The tracker was discovered while sorting mail on board, though only after Omroep Gelderland had been tracking the Evertsen for 24 hours, the broadcaster wrote on its website on Thursday. The Dutch Ministry of Defence said it’s taking measures in response, according to the broadcaster.

The tracker incident comes after a Le Monde reported in March it was able to locate a French officer taking a 7-kilometer run around the deck of the Charles de Gaulle while the carrier was at sea, through data from the officer’s connected watch via the running and cycling app Strava.

“You do want to be able to intercept such a tracker,” Rowin Jansen, assistant professor of national security law at Radboud University in Nijmegen, told Omroep Gelderland. “Commercial satellite images are currently released with a delay for good reason. You certainly don’t want to make it easy for terrorists to send a similar package and track a ship’s location in real time. You then run the risk of having missiles fired at you.”

The broadcaster described sending the Bluetooth tracker, a gadget used for example to find keys, to the frigate in an envelope using the military postal service, following online instructions from the MoD on how to send mail to military personnel.

While the ministry checks whether prohibited or dangerous items are sent by mail by X-ray scanning packages, Omroep Gelderland noted that online videos showed envelops not being scanned, so decided to pack the tracker in a postcard, with the gadget going undetected and simply mailed.

“In a large-scale conflict, everyone needs to ask themselves: What can I contribute to the safety of our men and women?” said retired Lt. Gen. Mart de Kruif, as cited by the broadcaster. “So you should no longer rely on existing rules, but on what is necessary. We’re still a bit naive, and that mindset needs to change.”

Omroep Gelderland mapped the route of the tracker from the Dutch naval base in Den Helder to Eindhoven Airport, and then on to the port of Heraklion in Crete, where webcam images showed the Evertsen moored at the quay.

With the frigate departing the port on March 27, the broadcaster said it was able to track the vessel sailing west along the coast of Crete before setting an eastward course. The tracker then went permanently offline 24 hours later near Cyprus, it said.

The MoD has made adjustments in response to the reported incident, including no longer allowing greeting cards with batteries to be sent to the Evertsen, and the ministry will further review the guidelines for military mail, a spokesperson told Omroep Gelderland.

The tracker was found during mail sorting aboard the frigate after it set sail, and while the vessel could be tracked at sea, this would not have posed an operational risk, according to the MoD.

Defence Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz informed parliament about the incident on Thursday evening, Omroep Gelderland said.

Meloni said Starlink offered advanced technology and, unlike European collaborative satellite program IRIS2, was ready.

“This is a European problem,” she said, adding the European Union “did not get there in time to have public technology able to secure this communication.”

Italy is in talks with Starlink, part of Musk’s SpaceX aerospace business, to use its 6,700 satellite constellation in a reported five-year, €1.5 billion ($1.55 billion) deal.

“Space X has illustrated to the government its technology that allows secure communication nationally and globally which means for us guaranteed communications with our diplomats and military missions abroad,” Meloni told reporters in Rome on Thursday.

She said no decision had been made, and that talks were also being held with other private operators, but said Space X had “the most advanced technology.”

She added, “There are no public alternatives.”

Meloni said, “Tomorrow there will probably be public entities able to guarantee the protection of communication. Today there are not.”

On Monday, Elon Musk said he was “ready to provide Italy the most secure and advanced connectivity.”

The European Union has signed to develop an array of 280 satellites known as ISIS2 which will offer encrypted satellite communications to governments, but it will not be ready until at least 2030.

Meloni said that she considered relying on a private operator to protect sensitive military data less than ideal, but could not wait for IRIS2.

“There are two scenarios and neither is optimal,” she said.

Fabiana di Porto, an expert on Innovation and Regulatory policy at Rome’s Luiss University, said, “Musk’s satellites are cheaper than IRIS2 and there are more of them, but the security aspect is important since we are talking about government communications in the hands of a private operator.”

She also pointed out that Italian state-controlled defense champion Leonardo had a stake in IRIS2.

Meloni said that Microsoft had previously worked on data centers in Italy, adding, “no-one complained.”

