Meanwhile, the Army has wasted up to $40 billion by some estimates, McCain said, on programs like the $2.2 billion Crusader howitzer, $5.9 billion on the armed reconnaissance helicopter, and the joint tactical radio system.

“Every one of those that I mentioned never became reality,” he said. “Never.”

Army leaders have testified on Capitol Hill multiple times this year that the service needs more funding to meet its current operational requirements and increase end strength for the future.

But McCain has rejected the idea of increasing funding until the procurement process shows improvement.

“I’m embarrassed to go in front of my constituents saying, ‘We need more money,’ when we just blew $7.5 billion for a thing called Warfighter Information Network-Tactical — or WIN-T — which the Army still is trying to hang on to,” he said.

The issues are larger than a few mistakes, added Sen. Angus King, I-Maine.

“Number one, it seems to me the fact that the Army has had this series of failures without too many successes over the past 10 — or actually, almost 20 — years, says that there’s something systemic in their procurement system that needs to be thought about,” he said.

McCarthy pointed to shifting requirements during acquisition as a major reason so many programs drag on for years and go so far over budget.

“I saw it firsthand with the Future Combat Systems in 2009, that changing midstream from light and fast to a heavier concept, that confusion in fluctuation confuses what you want to achieve with the system,” he said.

Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, chimed in, indignant that the Army just last year awarded the contract for its new pistol, replacing a handgun it had been using since 1982.

“Russia continues to upgrade its service rifle and we continue to carry the M4 and the M16s,” she said. “The Army just figured out how to procure new pistols. How simple. I can’t believe how long it took to procure a new handgun.”

McCarthy suggested looking at off-the-shelf rifles that could be modified to fit the Army’s needs. For instance, he said, the successful mine-resistant, ambush protected vehicle used by both the Army and Marine Corps was inspired by a similar vehicle used by South African forces.

Despite the hammering, McCain agreed that readiness — Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley’s top priority — could not continue to slip.

“Mr. McCarthy, the U.S. Army is facing a crisis,” he said. “With current operational demands, we can no longer accept that only about one third of the Army’s [brigade combat teams] are ready for deployment.”

McCarthy agreed.

“Six years ago, when I left the Department of Defense, the world was a complex and dangerous place. The Army had over 178,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said. “Today the danger and complexity in the world has only increased, while the size of the total Army has decreased.”

The Army reversed its end strength drawdown this year and leaders have said they would like to see the number of soldiers spread throughout the active and reserve components continue to climb.

Despite his tough questioning, McCain said he would like to move the nomination along as quickly as possible, and promised a fight on the Senate floor if his Democratic colleagues continue to hold up Trump nominations.

The moves are meant to allow MARFORCYBER to keep experienced cyber operators, Maj. Gen. Lori Reynolds told Marine Corps Times.

“Most of the Marines who come on mission, they want to stay on the mission,” Reynolds said after speaking at the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space symposium. “They don’t really want to go back to where they came from.”

Traditionally, Marine cyber operators have primarily come from two occupational fields: signals intelligence and communications, Reynolds said. Once assigned to MARFORCYBER, the command trains those Marines, gives them security clearances and puts them on teams.

Marine Commandant Gen. Robert Neller has approved creating a new occupational field and new MOSs for enlisted cyber operators, warrant officers and officers, Reynolds said.  

This way, MARFORCYBER can keep talented cyber operators who have conducted multiple operations during three or four years of experience instead of having those Marines return to their original MOS, Reynolds said.

“Those who come to cyber stay in cyber,” Reynolds said. “You’d be an offensive cyber guy or a defensive cyber guy, but once you come, you stay.”

The new occupational field and MOSs are slated to become a reality “as soon as possible,” Reynolds said, but Marine Corps officials are still working out the details.

The changes are in line with how Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command retains its Marines, she said.

“What we’ve learned in MARSOC is once you get all that training into Marines, you want to reap that investment for the fullness of their career,” Reynolds said.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees military activity in all three war zones, indicated it is unable to determine how far back the Army’s numbers have been excluded from these airpower summaries. Officials there would not address several detailed questions submitted by Military Times, and they were unable to provide a full listing of annual airstrikes conducted by each of the Defense Department’s four military services.

