Speaking Friday to members of Russia’s Security Council, Putin noted that “the challenges in this area have become even more pressing, serious and extensive.”

He charged that “an outright aggression has been unleashed against Russia, a war has been waged in the information space.”

Putin added that “the cyber-aggression against us, the same as the attack on Russia by sanctions in general, has failed.”

He ordered officials to “perfect and enhance the mechanisms of ensuring information security at critically important industrial facilities which have a direct bearing on our country’s defensive capability, and the stable development of the economic and social spheres.”

Also on Friday, Ukrainian authorities said their troops repelled a Russian attack in the east, as Moscow struggled to gain ground in the region that is now the focus of the war even while intensifying its campaign there.

Battered by their monthslong siege of the vital port city of Mariupol, Russian troops need time to regroup, Britain’s Defense Ministry said in an assessment — but they may not get it. The city and the steelworks where Ukrainian fighters have held off the Russian assault for weeks have become a symbol of Ukraine’s stoic resistance and surprising ability to stymie a much larger force.

On Friday, a number of soldiers — just how many was unclear — were still holed up in the Azovstal plant, following the surrender of more than 1,900 soldiers in recent days, according to the latest figure from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Efforts to remove the dead from the battle were also underway, according to Denis Prokopenko, the commander of the Azov Regiment, which is among those defending the plant.

Speaking of the “fallen heroes,” Prokopenko said: “I hope soon relatives and the whole of Ukraine will be able to bury the fighters with honors.” The Red Cross, meanwhile, said it has visited prisoners of war from all sides of the conflict, amid international fears that the Russians may take reprisals against Ukrainian prisoners.

With the battle for the steel plant winding down, Russia has already started pulling troops back from the site. But the British assessment indicated Russian commanders are under pressure to quickly send them elsewhere in the Donbas.

“That means that Russia will probably redistribute their forces swiftly without adequate preparation, which risks further force attrition,” the ministry said.

The Donbas is now President Vladimir Putin’s focus after his troops failed to take the capital in the early days of the war. Pro-Moscow separatists have fought Ukrainian forces for eight years in the region and held a considerable swath of it before Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion.

But the effort to take more territory there has been slow-going. In a sign of Russia’s frustration with the war, some senior commanders have been fired in recent weeks, the British Defense Ministry said.

Dr. John Arquilla and his colleagues at the Rand Corporation and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School were peering into the interconnected planet, and especially its future battlespace in the early 1990s. Despite creating new uniformed and civilian jobs in defense, as well as establishing U.S. Cyber Command, Arquilla sees cyber thinking among political and military leaders as potentially fractured or sometimes missing the point.

Arquilla served as an advisor to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, assisted with information strategy for former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre during the Kosovo War and consulted for Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm.

The NPS professor emeritus wrote the recently published book, “Bitskrieg: The New Challenge of Cyberwarfare,” which provides breadth and depth in a slim volume of roughly 200 pages.

Military Times spoke with Arquilla about the book and some of what he’s trying to share with everyone from the grunt to the general officer and civilian leaders on how the United States needs to shift its thinking and operations.

The following Q&A interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Q: What are your thoughts on Cyber Command, how it was formed, how it’s being staffed, used, etc.?

A: In the past, putting cyber behind the green door slowed the process of getting these ideas out across the services. It ramped up so quickly. I have a concern at the high number of private contractors. I think that’s a problem. The military should put more into getting uniformed personnel into those billets.

I understand that is breaking down now. And in the beginning, there was too sharp a division between offensive and defensive operations. Everything you can learn about good defense can get from doing offense, vice versa.

Q: What should every entry-level service member to service chief understand about cyberwarfare at their level?

A: Every E-1 should know that they are sensors, not just shooters. Every sensitive site exploitation can create an opportunity for information. Also, everyone is an emitter. Your smartphone’s probably got 20 [different] apps on it to say where you are. Information Mission Control is absolutely necessary. Realize that everybody is in the information age. Military organizations are sensor organizations, not just shooting organizations. The business of sensing is complemented by realizing that every individual on some level is an emitter of information.