She said, “Is the problem with Space X that it is private, or is it the political ideas of Elon Musk?”

Handing control of Italy’s military satellite communications to the U.S. tech tycoon has prompted sharp criticism in Italy from opposition politicians given Musk’s recent use of his social media platform X to lambast governments in the U.K. and Germany.

Meloni has forged a friendship with Musk, recently calling him a “genius.”

“I value investments overseas through one lens – national interest – and not through friendships or political ideas,” she said, adding, “I have never talked to Elon Musk of this project.”

The last few years have been some of the bloodiest in recent memory, and defense budgets, at constant threat of being cut in peacetime, are now increasing. None of this is welcome news, but it is a fact of the present moment, and we must act accordingly. TAHIS means taking steps to ensure the military is not just well drilled, but equipped with and supported by the latest in technology.

For the decision-makers at the Pentagon, that has meant turning to the private sector, with which the Department of Defense is looking to form partnerships. The aim is to integrate private sector technology into military operations, covering both training exercises and real-world scenarios.

The primary objective is to ensure that essential satellite-based capabilities – such as communications, navigation, surveillance, and missile detection – are maintained and improved by private enterprises with surplus capacity, particularly during wartime. In the communication area, this should include all the latest satellite communication options for redundant, high speed connectivity: LEO constellations, MEO, and GEO connectivity and also include not only traditional RF links but also leverage the latest Gigabit speed Free Space Optical Communications, both between satellites in space and through optical ground stations back to earth. The name for this program is the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR).

Its inspiration is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, which allows the government to use commercial airlines for transportation needs in emergencies. It came about in 1952, after aircraft were commandeered for the Berlin Airlift, and has been activated three times since, most recently in 2021.

With Russia locked in bloody conflict in NATO-backed Ukraine, and U.S. intelligence officials warning of an attempted Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the U.S. has good reason to pursue its new strategy. The U.S. Space Force Space Systems Command Commercial Space Office and Colonel Knisley have been laying the groundwork building over the past 12 months.

That the focus is space is key. China recently landed its unmanned Chang’e-6 aircraft on the moon, planting the Chinese flag, pointedly, in the Apollo crater – named for the original U.S. moon landing. It recently launched four high-resolution remote-sensing satellites and plans to launch ten more by the year’s end.

Space tends to grip the public imagination, but these forays are not driven by vanity. China, like the U.S., like Europe and like the other main players on the world stage, understands that Space is now one of the key arenas in a potential conflict, and a key driver of innovation across the board. And while the U.S. remains the preeminent space and military power, China’s rapid advancements are narrowing the gap.

The Pentagon’s overtures to private companies in the U.S. and allied countries reflects this understanding: that space is now a crucial battleground. Satellites form the backbone of modern military infrastructure, supporting vital functions like precise navigation and secure communication. And these advancements have largely been driven by the private sector, where the pursuit of profit spurs continuous innovation and the shedding of inefficiencies.

By collaborating more closely with private enterprises, the military simultaneously ensures access to cutting-edge technology and weaves a robust safety net. This partnership is crucial for maintaining technological superiority and operational readiness.

This is a very intelligent move by the DoD. Clearly, the leadership recognizes that its unique expertise and resources are best invested in areas not available in the commercial market. For many space capabilities, rather than build proprietary technologies, it can tap commercial products and take advantage of innovation and development from allied partners.

This has the secondary benefit of improving interoperability – that is, the ability of the U.S. and its allies to work together, exchanging technology and knowledge for mutual benefit. In this respect, the U.S. is drawing on ideas which have been tried and tested effectively in the private sector. ‘Network thinking’ is a familiar phrase in Silicon Valley. The Pentagon is now putting it to use in a military context.

The current global landscape is marked by increasing volatility. Accompanying that volatility, the U.S. is no longer the only nation that has substantial space capabilities. This makes continuing to foster cutting-edge space capability in the interest of the U.S and all of its allies. With significant capability in the commercial space sector, the CASR program is one of the programs that can tap the commercial innovation and capabilities in space and foster continued innovation. In tapping commercial innovation, it’s important to recognize the significant space contributions available from U.S. allies.