“It is really weird. We don’t track the number of strikes from Apaches, for example” said a U.S. military official with knowledge of CENTCOM’s data collection and reporting practices. The official, who spoke to Military Times on the condition of anonymity to freely discuss internal procedures, was referring to AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, which the Army has used prolifically in combat over the last 15 years, most recently in support of American allies battling the Islamic State.

“I can tell you, unequivocally, we are not trying to hide the number of strikes,” the official said. “That is just the way it has been tracked in the past. That’s what it’s always been.”

It’s a significant discrepancy, though, and one for which the full scope remains unclear. Airstrikes, according to definitionsestablished and followed by members of U.S.-led coalitions, can involve fighters and other jets, attack helicopters and drones, and they can include any combination of munitions.

A single airstrike can be carried out by multiple aircraft on multiple targets, and use multiple bombs, missiles, rockets and machine gun rounds. It can include combat sorties with predefined targets and attacks carried out during the course of close air support operations.

The Army views things differently, though.

“It seems to me the collection or distribution of airstrike data is not an Army Title 10 responsibility,” a senior Army official told Military Times on the condition of anonymity. Title 10 of the U.S. Code sets the laws that dictate the military services’ roles, responsibilities and missions. “This responsibility should lie with the operational or combatant commander.  Additionally, Apaches for example, conduct close combat attacks as a maneuver element supporting a ground force in contact with the enemy. I would not consider this in the category of ‘airstrike.’ “

The Air Force’s open-source database includes all such missions as part of its airstrike totals. The media and others have depended on these figures for years with the understanding they are a comprehensive rollup of all American and coalition activity. And while the data has been cited in countless reports — from newspaper articles to academic research to analytics provided to lawmakers — no one from the military ever has come forward to clarify that it is wholly incomplete.

As recently as December, an Air Force official told Military Times that its monthly airpower summary of activity in Iraq and Syria specifically represents the entire U.S.-led coalition “as a whole, which is all 20-nations and the U.S. branches.” It’s unclear whether this statement was intentionally misleading, or simply indicative of widespread internal ignorance, confusion or indifference about what’s contained in this data. Regardless, it does include airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps — but not the Army.

Financial implications, if any, are unclear. The Pentagon discloses its top-line expenditures for each of these ongoing military operations, but that data is not readily broken down by the number of sorties flown by specific U.S. aircraft and the amount of munitions they deploy. Consider, though, that Apache helicopters can carry a variety of weapons, including Hellfire missiles with a per-unit cost of $99,600, according to figures maintained by AeroWeb, a defense marketing intelligence firm that closely tracks international defense acquisition.

Such record keeping is no trivial matter. Even federal agencies routinely reference these airstrike figures in reports designed to influence Congress. Military Times’ investigation discovered multiple instances in which an inspector general drew significant conclusions, briefed to high ranking government officials working in the State Department and leading members of Congress, from open-source airstrike data.

The omission of Army strike data is one of multiple errors, discrepancies and shortcomings, raising questions about the validity of policies and methods used by the U.S. military to compile and disseminate information about its worldwide operations.

For example, a 2015 reportto Congress by the inspectors general for the Defense Department, State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development highlighted the open-source airpower tallies for operations against the Islamic State. At some point after the report was published and briefed to lawmakers on Capitol Hill, the Air Force revised the data on which the IGs’ work was based, in some cases adding more than 100 weapons releases for a given month. And while the Air Force notes that revisions do happen occasionally, in this instance they were significant — and occurred after the information was provided to Congress.

Another discrepancy: Though it claims to use the Air Force airstrike data, the Defense Department’s public summaryof operations in Iraq and Syria, current as of Jan. 31, fails to account for nearly 6,000 strikes dating to 2014, when the air campaign against ISIS began.

The most recent Air Force summary counts 23,740 coalition airstrikes through 2016. Meanwhile, the Defense Department’s website lists 17,861 through Jan. 31. The Pentagon routinely cites these figures when updating the media on its operations against the Islamic State and al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq and Syria.