Mid-career military members don’t need to be computer geeks but need to understand themselves as information managers. Make sense of all this information. What’s relevant to the situation that I am facing?

At higher levels, G1+ must make sure to connect those sensor and information links with issues of advanced organization and doctrine. And create the next AirLand Battle.

Q: There are a lot of references to Distributed Maritime Operations, Multi-Domain Operations, and other new warfare concepts. How does “Bitskrieg” fit in with or contradict these approaches?

A: On MDO, it’s important as a step towards Bitskrieg. But if you’re truly operating like China in warfare or Russian Gerasimov doctrine, then you need to tease out the implications for military doctrine and organizations for themselves. The “how you fight” optimal doctrine is not going to be mass on mass, not even maneuvers like Blitzkrieg. It’s the distribution of forces and fires capabilities. We called that “swarming.” My belief, to this day, the gathering swarm the coming swarm is really where we need to be moving. I do see distributed lethality, DMO, all building blocks to the battle.

To optimize the emerging new doctrine, you have to have the right organizational form. A century ago, planners brought the tank, plane, radio communications and other technologies together. And they realized it was important to concentrate tanks in their own organizational unit such as the Germans did with the Panzer division. Germans got it right first, others followed. What’s the right organizational form? The biggest challenge and most important is organizational. Instead of a military of a few large things like aircraft carriers, bomber fleets or Marine Expeditionary Units, we should build a military of many small things. That allows us to operate in a distributed way, be more elusive, more accurate as shooters. Feed the whole notion of the military as a sensory organization.

Among all the services I think the Marines are the farthest ahead in catching a glimpse. They’re the closest to Bitskrieg if you ask me. Decoupling range and accuracy from weapons. Working across great distances and extremely high levels of accuracy. The many and the small operating highly effectively. Especially in littoral operations. Hopefully what the Marines are doing will be a laboratory for the other services.

Q: Is the United States doomed to sluggishly trudge along with our cyberwarfare concepts as China and Russia’s militaries move ahead until there’s a reckoning?

A: We are way out of balance here. Our defenses are exceptionally weak, [but] to some extent moving ahead. I’m proud to say the NPS is one of the principal early advocates for data mobility and cloud storage. Keep your data moving and encrypted and it’s better. Strong encryption and data mobility has to happen and it has to happen right away. Every time you hear a story, whether it’s the colonial pipeline, title companies, office of personnel management got hacked, [the] emphasis [needs to be] on defense. I know everyone loves offense, but we’ve got to balance. Russia, China, North Korea and Iran have balanced.

And as far as kinetic warfare, now bombs and bullets will be directed by bits and bytes, just as the French and British took tanks and planes and parceled them out across the forces. Today we’re grafting the new technologies. Whether it’s carrier ops or land battle or any other area of military activity. We’re a little bit behind the Russians and a lot behind the Chinese. It’s less about an arms race and more about an organizational race. We have to redesign and redefine ourselves.

Q: You reference early successful operations in Afghanistan. Turning to similar areas, how could we properly use cyberwarfare in our non-peer operations in Libya, Somalia, Mali, etc.

A: I think we need to rekindle the spirit of those 11 Green Beret A-Teams that went to Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. Things like the tactical webpage and other tactical systems. They won a campaign in a very short amount of time. The campaign against ISIS under President Donald Trump was very much organized in small teams. Kurds were a tremendously reliable indigenous force to achieve in a very quick time. Again, it’s an example of how the many and the small, less permissive in some places, probably not sending teams in Libya or Yemen but we do have them operating in and around Somalia. Even in an era of great power competition, there are little brushfires going on. Just like in the Cold War and we’re going to see that again. But it’s going to be “little green men,” not the tanks into the Fulda Gap.

Q: Any closing thoughts to share with readers on cyberwarfare and its future?

