The sea service “is exploring the industrial base’s capacity to deliver highly capable, autonomous platforms optimized for operations from Ford-class and Nimitz-class Nuclear Aircraft Carriers,” according to the RFI. The response deadline has been set for Aug. 13.

The drones the service is targeting, part of the Air Wing of the Future Family of Systems, can be designed as “a single-role platform, a multi-role platform, or a modular FoS [family of systems],” according to the service.

But whatever the solution, the Navy wants the platforms to be capable of performing eight different missions: strikes against surface ships, strikes against land targets, anti-submarine warfare, air-to-air combat against enemy aircraft and missiles, electronic warfare, ISR, aerial refueling, and resupply flights for a naval task force.

The service is soliciting “industry expertise to identify a mix of platforms that can provide affordable mass, risk-tolerant platforms that can perform the above missions to counter current and emerging threats,” the request states.

The RFI lists a few specific requirements, including a minimum 1,000-nautical mile range for strike missions.

Drones must also possess “flight autonomy (e.g., carrier pattern, taxiing) and mission autonomy (e.g., dynamic tasking/retasking, threat evasion, automated aerial refueling) maturity.”

Additionally, they must be compatible with existing Unmanned Carrier Aircraft control systems, according to the RFI.

Significantly, while the RFI mostly focuses on carrier-based drones, the Navy also wants vertical-takeoff UAVs that can operate from other types of vessels, such as destroyers and mobile sea bases.

“The Navy is interested in novel concepts that can operate from any air capable platform in addition to the CVN (e.g., DDG, ESB) using Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL),” the RFI said.

The RFI is indicative of the Navy’s desire to eventually move on from fourth-generation carrier air wings to an air wing composed of fifth- and sixth-generation manned and unmanned aircraft.

The new drones “must demonstrate increased combat effectiveness over current fourth generation platforms at a given spot factor.”

The Air Wing of the Future, as designed, appears to be modeled for an old-fashioned battle of attrition, in which combat is waged by affordable — and expendable — drones rather than a handful of expensive platforms.

Contractors responding to the RFI are asked to “detail how your production approach supports rapid scaling and elasticity in a surge scenario,” and what techniques they will use to “keep unit recurring flyaway (URF) and sustainment costs within sustainable limits.”

Companies should also explain how their proposed designs will minimize maintenance requirements and fit into existing naval supply chains, according to the RFI. Potential manufacturers should also submit “planned capital investments (CAPX) or Internal Research and Development (IRAD) commitments to mature the solution.”

The Air Wing of the Future Family of Systems is part of the Trump administration’s Golden Fleet expansion plan for the Navy.

Existing family-of-system drone projects include the MQ-25A Stingray tanker and the Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or CCA.

The search comes after dozens of MQ-9s were swatted out of the sky during the Iran war, according to a May 13 Congressional Research Service report.

With the Air Force currently possessing about 135 Reapers — which cost approximately $30 million apiece — such a loss rate is not sustainable, especially against a force like Iran, whose air defenses are less sophisticated than those of China or Russia.

“The Joint Force’s reliance on low-density, high-value ‘exquisite’ (>$30 million) manned and unmanned aircraft is unsustainable against adversaries utilizing layered defenses enabled by increasingly low-cost antiaircraft capabilities,” warned the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation for a new drone, which the Pentagon wants to “execute missions that the MQ-9A performs today.”

Rather than build a better Reaper, DIU is opting for an expendable replacement. The Massed Modular Aircraft, or MMA, project aims to develop a UAV designed to operate in such large numbers that it can absorb heavy losses and still overwhelm enemy defenses.

Particularly of interest is the size of the MMA. Drone swarms may be the next big thing in unmanned warfare, but generally those hordes are made up of small, inexpensive UAVs with limited range and payload.

But the DIU solicitation envisions a drone that has long range and a heavy payload — and is still inexpensive enough for mass production. The solicitation calls for a payload of at least 2,800 pounds, a bit less than the MQ-9’s 3,800-pound capacity.

