Notably the country aims to put Sfera communications satellites into orbit — an analogue of the American-made Starlink and the British OneWeb constellations. Roscosmos previously sought to launch more than 600 systems into space as part of this project, but budget cuts prevented this. Now the agency is eyeing 360 satellites, although Borisov said the goal ought to be at least 1,200.

The government has agreed to approve 180 billion rubles (U.S. $2 billion) for 162 satellites. However, thus far the state has allocated 95 billion rubles, and a strategy meant to further develop the domestic communications sector up to 2035 calls for the launch of six geostationary satellites.

Sergei Prokhorov, who leads the Sfera project, recently said there is money set aside for four of them.

Is this practical?

While Borisov, who spoke July 3, is aiming for the production of at least 250 satellites per year for various purposes, the country currently makes about 15 annually — despite an existing capacity to manufacture about 40 each year.

Roscosmos’ goal is unrealistic, according to Pavel Luzin, a space policy expert at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank. He noted the satellites will likely serve several functions, including optical observation, communications, meteorology, radar and television service.

“All the serious satellites that Russia has launched into space since 2022 were produced using imported Western electronics purchased no later than the mid-2010s, before the first sanctions,” Luzin told Defense News, referring to economic restrictions placed on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

“It turns out to be a fundamental contradiction: Russia has a big problem with satellite production, but at the same time Russia declares that in just a couple of years it will be able to produce [250] high-quality satellites for various purposes per year and is already mastering the technologies of their conveyor production,” Luzin said. “This simply does not happen.”

Russia can find components on the world market for the production of several satellites, but not enough to produce hundreds, Luzin added. “The heads of companies report that despite the sanctions, the industry is alive, although in fact they may not know where to get components for hundreds of satellites.”

Indeed, Borisov had said “industry is functioning relatively stably” amid the sanctions.

Amid the war, the state has adjusted its satellite production priorities, focusing heavily on dual-use satellites — that is, ones that provide military and civilian services.

Among its priorities are the optical reconnaissance satellite Razdan; a radar satellite for marine reconnaissance for the Pion-NKS constellation; two radar satellites, dubbed Obzor-R and Kondor; and several Glonass communications satellites.

Denis Banchenko, a former employee of Roscosmos, told Defense News that “a significant part of the planned satellites, and most likely all of them, will be used in the interests of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation for intelligence, surveillance, navigation and communications purposes.”

The projection comes amid a demographic crisis of an aging population, factors that run counter to the government’s trumpeting of expanded weapons production and construction of new plants while the war against Ukraine enters its third year.

According to the former deputy prime minister and head of Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov, the entire Russian defense industry will lack 400,000 workers in the near future.

Irina Sokolova, a specialist at a Moscow recruitment agency who asked that her employer not be revealed, said there are fewer incentives available to fill the ranks. “In 2022-23, the Russian defense industry attracted almost the entire possible personnel reserve by increasing salaries,” she told Defense News. “It is becoming more difficult to recruit specialists; unemployment in Russia is only about 3%. Defense companies are already enticing personnel from each other.”

Firms have tried to increase cooperation with universities and technical schools to prime the personnel pump, according to aerospace industry analyst Vasily Brevnov. But finding management staff adept at navigating the pressure of the Ukraine war is another story.

“With the beginning of a special military operation, many heads of defense industry enterprises were not ready to work in the new realities,” Brevnov told Defense News, using the government-prescribed parlance for the war. “In some cases, drastic personnel decisions were needed.”

For example, business leaders were unfamiliar with available subsidies and credit opportunities or were unable to find alternative suppliers in the wake of Western sanctions, he said.

Managers were also used to running their businesses without paying attention to the needs of their engineers, according to Sergey Smyslov, an independent defense industry analyst. In addition, according to Russian media, the courts are considering the cases of former heads of various defense companies who are accused of fraud, embezzlement and abuse of authority.

Finally, the government’s legislative and regulatory framework is slowing down many production processes, increasing time, costs and hindering technological solutions, analysts interviewed for this article said.

The sanctions squeeze has especially hit those industries in which Russia has long relied on Ukrainian products or established channels for obtaining Western components, according to Brevnov and Pavel Luzin of the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank. Affected industries include aviation, space, shipbuilding and machine tool construction.

Scrounging for parts

While high-end radar components may now be hard to source for Russian arms makers, there is a large market of old but hardy parts that is nearly impossible to regulate, according to Michael Jerdev, a Russian aviation expert.