And the U.S. clearly recognizes this: the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) collaborates with the national space operations centers or headquarters of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The CASR program can be a meaningful step forward for the U.S. towards developing commercial space capabilities and a cost-efficient surge capability should the need arise.

It’s in the interest of all allied countries and believers in freedom to commend the Pentagon for this strategic shift. By engaging with the commercial space sector from both domestic suppliers and our allies, it’s highlighting the importance of space in any future conflict, and the role it has to play in shoring up U.S. military and technological superiority. The CASR initiative also exemplifies the forward-thinking approach that has helped the U.S. military to become what it is today.

Jeff Huggins is president of Cailabs US Inc., a supplier of photonics products for the space industry.

A vehicle equipped to that effect, made by United Arab Emirates-owned and Estonia-based Milrem Robotics, will be unveiled at the company’s during Eurosatory 2024 trade show that begins next week, according to a company statement,

Specifically, a THeMIS variant devoted to cargo transportation will feature the Starlink hookup, a constellation of internet satellites operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. Milrem has given more than dozen THeMIS vehicles to Ukrainian forces.

The Estonian company sought out the expertise of the Dutch datalinks firm AEC Skyline for the integration of the vehicles’ latest add-on feature, Milrem said.

“By leveraging satellite connectivity, the THeMIS robotic vehicle, which is currently assisting Ukrainian soldiers in the war with Russia, can seamlessly transmit data, receive commands, and relay vital information in real-time, regardless of its location on the battlefield,” the Milrem statement reads.

Using the Starlink satellite system requires a ground terminal, which SpaceX started shipping to Kyiv only hours after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, according to the BBC. As of June 2023, the British broadcaster reported that there were tens of thousands of terminals in Ukraine, including 500 bought by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Starlink satellites operate in low-Earth orbit at less than 600 kilometers (370 miles) above the earth, according to the company. Being closer to Earth translates into better performance for the system’s intended applications.

Last month, Russian Telegram channels published photos of what they alleged showed a badly damaged, captured model of the combat robot. A Milrem spokesman declined at the time to comment, stating only that the company was aware of the images.

In a December 2023 paper for Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Spacepower, former U.S. Space Command Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. John Shaw posited that the U.S. must build a dynamic and dominant force specifically for future military space operations.

“The paradigm of positional space operations must be replaced by a paradigm of dynamic space operations, where spaceborne combat forces are no longer static and predictable,” Shaw said in the paper.

While the paper lays out the importance of maneuver to dynamic space operations, or DSO, that concept alone isn’t sufficient to address demands of orbital warfare. The Space Force must take a more expansive view of DSO to include several other principles of warfare — starting with concentration of force and flexibility — in order to protect U.S. interests and achieve military objectives in space.

Putting a finer point on DSO

As our adversaries posture to make space the next battleground, agencies including the Space Force will play a pivotal role in defining how dynamic U.S. operations become. But what does DSO really mean for this scenario?

Put simply, DSO gives spacecraft the ability to move from a static role to one where they can act in real time to defeat any threats, assure combat effectiveness, or provide alerts about any anomalies outside of their regular mission.

This happens through three main capabilities:

Concentration — The ability to distribute or centralize military effects at the right place, at the right time, and in such a way as to achieve a decisive result. Given the expansiveness of space, DSO will not have the ability to mass forces of traditional battlespaces. As such DSO will require the ability to take inventory of those assets that might support a desired and decisive result, in turn orchestrating them in some form of concentration that drives the intended military objective. These could be assets near and far with multiple capabilities and effects coming together to achieve a clearly defined objective.

Flexibility — The capacity to adapt plans and operations to account for unforeseen circumstances, ensuring success in the face of “fog and friction”. DSO will need to consider multiple options and generate potential courses of action in near real time to properly preserve freedom of action in space. Given adversarial action in the space domain is likely to be the precursor to any peer conflict, being able to quickly switch gears from peace time cat-and-mouse operations to full orbital warfare will be necessary. The success of being able to do so will likely act as a key deterrent and inhibitor to escalating adversarial action.