A: I am very optimistic and here’s why: I think the early experiences of an officer are formative. The three-four stars today had their formative experiences in Desert Storm. The officers starting to put on stars now, will all have had their formative experience in the post-9/11 period campaigns. All will have these experiences and understanding and willingness to use new tools in new ways. I saw it until I retired recently in my classrooms. Officers usually attend NPS at about 10-12 years into their careers. I saw it coming in 2008-09.

And artificial intelligence will transform much of what we’re doing. I think GI Joe and “AI Jane” are going to get together in the coming years and AI will have as profound an effect in military affairs in the 21st Century as the aircraft did in the 20th Century. That is something that has tremendous potential for military and human affairs. China and Russia moving full speed ahead. An AI arms race, I think, is underway and will have transformational effects. I want to make sure that the U.S. military is in the forefront of development and what they will mean organizationally.

The information made available by accounts on certain apps “is a privacy and security concern,” according to a Marine administrative message signed July 28.

Marines also are prohibited from having gaming, dating or gambling platforms on their government-furnished mobile devices, per the memo.

“Users are strongly encouraged to delete any apps from their personal devices that the US Government has deemed a risk,” the memo urged.

Lists of authorized and unauthorized apps will be made available to Marines, and prohibited applications will be automatically removed from devices by a management server.

Banning apps

Banning applications is not a new cybersecurity measure in the military.

Earlier in 2020 each branch of the military banned service members from installing the Chinese-made video sharing app TikTok on government-issued phones over fear that the app was being used by the Chinese government to collect data and spy on American citizens.

Cryptocurrency, favored by cybercriminals for its anonymity and ease of use, can be obtained through the resource-intensive process of mining. Because of the high processing power and energy costs associated with such activities, mining popular coins like Bitcoin can be unprofitable without a specialized setup.

Less popular coins with smaller networks, however, can be more easily mined on individual devices, cybersecurity expert Randi Eitzman told Marine Corps Times.

For this reason, criminals often “cryptojack” computers, infecting them with malware that will install mining applications and use a victim’s electricity and processing power for profit, FireEye reported.

Even if a service member were to use cryptocurrency mining applications on a government device without malware, they would still be using government resources for their personal gain.

“While some may try to argue cryptocurrency mining is a sort of ‘victimless crime,’ it is important to realize that it is theft,” Eitzman said.

Other branches of service have their own guidelines and lists of authorized apps, though none specifically outlaw the act of cryptocurrency mining.

The Army and Air Force use the Defense Information Systems Agency’s regulations.

“Users are only authorized to download approved applications, and users who download unapproved or third-party apps may result in the device being flagged,” a DISA spokesperson told Marine Corps Times.

DISA did not comment on what types of apps are or are not approved.

The Navy’s acceptable use policy limits personal use of government technology, prohibiting activities inappropriate for the workplace but allowing some personal use like posting items for sale on a forum, similar to a workplace bulletin board.

The policy prohibits any use of Navy technology that would reflect poorly on the Department of the Navy, said Joe Gradisher, spokesman for the office of the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare.

“Using the AUP as the guide then, cryptocurrency mining would not be a permissible activity on GFE (government furnished equipment),” said Gradisher.

The Marine Corps was not able to immediately respond to requests for comment or about whether or not there have been cases of Marines mining cryptocurrency on their government mobile devices.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees military activity in all three war zones, indicated it is unable to determine how far back the Army’s numbers have been excluded from these airpower summaries. Officials there would not address several detailed questions submitted by Military Times, and they were unable to provide a full listing of annual airstrikes conducted by each of the Defense Department’s four military services.

“It is really weird. We don’t track the number of strikes from Apaches, for example” said a U.S. military official with knowledge of CENTCOM’s data collection and reporting practices. The official, who spoke to Military Times on the condition of anonymity to freely discuss internal procedures, was referring to AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, which the Army has used prolifically in combat over the last 15 years, most recently in support of American allies battling the Islamic State.