In this screen grab of the Defense Department’s website, taken Saturday, Feb. 4, officials have tallied 17,861 coalition airstrikes through Jan. 31. That’s nearly 5,900 fewer than the Air Force’s tally through the end of December 2016.

There also appear to be separate policies in place regulating the specificity of information that may be publicly disclosed. Citing policy, military officials in the U.S. and in Baghdad refuse to identify the type of American warplanes that conduct individual airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, nor will they provide a breakdown of activity by individual service components.

It’s another story entirely in Afghanistan, where U.S. military officials, in response to questions from Military Times, volunteered the previously undisclosed Army airstrike data for 2016, even identifying the four types of Army aircraft providing lethal air support there. Navy Capt. William Salvin, a spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said that in addition to Apaches, there are armed UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and MQ-1 Gray Eagles, which are drones. Initially, Salvin indicated the Army’s RQ-7 Shadow drones also are armed, but he later corrected that statement.

An MQ-1C Gray Eagle conducts live fire training at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Army uses this drone in Afghanistan and other theaters to conduct airstrikes in addition to intelligence collection.

Photo Credit: Sgt. William Begley/Army

Salvin also explained that the airstrikes conducted there — 1,071 total for last year, not 615 as the Air Force reports in its open-source database — are further classified by three categories: self defense, counter terror and strategic effects, which may be required when senior commanders believe U.S. firepower could help turn the tide in regions deemed vital to Afghanistan’s broader stability.

“We’re just trying to be transparent here,” said Army Brig. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the top spokesman for Operation Resolute Support, which includes the American military’s ongoing effort to train and advise the Afghan army and air force. A separate, smaller operation in Afghanistan, called Freedom’s Sentinel, involves U.S.-led counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaida and its numerous affiliates in the region.

“What you’re talking about is a larger policy decision that would likely start at OSD,” Cleveland said when asked whether these reports should become all inclusive. OSD stands for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “It’s probably larger than a CENTCOM policy decision. What you’re talking about is a global laydown because there are strikes in AFRICOM.”

U.S. Africa Command oversees many of the military’s most secretive counter-terror operations throughout the continent, to include Somalia and Libya. Those tallies are not routinely disclosed either.

Cleveland emphasized, too, that the United States’ air campaign in Afghanistan is part of a greater effort, now in its 16th year, to mentor, support and protect the Afghan military with hopes it will be able to independently provide the country’s security. “The overall concept of airstrikes,” the general said, “from anybody, is a small part of a larger mission.”

It remains unclear why the Army is unique in excluding its airstrike figures from these broader summaries and reports. Reached Saturday, a spokesman for Army headquarters in Washington declined to comment, saying he was unable to research the matter on short notice.

The U.S. military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said it’s because Army aircraft flown in war zones don’t fall under the Air Force chain of command responsible for publishing these monthly summaries.

Still, that does not answer why the Army does not disclose its airstrike data.

Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, a research and advocacy organization, called transparency essential to military accountability. That requires “honest reporting to the public,” Roth said.

“Security may at times require secrecy,” he added, “but embarrassment or political sensitivity never should. Facts regarding the number of airstrikes and their civilian toll should always be disclosed promptly and faithfully so the public, aided by human rights workers and journalists, can scrutinize military operations being conducted in their name.”

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times’ senior editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter: @adegrandpre.

Shawn Snow is a staff writer and Military Times’ Early Bird editor. On Twitter: @SnowSox184.

With additional reporting by Air Force Times’ senior writer Stephen Losey. On Twitter:

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Faller and Mattis have a noteworthy history together. While assigned to Central Command, Faller was investigated by the Navy Inspector General over allegations he breached military ethics rules when, as a carrier strike group commander in 2011, he was offered and accepted a luxury hotel suite in Malaysia.

The Navy determined Faller’s missteps were mitigated because he accepted the room upgrade to accommodate several members of his staff. It was Mattis, as Faller’s boss when the investigation was complete, who elected to forego disciplining the admiral.

