In a letter shared with Reuters by U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, U.S. Central Command said it had “received multiple threat reports concerning adversary exploitation of commercial location data to target or surveil U.S. personnel in theater.”

The message, sent on April 14, offered no further specifics, but CENTCOM’s area of responsibility includes the Gulf, where U.S. forces are facing off against the Iranian military over the Strait of Hormuz.

The disclosure was the first official confirmation that U.S. forces had been targeted in an active war zone, Wyden and a bipartisan group of legislators said in a letter sent on Thursday to the Pentagon.

“Commercial location data can be used to identify where U.S. troops congregate and their pattern of life, which can be exploited by adversaries to target attacks such as missiles, drones, and roadside bombs, as well as for counterintelligence purposes,” the letter warned.

Wyden said in a statement that it was time to “start treating the adtech industry as a national security threat.”

The Pentagon did not return messages seeking comment. The lawmakers said in their letter that their efforts to obtain more information from military officials about the reported targeting had been unsuccessful.

LOCATION DATA TRADE FUELS PRIVACY CONCERNS

Location data is widely used in digital advertising, which is a key source of revenue for many tech companies. Such data is typically collected from smartphones or other devices by apps or service providers before being sold to data brokers who collate and resell the data, sometimes via complex networks of intermediaries.

Although the threat to privacy inherent in selling the details of people’s day-to-day movements on the open market has long been a matter of public discussion, its potential as a national security risk has recently drawn concern as well.

As far back as 2016, one U.S. defense contractor was able to leverage commercially available location data to track special operations forces from their bases in the United States to a sensitive staging post in Syria, according to an account first disclosed by the Wall Street Journal.

More recently, journalists at Wired and two German news outlets drew on billions of coordinates collected by a data broker to expose the granular comings and goings of people stationed at or around 11 U.S. military and intelligence sites in Germany.

Two groups that represent digital advertisers, the Interactive Advertising Bureau and the Association of National Advertisers, did not return emails seeking comment.

The letter from U.S. lawmakers to the Pentagon said that, given what military officials know about the trade in location data, they should have acted faster to protect their personnel, for example by disabling the unique advertising ID attached to military-issued devices, automatically turning off location sharing on smartphones in the field and steering staff away from Google’s Chrome web browser toward more privacy-focused alternatives.

One of the letter’s cosigners was U.S. Representative Pat Harrigan, a North Carolina Republican who was formerly a U.S. Army Special Forces officer.

Harrigan said that browsers like Chrome “are built from the ground up to collect and share user data” and that every day they remain on government-issued devices “is another day we are handing our adversaries a weapon against our own troops.”

In a statement, Alphabet’s Google said that Chrome had “industry leading security.” The company added that it had “long advocated for stronger rules and safeguards against data brokers.”

The Iron Beam technology is “intriguing,” Doug Bush told reporters last week. “If [the Israelis] are successful, that certainly could be something the Army could think about leveraging.”

Congress has yet to pass the supplemental funding aimed to support U.S. and allies’ defense needs, including Ukraine and Israel. A growing number of House Republicans oppose additional Ukraine aid and have instead pushed for a stand-alone $14 billion Israel supplemental.

Bush said he’d seen the first prototype of the directed-energy technology meant to augment the Iron Dome air defense system capability in Israel on his last trip to the country, adding that he was “pleased” to see the supplemental include the U.S. investment in developing Iron Beam.

The Army is working on its own high-energy laser as part of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability, or IFPC, to defend against rockets, artillery, mortars, cruise missiles and drones. Despite supply chain issues causing delays, the Army is in the process of receiving the first prototypes from its Leidos subsidiary Dynetics.

Army’s laser weapon pursuit

The laser weapon portion of the IFPC system is under development by the American firm Lockheed Martin. The Army awarded a contract to Lockheed in October to deliver two 300-kilowatt-class laser weapon systems for the IFPC prototypes program, with an option for two additional units.