Maneuver — Giving satellites the mobility within or between orbits to evade threats or position near objects the U.S. may want to observe more closely. As Shaw suggested, Guardians will need to master the manipulation of energy, orbit, and angular momentum over time to move space assets into superior and enabling positions. This includes but is not limited to avoiding threats or projecting ISR capability. It becomes a key enabler to the concentration as well as flexibility principles.

These capabilities required to apply these principles to operations are important across the space domain, from being able to better collect information during specific missions to outfoxing a potential enemy satellite or weapons system.

Transitioning to DSO

The move to a broader definition and implementation of DSO can only occur by continuing to mature application of the principles of warfare to space operations. Using broadscale on-orbit experimentation will create the greatest and most rapid progress.

Taking such a course would greatly enhance our expectations of orbital warfare and strengthen education, training and exercises as well as the development of our tactics, techniques and procedures. Additionally, it would have the added benefit of triggering other countries’ SOSI systems and unique characteristics of their on-orbit behavior.

Implementation of such a strategy will require a conscious decision by Space Force leadership towards greater integration of the space acquisitions and operations communities. Together these two groups must rapidly iterate on technologies, system designs, and operational deployments.

Initial focus should target the key underlying capabilities inherent to the theory, including:

— On-orbit propulsion;

— Autonomous mission management and command and control;

— Advanced processing at the edge;

— Hi-fidelity on-orbit threat characterization, identification, and warning; and

— Precision guidance and navigation.

A second tier of capabilities will become more important over time, including on-orbit servicing and maintenance, and autonomous rendezvous and proximity operations.

Technologies like AI/ML and advanced processing will ultimately play critical roles in solving some of these challenges outlined above but are not necessary to capability deployment today. The Space Force and other defense agencies are taking steps in this direction with advanced algorithms and human-machine interfaces, but partners in the private sector have been maturing these capabilities to make sure they are reliable, affordable, effective and ready for use now.

By moving out to implement within Space Force practices and leaning on industry innovation, the U.S. can begin to implement and iterate today on those with a wider view of DSO, incorporating the key principles of warfare to military space operations without having to wait a decade.

Josh Hartman is Chief Strategy and Growth Officer of LightRidge Solutions and is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence.

This story has been corrected remove an extraneous word from Lt. Gen. John Shaw’s title in the second paragraph.

In the early days of the Defense Department’s pursuit of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, the focus was on full interoperability among and within all of the military services. Bryan Clark, director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, said the vision, while well-intentioned, was too broad in its scope.

“That was a little bit too ambitious for what the technology and our requirements and acquisition process can achieve,” he said June 5 at a virtual C4ISRNET Conference. “I think by building it from the bottom up to a larger aggregation, we’re going to see more success with JADC2 going forward.”

That bottom-up approach, Clark said, has meant that rather than try to connect everything, the department is addressing the most urgent operational problems through joint and service-level experimentation campaigns.

The military services each have their own versions of this. The Army calls its approach Project Convergence, the Navy Project Overmatch and the Air Force has the Advanced Battle Management System. The Chief Digital and AI Office also holds regular technology sprints through an event known as the Global Information Dominance Experiment, which bring together the services, combatant commands, Joint Staff and international partners to test out CJADC2 capabilities.

In February, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced the Defense Department had delivered a baseline CJADC2 capability that was validated through a GIDE event held late last year. The department hasn’t revealed specifics on what was fielded but Hicks said it was improving information-sharing in the field.

Mark Kitz, the Army’s program executive officer for command, control, communications-tactical, said during the conference that experiments like GIDE and Project Convergence have helped highlight the sensor-to-shooter connections that are highest priority for the services.

They’ve also led to a heightened focus on interoperability, which has yielded some tangible results, he said.

For example, during the most recent Project Convergence event that wrapped up in March, known as Capstone 4, the Army and the Navy directly integrated their kit and were able to bring together their data environments.