“If you look at the database of electronic components found in Russian weapons by Ukrainians, you can see a great conservatism in the use of electronic components in military equipment,” he said. “The mass of electronic component samples is literally 25 years old, massive and saturated in the secondary market, which is almost impossible to control with sanctions.”

Crucial equipment has continued to make its way to Russia since the beginning of the war — or has been there all along. Kirill Sypalo, general director of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, said in November 2022 imported machine tools made up the vast majority of equipment in his organization, with producers hailing from Germany, Sweden and Israel.

In total, foreign manufacturers accounted for up to 50% of the electronic components used in rocket and space technology systems and up to 70% in satellite production, an engineer at the state-owned enterprise Russian Space Systems told Defense News, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal planning assumptions.

Vitaly Egorov, an independent expert on the Russian space industry, said “new sanctions in electronics led to the suspension or significant postponement of the launch dates of various spacecraft.”

“Roscosmos itself or the Russian industry is not able to create a full-fledged replacement, and all the hopes of Russian cosmonautics are connected either with China or with parallel imports, that is, essentially gray schemes to circumvent sanctions, but this leads to significant losses of time and money,” he added.

Heavily dependent on foreign parts, Russian naval shipbuilders are now looking to source components from manufacturers in China, India, or Iran through shadow import schemes, a leading researcher at the state-owned enterprise Kant, who asked that their name not be revealed, told Defense News.

Alexey Migalin, the chief executive of marine equipment seller NavMarin, said in an interview with Kommersant newspaper that radars, satellite-based navigation receivers and related devices are manufactured in Russia, but based on Chinese technology.

China to the rescue?

At the Neva 2023 International Exhibition and Conference in St. Petersburg, the head of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, Petr Vanyukov, said 60 of his employees are embedded all over China to scout equipment officials hope could replace the entire ecosystem of sanctioned Western technology.

In September 2023, at a meeting of the Council of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Konstantin Babkin, president of the Rosspetsmash Association, said there is practically no production of hydraulics components, needed for making tanks, in Russia. Similarly, local makers of bearings and electronic parts can only produce up to 25% of the required volume, he added.

At the same time, it is not profitable to produce those parts in Russia, Babkin said, adding that the tax burden in China is lower and loans are cheaper.

That explains why many experts interviewed for this article said the scheme of import substitution is still weak. The head of Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, stated in a June 2022 article for RBC “replacing everything is pointless, economically inexpedient and simply impossible.”

In a study by the Russian Higher School of Economics, more than 60% of executives polled said they are confident that within two to three years they will only partially be able to forego using foreign equipment, technologies and raw materials.

Machine tools play a crucial role in the production of numerous types of weapons and military equipment. Well before Russia’s invasion in 2022, the country’s machine tool industry had been in crisis.

Last year, the government approved a program to provide loans to machine tool builders at an interest rate of 1% per year. The government plans to inject 300 billion rubles (U.S. $3.2 billion) into the industry by 2030. Rostec aims to reduce the import of machine tools by half.

In an effort to obtain foreign components and technologies, Russian metalworking company Stankomashstroy plans to open a machine tool factory in China.

But Asian-made machines are considered to be of lesser quality. Mikhail Prokopyev, an expert on robotics at SofPol, speaking at the Russian Industrial Week event held in Moscow in October, said Chinese equipment is usually less durable and less precise than Japanese and European equipment.

Parallel imports and smuggling are also used by Russia. According to Russian independent investigative journalists from The Insider, there are examples of a private foreign company purchasing microchips from Analog Devices or Texas Instruments, both U.S. companies, and reselling them to a Russian private importing company.

Russian officials are hedging against the semiconductor flow drying out completely. Analysts have observed large-scale import activity of equipment from China, amounting to a future repository that could serve production needs for one to two years, said Luzin, the CEPA analyst.

All told, the Russian defense industry, while firing on all cylinders, is behind the technology curve as Chinese substitutions turn out to be lackluster. As a result, it is easier for Russian industry to reproduce old Soviet models of equipment, rather than create technically more complex Armata tanks and Su-57 aircraft, Luzin said.

This was Shoigu’s second inspection of an Almaz-Antey property this year, having visited another facility in June that makes anti-aircraft missiles, the government news agency Tass reported.