“The Israeli system is a slightly different approach technologically,” Bush said, “so it’s actually a nice complement because we’re kind of going down one path; they’ve gone down a slightly different one. [I]f theirs works well, it could be something we could think about leveraging for our needs in that space. So that’s really a benefit of that funding is … we can explore multiple paths here and see what works.”

While Bush said he could not go into specifics about the technology, the differences have to do with “how the laser beam is formed and aimed,” and each uses different power levels.

“They have a very specific problem they’re trying to solve with rockets and things like that, where the Army system goes a little broader — cruise missiles perhaps, things like that,” he added.

Israel’s laser development

Mark Montgomery, a defense analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington, said he hopes that if Congress passes the supplemental funding then the U.S. can make a deal with the Israeli government in which intellectual property is owned by both American and Israeli companies involved. That would presumably be U.S.-based RTX and Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which worked together to co-develop Iron Dome.

Those companies should be able to “immediately turn it around and build stuff for us because this is a serious investment in laser and non-kinetic directed-energy weapons,” Montgomery told Defense News in a recent interview.

Then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced in early 2022 the country’s plan to create a “laser wall” to shift from spending money a large quantity of interceptors to using less costly lasers. He had said the system would be operational by next year. But later that year, the Israeli government said it could likely deploy the system in two years.

While the system is not yet operational, Israel announced in April 2022 it had successfully intercepted mortars, rockets and anti-tank missiles in recent tests in the Negev Desert the month prior. And Iron Beam was on display in February 2023 at the IDEX defense exhibition in the United Arab Emirates.

Experts have highlighted the technological challenge lasers have in handling large salvos of rockets because lasers take time to heat up a target to destroy it. A laser might need to hit a target steadily for two to three seconds to destroy a rocket, for instance.

The Israel-Hamas war has shown, according to reports from both sides, that the militant group potentially doubled its rocket rate of fire compared to the war they fought in May 2021.

In 2021, Hamas could fire roughly 125 rockets in salvos over several minutes. In Hamas’ attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the group reportedly fired 3,000 to 5,000 rockets into the country over a 20-minute time period.

Cattler now wrangles some 80 intelligence organizations from 31 NATO members, organizing their efforts somewhat like the director of national intelligence provides guidance to U.S. intelligence agencies. His main focus right now? Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine and its hybrid war against Ukraine and NATO, as well as the rest of Europe. This conversation has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Q: What does the hybrid fight look like right now?

A: Let’s start with the NATO definition of hybrid threats: Combining military and nonmilitary means to take covert and even overt action that involves everything from disinformation and cyber attacks, economic pressure, energy, coercion, irregular armed groups and even use of regular military forces.

These hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and to attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations, really with an aim to destabilize and undermine societies. And what we’ve observed is that the speed, scale and intensity of these hybrid activities has increased in recent years.

Ukraine has been victim to hybrid attacks … since even before 2014 when Crimea was illegally annexed. In some ways, the beginnings of the Russian deployment for the annexation was also a bit of a hybrid operation, in that there were “little green men” there. They didn’t wear identifying badges on their uniforms, clearly intended to create some confusion or to sow some doubt, to cause [Western] decision-making to be a bit delayed, hopefully, to deny consensus, and so on … that could prevent the outcome, this illegal annexation of Crimea.

And then in the years in between, you’ve seen everything from sustained cyber attacks of varying scales, denial of service data, exfiltration and so on, and then attempts to really undermine the Ukrainian people’s confidence in the government, undermine elections, try to steer the government in a direction against a Euro Atlantic alignment, whether for the EU or for NATO.

Q: And the Russian message now?

A: What they’re saying is that external support to Ukraine, if not illegal, prevented under international law, is actually against peace, which is really hard to comprehend when you’ve initiated an illegal war of aggression. Asking the country that you’ve illegally invaded to lay down their arms as a humanitarian gesture is a bit of a stretch, and then also to say to nations — that have the right under international law to come to Ukraine’s defense and assistance — that they may not provide that aid, because it extends the war and increases the human cost? Certainly, we don’t agree with it. But this is the voice in this so far from Moscow.