The MMA should also have an unrefueled combat range of at least 2,300 nautical miles, according to the solicitation, and a one-way transfer range of at least 8,000 nautical miles. Additionally, the drone should reach speeds of at least 200 miles per hour and have the ability to operate from a 6,000-foot runway or improvised airstrips.

The DIU solicitation states that the drone should have “sufficient available size, weight, power (25kW), and cooling (5kW) to host a variety of internal and/or external payloads,” with a level of autonomous operations that would allow one operator to control several drones.

The solicitation does not specify the MMA’s dimensions, though the specifications suggest a drone comparable in size to the MQ-9. It also did not list a desired price point, though presumably it would be less than the $30 million price tag of an MQ-9.

The timeline for the MMA project, meanwhile, is ambitious. DIU is calling for “full-scale prototype flight testing within 21 months of award, with a targeted Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY2031. IOC for MMA is envisioned as 20 mission-ready aircraft delivered to an operational unit, able to be deployed.”

Pentagon solicitations continue to reflect a mindfulness of lessons from the Ukraine War, as well as the experiences during the Iran War. In both conflicts, the defender exhausted interceptors before the attacker ran out of drones.

“Keeping a constant airborne MMA presence to launch weapons, gather intelligence, perform electronic warfare missions, or relay communications will force an adversary to stay on the defensive,” DIU said. “This relentless pressure will exhaust the adversary, forcing them to burn through expensive anti-aircraft missiles and resources faster than they can be replaced.”

But berthed in port — or sailing on the surface while transiting to and from port — these powerful yet fragile boats can be sitting ducks for drones, mines and even anti-tank rockets.

What once seemed the plot of thriller novels has become reality. Ukraine claims it successfully used an underwater drone to damage a Russian submarine in the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk last year. Guerrillas and terrorists lurking along a waterway could use anti-tank guided missiles or handheld anti-tank rockets to ambush an unwary sub.

To face the new threat, the U.S. Navy is looking to develop better methods of protecting its missile subs, as well as the shore installations that support them.

These defenses include “prototype technologies to detect, track, identify, deny, and defeat unmanned systems across all domains,” according to a Sources Sought announcement. “This area seeks scalable solutions for shore-based installations and afloat operations in Port, Harbor, Littoral, and Waterways (PHLW) and open ocean environments.”

The Navy is also searching for ways to escort and protect its missile subs as they transit to and from port.

The goal is to “ensure the zero-failure secure movement of strategic maritime assets,” the announcement said. “This area seeks advanced maritime situational awareness, physical security enhancements for escorting SSBNs [nuclear missile subs], and the detection, avoidance, and mitigation of maritime mines, and the defeat of direct-fire kinetic threats (e.g., shore-launched ATGMs/RPGs) during transit through PHLW to and from dive points.”

The threat of anti-tank weapons even extends to the truck convoys hauling ICBMs to sub bases. The Navy is interested in active protection systems — sensors and shotgun-like launchers mounted on armored vehicles to destroy incoming anti-tank rockets — “for ground transport and convoy operations of strategic weapons and equipment.”

Other security items in the Sources Sought announcement, which lists 22 “focus areas” that the Navy’s Strategic Systems Program wants to address, include sensors to protect harbors. The Navy is also interested in security robots, including “Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) for waterside patrol, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) for perimeter screening, and robotic inspection platforms that seamlessly integrate with existing response forces.”

Artificial intelligence has also emerged as a threat in the form of drone swarms or cyberwarfare.

The Navy is searching for countermeasures that “focus on defeating autonomous swarms, disrupting AI-enabled Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) directed at nuclear facilities, and hardening strategic security networks against AI-driven cyber-physical attacks or spoofing.”

The best defense for submarines is simply not to be detect in the first place. To that point, the Navy is seeking “prototype technologies that may mitigate the generation, radiation, propagation, and scatter of a variety of signal types (acoustic, chemical, optical, electromagnetic, radiological, hydrodynamic, and cyber) associated with submarine and unmanned system operations, to include both peacetime and wartime operations.”