“I can tell you, unequivocally, we are not trying to hide the number of strikes,” the official said. “That is just the way it has been tracked in the past. That’s what it’s always been.”

It’s a significant discrepancy, though, and one for which the full scope remains unclear. Airstrikes, according to definitionsestablished and followed by members of U.S.-led coalitions, can involve fighters and other jets, attack helicopters and drones, and they can include any combination of munitions.

A single airstrike can be carried out by multiple aircraft on multiple targets, and use multiple bombs, missiles, rockets and machine gun rounds. It can include combat sorties with predefined targets and attacks carried out during the course of close air support operations.

The Army views things differently, though.

“It seems to me the collection or distribution of airstrike data is not an Army Title 10 responsibility,” a senior Army official told Military Times on the condition of anonymity. Title 10 of the U.S. Code sets the laws that dictate the military services’ roles, responsibilities and missions. “This responsibility should lie with the operational or combatant commander.  Additionally, Apaches for example, conduct close combat attacks as a maneuver element supporting a ground force in contact with the enemy. I would not consider this in the category of ‘airstrike.’ “

The Air Force’s open-source database includes all such missions as part of its airstrike totals. The media and others have depended on these figures for years with the understanding they are a comprehensive rollup of all American and coalition activity. And while the data has been cited in countless reports — from newspaper articles to academic research to analytics provided to lawmakers — no one from the military ever has come forward to clarify that it is wholly incomplete.

As recently as December, an Air Force official told Military Times that its monthly airpower summary of activity in Iraq and Syria specifically represents the entire U.S.-led coalition “as a whole, which is all 20-nations and the U.S. branches.” It’s unclear whether this statement was intentionally misleading, or simply indicative of widespread internal ignorance, confusion or indifference about what’s contained in this data. Regardless, it does include airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps — but not the Army.

Financial implications, if any, are unclear. The Pentagon discloses its top-line expenditures for each of these ongoing military operations, but that data is not readily broken down by the number of sorties flown by specific U.S. aircraft and the amount of munitions they deploy. Consider, though, that Apache helicopters can carry a variety of weapons, including Hellfire missiles with a per-unit cost of $99,600, according to figures maintained by AeroWeb, a defense marketing intelligence firm that closely tracks international defense acquisition.

Such record keeping is no trivial matter. Even federal agencies routinely reference these airstrike figures in reports designed to influence Congress. Military Times’ investigation discovered multiple instances in which an inspector general drew significant conclusions, briefed to high ranking government officials working in the State Department and leading members of Congress, from open-source airstrike data.

The omission of Army strike data is one of multiple errors, discrepancies and shortcomings, raising questions about the validity of policies and methods used by the U.S. military to compile and disseminate information about its worldwide operations.

For example, a 2015 reportto Congress by the inspectors general for the Defense Department, State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development highlighted the open-source airpower tallies for operations against the Islamic State. At some point after the report was published and briefed to lawmakers on Capitol Hill, the Air Force revised the data on which the IGs’ work was based, in some cases adding more than 100 weapons releases for a given month. And while the Air Force notes that revisions do happen occasionally, in this instance they were significant — and occurred after the information was provided to Congress.

Another discrepancy: Though it claims to use the Air Force airstrike data, the Defense Department’s public summaryof operations in Iraq and Syria, current as of Jan. 31, fails to account for nearly 6,000 strikes dating to 2014, when the air campaign against ISIS began.

The most recent Air Force summary counts 23,740 coalition airstrikes through 2016. Meanwhile, the Defense Department’s website lists 17,861 through Jan. 31. The Pentagon routinely cites these figures when updating the media on its operations against the Islamic State and al-Qaida affiliates in Iraq and Syria.

In this screen grab of the Defense Department’s website, taken Saturday, Feb. 4, officials have tallied 17,861 coalition airstrikes through Jan. 31. That’s nearly 5,900 fewer than the Air Force’s tally through the end of December 2016.