Q: What of their attempts to message that the Western alliance is experiencing war fatigue?

A: I think war fatigue is a real thing. … You have it in Russia. You see it now, with people refusing to be mobilized and called up. You see it in feedback from soldiers that have been mobilized against their will, or that had been promised one thing, like being in the rear providing rear security or logistics, and then wind up in Bakhmut with little to no training and very poor equipment.

I think there’s a potential that you could see war fatigue elsewhere. In Ukraine, they have been subjected to very, very substantial, not just hybrid attack, but also direct physical attack, with many, many allegations of Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity. And that all does weigh on the society.

Q: But the message that the West is getting tired of war?

A: Look … we need to make clear that we will stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes, that we understand that it’s not just about protecting ourselves with stronger resilience, but it’s very important in a hybrid sense. Meaning that we’ve got the capability to withstand disinformation and propaganda, but also an understanding that there are costs that we feel due to higher inflation, energy prices, and so on.

But it’s the right thing to do, not just to help Ukraine, but also to help ourselves when we look at the longer term security implications of the war, because Russia has made clear … in January of 2022, at least, that what they actually wish to see is a revision of the international security order and, especially on their border, to roll back NATO to make changes in the security environment that are not, in fact, in line with international law and the sovereign rights of states.

Now, Ukraine feels it directly because they’ve now suffered this expanded invasion. But I think this is also a key reason why so many nations have stepped up and have made the political statement of resolve and also have acted on that statement by providing this assistance now for more than 444 days.

Q: U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have been told to prepare for war with China. Why should they be paying attention to what Russian troops are doing in Ukraine?

A: I think we can and should be able to handle and think about more than one thing at a time. The resolution of the war in Ukraine, I mean, just from the legal aspect of it alone, has bearing on other potential disputes around the world, even potentially including China and Taiwan. You could think of Russia and Georgia, and also, Moldova and Transnistria (an unrecognised breakaway state that is internationally recognized as a part of Moldova). There are a few other frozen conflicts around the world where these sorts of resolutions really matter.

And I think there’s been a good argument made in a lot of really strong public analysis that if Ukraine prevails, and the international order is preserved, that also helps maintain an international legal system and peace and stability … so these are very important.

Please remember that we … have a set of very important values. The idea that people have an inherent right to be free, that nations have a right to be sovereign, independent and make their own decisions, and that human rights are preserved on an individual level are things that I know we hold very dear.

And so I think this war in Ukraine is important to us whether we are Ukrainian or not. The war matters because of the things that are happening that we wish to stop and what the war means in the longer term for Ukraine, for Euro Atlantic security and also for international security.

Q: Has this war also been important for learning how Russia fights?

A: Yes, I think it is pretty clear in the way the Russians fight that a lot of the military way of thinking seems to be very Soviet in its mindset, in terms of command and control … in the operational art, the way they organize, the way they choose to fight and the way that they employ weapons.

Look at the use of artillery, for example. It’s very high volume with less precision, but then at huge cost in terms of the ammunition expenditure and also the damage on the ground. These are things that are not usually associated with modern warfare. They’re more commonly associated with World War II and even, in some cases, World War I. So they continue to do more and more poorly on the battlefield.

Q: Does the U.S. risk seeing Russia as too weak, whereas before they saw Russian troops as sort of 10 feet tall? Have we gone in the other direction after seeing their performance in Ukraine?

A: I think most of us did not think the Russians were 10 feet tall. … But they had credible capabilities … both strategic and conventional. ….

Some make a mistake when they say that because Russia has been unable to translate the military activity into the strategic political effect, that means that they’re not doing anything. Completely false. They’ve done a tremendous amount of damage. And that damage is devastating on a practical human level. And that’s why I say I think it’s a mistake to lose sight of that.