During the more recent tour, Shoigu and the head of Almaz-Antey emphasized the effectiveness of the S-300, S-350 and S-400 air defense systems amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, there was no mention of the more advanced S-500 Prometheus air defense system.

Russia has sought the S-500 as a means of countering hypersonic weapons, and it would be able to reach farther into enemy territory. The weapon is expected to defeat threats at a range of 600 kilometers (373 miles), according to the Center for International and Strategic Studies think tank, whereas the S-300 and S-400 can reach 150 kilometers and 400 kilometers, respectively.

As far back as 2018, President Vladimir Putin called for the mass production of the S-500. However, its manufacturer appears behind.

According to Michael Jerdev, a Russia military expert, international sanctions levied against the country may be negatively impacting work on the air defense system.

“Russia can multiply the production of air defense missiles, primarily missiles of the 48N6 family, as they are technological products with minimal dependence on foreign components,” said Jerdev, referring to the primary missile series for the S-400. “As for the production of anti-aircraft complexes and radars themselves, their production has a long cycle and depends on the supply of foreign electronic components, which obviously does not allow them to be produced around the clock.”

Furthermore, an Almaz-Antey employee said, the company is experiencing “problems with machine tools and a shortage of components.”

“The enterprise’s [production rate] has increased,” the source told Defense News on the condition of anonymity to speak freely, but “there are not enough workers.”

Meet Prometheus

Developing aerospace defense capabilities has been a major component of Russia’s State Armament Program since 2020.

The program is meant to lead to the deployment of 100 battalions, which include 800 launchers made up of S-350, S-400 and S-500 systems. Under the latest iteration of Russia’s State Armament Program, also known as GPV-2027, funds are to go toward the production of the S-500 Prometheus. The previous iteration, GPV-2020, laid out efforts to create, produce and maintain military equipment.

Russia began developing the S-500 in 2010, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which tracks the status of air and missile defense systems. In 2011, Russia unveiled plans for two new plants to produce the S-500; they opened in 2016. According to Russian media, one S-500 system would cost an estimated $700 million to $800 million in 2020, and up to $2.5 billion dollars in 2023.

In 2019, production of the S-500 began for the Aerospace Forces, according to the head of Russian defense conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov. The Defence Ministry and local company Almaz-Antey signed a contract for the supply of more than 10 S-500s in 2021, with the first delivery expected in 2022, Tass reported during the 2021 MAKS air show.

Also in 2021, the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army, whose primary mission is the defense of Moscow, received its first S-500 system. However, the system arrived in a reduced configuration that did not meet the full requirements of the defense force. Experts who spoke to Defense News specifically cited the lack of exoatmospheric missiles.

“Almaz-Antey and other air defense manufacturers are currently producing products aimed at meeting the needs of a military operation,” Jerdev said. “Neither the S-500 nor the Abakan air defense system have targets in Ukraine — the ballistic missiles — so their production is not a priority.”

Launch capabilities

Available information about the S-500 indicates it can defeat threats at a range of 600 kilometers (373 miles) and an altitude of up to 200 kilometers (124 miles). But Russian media recently reported the S-500′s range is closer to 500 kilometers and can reach an altitude of up to 100 kilometers.

Defense News was unable to independently verify either of the specifications.

According to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the S-500 can launch several interceptor missiles, including “the 40N6M for use against aircraft and cruise missiles, and the new 77N6 and 77N6-N1 to counter ballistic missiles or satellites.” The 40N6M has a range of 400 kilometers, while the 77N6 series interceptors can reportedly reach a range of 500-600 kilometers, the think tank found.

“Initially, the S-500 was positioned as a system better than THAAD [the U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system] with the possibility of exoatmospheric interception. At the same time, it had to be more compact than the S-400. However, the S-500 does not turn out to be more compact,” Pavel Luzin, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis think tank, told Defense News. “In addition, the 40N6 rocket, which is equipped with the S-500, is already used in the S-400 and is not unique.”

In 2014, reports noted the S-500 was to launch 77N6-H and 77N6-H1 missiles. Since then, the development of the former was confirmed, but the status of the latter, meant to be able to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit and feature a low-yield nuclear warhead, is unclear.

“According to its characteristics, the S-500 seems to be superior to the S-400, but it falls decently short of THAAD — there is no exoatmospheric interception. The dimensions of its 77N6-N anti-missiles are smaller than the PRS-1M/53T6 missiles of the Nudol [anti-satellite] system, [therefore the former’s] interception height is lower,” Luzin said.