A Naval Air Systems Command Request For Information posted on July 1 is asking industry whether it is capable of supplying up to 600 Advanced Emission Suppression Missiles per year.

In February — before the Iran War and the consequent guided missile shortage — NAVAIR posted a Sources Sought notice that stated “production demand is expected to be on the order of up to 300 [all up rounds] per year.”

The new RFI asks for a “mature design” of at least technological readiness stage 6 — the fully functional prototype stage.

“The U.S. Navy is seeking to enhance its capabilities to suppress and neutralize enemy air defenses in contested environments,” the RFI said. “This effort aims to identify and potentially acquire a weapon system focusing on extended range, advanced targeting, counter-countermeasures, and integration with existing and future platforms.”

Both the RFI and the earlier Sources Sought share some details. The Navy wants an “advanced anti-radiation seeker with broad frequency coverage” and the “ability to target modern and advanced radar systems.”

The AESM should be compatible with the F/A-18 E/F and the EA-18G, as well as being capable of mounting internally and externally on the F-35. It should also require minimal maintenance, and have at least a 15-year service life and more than 500 captive carriage flight hours.

But the RFI does not include several specifications contained in the Sources Sought. In particular, the Sources Sought asked companies to “describe ability to engage air-to-air and air-to-ground targets.”

The RFI doesn’t mention an air-to-air capability for the AESM. Nor does it repeat the Sources Sought call for an anti-radiation missile “with a longer range than existing in the Navy’s current inventory.”

The Navy’s existing anti-radar missile, the 1980s AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM, has a range of up to 80 miles, depending on the launch aircraft’s altitude.

The AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range, or AARGM-ER, has a longer range. But amid development delays — including problems with the rocket motor and software — the Navy has paused procurement for the AGM-88G, with limited procurement set to resume in Fiscal Year 2028.

The U.S. has sent HARMs to Ukraine for use against Russian air defense radars. However, the Ukrainians are replacing them with domestically produced attack drones, perhaps out of concern over the limited number of HARMs received.

His famous Observe, Orient, Decide, Act — or OODA — Loop described the mental cycle by which combatants, from fighter pilots to generals, assess and react to a constantly changing situation.

Those with a faster OODA Loop could exploit opportunities while their befuddled opponents struggled to understand what was going on.

Germany crushed France in 1940 largely because of a sluggish French command system that was always one OODA step behind the swift panzer divisions. More recently, OODA might explain why tactically rigid Russian tank columns were decimated by outnumbered but agile Ukrainian troops in 2022.

Had the Soviets invaded Western Europe during the Cold War, NATO would have relied on OODA — plus airpower and more advanced weapons technology — to stop the Soviet steamroller.

To the troops watching waves of Soviet tanks roll into the Fulda Gap or the North German Plain, OODA would have been just a buzzword. But NATO needed every advantage it could get to compensate for superior Soviet numbers and firepower.

Flashpoint Campaigns: Cold War, published by Matrix Games, is a computer wargame that depicts a hypothetical Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany in 1989.

But it is more than just another World War III wargame. Flashpoint Campaigns is the OODA Loop gamified. In fact, the game comes in two versions: the regular game for armchair generals, and a professional edition for real soldiers.

Flashpoint Campaigns is a 2-D map game, with NATO platoons and Warsaw Pact companies waging battalion- to division-sized battles. Set in the twilight of the Cold War, much of the hardware — such as Abrams and T-72 tanks, and Bradley and BMP infantry fighting vehicles — are still around today.

Players issue orders to their troops, such as movement, direct fire, calling in artillery and airstrikes, combat engineering operations and resupply. For example, a tank platoon can be ordered to head to a crossroads via a series of designated waypoints along the route.