“And so, Project Convergence offered sort of this real opportunity for us to bring these capabilities together in a real operational way and . . . get through sort of the challenges of data interoperability,” Kitz said.

During the same exercise, the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management team, led by Brig. Gen. Luke Cropsey, brought a tool that allows the service to see how its air picture integrates with its sensing environment — a capability that could directly benefit the Army.

“The investments that Gen. Cropsey and his team were making were directly related to a gap in the Army’s architecture,” Kitz said.

Now in its fourth year, the service has increasingly turned to commercial solutions for enhancing resiliency. Thus far, Space Force has leveraged private sector contracts to proliferate and diversify its satellite constellations as part of an acquisitions strategy to exploit what it has and buy what it can.

While redundancy and diversification are crucial for resilience, commercial space systems are increasingly vulnerable to digital compromise. Cyberattacks have become the most cost-effective means for adversaries to disrupt satellites, ground stations, and user devices for accessing space-based networks. They are a constant, daily threat that spans competition and conflict. With the acquisition of new space based capabilities, including commercial elements, it is vital that these systems have adequate protections against cyber threats.

Now is the time for the Space Force to address system cybersecurity in commercial acquisitions.

Cyberattacks can target the ground, space, and user segments of space systems. One of the most impactful attacks—the hack of U.S. commercial company Viasat by Russia during its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine — exclusively targeted ground and user elements. Russian operators infiltrated Viasat administrators’ virtual private network (VPN) to access ground management networks and send out data-wiping software to customer modems through a fake update.

After rendering thousands of modems useless, the hackers overloaded Viasat servers with traffic to prevent customers from reconnecting to company services. This disrupted Ukrainian military communications relying on Viasat and caused blackouts for thousands of European customers.

Satellites themselves are also at risk. The Space Force’s recent Moonlighter challenge demonstrated that hacking a live, in-orbit satellite is no fantasy. A similar exercise sponsored by the European Space Agency reinforced the digital insecurity of satellites. More alarmingly, adversaries like China are building cyber capabilities to hijack satellites.

And the options for attackers are growing exponentially. An increasing reliance on commercial off-the-shelf software for internal satellite operation and the proliferation of private sector satellites provide greater incentives for hacking the private sector to access U.S. military data.

Given these challenges, the Space Force can address cybersecurity through acquisition by prioritizing the ground segment, incentivizing secure-by-design procurement, and regularly auditing supply chains for cyber hygiene. First, ground segments require greater emphasis. While “delivering ground before launch” is one of the service’s acquisition tenets, commercial efforts have focused on satellites to the detriment of ground systems.

The aggressive pursuit of launch capabilities without corresponding ground elements means the Space Force cannot fully exploit its new satellites. It also leaves ground systems more susceptible to cyber disruption.

For ground acquisitions, Space Force must design multiple smaller, focused contracts and enforce stricter deadlines leveraging all tools in the acquisitions tool kit. Major development failures and schedule delays only increase the exposure to cyber threats. For example, the Enterprise Ground Services program—meant to develop a unified ground system for military satellites—fell apart last year and was replaced with a smaller-scale plan for satellite command and control (C2).

The Advanced Tracking and Launch System Analysis System (ATLAS), which would replace Space Force’s 1980s-era computer systems for satellite C2, has also faced multiple delays over an inability to coordinate across disparate hardware and software elements. Similarly, the Next-Generation Operational Control Segment (OCX) for the Space Force’s newest Global Positioning System satellites is already seven years behind delivery.

Second, the Space Force’s new commercial acquisitions should prioritize systems that are “secure-by-design.” Cybersecurity standards are explicitly built into products from the outset, not as an afterthought. Secure-by-design should also extend through sustainment and maintenance to include deliberately planned security updates. Designing preemptive security features into product development will only enhance cyber threat-hunting initiatives like Space Force’s Digital Bloodhound program by elevating the baseline for security across systems.