According to a Russian colonel who spoke on the condition of anonymity for safety, the second stage of the 77N6-N anti-aircraft missile is identical to the second stage of the 9M82MV missile used by the S-300′s V4 variant. The first stage has aerodynamic controls that maintain efficiency only in the upper stratosphere and lower mesosphere layers, about 50 kilometers above Earth’s surface, the colonel added. If it were to maneuver in low orbit areas, the 77N6-N would require a compact and light third combat stage, but there is no such stage.

Experts interviewed by Defense News doubt the 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 missiles can provide the S-500 with the accuracy required for its mission. These missiles were supposed to be the first Russian missiles with inert warheads, but the domestic industry has been unable to acquire the necessary quality of electronics, Luzin and the colonel each told Defense News.

Furthermore, the minister of industry and trade, Denis Manturov, said in June that the S-500 will be able to intercept hypersonic missiles. However, the S-500 has not undergone testing for this capability, the colonel explained, and it doesn’t appear Russia has target missiles that would mirror the characteristics of a hypersonic weapon.

Plans for an S-550

The State Armament Program is also expected to accomplish by 2027 the creation of the S-550, an anti-missile and anti-space system with improved detection capabilities and a greater range compared to the S-400 and S-500. The Aerospace Forces are to receive the S-550 by 2025.

Putin in November 2021 emphasized the importance of supplying S-550 systems to the military during a meeting with defense and industry officials, according to Shoigu.

That same month, Chemezov, the Rostec chief executive, said the S-550 would feature a longer detection range and improved missile range compared to existing air defense systems.

Experts interviewed by Defense News differed in their assessments of the S-550′s potential capabilities, but did agree the system will complement the capabilities of the S-500, and that its main purpose will either be to defeat hypersonic targets or satellites.

There is currently no evidence Russia has developed the S-550.

MOSCOW — Russia will finish modernizing the missile defense systems protecting its capital by the end of the year, according to Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.

The announcement comes amid the war in Ukraine, which has entered its second year. And earlier this week, Russia said a Ukrainian drone crashed and caused a fatal explosion in a town 175 kilometers (109 miles) south of Moscow. Ukraine did not immediately comment on the report, while Russia’s Defence Ministry said the drone crashed after an electronic jamming system disabled its navigation.

Russian state-run news agency Tass said authorities identified the drone as a Ukrainian Tu-141. The Soviet-era drone was reintroduced in Ukraine in 2014 and has a range of about 1,000 kilometers.

Shoigu made the announcement about Moscow’s defenses at a board meeting of his ministry this month. In 2023, he said, the country will form an air defense division and brigade, a special-purpose air and missile defense brigade, and an anti-aircraft regiment with the S-350 surface-to-air missile complex.

Developing aerospace defense capabilities has been a major component of Russia’s State Armament Program since 2020. That effort has accounted for about 17.5% of the 3.4 trillion rubles (U.S. $44.3 billion) spent on the program since it began in 2011.

The program is meant to lead to the deployment of 100 battalions, which include 800 launchers made up of the S-400, S-350 and S-500 missile systems. Under the latest iteration of Russia’s State Armament Program, also known as GPV-2027, funds will help with the production of the S-500. The previous iteration, GPV-2020, laid out efforts to create, produce and maintain military equipment.

Currently, Russia’s air and missile defense forces control 1st Air and Missile Defense Army, which defends Moscow and the central industrial district. The 1st Air and Missile Defense Army has regiments equipped with S-300 or S-400 systems, but Shoigu said the force is to receive S-350 weapons.

In total, according to the 2018-2027 timeline for the State Armament Program, Russian forces will receive 12 battalions of the S-350 to replace the S-300. Six S-350 launchers are already in service, but the 1st Air Missile Defense Army has not yet received this weapon.

Regarding the planned special-purpose air and missile defense brigade, Russia will arm the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army with the S-500, which can counter ballistic missiles.

The S-500 has been under development since the early 2000s. In 2011, Russia unveiled plans for two new plants to produce the S-500; they opened in 2016. In 2020, analysts with the Russian military news outlet Avia.pro estimated one S-500 — including launchers, radar, the command post, missiles and technical vehicles — costs $700-800 million.