Units can be given standard operating procedures, or SOPs, such as determining at what range to open fire, when to change firing position and when to retreat. Enemy units are usually invisible until spotted. With Late Cold War weapons so devastating, combat is deadly and proper concealment and reconnaissance a must.

After a player finishes issuing commands, they can hit the start button. A game clock then appears and a certain number of minutes elapse, during which units try to fulfill orders.

It all sounds like a straightforward process — until OODA intervenes.

Unlike many wargames, players in Flashpoint Campaigns can’t give orders to their troops at will. Instead, only at certain intervals does the game clock pause and allow commanders to issue fresh orders. This reflects the time it takes for the command system to collect information, analyze it, reach a decision and pass a new order to subordinates.

Like an object in motion in Newtonian physics, units will try to execute their last set of orders until new instructions arrive. That tank platoon heading down the road toward a village will keep going toward that village until told otherwise, even if the tactical situation has changed.

This is where NATO’s OODA advantage kicks in. The NATO player might have to wait, say, for 14 minutes of game time to elapse before issuing fresh orders. For the Soviets, the delay might be 23 minutes, or about 50% longer.

This means that NATO will have more opportunities to give new orders than the Soviets do. In turn, this means NATO troops can more quickly react to new threats such as enemy forces on their flank, or exploit discovery of a gap in the enemy’s lines.

It also means that NATO can be more flexible in its planning, rather than having to anticipate the tactical situation far in advance.

“We all know what happens when plans make contact with the enemy,” Robert Crandall, president of On Target Simulations, which designed Flashpoint Campaigns, told Military Times. “NATO spent considerable efforts to train for what happens after that contact and to respond faster than their counterparts. This could let them operate inside the Warsaw Pact command loop and outmaneuver them.”

But even NATO has OODA problems in the game. The presence of electronic warfare, in which the Soviets invested heavily, lengthens the interval before a player can give orders. Units engaged in combat will require 50% more time to react to new orders.

And commanders who send too many orders to their troops will receive an unpleasant surprise: too much radio traffic reveals the location as a headquarters, marking it for an artillery or airstrike.

Indeed, some U.S. Army experts today worry American command posts are so chatty that they will be targeted in wartime.

As battles progress in Flashpoints Campaigns, and units takes losses and headquarters are disrupted, command delays will inevitably lengthen for both sides.

Clausewitz’s “friction of war” will become an impediment, though a bit less so for NATO. Commanders on both sides will have to grit their teeth and accept that they can’t control their troops as they would like to.

Would NATO’s tighter OODA Loop have been enough to defeat the Soviets?

“One of the nicest compliments the game received came from a former Warsaw Pact officer who said he played the game using strict Warsaw Pact doctrine and won,” Crandall recalled.

“If the Warsaw Pact player has figured things out correctly, his initial plan will not have needed much, if any, adjustment and just rolls along at maximum speed. His opponent will be wrong-footed and at the mercy of the OODA Loop to react in time. With the fast-moving, hyper-lethal forces of 1989, good luck with that.”

In some ways, Flashpoint Campaigns is a memorial to another era.

The year 1989 was the twilight of 20th Century mechanized warfare. With the threat of drones paralyzing battlefield maneuver in the Ukraine War, discussing OODA’s influence on tactics seem almost quaint.

And yet, there is a reason why there is a global arms race today to develop smarter AI, quicker kill chains between sensors and weapons, and tightly networked forces that can act faster than the enemy.

Every year, the OODA Loop seems to tighten, with less margin to fall behind. As OODA reminds us, time is too precious a commodity to squander.

The Marine Corps wants to develop robots that can do the grunt work of laying down the matting used to quickly construct Expeditionary Airfields, or EAF, in amphibious beachheads and other remote locations.

“Currently, assembling EAF matting is a manual process carried out by Marines — a task that is physically demanding, labor-intensive and exposes personnel to potential hazards,” explained the Small Business Innovation Research proposal, which has a deadline of June 3.