There also appear to be separate policies in place regulating the specificity of information that may be publicly disclosed. Citing policy, military officials in the U.S. and in Baghdad refuse to identify the type of American warplanes that conduct individual airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, nor will they provide a breakdown of activity by individual service components.

It’s another story entirely in Afghanistan, where U.S. military officials, in response to questions from Military Times, volunteered the previously undisclosed Army airstrike data for 2016, even identifying the four types of Army aircraft providing lethal air support there. Navy Capt. William Salvin, a spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said that in addition to Apaches, there are armed UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and MQ-1 Gray Eagles, which are drones. Initially, Salvin indicated the Army’s RQ-7 Shadow drones also are armed, but he later corrected that statement.

An MQ-1C Gray Eagle conducts live fire training at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Army uses this drone in Afghanistan and other theaters to conduct airstrikes in addition to intelligence collection.

Photo Credit: Sgt. William Begley/Army

Salvin also explained that the airstrikes conducted there — 1,071 total for last year, not 615 as the Air Force reports in its open-source database — are further classified by three categories: self defense, counter terror and strategic effects, which may be required when senior commanders believe U.S. firepower could help turn the tide in regions deemed vital to Afghanistan’s broader stability.

“We’re just trying to be transparent here,” said Army Brig. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the top spokesman for Operation Resolute Support, which includes the American military’s ongoing effort to train and advise the Afghan army and air force. A separate, smaller operation in Afghanistan, called Freedom’s Sentinel, involves U.S.-led counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaida and its numerous affiliates in the region.

“What you’re talking about is a larger policy decision that would likely start at OSD,” Cleveland said when asked whether these reports should become all inclusive. OSD stands for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “It’s probably larger than a CENTCOM policy decision. What you’re talking about is a global laydown because there are strikes in AFRICOM.”

U.S. Africa Command oversees many of the military’s most secretive counter-terror operations throughout the continent, to include Somalia and Libya. Those tallies are not routinely disclosed either.

Cleveland emphasized, too, that the United States’ air campaign in Afghanistan is part of a greater effort, now in its 16th year, to mentor, support and protect the Afghan military with hopes it will be able to independently provide the country’s security. “The overall concept of airstrikes,” the general said, “from anybody, is a small part of a larger mission.”

It remains unclear why the Army is unique in excluding its airstrike figures from these broader summaries and reports. Reached Saturday, a spokesman for Army headquarters in Washington declined to comment, saying he was unable to research the matter on short notice.

The U.S. military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said it’s because Army aircraft flown in war zones don’t fall under the Air Force chain of command responsible for publishing these monthly summaries.

Still, that does not answer why the Army does not disclose its airstrike data.

Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, a research and advocacy organization, called transparency essential to military accountability. That requires “honest reporting to the public,” Roth said.

“Security may at times require secrecy,” he added, “but embarrassment or political sensitivity never should. Facts regarding the number of airstrikes and their civilian toll should always be disclosed promptly and faithfully so the public, aided by human rights workers and journalists, can scrutinize military operations being conducted in their name.”

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times’ senior editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter: @adegrandpre.

Shawn Snow is a staff writer and Military Times’ Early Bird editor. On Twitter: @SnowSox184.

With additional reporting by Air Force Times’ senior writer Stephen Losey. On Twitter:

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Faller and Mattis have a noteworthy history together. While assigned to Central Command, Faller was investigated by the Navy Inspector General over allegations he breached military ethics rules when, as a carrier strike group commander in 2011, he was offered and accepted a luxury hotel suite in Malaysia.

The Navy determined Faller’s missteps were mitigated because he accepted the room upgrade to accommodate several members of his staff. It was Mattis, as Faller’s boss when the investigation was complete, who elected to forego disciplining the admiral.