In 2019, production of the S-500 began for the Aerospace Forces. The Defence Ministry and local company Almaz-Antey signed a contract for the supply of more than 10 S-500s in 2021, with the first delivery expected in 2022. The 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army received the first S-500 prototype in 2021, but no delivery took place last year.

Shoigu also said his ministry will put the space control station Razvyazka on combat alert this year. This is a replacement for the Dunai-3U long-range radar station, which was in service from 1978 until the early 2000s. The Dunai-3U is located in the Chekhov district of the Moscow region, where the Razvyazka is based.

The Razvyazka early warning radar will complement the existing Don-2N radar station, which has operated around Moscow since 1989 and received upgrades in recent years.

Russian company Radiofizika said at the MAKS military conference in 2021 the Razvyazka is a P-band radar whose main purpose is cataloging and working with high-orbit space objects. According to the company, about 1 billion rubles went toward developing this radar in 2014.

The State Armament Program is also expected to accomplish the following tasks by 2027:

• The creation of the S-550, an anti-missile and anti-space system with improved detection capabilities and a greater range compared to the S-400 and S-500. The Aerospace Forces are to receive the S-550 by 2025. However, Russia hasn’t announced test launches.
• Designating the A-235 Nudol anti-missile and anti-satellite system as one of the top defense priorities. The ground-based, mobile, non-nuclear system should be capable of hitting objects in orbit at a maximum altitude of 700 kilometers (435 miles). Russia is creating it to replace the Soviet-era A-135 system. The A-235′s 12th test launch took place in December 2022 at the Sary Shagan test site in Kazakhstan.
• Delivering Pantsir S-1 anti-aircraft weapons to Russia’s air and missile defense forces to protect the other systems defending the country. A total of 507 items will be delivered to the Aerospace Forces this year. According to Shoigu, about 85% of the Aerospace Forces’ equipment will be modernized versions by the end of the year.

The Associated Press’ Karl Ritter in Kyiv, Ukraine, and Kirsten Grieshaber in Berlin contributed to this report.

The Defence Ministry’s Kupol constellation of satellites — an integrated space-based detection and combat control system — was designed to help the country track ballistic missile launches. Also known as EKS, Kupol serves as a replacement to the Soviet-era Oko and Oko-1 systems, which were operational from 1982 to 2019.

Russia wants at least 10 Tundra satellites in high-elliptical orbit — as well as a number of geostationary satellites — to support EKS. In late 2016, then-First Deputy Commander of the Aerospace Forces Lt. Gen. Pavel Kurachenko said the service planned to have all 10 in orbit by 2020.

But that year, the government-published newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported the Defence Ministry had plans to deploy a total of 10 by 2022. And around the same time as that report, a ministerial newspaper cited the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, then-Col. Gen. Sergei Surovikin, as saying the deployment of a group of orbital spacecraft for EKS is envisaged by 2024.

“The launch rate will be dictated by the need to replace aging or defunct satellites,” according to Bart Hendrickx, a longtime observer of Russia’s space program. “The minimum constellation they need for round-the-clock coverage is four. But it’s always good to have some redundancy, not only to safeguard against satellite malfunctions but also to reduce the chance of false alarms.”

Following the launch of the fourth Tundra satellite in May 2020, the general director of local aerospace company Energia announced the EKS constellation had reached “the minimum standard strength.”

While development of the EKS system began in 2000, it wasn’t until seven years later that the government signed a contract with Energia to supply the system. But repeated changes by the ministry to tactical and technical requirements caused production delays, according to the company.

Hendrickx said the main reason for delays “must be production issues.”

“And one can be fairly sure that these have to do largely with the sanctions,” he told Defense News, referring to economic restrictions placed on Russia as a result of its ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Space tech

Russia launched its first Tundra satellite in November 2015 on a Soyuz-2.1b rocket with a Fregat upper stage. The country planned to launch two satellites per year, but only launched one each in 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022.

Part of the production problem involves microelectronics, which are critical for satellites. Russia is heavily dependent on foreign components for space technology, which in and of itself causes delays, a manager of a Russian defense company told Defense News.

“Due to constant changes in suppliers and components, it is necessary to conduct new tests of systems every time, and evaluate them for the required characteristics of the Defence Ministry. This entails delays,” the source said, speaking on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic.

“At first it was Western electronics; after 2014, it became electronics from China and Southeast Asia to a greater extent,” the source said. “In some cases, Chinese devices were purchased, from which microelectronics were extracted and installed on Russian devices.”