The project, titled “Automated Expeditionary Airfield Assembly,” calls for robots capable of operating on “uneven or unstable surfaces.” They must also “manipulate and position heavy EAF mat sections with precision” while enduring “harsh environmental and operational conditions,” according to the proposal.

The Marine Corps envisions robots with sufficient autonomy to “navigate and control without human assistance, which includes obstacle avoidance, path planning and grasping,” according to the SBIR.

Contractor solutions will be expected to explore “various robotic configurations — such as mobile manipulators and assistive technologies — for their effectiveness in EAF mat handling, alignment and interconnection across diverse and austere terrains,” the proposal states.

Phase I of the project involves demonstrating “the technical feasibility of a robotic system capable of automating or augmenting the assembly of EAF prefabricated surfaced aluminum (PSA) Flat Top-Nested (Top-N) Trackway mats.”

Robots will be evaluated on metrics such as “payload capacity, reach, manipulation precision, power consumption and operational endurance,” according to the proposal.

Phase II calls for a functional prototype capable of automated or semi-automated operations.

“The robot shall be able to handle the PSA mats in some manner to aid in the assemble of the airfield, be a closed system and able be able to operate in a realistic environment,” the SBIR specified. “The system will be judged on feasibility, time to assemble, ease of use and overall size and mass.”

Phase III requires a deployable system for field testing. The SBIR emphasizes that the robot “will undergo hardening against electrical, environmental and cyber threats.”

“The resulting system must demonstrate sustained operation in deployed environments, achieving significant reductions in manning requirements, operational costs and/or deployment time,” the proposal states.

The Marine Corps has been working to ease the difficulty of expeditionary airfield construction, including adopting commercial lightweight matting.

Meanwhile, robotics companies are developing robots optimized for construction work, including four-legged and even two-legged humanoid robots.

For airport operations, Japan Airlines is testing humanoid robots for baggage handling.

The C-UAS Close-In Kinetic Defeat Enhancement project focuses on aided target recognition, or AiTR. This uses concepts such as AI, machine learning and computer vision to create a system that can detect threats — and distinguish them from non-threats such as birds — faster than a human operator can.

The first phase of the project is aimed at remote weapons stations, and specifically the ubiquitous Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, or CROWS, turrets fitted to a variety of military vehicles.

“The primary objective is to accelerate the engagement timeline, initially focusing on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), with a secondary focus on other threats like vehicular and man-sized targets,” explained the Defense Innovation Unit solicitation. The deadline is May 15.

Prototypes must “demonstrably improve” the ability of current remote weapons stations to detect, track and engage Groups 1 and 2 — targets with a weight of 55 pounds and under.

Detection should be at ranges greater than 600 meters, and engagement at a minimum of 100 meters. The system should be effective against drones moving at speeds of at least 30 meters per second, or 67 miles per hour, per the solicitation.

The second phase of the project seeks to boost C-UAS capabilities on “both moving and stationary platforms, including ground and maritime environments,” the solicitation said.

Specifications include the ability to hit a Group 1 drone — under 20 pounds — moving at 7 meters per second, or 16 miles per hour, at a range of 50 to 200 meters. Weapons should be able to engage targets while depressed to minus 10 degrees or elevated directly overhead to 90 degrees, the document stated.

This requires contractors to provide a prototype that can “be fired in land and maritime environments,” the solicitation says, “rather than just a laboratory setting at time of pitch.”

Most noteworthy, meanwhile, is the third phase of the project: adding aided target recognition to small arms carried by dismounted troops.

“Desired solutions include systems capable of deflecting or self-aiming standard-issue rounds to increase hit probability against manually selected, transient targets, while integrating networked sensor and small arms fire control systems,” DIU said.

The system must be capable of engaging drones moving at least 7 meters per second, and “must be adaptable to dismounted legacy small arms, scalable across calibers and configurations, and maintain baseline weapon performance in the event of system degradation or failure,” the document states. “A semi-automatic, live-fire capable prototype is required.”

