However, this vital task places engineers at significant risk, making the need for technological advancements — specifically remote-controlled and autonomous breaching devices — more pressing than ever.

Challenges for mounted combat engineers

Mounted combat engineers typically use vehicles to clear routes and breach obstacles. The U.S. Army’s Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV), a tracked, armored platform based on the M1 Abrams tank, is central to this mission. The ABV is equipped with systems for in-stride breaching of minefields and complex obstacles, such as a mine plow and the Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC), which allows for remote detonation of mines.

Though effective, the ABV has a significant vulnerability: It is a high-value target for enemy forces, increasing the risk to its crew. This makes it clear that the future of battlefield breaching may lie in autonomous or remote-controlled vehicles, which could reduce the exposure of soldiers to enemy threats.

Recent developments show progress in this direction. In 2021, the Army initiated a program to integrate teleoperation capabilities into the ABV. By 2022, the Army awarded a contract to Cybernet for a robotic system designed to allow remote operation of these vehicles. Prototypes have shown promise, successfully clearing obstacles during training exercises, and more developments are expected in the near future. To maximize the potential of this technology, the Army could also explore the creation of new military specialties focused on the operation and maintenance of remote-controlled breaching systems.

Challenges for dismounted combat engineers

While mounted engineers have significant support from armored vehicles, dismounted engineers face a more dangerous set of challenges. Often required to clear obstacles on foot, they must carry heavy equipment, such as grappling hooks and explosive charges, through hostile terrain. Without the protection of vehicles, dismounted engineers are highly vulnerable to enemy fire. Currently, remote-controlled robots and drones are used to detect obstacles from a safe distance, but these devices cannot carry out the full range of breaching tasks that dismounted engineers perform, such as placing explosives or clearing large obstacles.

The need for more advanced autonomous or remote-controlled breaching tools is clear. Such devices could enable engineers to clear paths and neutralize threats from a safe distance, significantly reducing the risk to soldiers. By bridging the gap between current capabilities and the demand for fully autonomous systems, the Army could better protect dismounted engineers while maintaining operational effectiveness.

The need for technological advancements

Both mounted and dismounted combat engineers face challenges in ensuring mobility for their units, and technological advancements offer a viable solution. Remote-controlled and autonomous breaching devices can help mitigate the dangers that engineers face while performing their essential tasks. The need for these innovations in modern warfare, where rapid adaptability and enhanced safety are crucial, has never been more apparent. By investing in the development of autonomous systems for both mounted and dismounted engineers, the military can increase the efficiency and safety of its combat engineering units.

As technology continues to evolve, the military must prioritize the development of remote-controlled and autonomous breaching devices. This will not only safeguard soldiers but also enhance the flexibility and effectiveness of combat engineers. The strides made in the field of remote-controlled breaching vehicles, particularly with the ABV, provide a strong foundation. The next step is to extend these advancements to dismounted operations, ensuring that engineers can safely and effectively carry out their missions on all terrains.

Embracing technological innovation will ensure that combat engineers remain equipped to fulfill their critical role in modern warfare. As lessons from current conflicts continue to shape military strategies, remote-controlled and autonomous devices will become indispensable tools for enhancing battlefield mobility, counter-mobility and survivability — ultimately ensuring the success of military operations.

Michael Hamilton is a captain in the U.S. Army currently pursuing a master’s degree in Geological Engineering.

However, the Naval Systems Command, or NAVSEA, strategy states the Navy must stay on schedule with maintenance to keep the service’s vessels seaworthy and combat-ready.

The new strategy, released Jan. 13, is key to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti’s ambitious goal of having 80% of the fleet ready to deploy at any given time by 2027.

On average, Navy ships remain in dry dock for up to one year, said Vice Adm. Jim Downey, NAVSEA commander, in a Jan. 16 panel at the Surface Navy Association’s symposium near Washington, Defense One reported.

If the new strategy is effective, that yearlong wait could be cut by two-thirds or more, meaning a 100- to 150-day wait for ship repairs, according to Downey, who guided the plan’s development.