In January, the head of Russian space agency Roscosmos, Yuriy Borisov, claimed that despite Western sanctions preventing the supply of microelectronics to the country, China has agreed to sell components meant for rocket and space-related technology. As for completely replacing foreign equipment on satellites, Nikolai Sevostyanov, adviser to the director general of Roscosmos, estimated it will take at least five years.

Another issue for the Russian government is the quality of the Soyuz-2.1b rocket’s Fregat upper stage, which has encountered at least five technical problems over the past nine years.

Celestial placement

Pavel Luzin, an independent expert on space militarization, said it’s unlikely Russia will deploy the entirety of Tundra satellites by 2024.

“Rather, one launch per year will be continued. That is, they will complete the launch of satellites into the Molniya orbit no earlier than 2026,” he predicted, referring to a medium Earth orbit best for observing high latitudes.

According to NASA, a satellite in that orbit takes 12 hours to complete its orbit, but spends about eight hours of that over one hemisphere. In the Molniya orbit, a satellite moves in an extreme ellipse with the Earth close to one edge.

An integrated space system, like the EKS, performs best with satellites both in a high-elliptical orbit and a geostationary one. According to Surovikin, “the deployment of a high-orbit space reconnaissance system should begin from 2023.”

But Russian production of geostationary satellites is lagging behind other advanced nations. In Energia’s annual report for 2017, the company suggested the satellites were still in their design stage.

“Geostationary satellites seem to have a different payload and may even have a fundamentally different design. That may also be causing problems,” Hendrickx said.

The Angara vehicle

Russia chose the Angara launch vehicle to send the EKS constellation’s geostationary satellites into space to complement the Tundra systems. In 2020, the Defence Ministry signed a deal with space launch vehicle manufacturer Khrunichev Center for the production of four Angara-A5 rockets during the 2022-2024 time frame.

But when the ministry didn’t receive any rockets in 2022, it sued the center. The courts have so far ruled that the company pay the government nearly a third of the ministry’s monetary claim.

The ministry also sued Energia in 2019 over development disruptions related to a new Persei-KV upper stage for the Angara-A5. The court has since ruled in the government’s favor, though not to the extent sought by the ministry.

During the last launch of an Angara-A5 in 2021, the designers tested a Persei upper stage, but it was unsuccessful.

In September 2022, a representative of Khrunichev Center said full-fledged serial production of the Angara family would begin in the city of Omsk by 2024.

It was announced in 2015 that production would move from Moscow to Omsk. Vladimir Nesterov, who provided design services to Khrunichev and died late last year, wrote in his book “Space rocket complex Angara: History of creation,” published in 2018, about the impact of the move.

“The established production cycle was disrupted, three large enterprises numbering about 16,000 people were withdrawn from the developer, production ties were undermined, development work suffered,” according to the engineer.

But despite delays and the absence of geostationary satellites for EKS, Russia’s defense minister said the launch of the sixth Tundra satellite means the country can now continuously monitor priority areas “in the Northern Hemisphere” — a subtle reference to the United States and its North Atlantic allies.

“At the same time, the current generation of satellites has a guaranteed period of at least seven years,” Luzin said. “But they can serve further beyond the warranty period.

“The problems are likely to be with their planned renewal, which in any case will need to start [around] 2025-2030.”

Russia recently attacked Ukraine using Kalibr cruise missiles, among other projectiles.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Tuesday the future Lada-class submarine Kronstadt, which is under construction, will be able to fire Kalibr cruise missiles. That same day, state-run news agency Tass reported the corvette Steregushchiy will receive a new Kalibr-NK missile system during modernization work at the Kronstadt Marine Plant.

And Mikhail Budnichenko, CEO of the shipyard Sevmash, said earlier this month the nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov will be armed with Kalibr-NK missiles, following repairs and modernization work.

Submarine construction

The keel laying of the diesel-electric submarine Kronstadt took place in 2005, but construction was suspended. It resumed in 2013 and is ongoing, after which the boat will join the Northern Fleet.

The transfer to the fleet was planned in 2019, but was postponed several times due to noncompliance with Defence Ministry requirements. The fleet will likely take delivery of the boat this year, according to the Russian naval policy expert, who spoke to Defense News on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

The submarine is expected to have a launcher that can hold 10 Кalibr missiles.

“Thanks to the Kalibr missiles, submarines will be able to hit not only land and sea targets, but also submarines,” the expert said.