And then further, they still retain great nuclear capability. They have the largest nuclear inventory in the world. And that does represent an existential threat, potentially, that needs to be really closely monitored and understood. That’s still retained. And this is a force that in some ways, is larger.

Just because an army is less capable doesn’t mean that it can’t cause significant damage, as this one has done and continues to do so.

Q: And you’ve been having to warn American and international companies about another threat from Russia: critical infrastructure threats.

A: To be clear, I’m not attributing the Nord Stream I or II attacks to Russia. But I’m just pointing out that you see that … the investigation has already preliminarily, to the extent it can, confirmed that it was sabotage and not a naturally caused outage in the two pipelines.

And we’re increasingly mindful that the way our societies have evolved, whether for information technology, communications, financial transfers, or for energy, now natural gas and oil transfers, but increasingly in the future, offshore windmills and solar panel arrays and so on, that we need to pay attention to the potential that Russia could choose to attack that infrastructure.

We already see them mapping undersea infrastructure. We know that they have capabilities that they’ve sought to preserve and expand over time to do the sorts of activities whether for intelligence, or for more hostile activities, more hostile actions against that infrastructure. And we have to look for it because, as I said in the definition, economic … leverage and energy leverage are two tools that we would consider to be in the hybrid toolkit.

Part of our public outreach has, in fact, been to the private sector — to the energy industry, to telecommunications industry, to IT service providers, network operators, and so on — to try to explain the potential of these threats because they have a large stake in the risk.

They do own some of it, and they also have some capabilities on their own to help us monitor, to provide that situational awareness and to see some anomalies, potentially to detect problems in the system. And I think, in some cases, they’re likely to be first, in fact, to see these things. …

I think it was the open ocean that they used to consider was the protection — that they had to provide armor for a telecommunications cable close to the beach so an anchor couldn’t drag across it and cut it. … Or maybe put a bigger fence or have some physical standoff around a landing station, so a terrorist attack would be less effective. Or there can’t be a break in, because I’ve got guards, and I’ve got cameras and things.

And what we’re saying to them now is: You have to potentially worry about a state capability that could reach out and touch your infrastructure.

Q: You’re essentially asking them to armor every foot of those undersea cables and put some sort of sensor on them to detect interference?

A: I wouldn’t quite go that far. … That’s reasonably unreasonable, because the cost would be phenomenal. … But that’s where you have to really then think through what do I do for surveillance? What do I do for monitoring? Maybe I use AI for anomaly detection or to look for patterns of surface ships, aircraft hovering around key nodes and that sort of thing. How do I use my network monitoring? If I’m on Google or … Deutsche Telekom, British Telecom, maybe there are things I could do other than just monitoring my network. I think there needs to be a good healthy discussion between the public and private sector about … ways to mitigate it that are feasible and affordable.

The competitively awarded Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1982 and recently reauthorized by Congress, can play a greater role in bridging that gap.

As the Pentagon’s recently published Small Business Strategy makes clear, small companies are key to helping the U.S. ensure its technological superiority over China and other potential adversaries.

“Despite their significance to the defense mission, the Department of Defense has yet to utilize the full potential of small businesses,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin wrote. The document singles out the SBIR and STTR programs as key entry points for small businesses into the broader defense-industrial base.

The DoD’s own review of the economic impacts of the SBIR program reported a 22-to-1 return on its investment and $28 billion in sales of new technology to the military. In her testimony to Congress in support of reauthorization of the program, the undersecretary for research and engineering, Heidi Shyu, said the “SBIR/STTR programs play a vital role in enabling the U.S. to maintain technological dominance and provide the innovation to allow the U.S. to remain ahead of our adversaries.”

At our company, Physical Sciences, SBIR-funded research and development has enabled us to provide advanced technology to a range of DoD programs. Key SBIR-developed technology, for instance, has allowed us to domestically produce specialized battery systems meant to improve the safety and performance of unmanned underwater vehicles.

