusian border, following a separate attack on Primorsk − Russia’s other major Baltic oil port, which had been burning for over two days by Wednesday. Lithuanian authorities confirmed the drone had flown over Belarus before crashing.

It’s not clear why these Ukrainian drones are now repeatedly falling on Western territory rather than reaching their intended Russian targets, but Russian GPS jamming and spoofing have been singled out as a likely cause by officials and analysts. Russian transmitters are known to block and falsify Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals, such as those from the GPS and European Galileo satellite constellations. This can cause drones to lose track of their location or even veer off course when the systems on board are fed falsified location information.

“It’s electronic warfare with the aim of preventing being hit by things that use satellite navigation – drones,” Ralf Ziebold of the German Aerospace Center DLR previously told Defense News for an investigation that geolocated the origin of these signals.

It’s unclear whether Russia is actively redirecting drones to NATO countries or whether the incursions are simply a byproduct of EW defenses protecting key infrastructure and assets on Russian soil. Western officials so far have described the incidents as accidents.

In addition to electronic warfare, the distances at play are huge: Some of the targets Ukrainian drones were intending to strike were up to 1,000 kilometers from Ukrainian territory, making these some of the longest-distance strikes Ukraine has conducted. These long flights can magnify minor navigational errors.

Russian media, heavily controlled by the Kremlin, have reported that the Baltic States have opened their air spaces for the overflight of Ukrainian drones on their way to strike targets in the Leningrad oblast. The claim, which was picked up by Russian state-owned TV channel Rossiya 1, appears to have originated from Mash, one of the most widely read Russian-language Telegram channels.

None of the three drones was intercepted by the Baltic states’ or allied air defense systems. The EDF commander acknowledged that engaging drones near the Russian border is legally and tactically constrained. “Our goal is to avoid any unintended escalation, so we certainly cannot engage drones where there is even the slightest risk that our actions could carry over into Russian territory,” Merilo said.

The incidents follow a growing number of drone incursions along the eastern flank. In July 2025, Lithuania recorded two incursions by Russian-origin Gerbera drones crossing from Belarus − the second of which was found at the Gaižiūnai military training ground carrying approximately two kilograms of explosives, some 100 kilometers inside NATO territory. In August, Ukrainian drone fragments were found near Elva in south-central Estonia after a night of Ukrainian strikes on Russian inland targets. The following month, Latvia recovered Gerbera fragments on a western beach.

That accumulation of incidents has sharpened allied frustration. “These are the effects of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression. We can assume that we will see more such incidents,” said Margo Palloson, director general of Estonia’s Internal Security Service.

Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina drew a connection with Western capitals’ preoccupation with the war against Iran: the attacks on Ukraine and their spillover were intensifying “at a time when the attention of the West has been diverted by events in the Middle East,” she said.

Latvian Defense Minister Andris Sprūds cut short a visit to Kyiv, where he had been delivering drones to Ukrainian forces, to return home. Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said Vilnius had opened talks with Kyiv. None of the governments signaled any intent to invoke Article 4 or 5, and all three publicly attributed the drone incidents to the spillover of Russia’s war.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi addressed the incidents at a press conference, stating that Kyiv is in close contact with its partners to clarify all details and that such incidents “have been occurring regularly” in the Baltic states.

The incursions show that the Baltic states’ air defenses may still be unprepared to tackle modern drone threats and raise questions about whether Russia is deliberately redirecting Ukrainian drones to Western states, or whether the incidents can be chalked up as collateral. With Ukraine striking deep into Russia and targeting the Leningrad Oblast along corridors that pass directly over or near the Baltics in particular, more incidents of the Baltic states inadvertently ending up in the crossfire of the war in Ukraine seem likely.

The announcement, reported by Reuters, marks a striking role reversal from years of Western forces training Ukrainian troops and underscores the value of lessons learned on the increasingly drone-dominated battlefield of the Russian invasion. ​

“We have high expectations,” Lt. Gen. Christian Freuding told Reuters in an interview. “The Ukrainian military is currently the only one in the world with frontline experience against Russia.”

The deployment follows an agreement signed between the German and Ukrainian defense ministries, under which Ukrainian instructors will embed at Bundeswehr schools to pass on battlefield knowledge accumulated over more than four years of full-scale war. The first contingent is expected to number in the “middle double-digits” and will rotate through for several weeks at a time, Freuding said.

Their expertise will span artillery, engineering, armored operations, drone employment, and command and control − precisely the capability types where the Ukraine war has produced the most rapidly evolving battlefield lessons. The move reflects growing recognition across NATO that European armies have more to learn from Kyiv than they can offer in return.​

Freuding grounded the urgency in Western intelligence assessments suggesting Russia could be in a position to mount a large-scale offensive against the alliance as early as 2029. “That’s almost the day after tomorrow. We have no time – the enemy doesn’t wait for ‌us ⁠to declare we’re ready. So we have to use every possibility to prepare,” he said.

Germany has trained Ukrainian personnel on platforms including the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, Leopard main battle tanks, artillery systems, and air defense since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. That the relationship has now effectively inverted − with Kyiv dispatching trainers north rather than receiving them − is, Freuding said, a reflection of “an equal partnership in the field of security.”

Berlin is currently Kyiv’s most significant backer, having provided the most aid of any country aside from the United States, which has paused direct military support to Ukraine under the Trump administration. By the end of 2025, Germany had provided a total of €20 billion ($23.1 billion) in military aid to Ukraine, according to a running tally by the German-based Kiel Institute, an economics research organization.

Defense and government officials from both countries have launched a number of initiatives to benefit from each other’s comparative advantages, including taking steps to foster tighter integration of their defense industrial bases.