Faller studied engineering at the Naval Academy and worked in nuclear specialties early in his career. Later, as a commanding officer, he deployed repeatedly the Middle East, leading combat forces supporting U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf, and in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He’s had a number of high-profile shore assignments, too, including as a fellow working for the late Sen. Ted Kennedy, as the head of Navy recruiting and as a top assistant to the head of U.S. Pacific Command. In that job, Faller would have gained valuable insight into U.S. efforts to contain North Korea and counter China.

While at Central Command, Faller served as operations director, a post that afforded him a oversight of the complex security dynamic throughout the Middle East. That will be important now with some 15,000 U.S. troops deployed to active war zones in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Rear Adm. Kevin M. Sweeney, speaks with sailors during a visit aboard the guided-missile destroyer Mason in November 2013.

Photo Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Rob Aylward/Navy

Sweeney spent 32 years in the Navy, retiring in 2014. Since then, he’s been active as part of an economic development group in Hampton Roads, Virginia.

He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1982, one year ahead of Faller, and worked for Mattis twice — first as an assistant at the now-defunct U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and later as the general’s executive officer at Central Command in Tampa, Florida. Throughout his career, Sweeney held three high-profile staff assignments in Washington, working for top Navy leaders in the Pentagon and for members of the Joint Staff. The retired admiral also held several jobs focused on managing large office staffs, suggesting he will be valuable to Mattis and Work in helping to steer the Pentagon’s day-to-day operations.

His background is quite diverse, however. Early in his career, Sweeney was focused on communications and combat systems. Later, as a commanding officer, Sweeney oversaw restoration of the USS Cole after it was attacked by suicide bombers in Yemen in 2000. Later, he deployed in support of the Iraq war.

Toward the end of his career, Sweeney came under professional scrutiny when a Navy investigation, led by a fellow admiral, determined that as the head of a carrier strike group he and another senior officer should bear responsibility for a costly training mishapin 2012. Sweeney’s boss at the time, Adm. Bill Gortney, then the head of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, disagreed with and overruled that conclusion.

Sweeney’s selection to be Mattis’ chief of staff continues the Trump administration’s trend of putting retired military officers into important national security roles, including as the president’s national security adviser, a post occupied by retired Army Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn. Trump’s Homeland Security secretary is John Kelly, a retired four-star Marine general.

The issue overshadowed Mattis’ confirmation process early on, with critics voicing apprehension about his nomination because of the short duration he’s been separated from the military. The law requires that to serve as defense secretary, retired military personnel must be at least seven years removed from active duty. Mattis, who retired in 2013, required a waiver to bypass that policy.

Mattis was confirmed by the Senate on Friday and sworn into office that evening, arriving for work at the Pentagon on Saturday afternoon. He received his first daily intelligence briefing at that time, and convened a meeting with Work, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford and Vice Chairman Gen. Paul Selva.

On Monday, Mattis met with the joint chiefs of staff and placed his first calls international partners, including NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Canadian defense minister Harjit Sajjan and British defense chief Michael Fallon.

In all three instances, Davis said, Mattis sought to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to its allies — particularly in Europe, which is under renewed threat from neighboring Russia. Trump has suggested his administration may look to mend ties with Moscow, and he has questioned the need for NATO, causing angst at home and overseas.

“The secretary,” Davis said of Mattis, “… wanted to place the call [to Stoltenberg] on his first full day in office to reinforce the importance he places on the alliance.”

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times’ senior editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter: @adegrandpre. Aaron Mehta is Defense News’ associate editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter:

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During his confirmation hearing earlier month, some lawmakers, including Gillibrand, expressed apprehension about Mattis’ ability to approach the job as a civilian — not a 44-year military officer. Mattis sought to assuage those concerns, saying the top role of defense secretary mandates a careful balance of military and diplomatic solutions.

“We shouldn’t be turning to the military,” he said, “to answer all of our problems in the world.”

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times’ senior editor at Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter:

. With reporting by Leo Shane III and Joe Gould.