The Space Force must incentivize secure-by-design through contract bonuses and prospects for follow-on work. Secure-by-design will require transparency into commercial satellite design and the software acquired to communicate within and across military space systems. Understandably, the Space Force has prioritized interoperability. Connecting the military’s disparate satellite networks makes for a more effective force. But greater communicability across networks also creates new attack vectors. Secure-by-design is critical to reduce vulnerabilities for new software solutions that must interact with legacy networks operating on outdated and insecure software.

Finally, the Space Force must have deep insight into the cyber risks to its supply chains. The complex and convoluted supply chains for space systems present multiple points of potential compromise for state-sponsored hackers to exploit. Early concerns about exposure to potential Chinese hacking did emerge with the 2014 Chinese acquisition of IBM’s personal computing business that underpinned OCX. The Russian hack of Viasat’s VPN service finally put upstream software vendor risks on the agenda. Despite numerous vulnerabilities, cybersecurity remains a glaring problem for the space industry and contractors have no common framework for network security, user authentication, systems management, and incident prevention and response.

Cybersecurity cannot stop after purchase. The 2020 SolarWinds compromise highlighted the need to regularly audit supply chains. Russian cyber operators infiltrated Fortune 500 companies and U.S. government agencies with existing SolarWinds contracts by corrupting a single software product upstream in supply chains.

The lesson for Space Force is that sustainment requires supply chain security verification at annual or semiannual intervals. The service must ensure that “safe” contractors remain safe over time and that products acquired from those companies are not critically dependent on components or vulnerable to disruptions from geopolitical adversaries.

Even as we get Guardians into orbit, Space Force remains a digital force reliant on satellite data. Prioritizing cybersecurity may result in higher initial costs and longer schedule times that clash with the Space Force’s drive to acquire commercial solutions cheaper and faster. Striking the right balance between these prerogatives will be essential for the implementing the service’s recently released commercial space strategy. But cyber protections are a necessary investment: paying more upfront reduces the costs of an adversarial comprise later through protection and mitigation. In a wartime setting, the last thing the U.S. wants is a collection of satellite networks that are easily crippled due to its own inaction.

Jason Blessing, Ph.D., is a Research Analyst at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. His research focuses on cybersecurity as well as transatlantic relations. All views are his own and do not represent the views of the Institute.

But budgets are tight, and that means that it’s crucial that the DoD prioritizes, and invests in the most essential technologies, not just for this purpose, but so it remains at the leading edge militarily and technologically, shoring up its position as the world’s foremost defense superpower.

One such technology is optical communication. Though the U.S. is investing in domestic laser R&D, the leaders in the field among its allies are in Europe. Photonics21, the European technology platform, points out that Europe’s market share is 16 percent of the global industry – second only to China.

And the broader European photonics industry is growing at three times the rate of the continent’s GDP. EU programs, including Horizon 2020 and its successor, Horizon Europe, have strengthened commercial photonics and photonics research through investment. There is also a broad network of research universities and institutions across Europe whose work undergirds the commercial applications of laser. The U.S. can make use of this robust photonics infrastructure in Europe to boost its defense.

But why optical communications? Because the dominant technology used for space-to-ground communication is still radio, which is fully mature and reliable but always at risk of interception and jamming in conflict scenarios. A satellite’s radio transmission to Earth can span across tens of kilometers, making it ideal for applications like satellite TV but less suitable for direct, point-to-point communications crucial in sectors such as defense. This is because anyone within the transmission’s reach can potentially intercept the signal, and the presence of ‘side lobes’ expands the detection area even further. Additionally, radio waves can interfere with each other, necessitating regulated and careful management of the radio spectrum.

On the other hand, laser communication technology, though not as widely recognised, offers alternative capabilities to RF radio waves in a number of ways. It can send data up to 1000 times faster than radio signals. Its inherent characteristics prevent signal dispersion or leakage with a footprint of just 12 meters from low-Earth orbit to the ground. Lasers are thus considered to have a ‘low probability of detection’ and ‘low probability of intercept’, virtually eliminating interference issues and making them very difficult to jam. This attribute is particularly crucial in conflict situations, where jamming radio communications could lead to dire consequences. And European companies have found solutions to what used to be laser’s Achilles’ heel – that it could not pass through atmospheric turbulence without degrading.