The final phase of the project seeks to improve integration between sensors and weapons.

“A commercial wireless edge network architecture that bridges to military systems and the reverse is essential across all stages of this effort to manage data transfer from sensors and weapon/fire control systems,” the DIU wrote.

The U.S. military is beginning to embrace aided target recognition. The Army is already testing small UAVs equipped with AiTR to help infantry squads control drones.

But the Pentagon is also aware that AI and targeting is controversial.

The DIU project specifies that there must be a human in the loop. Solutions must strictly adhere to DOD’s AI Ethical Principles. Non-compliance “will result in immediate disqualification,” DIU warned.

The two nations are seeking a comprehensive suite of commercial systems that can detect and destroy a variety of undersea robots, including unmanned underwater vehicles, remotely operated vehicles and semisubmersibles.

“Current solutions are fragmented, expensive, and limited in number,” warned the solicitation. The primary focus of the Robotic Exclusion and Engagement Framework, or REEF, project is to protect “ports and harbors from underwater threats of varying size and sophistication, while the broader goal is to protect all U.S. critical waterways.”

DIU envisions using off-the-shelf sensors, edge processing, active and passive sensors, sensor fusion, decoys and other technologies to create a stand-alone solution that can be quickly deployed as needed. This can include fixed systems such as moored buoys and buried cables, or mobile systems such as USVs, UUVs, UAVs and drifting buoys.

Sensors should be able to utilize artificial intelligence to discriminate between hostile undersea drones, versus nonthreats such as marine life, cargo ships and fishing vessels.

“The system must provide sufficient detection-to-response time for human in-the-loop decision-making such that underwater threats can be safely interdicted or neutralized,” the solicitation noted.

The system will employ kinetic and nonkinetic approaches to stop drones. Nonkinetic methods can include rapidly deployable nets, bubble curtains and synthetic barriers. Kinetic defenses can include kinetic payloads, acoustic directed energy and physical coupling devices.

Preference will be given to nonkinetic solutions, the solicitation said.

REEF will emphasize decoys to protect waterways and critical infrastructure. “Capabilities to confuse adversarial underwater craft are of high interest. These can be low-cost attritable systems or more technologically advanced systems that use signals to act as a decoy to prevent the successful completion of the adversary’s mission,” according to the solicitation.

REEF should require little training to operate, and use AI to provide users with suggestions. It must be compatible with existing U.S. command-and-control systems and common operating pictures.

Cooperation with the U.K. will be eased by a 2024 Department of Commerce interim final rule that allows some controlled items to be shared with Britain. British companies are eligible for export control relief under General Export Authorization No. 001.

The Geosynchronous High-Resolution Optical Space-Based Tactical Reconnaissance project — also referred to as “Ghost Recon” (as in the Tom Clancy novels and video games) — is intended to address a vulnerability in America’s space-monitoring capabilities.

The problem is that DOD “lacks sufficient satellites capable of providing high-resolution space-to-space imagery and maintaining custody of both friendly and adversarial satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO),” according to the solicitation.

Hence, the Pentagon is looking for commercial satellites that can be launched within two years after the contract begins. Within three years, those satellites would become government owned and operated. Within four years, they will have to demonstrate the ability to “perform at least one drive-by (Sub or Super Sync) or an inclined track design reference mission (DRM) per week through the first year of government operations,” the solicitation states.

The goal is relatively inexpensive and scalable designs, including space vehicles, satellite buses and payloads that offer “high-resolution space-to-space imagery and accurate object characterization,” DIU said.

“These systems must reduce costs compared to existing and planned programs of record while achieving high-resolution image collection, allowing for increased collection frequency and detailed characterization of resident space objects (RSOs) in GEO. The successful deployment of these capabilities will significantly improve GEO RSO Characterization, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), Positive Identification (PID), and Combat Identification (CID),” the solicitation notes.