That’ll mean extensive planning for work scope, what materials are available and ready for use and building a ready workforce at the same time, said George Whittier, CEO of ship engine company Fairbanks Morse, said on the panel, according to Defense One.

The NAVSEA “Enterprise Strategy” will address five core “lines of effort,” according to the service’s release:

• Accelerate force generation to deliver ships and combat systems.
• Generate readiness to maintain, modernize and sustain platforms.
• Generate, capture and use data to drive innovation.
• Strengthen the Navy team by attracting, retaining and growing the NAVSEA workforce.
• Strengthen the foundation, enhancing NAVSEA critical infrastructure.

“CNO depends on the NAVSEA enterprise to get the Navy’s ships, and their warfighting systems designed, delivered, maintained, and sustained to meet global national security requirements,” Downey said in the release. “So, NAVSEA is accelerating efforts to put more players on the field — that is, platforms, ready with the right capabilities, weapons, and sustainment support.”

The Navy has faced years of maintenance backlogs and ship shortages. In December, the Government Accountability Office found that a shortage of amphibious warfare ships has hindered various Marine deployment and training plans, Marine Corps Times previously reported. From 2011 to 2020, only 46% of the Navy’s amphibious class of ships were available at any given time, according to the government watchdog.

GAO recommended the Navy refine ship availability, build a joint-service plan, update the service’s ship maintenance policies and establish performance goals for implementing the amphibious readiness review recommendations GAO provided.

“Nothing was off the table when we started this process last May,” Downey said of the Navy’s five-part plan.

Downey, who took command of NAVSEA in January 2024, formed a Commander’s Action Group and a Force Improvement Office to have closer management of command priorities and enhance personnel skills and capabilities. The command also restructured its operational centers, according to the release.

In another organizational move, the command “decoupled” positions for its Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, or SUPSHIP, and its Industrial Operations, or SEA 04, according to the release. That allows the individual heads of the two areas for a more focused approach to their core duties.

“With more than 90 ships under contract, SUPSHIP has an expansive level of responsibility,” said Downey. “This new realignment puts SUPSHIP in a better position to oversee and administer the Navy’s new construction programs across the directorate.”

Having one individual responsible and accountable for both USCYBERCOM and the NSA has been the United States’ most critical advantage in cyberspace. Although this setup predates the 2010 creation of USCYBERCOM by six years, the military command’s formal establishment spurred debates over separating organizational leadership. Many talking points against a dual hat have not changed, and the Trump administration seems set on moving forward with an outdated view.

Operating in cyberspace is far more complex than it once was. Fighting today’s digital threats requires the fluid setting and resetting of network security through continuous cyber operations to sustain long-term initiative. In this environment of persistent engagement, the technical and operational requirements for military and intelligence efforts have largely converged. With similar lines of code used for network access and exploiting vulnerabilities, intelligence collection has become nearly indistinguishable from planting disruptive malware. Adversaries have long recognized this by blending military and intelligence activities in cyberspace.

Increased alignment between USCYBERCOM and the NSA also marks a significant change, and the dual hat has evolved to manage the resulting synergy. When USCYBERCOM initially gained footing, the arrangement managed the military’s reliance on the NSA and capability borrowing (i.e., vulnerabilities, exploits, and personnel) across organizations to meet separate operating pictures. That relationship looks very different today. The dual hat now balances overlapping resource requirements and the intermingling of military disruption with secretive intelligence collection. As USCYBERCOM and the NSA have become more symbiotic, the dual hat has adapted to leverage operational integration and enhance the organizations’ independent and joint effectiveness.

In grappling with these changes, dual-hatted leadership has created inter-organizational processes to increase effectiveness in cyberspace. For example, the Integrated Cyber Center and Joint Operations Center (ICC/JOC) launched in 2018 literally broke down walls. Previously, NSA and USCYBERCOM had operations centers in different classified rooms physically separated by a secure door. The ICC/JOC introduced a common operations floor with dedicated spaces for USCYBERCOM and NSA personnel. By eliminating barriers, the ICC/JOC created more communication at the operator level to achieve greater awareness, speed and impact.

Operational success has followed organizational change. Leveraging enhanced coordination from unified leadership, the joint USCYBERCOM-NSA Election Security Group task force has effectively combatted foreign interference in U.S. elections. Formed in 2020, it grew directly out of the dual hat’s Russia Small Group that disrupted Russian cyber meddling during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. Pooling resources for greater impact, while advocating for and protecting the distinct contributions of USCYBERCOM and the NSA, would be far more difficult under split leadership.

Separate leaders risk prioritizing their own organizational outcomes at the expense of operational speed and combined effectiveness. It is true that the dual hat does not eliminate all interagency competition over cyber operations. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) delayed USCYBERCOM’s 2016 offensive against the Islamic State with objections over the military’s interagency reporting and update requirements. The CIA and USCYBERCOM had already agreed on communication measures, so the delay was really about preserving bureaucratic influence. But it is equally true that, because the preponderance of cyber operations originates from Fort Meade, centralized authority preserves speed by preventing turf disputes and operational delays between independent USCYBERCOM and NSA heads.

Without the dual hat, USCYBERCOM-NSA coordination and dispute resolution become more cumbersome and subject to an unpredictable working relationship between chiefs with differing ranks. A four-star officer must lead USCYBERCOM; the NSA only requires a three-star chief. Currently, one four-star commander reports to both the defense secretary (as USCYBERCOM commander) and to the national intelligence director (as NSA director). With both military and intelligence roles, the dual hat efficiently balances tradeoffs in cyber operations while subjecting NSA activities to the law of armed conflict. With two different leaders, disputes would escalate to the White House for resolution, and the NSA faces greater risks of politicization in the process. A return to laborious interagency reviews would also negate the legacy of the first Trump administration, which reduced decision times for cyber operations.

The cost of splitting USCYBERCOM-NSA leadership would also create a nightmare for the Trump White House. Cyber Command lacks sufficient resources to operate fully independently from the NSA. Dividing authority will require duplicated efforts for USCYBERCOM to secure its own cyber resources in an already resource-scarce environment. Duplication would be particularly costly given declining budgets and spending power that demand better use of existing resources. It would also be a significant misstep for an administration focused on greater government efficiency.

Unwinding America’s military-intelligence leadership for cyber operations would be a gift to hackers in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. These adversaries will not wait for the U.S. to devise a new bureaucratic architecture. Instead, the new administration should build on the success of the dual hat. It has aligned USCYBERCOM and NSA effectiveness for combined impact with a unity of effort crucial for achieving the operational speed and scale needed to secure U.S. interests in cyberspace. The dual hat has been a defining feature of U.S. cyber operations, not a bug. The Trump administration should be wary of throwing away another 20 years of USCYBERCOM-NSA success.

Jason Blessing, Ph.D., is a research analyst at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. His research expertise focuses on cybersecurity as well as international partnerships. All views are his own and do not represent the views of the Institute. Follow him on LinkedIn and on X/Twitter @JasonABlessing.

There were two catches: Marines had to commit to return to the service to serve double the amount of time they took off; and they had to apply for one of a limited number of spots — 20 per year for enlisted Marines and 20 for officers.

A dozen years later, fewer than half of the spots from the first year alone have been claimed.

According to Lt. Col. Emma Wood, a project manager with the Marine Corps’ Strategic Talent Management Group, as of Nov. 24 of last year, only 16 Marines have taken advantage of the service’s Career Intermission Program, or CIP, since it stood up as a pilot. And the individuals who have opted into the program don’t fit a specific category.

Seven of those Marines, she told the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services in a December briefing, had fulfilled their post-intermission obligated service and remained on active duty; three had transferred to other services to pursue career paths the Marines don’t offer, including military nurse and chaplain; two had taken advantage of Temporary Early Release Authority to depart after fulfilling their CIP obligation; three had gotten out after the end of their contract; and one was still paying off the post-intermission service.

For the planners who envisioned CIP as a way to hang onto Marines who might otherwise be tempted to depart for other pursuits, the program would appear to be a swing and a miss.

For the three Marines who had left service after completing a single post-intermission tour, Wood said she saw a potential missed opportunity to take a more conventional path.

“If I look at those three service members, I think, ‘Oh, they would probably be better served to have done an [Active Duty Operational Support] period, maybe, and also maybe a drill during that time in CIP,” she said. “That’s one of the limitations of CIP, is that you, the service member, cannot drill during that time. So, if it’s a three-year period, particularly, you’re not maintaining readiness or affiliation with the Marine Corps.”

Active Duty Operational Support, or ADOS, is a program that allows Reserve Marines to fill an active-duty role for a set time period.

Part of the vanishingly low take rate on CIP may be due to the Marines’ lack of targeted advertisement of the program, Wood suggested. But it may also be that the program’s terms and limitations simply don’t add up to a good deal for many Marines.

She compared CIP to an “[active component]-minus” arrangement that took Marines out of the active community for a period of time.

Another option that “might offer more agency” for Marines, she said, is a “[reserve component]-plus” model in which Marines remain in the Reserve component, but participate in significant activation periods.

“It might be more appetizing,” Wood said.

Wood added that the Marine Corps was developing a legislative proposal that would change the terms of CIP and send Marines from active duty into a Reserve drilling component rather than the non-drilling IRR, allowing troops to stay more ready and engaged with their service, and potentially do a better job of preserving interest in returning to service for a significant amount of time after their career pause concluded.

“I don’t know if we see that as being very likely soon, but that’s something that we’re actively looking to pursue,” she said.

All the military services, including the U.S. Space Force, now have their own version of CIP. And while not all have made their numbers public, the Marine Corps is not alone in its struggles.

In a Navy presentation also delivered to DACOWITS, service officials cited a series of lessons learned about obstacles that kept sailors from participating in CIP.

In addition to the Marine Corps’ finding that a transition to the Selected Reserve would be more appealing than a sabbatical in the IRR, the process for transitioning in and out of CIP lacked clarity, said Rear Adm. Jennifer Couture, the service’s director for Military Personnel Plans and Policy. And, she said, both service members and their dependents lose their benefits, including health care and base access, during their time out of uniform.

Since 2009, according to the Navy, 190 women and 177 men have entered CIP. The Navy, Couture said, has changed to allow for applications on a rolling basis and is seeking to remove limits on when sailors can apply for CIP relative to their projected rotation date to further remove barriers.

“We’re continuing to iterate on the feedback that we receive from our sailors about how to make these programs more meaningful,” Couture said.

Katherine Kuzminski, the deputy director of Studies and program director of the Military, Veterans, and Society Program at Center for a New American Security, told Military Times that the career sabbatical programs, often promoted specifically as a way for women to step away from service to have children, also had cultural drawbacks that manifested “behind closed doors.”

Kuzminski, whose research has involved focus groups with service members who have participated in CIP or considered it, said a lack of familiarity with the program may end up affecting the career progression of participants.

“One of the biggest flags is, you never want your file to look different from anyone else’s,” she said. “And so, if you took the career intermission program and there’s only 20 officers in an entire service who took it, the folks who are serving on the [promotion] board don’t know what that is. So, it’s not that they’re punishing you for taking the career intermission program — [they just think], ‘We’re gonna select people whose career path we understand.’”

For many pursuits that might require time away from active duty, like education, other existing military programs might be a better fit, Kuzminski said. But she maintained that the costs of keeping CIP as an option were probably low enough to keep it active.

In total, the Marine Corps spent $175,638 on CIP for the program’s first three years. In addition to the changes that Wood proposed, Kuzminski said she’d like to see prominent leaders promoting CIP success stories to show troops that career success with the program was possible.

“If the 75th Ranger Regiment commander … says, ‘I took the career intermission program because we had a toddler and a newborn at home, and my wife’s job mattered more than mine, and then it enabled me to stay such that I’m now in this leadership position,’ that would sell it,” she said. “But that person, that experience is never going to be selected for that position, I don’t think.”

The long-range Atlantique 2 aircraft on a new mission for NATO then shifted its high-tech gaze onto another target, and another after that until, after more than five hours on patrol, the plane’s array of sensors had scoped out the bulk of the Baltic — from Germany in the west to Estonia in the northeast, bordering Russia.

The flight’s mere presence in the skies above the strategic sea last week, combined with military ships patrolling on the waters, also sent an unmistakable message: The NATO alliance is ratcheting up its guard against suspected attempts to sabotage underwater energy and data cables and pipelines that crisscross the Baltic, prompted by a growing catalogue of incidents that have damaged them.

“We will do everything in our power to make sure that we fight back, that we are able to see what is happening and then take the next steps to make sure that it doesn’t happen again. And our adversaries should know this,” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said this month in announcing a new alliance mission, dubbed “Baltic Sentry,” to protect the underwater infrastructure vital to the economic well-being of Baltic-region nations.

What’s under the Baltic?

Power and communications cables and gas pipelines stitch together the nine countries with shores on the Baltic, a relatively shallow and nearly landlocked sea. A few examples are the 94-mile Balticconnector pipeline that carries gas between Finland and Estonia, the high-voltage Baltic Cable connecting the power grids of Sweden and Germany, and the 729-mile C-Lion1 telecommunications cable between Finland and Germany.

Why are cables important?

Undersea pipes and cables help power economies, keep houses warm and connect billions of people. More than 807,800 miles of fiber optic cables — more than enough to stretch to the moon and back — span the world’s oceans and seas, according to TeleGeography, which tracks and maps the vital communication networks. The cables are typically the width of a garden hose. But 97% of the world’s communications, including trillions of dollars of financial transactions, pass through them each day.

“In the last two months alone, we have seen damage to a cable connecting Lithuania and Sweden, another connecting Germany and Finland, and most recently, a number of cables linking Estonia and Finland. Investigations of all of these cases are still ongoing. But there is reason for grave concern,” Rutte said on Jan. 14.

What’s causing alarm?

At least 11 Baltic cables have been damaged since October 2023 — the most recent being a fiber optic cable connecting Latvia and the Swedish island of Gotland, reported to have ruptured on Sunday. Although cable operators note that subsea cable damage is commonplace, the frequency and concentration of incidents in the Baltic heightened suspicions that damage might have been deliberate.

There also are fears that Russia could target cables as part of a wider campaign of so-called “hybrid warfare” to destabilize European nations helping Ukraine defend itself against the full-scale invasion that Moscow has been pursuing since 2022.

Without specifically blaming Russia, Rutte said: “Hybrid means sabotage. Hybrid means cyber-attacks. Hybrid means sometimes even assassination attacks, attempts, and in this case, it means hitting on our critical undersea infrastructure.”

Finnish police suspect that the Eagle S, an oil tanker that damaged the Estlink 2 power cable and two other communications cables linking Finland and Estonia on Dec. 25th, is part of Moscow’s “shadow fleet” used to avoid war-related sanctions on Russian oil exports.

Finnish authorities seized the tanker shortly after it left a Russian port and apparently cut the cables by dragging its anchor. Finnish investigators allege the ship left an almost 62-mile-long anchor trail on the seabed.

Intelligence agencies’ doubts

Several Western intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of their work, told The Associated Press that recent damage was most likely accidental, seemingly caused by anchors being dragged by ships that were poorly maintained and poorly crewed.

One senior intelligence official told AP that ships’ logs and mechanical failures with ships’ anchors were among “multiple indications” pointing away from Russian sabotage. The official said Russian cables were also severed. Another Western official, also speaking anonymously to discuss intelligence matters, said Russia sent an intelligence-gathering vessel to the site of one cable rupture to investigate the damage.

The Washington Post first reported on the emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services that maritime accidents likely caused recent damage.

Cable operators advise caution

The European Subsea Cables Association, representing cable owners and operators, noted in November after faults were reported on two Baltic links that, on average, a subsea cable is damaged somewhere in the world every three days. In northern European waters, the main causes of damage are commercial fishing or ship anchors, it said.

In the fiber-optic cable rupture on Sunday connecting Latvia and Sweden, Swedish authorities detained a Maltese-flagged ship bound for South America with a cargo of fertilizer.

Navibulgar, a Bulgarian company that owns the Vezhen, said any damage was unintentional and that the ship’s crew discovered while navigating in extremely bad weather that its left anchor appeared to have dragged on the seabed.

NATO’s ‘Baltic Sentry’ mission

The alliance is deploying warships, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones for the mission to provide “enhanced surveillance and deterrence.”

Aboard the French Navy surveillance flight, the 14-member crew cross-checked ships they spotted from the air against lists of vessels they had been ordered to watch for.

“If we witness some suspicious activities from ships as sea — for example, ships at very low speed or at anchorage in a position that they shouldn’t be at this time — so this is something we can see,” said the flight commander, Lt. Alban, whose surname was withheld by the French military for security reasons.

“We can have a very close look with our sensors to see what is happening.”

Burrows reported from London. AP journalists Jill Lawless in London, David Klepper in Washington and Veselin Toshkov in Sofia, Bulgaria, contributed to this report.

BAE will receive an additional $23.5 million, according to a release. That amount comes in addition to its original $47 million contract, bringing the cost of the project to over $70 million.

The company will extend the barrel of the Mk 45 to 62 calibers and strengthen the gun mounts. It will also incorporate a fully digital control system. The upgrades will allow the Mk 45s to fire more modern munitions that have 50% greater firing energy, BAE said in the release.

The work is expected to be completed by the end of 2028.

Brent Butcher, vice president of weapon systems at BAE, said the events in the Red Sea last year emphasized the need for modernized weapons systems in the Navy’s fleet. Starting in late 2023 and continuing through 2024, Iran-backed Houthi rebels launched attacks against commercial and naval ships in the Red Sea, leading to U.S. naval and air strikes against the group.

The situation “underscored the importance of firepower aboard U.S. Navy ships,” Butcher said.

“Equipped with the latest configuration of the [Mk 45] gun system, the men and women in the Navy have the capabilities to protect themselves at sea,” Butcher added. “We continue our commitment to providing the latest naval gun technology, including advanced munitions, to U.S. Sailors and their allies.”

BAE said the upgrades would come at a lower cost than introducing a new gun system altogether. The work on the Mk 45s will be completed at the company’s production facility in Louisville, Kentucky.

The 40-page comic book, titled “The Stories of Teacher Jun,” was unveiled by Philippine officials. It contains colorful caricatures of a Filipino teacher and his young students discussing the complex territorial disputes in simple terms and highlights the Philippine position.

One fictional student in the book describes China as a bully and another says Beijing’s “behavior is outrageous.”

“Chinese officials, along with state-sponsored media and individuals, continue to spread distorted and twisted narratives to malign our efforts and justify their unilateral claims,” national security adviser Eduardo Ano said in a speech at the book launching in Manila.

The Philippines will do everything to “fight misinformation, disinformation and false narratives to put forward the truth,” Ano told reporters.

The Philippines has faced a lopsided battle against the militarily superior China in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, prompting it to strengthen security alliances with the United States and other friendly states to build deterrence against Beijing’s aggressive actions.

Two years ago, the Philippines adopted a shame campaign by releasing videos and photographs of China’s increasingly assertive actions in the contested waters, including the use of powerful water cannons and dangerous blocking maneuvers, to domestic and international audiences.

But the territorial spats, particularly between Chinese and Philippine coast guard forces, have continued.

The ambassadors of the United States and Canada, among the key supporters of the Philippines in confronting China’s increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waterway, attended the comic book launch. Officials from the Philippine Coast Guard and military, and the education secretary, were also present.

There was no immediate comment from Chinese officials, but they have repeatedly reasserted their claims to virtually the entire waterway and accused the Philippines and other rival claimant states of encroachments.

Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also lay claim to the busy sea passage, a key global trade route with rich fishing grounds and undersea gas deposits.

About 11,000 copies of the comic book have been distributed for free, and thousands more will be printed depending on the availability of financial donations, said Philippine Coast Guard Commodore Jay Tarriela, one of the proponents of the book project.

The intended recipients are young students and Filipinos in far-flung regions with limited access to news sources. Foreign readers who show an interest could be provided with copies of the book in their language, officials said.

“This initiative aims to highlight our maritime rights and entitlements while revealing China’s unlawful activities, aggressive behavior and bullying tactics,” Ano said. “It is crucial for us to shed light on these actions as transparency is a powerful tool in combating misinformation.”

The Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact, was signed in July 2024 on the occasion of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington. It aims to combine the three nations’ knowledge, resources, and expertise about the Arctic region in general and polar icebreaker construction in particular.

The core ambition of the agreement is to collectively build best-in-class ice boats capable of year-round operations in Arctic waters, plowing pathways for maritime traffic in a region being transformed by climate change. Teaming up in a cluster of countries, the idea goes, will lead to better prices and speedier deliveries for the governments involved.

Officials signed an additional memorandum of understanding last November in Washington to emphasize that the strategic context of polar regions requires deeper economic and security cooperation between the three partners.

The new U.S. president, Donald Trump, who was sworn into office this month, has since made disparaging comments about fellow Arctic players Canada and Greenland, suggesting that both should become part of the United States.

The statement has prompted pushback from leaders in Canada and Denmark, of which Greenland is a district, with neither country prepared to have their territorial integrity challenged by a longstanding ally.

A spokesperson for Public Services and Procurement of Canada, which represents Ottawa’s central purchasing agent in the ICE Pact, said Trump’s combative talk has not affected the spirit of the icebreaker agreement.

“Canada remains steadfast in its commitment to the ICE Pact, our collaboration efforts with the U.S. and Finland continue as planned – there are currently no changes to our agreement or initiatives,” a representative said in a Jan. 22 email to Defense News.

The three nations have each appointed a national coordination team for the ICE Pact, which is working to formulate a plan of action through four working groups, the spokesperson added.

Among the initial priorities outlined by Trump during his first term as president was the need to bolster America’s icebreaker fleet. In 2020, he emphasized that the country needed a “ready, capable, and available fleet of polar security icebreakers that would be operationally tested and fully deployable by fiscal year 2029,” he wrote in a memo.

Washington is far from reaching this goal, then-commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Adm. Linda Fagan, noted during the Halifax International Security Forum last November.

“So as a nation, we have one heavy icebreaker … [Russia] has way more than one. It’s close to 40,” she said during a panel discussion, as reported by National Defense Magazine.

It is important to distinguish that even as icebreakers are a highly specific type of ship, countries have different ways of classifying them.

While the U.S. and Canada use a classification system of light, medium and heavy ships for different types of ice cover, Russia’s large fleet is typically split into categories based on their mission type and other technical characteristics.

In 2023, the Canadian shipyard Davie took over Finland’s Helsinki Shipyard, which produced over 50% of the global icebreaker fleet. The acquisition entailed a transfer of Finland’s leading expertise, designs and trained personnel into Canadian hands.

The current demand for such specialized ships is at an all-time high, a statement from Davie said, with over 80 open projects among Western countries as of last July.

Experts have argued that the U.S. defense industrial base is set to greatly benefit from the ICE Pact, as America’s naval shipbuilding industry has been beset by schedule delays and cost overruns.