The latest announcement comes as Berlin accelerates its broader Bundeswehr buildup, with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius targeting defense spending of 3.5% of GDP by 2029 as part of an ambition to field Europe’s most powerful conventional army.

The procurement, approved by the parliamentary budget committee on Dec. 17 and announced on Monday, includes four complete systems − each comprising two aircraft − along with four “certifiable” ground control stations that will allow the aircraft to operate alongside civilian traffic. First deliveries are expected in 2028, with the German Navy’s Marineflieger planning to operate the platforms from Naval Air Wing 3 Graf Zeppelin in Nordholz.

The SeaGuardians will focus on maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare across the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic, missions that have gained urgency amid heightened concerns over Russian underwater activity and critical infrastructure security in European waters.

The drones will complement Germany’s fleet of eight P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the first of which arrived in Germany in November 2025. Together, they mark a notable shift in German focus toward maritime surveillance and counter-submarine warfare capabilities in recent years.

General Atomics markets the MQ-9B SeaGuardian as being capable of over 30 hours of endurance with a mission radius of 1,200 nautical miles, or over 2,000 kilometers. The platform features pole-to-pole satellite control, de-icing capability for cold-weather operations, and an integrated Detect and Avoid System designed to enable operations in unsegregated civilian airspace.

The aircraft can be equipped with maritime surveillance radars and configured with anti-submarine warfare mission kits capable of deploying up to 40 ‘A’-size or 80 ‘G’-size sonobuoys. Germany has indicated the systems will initially focus on reconnaissance missions.

“The proliferation of MQ-9B in Europe delivers commonality between NATO countries and for Germany, it will provide opportunities for interoperability with their fleet of P-8As,” said Linden Blue, CEO of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.

Interoperability with allies was an important factor in the purchase decision, the German military said, adding that they would benefit from learning from British and Belgian experience with the aircraft type.

Poland will soon join the club, too, after signing a $310 million contract for MQ-9B SkyGuardian systems in December 2024.

Berlin’s new focus on maritime surveillance comes at a time of heightened presence of Russian naval assets, both military and ostensibly civilian, in the waters of the North and Baltic Seas near Germany. In July of last year, the government announced a new mission to put pressure on the Russian shadow fleet of tankers used to circumvent EU sanctions and continue financing the war in Ukraine.

“The more complete the picture, the sooner we can cooperate with our partner countries in the Baltic Sea region to take appropriate measures,” said German Transport Minister Patrick Schnieder at the time.

The Bundeswehr announced the move in a press release late Thursday. According to the military, first units of the Luftwaffe – Germany’s air force – have already arrived in Belgium, where they are investigating the situation on the ground and coordinating with the Belgian armed forces. Further German forces would “soon follow,” the military said.

Belgium had requested assistance from Germany following a “significant increase” in sightings of unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles, including in the vicinity of Belgian military facilities, according to the German government.

Germany was the only country capable of helping “immediately and comprehensively” with the neighboring country’s “considerable drone problem,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told Defense News on Friday.

The first of several drone sightings over Belgium occurred on Oct. 31 at the Kleine-Brogel military air base, followed by sightings near civilian airports that have disrupted air travel in the following days.

Kleine-Brogel hosts sensitive military assets, including U.S. nuclear weapons. Other air bases that have experienced drone sightings in early November also includes the airbase that Belgium’s freshly-delivered F-35 fighter jets are currently located at.

Belgian authorities have said they had “little doubt” that a state actor is behind the incursions, with Russia being named as a suspect in intelligence circles, Belgian media reported.

In its statement, the German government described the troops it was sending to Belgium as “specialized forces of the air force for the detection of and defense from small unmanned aerial vehicles.”

The defense ministry in Berlin described the mission as being of “limited duration,” though it did not specify how long it was planned to continue. The Bundeswehr’s press office declined to provide additional details about either the duration of the mission or the units involved.

The German defense ministry emphasized the speed of the deployment, saying that it proved the close cooperation within NATO and European solidarity in “dealing with hybrid threats.”

The score will be calculated based on ten criteria identified as crucial in successfully developing drone capabilities, including the availability of relevant infrastructure, access to dedicated financing, and the number of full-time drone operators working within the region.

Starting next year, participating in the scoring will be mandatory for all of Russia’s constituent parts except what the Kremlin calls the “new regions” – the unilaterally annexed parts of Ukraine. In its first iteration in 2025, a total of 47 regions participated. Ranked highest was the south-central Russian Republic of Bashkortostan, also known as Bashkiria.

A previous Defense News investigation revealed how drone makers in Bashkiria were benefiting from generous public contracts and pivoting from producing agricultural drones to loitering munitions for use in war.

Runners-up in this year’s ranking included the Samara, Sakhalin and Novgorod oblasts, as well as Ulyanovsk and Yamalo-Nenets. Moscow ranked ninth and Saint Petersburg came in twelfth, although it scored highest in the category of industry-relevant infrastructure, Russian media reported.

The initiative has been promoted by Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Vasily Shpak as an explicitly civilian project, aiming, as he says, to help build a new sector of the economy based on unmanned aerial vehicles. He has said that the rating system, in addition to assessing regional readiness for the mass deployment of UAVs, should help shift public perception of drones away from their military associations and towards civilian applications.

Nonetheless, the technology is inherently dual-use, and raising capabilities for civilian drone production would also provide a significant boost to any potential non-peaceful applications. Existing Russian drone programs with officially civilian aims have, on several occasions, found military applications, including in Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine. This includes civilian drone makers selling their products for military use, all the way to government projects for training school children to build and operate drones.

In 2023, Russian authorities unveiled a program for the development of unmanned aviation in the Russian Federation by the end of the decade. The government is investing between 660 billion and 1 trillion Rubles ($8.2 billion to $12.4 billion) in the initiative, with additional funding streams and programs available for specific drone-related projects.