Defense industry experts in 2017 estimated the cost of the Lada-class sub at $350 million, but increased the approximation to $700 million in 2018.

Corvette update

The corvette Steregushchiy was produced under the shipbuilding program dubbed Project 20380. It and the other ships made under that effort were equipped with the Uran anti-ship missile system, which consists of two four-container, inclined launchers with an ammunition set of eight Kh-35U missiles.

Now the lead ship of its class, the Steregushchiy — constructed 17 years ago — is undergoing a midlife update, during which it will receive a universal shipborne firing complex 3S14. That technology will allow the vessel to launch Kalibr missiles and, eventually, hypersonic Zircon missiles.

“The next ships of this class will also receive Kalibr missiles in the course of their modernization,” the naval expert said.

In an interview with a corporate newspaper, the CEO of the Kronstadt Marine Plant, Anatoly Beloev, said modernization of the Project 20380 corvette will not begin until the end of the spring or the beginning of the summer. By that time the plant is required to hand over a large landing ship to the Defence Ministry, which would make room for new projects. The timeline for the modernization work is not yet determined, Beloev said.

Per annual reports from the shipyard Severnaya Verf, which makes corvettes, it appears the cost of such as vessel in 2016 was 17-29 billion roubles (U.S. $224-382 million).

Warship work

The nuclear missile battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov has undergone repairs and modernization since 2013. More than 150 enterprises have participated in the effort.

Last year, the installation of systems and equipment took place. The cruiser is currently at the outfitting quay, and it will begin trials in the spring of 2023, Budnichenko told a corporate magazine.

Delivery to the Navy was postponed several times, and the service is now expected to receive the ships in 2024.

As part of the modernization effort, the ship will carry 10 3S14 launchers, with eight Kalibr-NK cruise missiles in each, instead of 20 heavy supersonic Granit missiles.

In total, there will be 80 attack missiles on the vessel — a record number for the Russian surface fleet, according to the naval expert.

The Kalibr missile family is made up of several variants, including long–range cruise missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes. Russia decided as far back as the 1990s to equip naval platforms with the weapon.

Almost all newly built and most upgraded units receive this system, the naval expert said.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

The Norwegian Intelligence Service released its annual report on Feb. 13, in which it noted that Russia is increasingly turning to its Northern Fleet to provide regional deterrence.

“The Northern Fleet’s naval forces will continue to carry out routine fleet exercises, longer submarine patrols in the Barents Sea and submarine operations in the Atlantic Ocean. The supply of new silent multi-role submarines increase the fleet’s capacity in the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic Ocean,” the report stated.

The Northern Fleet is made up of 26 submarines, 10 surface combatant ships, 16 patrol and coastal vessels, eight mine warfare/mine countermeasure ships, and eight amphibious platforms, plus fighter jets, anti-submarine aircraft and air defense systems, according to the 2023 Military Balance report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Russian Defence Ministry says the fleet has six ballistic missile submarines in service, and one is under repair while three more are under construction. There are also four cruise missile submarines, plus three under construction, per the ministry.

Pavel Luzin, a visiting scholar of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Tufts University, said Russia is completely rethinking its maritime approach amid bids by Sweden and Finland to join NATO.

“The Baltic Fleet generally loses all meaning, and Moscow on the contrary will try to strengthen the Northern Fleet and will look for ways to asymmetrically respond to NATO,” Luzin told Defense News.

As for the Northern Fleet’s aircraft inventory, it will likely retain its numbers and conduct activities as usual, the Norwegian report read. Meanwhile, with Russia’s strategic bombers focused on the invasion of Ukraine, Norway will likely see less of those aircraft near its sovereign territory, the report stated.

In October 2022, media reports cited satellite photos showing seven Tu-160 and four Tu-95 aircraft at the Olenegorsk air base, about 100 miles from the border with Norway.

“Because the importance of nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence forces is increasing, the Northern Fleet’s defense of the military bases on Kola, the northern bastion and the Barents Sea will also become more important,” the agency wrote.

In a Feb. 16 update to the report, the agency explained it does not foresee any change in the way Russia is arming the Northern Fleet’s surface ships.

Luzin noted that if Russia does kick off an effort to arm additional Northern Fleet vessels with nuclear weapons, it would do so with the introduction of new Borei-class and Yasen-class submarines, and with the battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov after it returns from repairs.