This is one example of technology needed for national defense, but so focused it has very limited markets. These kinds of technologies take a long time to mature and face multiple barriers to entry in the cumbersome DoD acquisition processes — what Austin called “a complex web of entry points and intricate regulations.”

Earlier reauthorizations of the SBIR/STTR programs have increased technology transition success by creating pathways to provide the additional funding necessary to successful mature technologies, including the Commercialization Readiness Program and the Rapid Innovation Fund. Acquisition authorities are becoming more adept at recognizing and applying additional SBIR funds to technologies with merit. Congress in September reauthorized the programs for three years, including with some welcome reforms to ensure oversight.

Now, they can be strengthened even further by the Biden administration and Congress.

One of the most persistent questions we get from prime contractors is about our ability to scale production to become a reliable supplier of our own technology. The production of many of these items is capital-intensive, and subject to extensive and expensive qualification requirements without parallel in the commercial world.

The Pentagon has sought a variety of novel ways to encourage sufficient investment to make the leap from prototype to production and supply chain viability — most recently setting up the Office of Strategic Capital to help small businesses secure venture capital and loans. But the lack of venture interest in many of these markets limits the impact of that approach. Any small business contemplating borrowing to fund expansion, at levels approaching its entity value, would be very reluctant to do so considering the high degree of uncertainty in the budgets of its sole customer.

There are some immediate ways the Biden administration and Congress can double down on success. In Executive Order 14017, the president directed the DoD to deploy incentives through the Defense Production Act “to support sustainably-produced strategic and critical materials, including scaling proven research and development (R&D) concepts and emerging technologies from other programs such as the Small Business Innovation Research awardees.”

Congress can provide more effective pathways to implement that policy. It can appropriate additional funding for the Defense Production Act as well as for the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program, intended in part to cultivate emerging defense sectors and invest in greater partnerships across the industrial base. As it considers these programs, Congress should directly fund and improve access to these funds for SBIR-developed technologies.

Finally, Congress needs to provide additional stability to the SBIR/STTR programs. Its recent reauthorization came down to the wire, delayed key awards, had the potential to exclude many successful performers from the program, and in the end was only for three years. Few would risk making investment decisions supporting acquisition cycles that last over a decade in that climate. It is time to permanently authorize the program.

The Department of Defense is rightly pursuing a host of investment strategies and incentives to help ensure next-generation technologies reach our troops. But while building new bridges, it should also strengthen those that exist. The alternative is squandering investments across the entire defense R&D spectrum and relinquishing technology leadership to our adversaries.

Bill Marinelli is chief executive of Physical Sciences, a U.S.-based company that develops electro-optical/infrared sensing systems and technologies for the defense, homeland security, medical and energy sectors.

JPSS-2 carries Raytheon Intelligence & Space’s Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite sensor and is controlled by RI&S’ JPSS Common Ground System, the company said in a statement.

From 500 miles above the Earth, VIIRS collects day-and-night imagery across twenty-two bands of light to characterize emerging storm patterns and generates high-fidelity sea, land and atmospheric data for a variety of applications, including monitoring of wildfires, droughts, floods, vegetation health, algal blooms and other phenomena.

“VIIRS gives us the big picture” said Edmond Chung, program manager for RI&S. “This latest instrument will expand NOAA’s Earth observation capabilities, enhance forecasting and help us all better understand how our planet is changing.”

The JPSS-2 satellite joins the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership satellite and NOAA-20, previously known as JPSS-1, in polar orbit. These satellites circle the Earth from the North Pole to South Pole 14 times daily, delivering weather data for both short- and long-term forecasting.

Composed of a global network of ground antennas and computers, JPSS-CGS provides mission planning, command and control and cloud-based data processing for all JPSS satellites. It also delivers data to partner weather and climate satellite systems controlled by the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, the U.S. Space Force and the Japan Exploration Aerospace Agency.