Given the current geopolitical volatility, DoD’s stated desire to preserve the resilience of its satellite systems, and the sophistication of European photonics, taking advantage of the investment and progress in optical communications systems from some of our strongest allies in Europe is the effective and efficient path to ensuring the U.S. maintains its edge as the foremost superpower. Another advantage of looking to Europe for defense technologies is that the U.S. can pre-empt any move towards protectionism – an ever-present temptation for the countries on the continent. However, the European Union has made ‘strategic autonomy’ one of its aims.

Though that aim of ‘strategic autonomy’ is worthwhile, it could inspire protectionist or semi-protectionist policies, which is one way to reduce dependence on other countries. This could be to the detriment, ultimately, of U.S.-European relations, including commercial relations. If the U.S. takes advantage of European research and development investment, then trade between these two great allied powers remains open. European businesses benefit in a way they wouldn’t otherwise. And the relationship is strengthened. Shifting geopolitical dynamics remind us of how important it is for the world’s free countries and regions to work together.

One reason for the technological and military sophistication of the U.S. is that it has always shown foresight and pragmatism in how it has procured services and solutions. When, before the turn of the century, the private sector began to show it could develop higher-quality technologies more cheaply and quicker than the DoD could, the U.S. welcomed it, and began to partner more aggressively with the private sector. With the world becoming more and more volatile, it’s essential that the U.S. shows a willingness to turn to new companies and new technologies, including those in Europe.

Jeff Huggins is President at Cailabs U.S. Inc., a maker a photonics products for the aeronautics, telecommunications, rarth-space laser communications, defense, and laser materials processing industries.

The Ball Aerospace-built satellite lifted off from Vandenberg Space Force Base April 11 on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. The spacecraft is part of the Weather Satellite Follow-on Microwave program, or WSF-M.

The launch is a first step toward modernizing the Space Force’s 60-year-old weather constellation, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. The legacy satellites’ sensors can measure things like moisture in the atmosphere, cloud cover and precipitation — data that the military uses to plan its missions. The last DMSP satellite launched in 2014.

The WSF-M satellite, which can detect wind speeds and tropical storm intensity and determine snow and soil depth, meets a portion of those requirements. A second WSF-M spacecraft will launch in 2028. The remaining capabilities will come through satellites developed through the Electro-Optical Weather System, with the first slated to launch in 2025 and the second in 2027.

The Pentagon has been trying for more than 20 years to develop a replacement for DMSP. In the ‘90s it kicked off the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. The effort was canceled after repeated cost and schedule breaches. Lawmakers canceled a second attempt, the Defense Weather Satellite System, in 2012 due to mismanagement.

The Mitchell Institute, a DC-based aerospace think tank, said in a November 2023 report that while those efforts were well-intentioned, their missteps have put the military at risk. In that time, the capability of the DMSP satellites in orbit has depleted, and the two remaining spacecraft are on track to run out of fuel in 2026.

“These back-to-back failed mission modernization efforts weakened an already obsolescing national security weather enterprise, burning through time and resources while doing little to produce the operational capabilities necessary to meet demand,” the report states.

The plan to split the DMSP requirements into two programs came in 2018, but the four-satellite mix is not the service’s final strategy for long-term weather coverage. The satellites, each designed to last at least three years, will serve as an interim capability as the Space Force determines how much of the mission can be met by commercially available weather capabilities.

Col. Rob Davis, Space Systems Command’s program executive officer for space sensing, told C4ISRNET the service plans to host an industry day later this month to hear ideas from companies about how their systems and sensors might meet Space Force requirements.

“There’s a lot of interest out there,” Davis said in an April 10 interview at Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Colo. “I’ve met with several companies this week that are developing commercial weather capabilities.”

Over the next year, the Space Force will weigh those options as part of a study that will inform its new space weather architecture.

The Mitchell Institute report recommends the service pursue a disaggregated architecture comprised of smaller, less expensive satellites as well as government-owned systems.