DIU envisions a spacecraft that can move close to other satellites. The result would be “fully resolved imagery of an ESPA Grande-sized spacecraft and its key subsystems (i.e. star tracker, communications payload, mission payload) from a distance of no closer than 10 kilometers,” according to the solicitation. Ghost Recon satellites would also need to maneuver above or below GEO altitude to maximize solar lighting of the target.

Interestingly, DIU suggests satellites from other nations may be less than cooperative when it comes to having their picture taken, such as moving away from American space vehicles. The solicitation cites the possibility of using “several [space vehicles] to support collection of tasked RSO, [which are] used to support collection for uncooperative RSOs.”

While Ghost Recon satellites would mainly track space objects that have already been detected, they may have to search for targets themselves, including “detection and localization of untracked or non-cooperative RSOs,” according to the solicitation.

Contractors are asked to detail the capabilities of their designs, including the cost for a Ghost Recon satellite to revisit another space object every 30 days for 10 years. Companies must also specify slew rate, mission payload angular resolution and modular transfer function.

Minimum requirements include the ability to “successfully perform rendezvous and proximity operations,” according to the solicitation. Satellites must also be capable of operating for at least three years in GEO, meet National Security Space Launch medium and large standards for launch integration, and use Unified S-Band protocols.

Though DIU wants affordable spacecraft that can be deployed within two years, the solution mentions the possibility of refueling these platforms “to extend spacecraft lifespan, increase maneuverability for follow-on missions, and reduce replacement cadence.”

The project deadline is March 3.

And it wants them fast.

“Due to the urgency of the threat and the need to assess capability readiness,” the Defense Innovation Unit needs products in time for a spring 2026 demonstration a Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, according to a DIU solicitation.

“Invited companies may have 30 days or less between notification and execution of the demonstration,” the solicitation adds.

The project, titled “Counter UAS Sensing for Homeland and Mobile Defense,” seems aimed at both civil defense and battlefield protection.

The first track is protection of installations in the U.S. In this case, the sensors must detect Group 1 UAVs — the smallest category, weighing less than 20 pounds — at a minimum range of 2 kilometers.

A secondary attribute is the ability to spot Group 2 and 3 drones, or those weighing less than 1,320 pounds.

Sensors should also be able to screen out ground clutter and birds, according to the request.

“Solutions may employ single or multimodal sensing to enhance the radar solution, however the solution must include a radar sensor as part of the total proposal,” the DIU solicitation states.

The goal appears to be deploying sensors that can be used for both detection and destruction of drones, including “rapid integration capability with government designated CUAS fire control systems.”

The solicitation did not specify whether this would involve protecting military or civilian sites. However, it did state that systems must “operate safely near populated areas, within congested airspace, and across complex electromagnetic environments dominated by lawful emitters.”

The DIU project’s second track aims to provide mobile counter-drone sensors for small military units that are on the move. Equally important, these sensors themselves have to avoid being detected and targeted by enemy fire, which has been a problem for electronic warfare emitters in the Ukraine war.

“The solution’s ability to deliver early warning, allowing units to take protective action, is critical and depends upon a low physical and spectral signature to prevent targeting by enemy forces,” said DIU. “All sensing modalities are welcome, with preference for passive approaches.”

Sensors must detect Group 1 and 2 drones flying below 50 meters. Other desired attributes include multiple and redundant sensors, minimal setup time and “broadspectrum RF [radio frequency] sensing (e.g., approximately 400 MHz–8 GHz) for passive solutions, including adaptability to evolving UAS data links.”

DIU is also looking for robust systems that troops can maintain themselves.

“The system must reduce operator burden with intuitive controls for detection, tracking, and alert management,” the solicitation said. “It must be configurable and adaptable by tactical operators to the dynamic front-line RF environment without requiring support from engineering personnel.”

Interestingly, these C-UAS sensors seem aimed more at trucks and light vehicles than armored vehicles. The system, the solicitation states, must be capable of being mounted on the Infantry Squad Vehicle, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles and the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck.