The decision marks another example in Europe of national security factors seeping into political decisions that were deemed civilian in nature before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

In this case, the issue is about two dueling interests: sustainable-energy independence and surveillance of the national airspace. That is because wind farms can interact with radar signals, reducing the quality of the situational air picture or even outright blocking out parts of the sky.

“The reaction time in the event of a missile attack could go from 2 minutes to 60 seconds with wind farms in the way,” Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson wrote in a series of posts on X, formerly known as Twitter. They were accompanied by a schematic drawing of the wind farms casting a “shadow” behind them in which missiles and cruise missiles would stay undetected.

The perceived threat clearly comes from Russia, with Jonson pointing out that “the proximity to the heavily militarized” Russian exclave of Kaliningrad was “important in this context.”

Experts speaking to Defense News for this story said wind farm radar interference is a known issue. And some expressed concern that as more and more wind farms are built, the effects could get worse unless countermeasures are put in place.

“Radar interference can impede air traffic control, weather forecasting, homeland security, and national defense missions,” U.S. Department of Energy spokesperson wrote in an email to Defense News, while also stressing that “the vast majority of wind projects … pose no significant impacts to radar missions.”

Radar performance

There are a number of ways that wind turbines, and especially large groups of them, can mess with the readings from a radar system. For one, they can show up on the screen because, just like any other object, they bounce back the electromagnetic waves that radar relies on. The fact that they are moving – the blades are spinning, and the turbines can change orientation – can make it more difficult for analysts to filter out the noise and find actual threats in the skies.

With the wingtips rotating at a speed of up to 370 kilometers per hour (around 230 mph), they move fast enough for doppler radars to sense them as moving objects, resulting in a false positive on an operator’s screen.

Benjamin Karlson leads the Wind Turbine Radar Interference Mitigation program at the American Sandia National Laboratories. His team has tested various concepts at mitigating the problem, he said, but “there’s no silver bullet.” Radar-absorbent coating is expensive and leaves the problem of a blind spots; temporary shutoffs lead to losses for the operators of wind farms; and infill, or fallback, radars are but costly workarounds.

Governments and private companies have been aware of the issue for decades, with the topic first being presented to the U.S. Congress in 2006. Considerable research has occurred in both the U.S. and U.K.

In the United States, “the communication between the developers and the federal agencies has grown over the years,” said Karlson. The Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, the country’s weather service NOAA and others all have a stake in approving new wind farm developments. Despite these hurdles, Karlson said he wasn’t aware of a single case where a wind farm proposal had to be denied outright, though adjusting the placement of individual turbines, or tweaking their dimensions, is a more common practice.

“Most potential conflicts are dealt with through minor and routine mitigation measures in the federal project evaluation process,” the Department of Energy said in a statement.

Radar systems vary greatly so what might work for one can be completely ineffective on another. Over-the-horizon radars, for example, might be especially affected by offshore wind farms. As the name suggests, these systems have a much greater range than other radars, which are generally limited to the line of sight of the antenna and so cannot see past the curvature of the earth.

The longer-range variants bounce their beams off the ionosphere layer of the atmosphere before the waves travel back close to the surface – where wind farms can get in the way and may completely block out the signal. “There is no way of mitigating that aside from not building turbines,” said Karlson.

In his announcement, the Swedish defense minister did not specify what radar systems’ signals the country was concerned about blocking, and Karlson said that there was not enough information to make an educated guess.

Additionally, “the wind farms could also lead to reduced intelligence-gathering capabilities and disrupt sensors used to detect submarines,” Jonson said in his announcement. Altogether, the construction would have “unacceptable consequences for Swedish security.”

“Clearly, the Swedish government thinks there is a big concern,” said Karlson.

Energy requirements

Simultaneously, wind energy presents a crucial pillar in the clean energy transition, a topic that has gained exceptional pertinence in a Europe starved for energy since the Russian war in Ukraine. Traditionally, Europe obtained a large part of its energy from Russia, which controls vast oil and gas reserves and over decades built a network of pipelines to European countries to sell its hydrocarbons at a competitive price. While the green-energy transition predates the war, it has been turbocharged by it: Russia has used its leverage over European energy supply as a leverage and a weapon in its hybrid warfare, while European leaders have rushed to ween their countries off of Russian gas and oil.

According to the Swedish Energy Agency, the “supply of electricity in Sweden is stable.” Simultaneously, however, the government agency warned that “Sweden will have rising electricity prices” as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The planned wind farms would have had the potential to contribute significantly to Sweden’s renewable energy production, with the rejected plans seeing turbines stretching all the way from the Åland Islands along the east coast down to Öresund.

While the government blocked the construction of the 13 proposed wind farms in the Baltic, it also greenlit the construction of the “Poseidon” wind farm off the country’s western – NATO-facing – coast, with a maximum of 81 turbines producing up to 5.5 terawatt hours per year.

Sweden’s government has committed itself to double the country’s annual electricity production in the next twenty years, in anticipation of higher consumption. A buildup of the country’s nuclear power capacity is supposed to bear the brunt of this burden, though critics have pointed out that demand is expected to increase faster than new power reactors can go online.

Similar trade-offs between wind farm construction and radar visibility have had to be made in other European countries. The British and French ministries of Defense have objected to developments over similar concerns, and various other government agencies across the continent have issued guidelines for distances that should be maintained between wind farms and different types of radar stations.

Both energy independence and climate change have increasingly entered the realm of national security in national government across Europe and the world, with leaders seeing them as integral parts of their countries’ defense and prosperity. The Swedish government’s decision points the spotlight on one dimension of this interaction that has, until now, flown under the radar.

Initiatives like Executive Order 14028 and CISA’s Binding Operational Directive 23-1 have heightened scrutiny and accountability for security leaders tasked with ensuring network security and compliance. This guidance helps government entities and private sector organizations navigate the threat landscape and improve their security posture. However, diverse directives from the White House, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other government entities create confusion over which guidance to follow.

As we navigate the various federal guidelines, it’s important to remember that you’re not alone in this struggle. Security professionals across the board are grappling with legacy tools, siloed security applications, the time-consuming nature of data collection and analysis, and the scarcity of skilled security personnel. These are all factors that complicate efforts to gain comprehensive network insights and prove compliance.

So, where to begin?

Focus efforts on greatest benefit

Vulnerability management is complex and overwhelming for most agencies, often competing with a slew of information from various vendor sources. I like focusing on the basics. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD), the U.S. government’s repository of standards-based vulnerability management data, is one of the most important sources of truth worldwide and a good place to start.

Maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and sponsored by DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, the NVD provides detailed analysis and scoring of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) to help organizations prioritize their response to vulnerabilities. They also publish the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog which is a great supplement. In 2024 NIST has already issued nearly 35,000 alerts; agencies need to understand which CVEs are relevant to their network and their degree of exposure.

Private sector CISOs and federal agencies face the dilemma of complying with complex regulatory requirements within limited timeframes and budgets. Executive orders, for instance, are often issued without fiscal budget backing, forcing security leaders to assess their existing systems and contracts to determine if current infrastructure investments will support the new requirements and identify which legacy systems must be updated or removed from the network.

Additionally, security leaders must evaluate which contract terms may help or hinder the evolution of the network to meet new regulatory compliance standards.

The list of considerations goes on, but the point is that budgets are capped, and contracts can constrain the timing and degree of progress. It’s easy to get distracted by all the noise around new standards and guidelines but stay focused on the regulations that matter to your organization.

Adopt multifunctional technologies

While a private sector organization typically operates one network, the federal government operates multiple. Some examples include unclassified, secret, and top-secret networks, each with its own rules and network challenges. Users often have to contend with challenging military operating environments and low bandwidth connections. In addition, regardless of the challenges, each network must continue to comply with cybersecurity regulations.

The diverse nature of these environments means that security teams must possess expertise across multiple platforms. The scarcity of skilled security personnel exacerbates this challenge, as organizations struggle to find and retain professionals with the necessary knowledge and experience.

To expedite compliance efforts, utilize solutions that provide greater network visibility and are familiar to a broader community of security professionals. Also, adopt multifaceted, versatile technologies and rely less on bespoke solutions. This approach provides more flexibility and scalability to meet evolving guidelines. For example, consider the benefits of automated security and compliance tools. These tools can significantly reduce the time and effort required for data collection and analysis by automating routine tasks and providing centralized visibility into the network.

Additionally, agencies implementing a zero trust architecture require continuous verification of user and device identities. This approach minimizes the attack surface and enhances the overall security posture. By integrating zero trust principles with automated tools, organizations can achieve a more resilient and compliant security framework.

Efficient evidence collection

The shift toward hybrid and multi-cloud environments adds layers of complexity to cybersecurity and compliance efforts. These geographically dispersed systems make it difficult to gain a holistic view of the entire network. This forces security teams to manually aggregate and correlate data from various sources, which is time-consuming and prone to errors. It also hinders the ability to detect and respond to threats promptly, leaving networks vulnerable.

Evidence collection solves this challenge as it requires a comprehensive model of the entire network infrastructure. With end-to-end visibility of the network, even in multi-cloud environments, and capabilities for historical data analysis, path analysis, and compliance monitoring, organizations can more efficiently achieve and maintain a strong security posture and compliance, even with evolving standards.

Behavioral analysis and attack surface management are key components of an effective evidence collection strategy. These capabilities enable security professionals to proactively verify that network behavior aligns with intended configurations and identify anomalies. Additionally, security professionals can simulate the network environment and conduct detailed analysis without impacting live operations. In this controlled setting, security professionals can identify potential vulnerabilities and remediate issues faster.

Staff retention, collaboration

Evolving security guidelines are creating increased demand for cybersecurity professionals. However, the cybersecurity industry is concurrently grappling with a skills gap, where there are more job openings than qualified candidates available to fill them. To address this issue, organizations should prioritize investments in training and development programs. By enhancing the skills of existing staff and fostering a culture of continuous learning, organizations can cultivate a more adept and knowledgeable security team while retaining valuable talent.

Retaining security professionals is crucial for organizations to achieve compliance. These professionals develop deep expertise and knowledge of the organization’s systems and processes over time. This institutional knowledge is invaluable as experienced security staff can oversee the continuous implementation and management of security policies and practices necessary for ongoing compliance. Cross-functional software systems can improve collaboration by providing the entire organization access to accurate information about the hybrid multi-cloud environment.

Retaining staff also contributes to efficient audits and assessments. They are well-versed in the organization’s compliance history and processes, enabling them to prepare effectively for audits and respond promptly to assessment findings.

Additionally, collaboration plays a crucial role in navigating the complexities of achieving, maintaining, and proving compliance. Partnering with security professionals in other departments or across entities can break down silos and promote the sharing of resources and knowledge. A collaborative approach can facilitate the adoption of similar technologies and encourage transparency in sharing successful approaches and solutions. By avoiding redundant efforts and isolated strategies, departments and organizations can collectively navigate cybersecurity and compliance challenges.

The complexities of federal cybersecurity guidance necessitate a multifaceted approach to achieving compliance. Understanding what regulations are applicable and implementing multifaceted technologies and frameworks, such as automated tools and a zero trust architecture, enables organizations to adapt to evolving standards more easily. Additionally, prioritizing evidence collection helps organizations gain end-to-end visibility, compliance verification, and network monitoring for vulnerabilities. Amidst these changes, retaining security professionals is critical for developing effective strategies and leveraging institutional knowledge.

These four strategies empower federal and private sector entities to enhance their security posture swiftly, achieve compliance efficiently, and fortify their networks against emerging threats.

Matt Honea is Head of Security and Compliance for Forward Networks.

An FBI investigation revealed that Teixeira, a 22-year-old who ran a server on Discord called “Thug Shaker Central,” spent much of his life online, talking primarily with other young men via message, video calls and voice chats. He chatted about guns and military gear, threatened his school, made racist and antisemitic jokes, traded conspiracy theories, discussed antigovernment sentiments, and in a bid to show off, shared some of the military’s most closely guarded secrets about the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East.

By the time the young airman was arrested in 2023, media scholar PS Berge had been studying Discord and its users for three years and had created an online consortium of other academic researchers who were doing the same. That an intelligence leak occurred on the site, creating a national security incident, didn’t come as a shock to her.

“My response was, ‘Of course. Of course this would happen on Discord,’” Berge said. “Because on a platform like this, you share everything with your people. Everything about your life. So, why not share national security secrets?”

Teixeira pleaded guilty in March to six counts of willful retention and transmission of national defense information. His sentencing is scheduled for September, and prosecutors are asking that he serve between 11 and 17 years in prison.

The same month Teixeira agreed to a plea deal, the FBI revealed it had investigated another service member in 2022 for leaking information on Discord.

Former Air Force Staff Sgt. Jason Gray, who served as a cyber analyst at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, admitted to running a Facebook group for followers of Boogaloo, a loosely organized, antigovernment movement that advocates for a second Civil War. Gray was disgruntled with his military career, and he discussed his dissatisfaction with the U.S. government in several Discord channels created for the Boogaloo movement, according to a 2022 FBI affidavit that was unsealed in March.

Gray, who used the account name LazyAirmen#7460, was accused of posting a classified image in a private Discord channel that he “likely obtained” from his access to National Security Agency intelligence, the affidavit states.

Investigators said the image could’ve been shared “in furtherance of the Boogaloo ideology,” but didn’t elaborate on the image’s details. It’s uncertain whether the FBI is still investigating the potential leak. But while searching Gray’s electronic devices for evidence of an intelligence breach, authorities discovered hundreds of images of child pornography. Gray is currently serving five years in federal prison on multiple child pornography charges.

Oversharing is a hallmark of Discord, an online world where members of certain channels talk all day, every day, and even fall asleep together on voice calls, said Megan Squire, a computer scientist and deputy director for data analytics at the Southern Poverty Law Center.

People who study the platform agree that it’s not inherently bad — it’s used by millions of gamers, students, teachers, professionals, hobbyists and members of the military community to communicate and socialize. However, extremists have hijacked a part of the platform to radicalize and recruit others to their causes, said Jakob Guhl, senior manager for policy and research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Following the leak of national security secrets and other high-profile, nefarious uses of the platform in recent years, researchers are grappling with what to think of the platform’s small but headline-grabbing dark side, and many disagree on whether Discord as a company is doing enough to root out bad actors.

“It’s always a bit difficult to strike the right tone between not scaring people off the platform, because the majority of users are completely fine, but also highlighting that there is an actual issue of radicalization,” Guhl said. “It’s not the biggest or most offending platform, but it definitely plays a crucial role among this network.”

‘Not inherently evil’

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, known as START, studied decades of violent extremist attacks and found a military background to be the most commonly shared characteristic among those who committed or plotted mass casualty attacks from 1990 through 2022, more so than criminal histories or mental health problems.

Researchers from START said the study revealed why extremist groups tend to focus recruitment efforts toward people with military service records: Even a small number of them can have an outsized impact inside extremist movements.

While such recruitment occurs on Discord, Guhl, Berge and Squire agreed that the mere presence of service members and veterans on the platform isn’t a cause for concern.

“It’s a popular platform and not inherently evil,” Squire said. “I’d be much more concerned about military folks on 4chan, Telegram, places like that. Nothing good is happening on those platforms, but Discord could be useful.”

In fact, Berge said, it can be a valuable forum for marginalized people to foster a sense of community. On its “about” page, Discord describes its mission as one that helps users find a sense of belonging.

“Discord is about giving people the power to create space to find belonging in their lives,” the company’s mission statement reads. “We want to make it easier for you to talk regularly with the people you care about. We want you to build genuine relationships with your friends and communities close to home or around the world.”

That’s what the veterans group Frost Call is doing on the platform. The nonprofit encourages veterans and service members to stay connected through gaming, one of its founders told Military Times last year. As of June, it boasted 390 members.

“When we founded Frost Call, we built an organization around this idea of bringing veterans together, helping to improve camaraderie that’s missing from military service,” Marine Corps veteran Wesley Sanders said last year. “It serves an enormous mental health need, but also … an existential need for a lot of veterans.”

Moreover, when new users join Discord, extremist elements of the platform are not easily visible.

Discord is made up of millions of servers centered on various topics. Users can join up to 100 servers, and each server has numerous text, voice and video channels. When a new user creates an account and searches servers to join, the platform will suggest “its most popular, most successful, public-facing communities,” rather than any disquieting, invite-only communities, Berge said.

“If you are a standard user, and if you’re signing in to Discord for your general interests — maybe you’re looking for fellow students or fellow veterans — 90% of the time, you’re not going to accidentally stumble upon an extremist group,” she said. “They actually go through a lot of effort to make these spaces insulated, to make them difficult to find.”

When using Disboard, a third-party search platform for Discord servers, prompts such as “Nazi” or “white supremacist” won’t elicit results like they used to, Berge said. In a 2021 study, she found thousands of Discord servers that marketed themselves on Disboard as hateful and Nazi-affiliated spaces.

“You used to be able to search for those terms and find communities. It was horrifying,” Berge said. “Those servers still exist, but they’ve changed the ways they’re identified, and in some cases, we know that high-profile, toxic communities have been shut down.”

Extremists find a foothold

Founders Jason Citron and Stan Vishnevskiy created Discord in 2015 as a way to allow friends around the world to communicate while playing video games online. Its popularity exploded during the Covid-19 pandemic, when lockdowns went into effect and many people became more isolated than ever before.

Just two years after it launched, Discord gained notoriety as the platform of choice for facilitators of the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Organizers, including some veterans, used Discord to share propaganda and coordinate the protest, which turned deadly. James Fields was convicted of killing Heather Heyer when he drove his car into a group of counterprotesters. Fields had joined the Army in 2015 but was separated quickly because of a cited lack of motivation and failure to train.

In 2022, Discord made headlines again after a mass shooting at an Independence Day parade in Highland Park, Illinois, where seven people were killed and dozens more injured. The suspected shooter ran his own Discord server called “SS,” where he complained about “commies,” short for “communists,” according to posts archived by the nonprofit website Unicorn Riot.

That same year, an 18-year-old white gunman killed 10 Black people at a supermarket in Buffalo, New York. The gunman, Payton Gendron, spent months writing plans for the attack in a diary he kept on a private Discord server, visible only to him. About 30 minutes before the attack, Gendron sent out invitations for others to view the diary, and 15 people accessed it, according to Discord.

The platform again faced scrutiny following Teixeira’s leak of national security secrets.

“It’s periodic. Every couple of years, it seems like there’s something,” Squire said. “There are other platforms that are worse, but Discord keeps coming up over and over again.”

Research institutions such as the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found that Discord serves as a hub for socializing and community-building across far-right groups, including Catholic extremists, the white supremacist Atomwaffen Division and the antigovernment Boogaloo movement.

Extremist groups value the platform’s layers of privacy and anonymity, as well as its chat and video functions and collaborative nature, Guhl said. Berge described it as a walled garden, or an online environment where user access to content can be controlled. Servers come with the capability to assign hierarchy to different members and allow some members to access information that others can’t, the researchers said.

“In, say, a Twitter direct-messaging thread or Facebook DM, you don’t really have levels and hierarchies,” Squire said. “Discord really allows you to have more fine-grained ranking structures.”

Another reason for the prevalence of extremists on the platform stems from its roots in gaming, Guhl surmised.

Rachel Kowert, a globally recognized researcher on gaming and mental health, has spent five years researching extremism in video game communities. Though gaming itself is a powerful tool for connection and growth, extreme and hateful ideologies are now commonplace in those spaces, Kowert said.

“If you’re spending a lot of time in the social or gaming spaces where misogyny is commonplace, that can in turn start to internalize in the way you see the world and interact in it,” Kowert said.

Fighting a dark legacy

The existence of far-right groups on Discord — and the high-profile instances of extremism on the platform in the past several years — has spawned its “extremist legacy,” one from which it’s now trying hard to distance itself, said Berge.

Discord said it removed more than 2,000 far-right-affiliated servers following the “Unite the Right” rally. After the Buffalo killings, it removed Gendron’s server and worked to prevent the spread of content related to the attack, the company said. At that point, Discord agreed it “must do more to remove hate and violent extremism.”

“We created Discord to be a place for people to find belonging, and hate and violence are in direct opposition to our mission,” the company said in a statement at the time. “We take our commitment to these principles seriously and will continue to invest in and deploy resources.”

Earlier this year, the company reported that 15% of its staff works on its user safety team, which cracks down on harassment, hateful conduct, inappropriate contact, violent and abusive imagery, violent extremism, misinformation, spam, fraud, scams and other illegal behavior.

During the investigations into Teixeira and Jason Gray, Discord officials immediately cooperated with law enforcement, a company spokesperson told Military Times. And in recent months, Discord has leaned on machine-learning technology to moderate content.

“We expressly prohibit using Discord for illegal activity, which includes the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents,” the spokesperson said.

The company publishes reports each quarter showing actions taken against various accounts and servers. The latest report, published in January, says Discord disabled 6,109 accounts and removed 627 servers that espoused violent extremism during the last few months of 2023.

Squire and Guhl agreed that Discord is “pretty good” at responding to extremist content. Guhl credited the company for including extremism and hate speech in its community guidelines, as well as for deleting servers on a regular basis that breach its terms of service. Discord also created a channel where Squire could flag questionable content on the platform, and the company has been receptive to the concerns she’s raised, she said.

“I credit where credit is due, and I have to give them credit for that,” Squire said. “I think it’s taken seriously, and there are other platforms that I could not say that about.”

Extremists are ‘absolutely still there’

Berge applauded Discord for ramping up the technology behind its moderation and for introducing IP bans, which restrict a device from accessing the platform, rather than just an account. Still, she sees room for improvement.

Discord should place more emphasis on educating moderators and users about how to recognize when someone is being radicalized and pulled into an extremist space, Berge said. She also criticized the platform for disbanding a program in 2023 that included hundreds of volunteer moderators.

“It wasn’t Discord’s automated flagging systems that caught national security secrets being leaked by Jack Teixeira. It took other users and community moderators digging into it and someone finally reporting it,” Berge said. “Elevating people and giving them tools to moderate is absolutely central to protecting the platform, and that’s one area where I think they’re taking a step back.”

Berge is still researching communities on Discord, four years after she first uncovered a network of white supremacists using the platform as a recruitment ground. Despite its community guidelines and efforts to remove offending servers and accounts, Discord still serves as a meeting place for pockets of extremism.

“They’re harder to find, but they are absolutely still here. We’re still finding them,” Berge said. “It is still one of the most popular spaces for people to congregate, share and be in community with each other, for better or for worse.”

Discord remains the “platform of choice” for some hate groups, noted Squire, who described the company’s fight against extremists as playing whack-a-mole: As soon as one is removed, another pops up. A lack of institutional knowledge among far-right extremist groups is partly to blame, she said.

“Everybody’s always fresh, and they don’t have any structure for teaching one another and learning from mistakes of the past,” Squire said. “That’s convenient for us, because as we keep amassing knowledge, they make the mistake of reusing the technology that’s most convenient, rather than being strategic.”

This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.

Published recently, the “Vision for the IC Information Environment: An Information Technology Roadmap” articulates the pressing need for transformation within the IC, emphasizing how the current strategic environment is vastly different from that of September 2001.

Today, we face adversaries ranging from peer nations to non-state actors, each seeking to challenge our national interests and security. This dynamic environment demands that our information technology infrastructure not only keep pace but also provide a strategic advantage.

The roadmap aims high and purposefully so. It outlines five key focus areas, each designed to fortify, assure, enable, enhance, and accelerate the mission through a comprehensive IT strategy. These areas include:

— Fortify the Mission with a Reliable and Resilient Digital Foundation.

— Assure the Mission with Robust Cybersecurity.

— Enable the Mission with Modern Practices and Partnerships.

— Enhance the Mission with Data-Centricity.

— Accelerate the Mission with Advanced Technologies and Workforce Readiness.

One of the most exciting aspects of this roadmap is Focus Area 4: Enhance the Mission with Data-Centricity. This section highlights the importance of managing and securely using data effectively to expedite mission outcomes and maximize intelligence value. Of particular note, it stresses three main objectives:

Realizing End-to-End Data Management: To achieve data-centricity at scale, the IC must govern and manage data cohesively, at every point of the data lifecycle. This involves comprehensive data management planning, which aligns complex data lifecycle management activities with critical mission architectures. Whether you’re gathering sensor data or video footage in a remote location or extracting insights from that data in an air-gapped facility, such plans will increase the adoption of IC Data Services and applied advanced analytics and AI.

Implementing a Data-Centric Architecture: Valuing data as a strategic tool requires establishing common data standards, models, services, and enterprise digital policies so that everyone is handling mission-critical information in a cohesive way, aligned with the appropriate protection and sharing of each data object. This will facilitate a decentralized data ecosystem, enabling seamless data exchanges and fostering advanced AI/Machine Learning capabilities. Ultimately, this architecture will streamline data sharing and collaboration within the IC and with external partners.

Transitioning Sensitive Data Silos to Data-Centric Enclaves: Sensitive data within the IC is often siloed, making it difficult for analysts to access and utilize information across different enclaves. By transitioning to data-centric enclaves, the IC can break down these barriers, allowing authorized users to discover and access relevant data more efficiently and effectively.

As a whole, this focus area encapsulates the IC’s shift from traditional processes to a data-centric approach. The report details, “Timely, accurate, well-informed insight is key to delivering enhanced mission outcomes. The IC must shift from an organization- and system-centric paradigm to one that is data-centric; preserves organizational equities, authorities, and rights; implements legal/compliance frameworks; and enforces security.”

Centering the data changes everything

Let’s give credit where it’s due; this vision for data-centricity is transformative. Aiming to shift the IC from a paradigm of isolated data silos to an integrated, agile, and efficient data environment, this transition is crucial for enabling analysts to derive actionable insights swiftly and accurately, thereby enhancing the overall intelligence process. By implementing a data-centric architecture, the IC can ensure that data is not just a byproduct of operations, but a core asset that drives decision-making and operational effectiveness.

One of the most critical aspects of this transformation is bringing data-centric security down to the data object level using technologies like the ODNI’s Trusted Data Format and the recently approved Zero Trust Data Format by the CCEB. By doing so, the IC can ensure that data remains secure and can be effectively shared and utilized across various platforms and with international partners and allies. This granular level of security is essential for maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information while promoting interoperability and collaboration.

The “Vision for the IC Information Environment: An Information Technology Roadmap” provides a robust framework for modernizing the IC’s IT infrastructure. By prioritizing data-centricity specifically, the IC can unlock the full potential of its data assets, enabling more informed decision-making and more effective operations, which will ultimately prove to be critical for maintaining a strategic edge in a data-driven world and ensuring the United States remains protected.

The roadmap’s vision is ambitious, but with commitment and collaboration, it is well within reach. Together, we have the opportunity, talent, and determination to close IT gaps and open new mission horizons, securing our nation’s future.

Shannon Vaughn is general manager of federal at Virtru, a data security company.

The agency is also working with Thales on quantum sensors for electronic warfare that will allow monitoring of a broad swath of the electromagnetic spectrum, Patrick Aufort, the head of the agency, told Defense News at last week’s Eurosatory defense show in Paris. Those sensors will be available within the next five years, he said.

France in 2022 earmarked €1.8 billion, or U.S. $1.93 billion, to develop quantum technologies, a rapidly evolving field that exploits the laws of quantum physics to create new forms of computing, communication and sensing. Quantum gravimeters measure falling, laser-cooled atoms to detect tiny variations in gravitational pull, which could be used to detect the mass of an adversary submarine. There are no methods for submarines to shield themselves from such sensors, according to a 2020 policy brief from the European Leadership Network.

The gravimeter “is particularly useful for the first applications we’re doing here, mapping the seabed,” Aufort said. “But afterward, we can imagine other uses for the gravimeter, notably for positioning, notably for detecting the existence of a cavity on the seabed.”

French defense-procurement agency DGA has been funding work by the French national aerospace research office Onera on quantum gravimeters since 2006, with a first demonstrator in 2016. The office has worked with France’s Muquans, now part of the technology firm Exail, to industrialize the production of the gravimeter.

The second development France is working on is quantum-based, electronic-warfare sensors, which will allow for a higher probability of intercepting emissions in the electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications, according to Aufort.

“Quantum technologies allow you to have both a much better resolution on what you’re going to detect and, above all, to have instant detection over a very wide bandwidth,” Aufort said. “You have access to much greater bandwidths, and so a higher probability of interception, because emissions are in fact fleeting.”

Quantum-based electronic warfare sensors can use laser-cooled quantum bits that interact with any incoming electromagnetic waves, measuring tiny changes in a qubit’s quantum state. Today’s analysis relies on rotating through different bands to monitor the entire spectrum.

France is working in particular with Thales on such quantum sensors, which are “a question of, I’m not going to say months, but years, in the next five years,” Aufort said.

The head of the defense innovation agency said quantum computers are also a “question of years,” and they may be a mix of traditional high-performance computing with a quantum part. The DGA in March awarded contracts to five domestic computer research startups to develop technology that will allow France to have two universal quantum computer prototypes by 2032.

In an interview, its new director said the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, nicknamed America’s gatekeeper, is better known for conducting 95% of background investigations for federal workers and military personnel, but less so for its role protecting the nation’s industrial base.

David Cattler, who took the reins in March, wants to change that.

In an effort to centralize the government’s sprawling personnel security system, Congress sought to move this responsibility to DCSA from the Office of Personnel Management, which was finalized via an executive order in 2019. Now, Cattler said he’s in the midst of a “90-day approach” as the leader of an organization that should be at full performance in five years.

The White House has said small businesses are “the engines of the economy,” and it has told agencies like DCSA to ensure their participation in government contracts. Last year, they spent a record $178 billion on small businesses. DoD alone increased its spend by 8%.

There’s an imperative from government to extend a welcome to small businesses, and DoD has a growing portfolio of commercial technology and services that can diversify the industrial base. There’s also a need to ensure barriers to entry aren’t too high without compromising security. That’s where DCSA comes in.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

You’ve been in this role for a little less than three months. What’s new to you? What’s your vision for the agency?

I’m a big “first 90 days” person. This is one of several organizations I’ve either joined or created or led over the course of my career that is new or beginning or had some big issues that needed to be addressed. And this one’s no exception.

As far as the “first 90 days” approach, I tend to see this as an organization that after five years should be in full performance. In a lot of ways it is because it builds off a pretty strong legacy, whether you were formerly with the Office of Personnel Management or the Defense Department. We’re talking decades of experience and structure and qualification in the workforce.

The first thing that struck me in this 90 days is that we’re not actually fully confident in every way we should be. We’re not fully mature. Some things have to be worked out. If you put it in commercial terms, we’ve gone through a five-year period of strategic merger and acquisition, and that can be tough because you do need to have a mindset of one culture, one team, one brand.

This is a purpose-built security agency that combines a lot of elements from the legacy Office of Personnel Management and its authorities and statutory responsibilities, along with a similar and impressive set of things from DoD. And the expectations for what DCSA will do span across the federal government.

DCSA is not just America’s gatekeeper; DCSA should be the nation’s premier provider of integrated security services. So the first task is not to assert that we are that, but to have other people see us in that way, and relatedly to have them see us as their preferred partner.

How does DCSA interface with the defense-industrial base and its security?

If you’re outside the national security community, especially the security part of the national security community, and if you’re outside of the defense-industrial base, do you know who we are? I don’t think so. And that’s a real shame because taxpayers are paying $2.8 billion for it this fiscal year. I take this very seriously. You’re paying 15,000 people to do the work.

We were created as a result of yet another inflection point: the OPM hack. We’ve accreted some of these additional responsibilities like the insider threat role, in no small part because of the series, conditions and departmental analysis after the Navy Yard active shooter [incident], Fort Hood, and related tragedies and real problems within the security community to anticipate, detect, characterize, intervene and mitigate those sorts of threats.

If you work for a company, if you want to start one or if you want to keep up business at a company that requires a facility clearance, the odds are pretty good you’re going to work with DCSA. If you have a cyber problem, if you have an insider threat problem or if you have a counterintelligence problem, the odds are pretty good you’re going to interact with DCSA. If you want to be certified to be a professional in a space, or if you want to get better as a professional inside and outside government, you’ll likely interact with DCSA.

What is the ideal relationship between the agency and industry?

Security can be viewed by some as an overhead cost. It’s a must-do, but I’m going to go to compliance. Some — many even — may go the extra mile.

I sent a letter to our key partners in government and in the private sector when I first arrived, saying: “Call me directly, anytime. Send me an email I want to meet you all. I really want to hear from you. If I can help you, I will.”

We’re going to expand CEO-level and C-suite engagement. I get that security can be viewed as overhead and as a cost, but we need to practice security by design, which means that security really should be baked in from the very beginning. Security is a required element to one’s approach to tackling a contract — the same as it is for us in government before we embark on anything.

Be reasonable, particularly on the cost of compliance. You need to be efficient and effective. You don’t have to build to the minimum; you can build in some additions so that there’s more resilience and maybe some fallbacks or spillover so that you’ve got overlapping capabilities.

I was a little surprised by how warmly welcomed I was by industry. We are on the same team. And to be clear, it’s not that they think they’re going to have an easier time in a compliance inspection; that’s not what it is. It’s that you don’t start in an adversarial way. We want industry to be proved to be secure. Nobody who works for DCSA is going out trying to have someone lose their security clearance or fail on a facility clearance review.

So the relationship with industry is critically important. It’s very, very close. And it is mutually respectful, hopeful and very supportive.

The federal government is trying to increase business with small companies. How do you ensure the barriers to entry aren’t too high without cutting corners on security?

A lot of this stuff becomes about balance. We want to trust you. We want you, as a small business, to be able to compete. For classified work, we want you to be able to sustain the facility so you can do the work and compete for more work or different work. But that’s also about trust and the right balance.

Now that the internal directives have been approved, we’re moving forward with Section 847 implementation, [a provision from the fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act that says DCSA will review Defense Department contracts that exceed $5 million for foreign ownership, control or influence in its supply chain]. The clock will soon start for that to be implemented. Put that human terms: Say I’m the CEO of a company that’s won a DOD contract of $5 million-plus. That’s just about everybody, right? We’re going to have to take a hard look at that coming in. We want 25 calendar days to complete our review.

That’s an inflection point in terms of responsibility, authority and accountability. There’s no one that works at DCSA that wants to be in a position to tell the CEO of a small business: “Sorry, that’s going to take 40 days, 80 days, 120 days.” We’re going to do everything we can to make sure we’re ready when the light turns green, to move forward and be able to satisfy that set of requirements.

That’s why we’ve asked again for more resources and proper authorities. Give us the guiding directives to get the policy framework built so that we know what we’re required to do.

If I put myself in the shoes of somebody in the private sector and ask myself, “Would I just spend money on security?” — maybe, maybe not.

But if the government came to me and explained — and we can and we do — the reason why we have changed this policy that will correspondingly increase cost is X, Y and Z, and we provide the expert that can give you the details, they get it.

Is that baseline trust there, or is DCSA in the rebuilding stage with industry and its stakeholders?

It’s there. The only thing that surprised me was how strongly positive these interactions have been. Industry is telling me: “Wouldn’t it be great if DCSA had more responsibility and authority?”

From a workforce perspective, DCSA conducts 95% of the federal government’s background clearances. How are you tackling the modernization of this system? What advice do you have for someone who’s looking to get cleared for the first time?

One bit of advice I would give to somebody that’s coming in from the outside is: Plan ahead and be realistic.

If you’ve never held a security clearance and you wish to pursue a government job that requires one, it could take some time. Hiring is one thing; onboarding is another.

The second thing I would say is: Be honest. When you open that eApp form and you start typing, fill it out completely and honestly. Don’t overthink it. Not to sound harsh or overly dramatic, but we’re going to find out about things because we’ve got awesome people and great databases, and we’re going to check you six ways to Sunday before we put you in a position of trust. So be honest. A mistake that you made that you’ve picked yourself up from and recovered and moved on from — that’s perfectly understandable. Nobody’s perfect.

The next thing I would stress to people coming in from the outside is: If you’ve had a security clearance and it’s fairly recent, and you are enrolled in [continuous vetting], you can actually be re-onboarded, re-adjudicated and authorized for onboarding very quickly. And that’s another element of Trusted Workforce, [a whole-of-government approach to reforming the personnel security process].

Reciprocity is also a piece of this. If you come into the DOD, I’m proud to say that the DCSA team can get that done for your employer in less than one day. Reciprocity going in other directions can be more of a challenge.

What’s the latest on timelines for security clearances?

When we talk about the timelines that are in Trusted Workforce — and where we are with the inventory and the goals — what we’re tracking right now is the toughest 10% of cases.

So in 90% of the cases, you’re going to move quite quickly through because you probably haven’t had a brush with the law or you haven’t traveled extensively.

Many of the things we’re looking for in terms of potential indicators where — it’s not a bar to your clearance or a bar to your re-clearance, it’s just something that gets flagged for investigation and adjudication, and we have to take a deeper look. That deeper look can take time. And that time can aggregate.

Especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, we continue to do interviews remotely, but we also do a great number of interviews and investigations in person. It can be challenging. People are working from home, sometimes in remote areas. They’re working odd schedules. Your references need to be checked, and they’re working from home, they’re working on schedules, they’re traveling. That all takes time to get through.

Yet, as the U.S. Department of Defense pursues modernization programs to retain our competitive edge, we cannot afford to forget about vulnerabilities to the systems that the American people use every day. The cyber domain could make the difference between victory and defeat.

As the top Republican on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense and Homeland Security, I have a multifaceted view of the threats we face.

There is undoubtedly a DoD interest in the cyber security of our critical infrastructure — the expertise and readiness of our service members and their equipment can be undermined in the blink of an eye if their installations lose access to power or water while attempting to deploy.

Earlier this year, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a joint advisorythat Chinese state sponsored cyber actors are pre-positioning themselves on U.S. networks to conduct destructive cyber attacks against our critical infrastructure in the event of a global crisis or conflict. According to their report, the Chinese state-sponsored group Volt Typhoon had persistent access to some U.S. critical infrastructure for up to five years.

Further, an adversary attack against U.S. critical infrastructure during a conflict could affect the lives of everyday Americans severely enough to sway public opinion in opposition to U.S. military operations. These national security challenges under DoD’s purview are challenged by the fact that the majority of our nation’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector.

It is evident to me from my leadership roles on the committees responsible for authorizing public works programs and funding homeland security initiatives that today’s national security issues demand increased synchronization with the state, local, and industry partners that administer our day-to-day functions.

I recently attended the groundbreaking ceremony for a new National Center of Excellence for Cyber Security in Critical Infrastructure, which will be housed in my home state of West Virginia at Marshall University.

This NCOE will break down the walls between the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security, academia, and industry to facilitate cooperation in identifying and tackling the cyber threats we face. As a partnership with United States Cyber Command’s Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Network, as well as the National Guard, it also emphasizes a joint, operational perspective to the cyber problem set. Most importantly, it will serve as a hub for the curriculum and training of the U.S. cyber workforce necessary to defend our infrastructure—both in and out of uniform.

Cyber protection is not only a U.S. interagency, public-private challenge, but an allied problem set. I’m proud that West Virginia is also leading the way in bolstering the cyber security of our allies and partners as the host for the U.S. team in NATO’s Locked Shields Exercise.

Locked Shields is the world’s largest and most complex live-fire cyber exercise, featuring 40 countries and 3,000 participants throughout NATO member states. In Morgantown, West Virginia, nearly 200 United States, Norwegian, and Montenegrin players worked as a team in the simulated cyber defense of a NATO ally under attack—an all-too-realistic scenario that we must prepare for.

The United States remains a global superpower—one that can devote resources to military modernization programs while also improving interagency and public-private coordination right here at home to protect our most critical systems.

Our next fight won’t just take place in the air, on land, and at sea. Instead, it will take place in the space and cyber domains where boundaries are blurred and partnerships are key.

If done right, the NCOE will be a model for future national security challenges that extend beyond DoD jurisdiction in areas like the private sector, academia, and state and local. On the battlefields of today and tomorrow, even the most advanced militaries will be challenged by cyber threats. Breaking down the barriers now will help us win.

U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) is a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and serves as the Ranking Member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Capito also serves as the vice chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, the fifth ranking Republican in the U.S. Senate.

In recent years, notable progress has been made in fostering multilateral relationships within the Indo-Pacific region, moving beyond traditional bilateral frameworks towards mini-lateral arrangements.

Just this month, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin convened the inaugural quadrilateral defense ministers meeting in Honolulu, bringing together allies Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. This gathering followed landmark joint patrols conducted by these nations in the South China Sea and a first trilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders’ summit held in April.

Concurrently, the U.S. continues to strengthen its trilateral ties with Japan and South Korea while expanding its quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan, and India. Despite these advancements, however, a significant gap remains apparent—a deficient information sharing network that fails to adequately reflect the depth and scope of our evolving partnerships.

The current structure, largely rooted in antiquated bilateral information systems, lacks the agility and robustness required to address the multifaceted challenges of the 21st century.

While the U.S.-Japan-South Korea have a trilateral sharing agreement, information exchange between Tokyo and Seoul remains in its early stages and largely centered on the nuclear and missile threats by North Korea, less so on the other security and economic threats in the region. Efforts to establish information sharing among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India are still ongoing, with discussions centered on how to cooperate on cybersecurity.

By year-end, the U.S. and the Philippines will hopefully finalize the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which would enable real-time information sharing and technology across domains, and perhaps could serve as a catalyst to make these new groupings into a more robust information sharing network.

Five Eyes

Despite these efforts, we are still a long way off in establishing a secure network that connects these separate channels together, allowing concurrent secure communications across partners under one system that incorporates databases and exchanges via email, text, or video. Currently, the only cross collaboration or communication of information among allies is under the “Five Eyes” rub, of which Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand are part of, and even under this structure the system isn’t perfect.

Having a joint capability to track maritime, ground, and air activities or any other coercive activities in the Indo-Pacific would be immensely useful, particularly as the People’s Liberation Army’s activities grows more dangerous every day. Additionally, it is even more important for the U.S. and its partners to identify and mitigate economic security risks, critical technology concerns, and supply chain vulnerabilities as well as the opportunities to collaborate effectively against these risks.

To be effective, we need to create a secure, zero-based trust network that would allow the transfer of sensitive information, enhance situational awareness, and fortify joint operations and operating pictures. Much of this could be built on the zero trust architecture that DoD directed to be built by 2027 to enable secure data-sharing. Last year, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) accelerated efforts to construct such a network called the INDOPACOM Mission Network (IMN), which has its pedigree to the DoD’s larger Mission Partner Environment (MPE), and would allow the command to rapidly share information as well as operate a common operating picture with allies and partners, representing a critical step towards overcoming these challenges.

IMN would essentially incorporate and replace stove-piped bilateral collaboration networks and create an interconnected web of communication and integration among U.S. and its allies and partners. It would also eventually feed into INDOPACOM’s Joint Fires Network, which will integrate systems across the entire battlespace among the services as well as key international partners.

The value of an integrated information sharing network would also extend beyond traditional defense considerations. A network that serves as the bedrock for addressing broader strategic imperatives such as economic resilience, defense industrial base requirements, technological innovation, and safeguarding critical infrastructure is greatly needed. Eventually, this network — or an offshoot that feeds into IMN — could enable cleared private industries within participating nations that are supporting government efforts to better collaborate on these issues.

Three steps

To realize this vision, several critical steps must be undertaken:

First, there is an urgent need to set what the baseline security standards and protocols are needed for countries to participate in a zero-trust information sharing network, particularly as it relates to cleared personnel, training, practices, cybersecurity infrastructure, and any necessary information agreements. These standards should not only ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of shared information but also facilitate interoperability and collaboration across diverse platforms and systems—controlling security permissions as necessary.

Second, each country needs to ensure it has its own secure infrastructure and common operating picture to share information within its own interagency. The use of U.S. security cooperation authorities or even Foreign Military Sales could support partners to acquire such capabilities and train personnel to standardize security clearances, practices, and infrastructure in those nations. Private industry could help in this effort.

Third, adequate funding and alignment DoD is imperative to support the development and implementation of IMN. Without sufficient resources, cohesive governance structures, and top-down leadership, even the most well-conceived initiatives are destined to falter or not progress. Over the last five years, and perhaps more, IMN and its precursor MPE has been a recurrent unfunded Commander’s priority. Even though the Indo-Pacific region is stated as DoD’s priority theater, $124,000 million of IMN remains unfunded for FY2025 and should get funded this year.

Finally, for this endeavor to succeed, it necessitates focused attention and prioritization at the highest echelons of leadership. Its progress is contingent upon the commitment of senior DoD leaders and the availability of resources provided to execute it. Civilian leadership at the senior level within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy must support and accelerate such steps. Considering the scope of implementation across allies and partners and the imperative to standardize processes and data across various services, it also might make sense for a civilian czar to accelerate these efforts.

In charting the course forward, it is imperative to draw lessons from successful models of collaboration, while tailoring them to the unique dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, and to accelerate the positive momentum occurring with our allies and partners in the region. By leveraging the expertise and capabilities of like-minded nations, we can expedite the standardization of protocols and technologies across these new multilateral and bilateral groupings — ensuring seamless, secure, and efficient communication channels that are indispensable in both peacetime and conflict scenarios.

Kimberly Lehn is a senior associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a senior fellow (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a former professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee.

The aid package will include the Saab-made airborne surveillance and control aircraft, known as ASC-890, which can track ships, drones, aircraft and missiles.

According to a statement published by the Swedish government, the aircraft will strengthen Ukraine’s “capability to identify and engage targets at long range.”

The weapons bundle will also contain a number of Swedish-made, advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, or RB-99-AMRAAM, adapted for ground-to-air engagements.

The Scandinavian country will send its complete stock of armored tracked personnel carriers, the PBV 302, alongside spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance equipment to support the regeneration of new Ukrainian brigades.

The Swedish vehicles, produced by the company now known as BAE Systems Hägglunds, were retired from service in 2014.

Additionally, Kyiv will receive an undisclosed number of 155mm artillery shells from Swedish stockpiles, “to combat Russian units in the depths of the battlefield,” according to the statement.

While this donation will lead to a temporary decline in Sweden’s armament, government officials have already committed to procuring more munitions as replacements. Similarly, defense officials in Stockholm intend to buy more GlobalEye surveillance aircraft from Saab to make up for the donation of the older ASC-890 type.

These Swedish pledge follows military aid commitments from Spain and Belgium this week in the areas of combat aircraft, tanks and air defense.

This shift in focus has caused the development and distribution of technologies that accelerate the demand for tools that drive a decision advantage that enables improved U.S. and partner nation decision making along the edge.

The rapid development of edge computing and network solutions continually forces the evolution of technology driven C2 and ISR systems that warfighters rely on in multi-domain operations.

These ongoing multi-domain operations currently allow the U.S. and our partner nations to establish integrated deterrence, while supporting interoperability within a mission partner environment.

It also allows joint and service planners to realize scalable decision-making advantages for agile basing and contested logistics missions while assuring communications in denied/degraded environments and enhancing intelligence collection capabilities.

So, What’s Next?

Three things are needed to take advantage of the first island chain edge focus:

1) Develop and sustain a persistent decision-making advantage;

2) achieve an accelerated, more accurate, data, information and intelligence decision cycle; and

3) training and experience.

Persistent Decision-Making Advantage

The U.S. and partner networks are performing in the future operating environment now. Our adversaries, through their Gray Zone warfare tactics or anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) deterrent capabilities, are expected to continue their bullying efforts.

The good news for the Joint Force and partner nations is represented by our precision and our persistence to achieve decision advantage effects outcomes along the first island chain edge.

In short, this signals an opportunity for the key decision makers to apply decision advantage tools more rapidly across the range of multi-domain operations (adversary electronic warfare, cyber, long-range missiles, and advanced air defense threats) to deter, or if deterrence fails, fight and win.

Three of the IndoPacific multi-domain missions that now rely on decision advantage include Precision Fires, Agile Basing and Contested Logistics.

For Fires, our tactical and joint command centers – using their decision-advantage – will be able to direct long-range precision fires including Extended Range Cannon Artillery; Precision Strike Missile; Strategic Long-Range Cannon; Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons; and the Navy’s Navy SM-6 and UGM-109 ground launched missiles.

For Agile Basing, command centers at their air force base locations and nodes along the first island chain edge will be able to conduct air superiority, support sea control missions, or air or fleet sustainment missions.

For Contested Logistics, sustainment planners using tactical, joint or expeditionary command center nodes and their logistic staff will be able to conduct logistics operations along the first island edge to pre-position or provide ammunition, fuel, food and medical supplies.

Finally, as we accelerate decisions in tactical and joint operational command centers, we in effect create new decision advantages all along the first island chain edge.

Decisions within the Combined, Joint All-Domain environment require the integration of a myriad of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications capabilities on the edge of the operations area.

Edge integration must take place within the evolving agile tactical operations centers and communication nodes along the edge of the first island chain.

The U.S. Air Force Agile Combat Employment, or ACE, from these bases will need decision advantage tools to achieve an accelerated decision cycle to build tempo and sustain combat operations along the first island chain.

These adaptive bases directly support the operational maneuver of air forces, assured command and control and sustain combat sorties from the edge.

Training and Experience

Our people remain the critical factor when achieving decision advantage at the edge.

Tactical and Joint Operations Centers can now have internal multi-domain scenario driven exercises while partner exercises build experience and drive interoperability within the different formations along the edge.

An important training goal in these operations center scenarios is the experience garnered from the involvement of different organizations, services, and partner nations to achieve command and control objectives while working through interoperability challenges driven realistic multi-domain training and exercises.

Effective multi-domain operations training requires the management of multi-level classification enclaves requiring cross-domain screening for all source display and decision making.

With geographical focus, multi-domain training to achieve decision advantage combined with the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) software, has the potential to accelerate and add quality data, information and intelligence to decision makers.

In conclusion, the focus for U.S. and partner nations to operate in the multi-domain environment along the first island chain edge has created opportunities for decision makers to leverage this important geographical architecture.

Going forward, our Leaders must improve their decision advantage posture and accelerate decision making to achieve integrated deterrence and to counter gray zone tactics.

Lt. Gen. James Terry (Ret.) is senior vice president at Cubic Defense.