Faller studied engineering at the Naval Academy and worked in nuclear specialties early in his career. Later, as a commanding officer, he deployed repeatedly the Middle East, leading combat forces supporting U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf, and in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He’s had a number of high-profile shore assignments, too, including as a fellow working for the late Sen. Ted Kennedy, as the head of Navy recruiting and as a top assistant to the head of U.S. Pacific Command. In that job, Faller would have gained valuable insight into U.S. efforts to contain North Korea and counter China.

While at Central Command, Faller served as operations director, a post that afforded him a oversight of the complex security dynamic throughout the Middle East. That will be important now with some 15,000 U.S. troops deployed to active war zones in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Rear Adm. Kevin M. Sweeney, speaks with sailors during a visit aboard the guided-missile destroyer Mason in November 2013.

Photo Credit: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Rob Aylward/Navy

Sweeney spent 32 years in the Navy, retiring in 2014. Since then, he’s been active as part of an economic development group in Hampton Roads, Virginia.

He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1982, one year ahead of Faller, and worked for Mattis twice — first as an assistant at the now-defunct U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and later as the general’s executive officer at Central Command in Tampa, Florida. Throughout his career, Sweeney held three high-profile staff assignments in Washington, working for top Navy leaders in the Pentagon and for members of the Joint Staff. The retired admiral also held several jobs focused on managing large office staffs, suggesting he will be valuable to Mattis and Work in helping to steer the Pentagon’s day-to-day operations.

His background is quite diverse, however. Early in his career, Sweeney was focused on communications and combat systems. Later, as a commanding officer, Sweeney oversaw restoration of the USS Cole after it was attacked by suicide bombers in Yemen in 2000. Later, he deployed in support of the Iraq war.

Toward the end of his career, Sweeney came under professional scrutiny when a Navy investigation, led by a fellow admiral, determined that as the head of a carrier strike group he and another senior officer should bear responsibility for a costly training mishapin 2012. Sweeney’s boss at the time, Adm. Bill Gortney, then the head of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, disagreed with and overruled that conclusion.

Sweeney’s selection to be Mattis’ chief of staff continues the Trump administration’s trend of putting retired military officers into important national security roles, including as the president’s national security adviser, a post occupied by retired Army Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn. Trump’s Homeland Security secretary is John Kelly, a retired four-star Marine general.

The issue overshadowed Mattis’ confirmation process early on, with critics voicing apprehension about his nomination because of the short duration he’s been separated from the military. The law requires that to serve as defense secretary, retired military personnel must be at least seven years removed from active duty. Mattis, who retired in 2013, required a waiver to bypass that policy.

Mattis was confirmed by the Senate on Friday and sworn into office that evening, arriving for work at the Pentagon on Saturday afternoon. He received his first daily intelligence briefing at that time, and convened a meeting with Work, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford and Vice Chairman Gen. Paul Selva.

On Monday, Mattis met with the joint chiefs of staff and placed his first calls international partners, including NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Canadian defense minister Harjit Sajjan and British defense chief Michael Fallon.

In all three instances, Davis said, Mattis sought to reaffirm the United States’ commitment to its allies — particularly in Europe, which is under renewed threat from neighboring Russia. Trump has suggested his administration may look to mend ties with Moscow, and he has questioned the need for NATO, causing angst at home and overseas.

“The secretary,” Davis said of Mattis, “… wanted to place the call [to Stoltenberg] on his first full day in office to reinforce the importance he places on the alliance.”

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times’ senior editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter: @adegrandpre. Aaron Mehta is Defense News’ associate editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter:

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During his confirmation hearing earlier month, some lawmakers, including Gillibrand, expressed apprehension about Mattis’ ability to approach the job as a civilian — not a 44-year military officer. Mattis sought to assuage those concerns, saying the top role of defense secretary mandates a careful balance of military and diplomatic solutions.

“We shouldn’t be turning to the military,” he said, “to answer all of our problems in the world.”

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times’ senior editor at Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter:

. With reporting by Leo Shane III and Joe Gould.