“Space Force recognizes that it can augment some of its space-based sensing capabilities with commercial services,” the report states. “While this is an important family of systems capability, it is not a substitute for a DMSP replacement system, nor does it provide the necessary organic space-based environmental monitoring capabilities DOD requires.”

The Space Development Agency, a Pentagon space acquisition organization, already has launched 27 low Earth orbit satellites for experimentation and demonstrations in the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture program, Derek Tournear, Space Development Agency director, said Monday here at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference.

Low Earth orbit satellites orbit about 1,200 miles above the Earth, compared to medium Earth orbit satellites, which run the Global Positioning System and are placed about 12,550 miles above the Earth.

Later in 2024 the second wave of low Earth orbit satellites will go into orbit, Tournear said. By the end of 2025, the program expects to have 160 satellites in orbit, the majority covering the globe to create connectivity across regions, more than two dozen dedicated to missile warning and a handful running missile control.

Marines and other military branches have relied on satellite communications for decades. But advances in low Earth orbit satellites deliver higher bandwidth and lower latency, or delays, meaning users can send more data faster.

Ukraine has relied heavily on company SpaceX’s commercial satellite Internet constellation Starlink to pass battlefield data throughout its war with Russia. The military version of the system is known as Starshield.

Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, began using the Starshield system recently, according to a March release.

The system allowed Marines to maintain communications services when weather forced power outages that shut down base fiber and cloud cover interfered with other satellite communications, said Maj. Tim Wrenn, 6th Marine Regiment communications officer.

During the September 2023 Archipelago Endeavor exercise, Marines used Starshield with the Swedish marines by mounting the device on a Swedish command and control boat.

“Having high bandwidth, low latency services on a mobile maritime platform allowed U.S. and Swedish Marines to prosecute fire missions and provide reliable and relevant information throughout the battlespace,” said Capt. Quinn T. Hemler, the assistant operations officer with 2nd Marine Division’s G-6 communications.

Marine Maj. Gen. Joseph Matos, commander of Marine Forces Cyber, said that satellite communications such as the Space Development Agency program enable both the crisis response mission of the Marine Corps and its ongoing Force Design changes that aims to better position the service for distributed, long-range operations.

“(Force Design) is really talking about modernization, bringing in new technologies, such as (Proliferated Low Earth Orbit) how do we incorporate that into what we do every day and how we fight,” Matos said.

While missile tracking is crucial, most Marines using the satellites are likely to see improved communication and less down time between transmissions as they pass data in training and operations between various platforms.

The Space Development Agency had demonstrated Link 16 connectivity using its satellites, Marine Corps Times’ sister publication C4ISRNET reported in November 2023.

Link 16 is the tactical data link used by the U.S. military, NATO and other partner nations to share tactical information such as text, voice and imagery.

The Link 16 application uses the “transport layer,” which is one of the layers that the Space Development Agency is developing along with the tracking, custody, navigation, support, emerging capabilities and battle management layers.

Once deployed, the transport layer, which holds most of the program’s satellites, will provide a mesh network of communications satellites that connect to each other and other space vehicles and ground stations, according to the Space Development Agency website.

The next batch of satellites is planned for 2027 and another for 2029, by which time the network is expected to have “full global persistence” and resiliency, Tournear said.

The program seeks to create a hybrid satellite terminal for troops to use. That would allow a user’s terminal to switch between the low Earth orbit satellites transport layer or use dedicated military or commercial bandwidths such as the satellite communication Ka and Ku bands, respectively.

The same terminal could also switch to use the Ka or Ku bands on MEO or GEO satellites.

The system would work much like multiband radios can switch between frequency bands for a variety of communications options.

Matos emphasized that while the low Earth orbit satellites program will give users new ways to communicate it still is only “part of the overall architecture.” If Marines can’t access those satellites for some reason, they need backup ways to conduct operations.

“We don’t own our own space assets,” Matos said. “We use what industry provides. If that’s not there then we have to look at other means of communication, single channel radio, troposphere, those are the systems we can control at the Marine Corps level.”