Lospinoso recently told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee how artificial intelligence can help protect military operations. The CEO/programmer discussed the subject with The Associated Press as well how software vulnerabilities in weapons systems are a major threat to the U.S. military. The interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Q: In your testimony, you described two principal threats to AI-enabled technologies: One is theft. That’s self-explanatory. The other is data poisoning. Can you explain that?

A: One way to think about data poisoning is as digital disinformation. If adversaries are able to craft the data that AI-enabled technologies see, they can profoundly impact how that technology operates.

Q: Is data poisoning happening?

A: We are not seeing it broadly. But it has occurred. One of the best-known cases happened in 2016. Microsoft released a Twitter chatbot it named Tay that learned from conversations it had online. Malicious users conspired to tweet abusive, offensive language at it. Tay began to generate inflammatory content. Microsoft took it offline.

Q: AI isn’t just chatbots. It has long been integral to cybersecurity, right?

A: AI is used in email filters to try to flag and segregate junk mail and phishing lures. Another example is endpoints, like the antivirus program on your laptop – or malware detection software that runs on networks. Of course, offensive hackers also use AI to try defeat those classification systems. That’s called adversarial AI.

Q: Let’s talk about military software systems. An alarming 2018 Government Accountability Office report said nearly all newly developed weapons systems had mission critical vulnerabilities. And the Pentagon is thinking about putting AI into such systems?

A: There are two issues here. First, we need to adequately secure existing weapons systems. This is a technical debt we have that is going to take a very long time to pay. Then there is a new frontier of securing AI algorithms – novel things that we would install. The GAO report didn’t really talk about AI. So forget AI for a second. If these systems just stayed the way that they are, they’re still profoundly vulnerable.

We are discussing pushing the envelope and adding AI-enabled capabilities for things like improved maintenance and operational intelligence. All great. But we’re building on top of a house of cards. Many systems are decades old, retrofitted with digital technologies. Aircraft, ground vehicles, space assets, submarines. They’re now interconnected. We’re swapping data in and out. The systems are porous, hard to upgrade, and could be attacked. Once an attacker gains access, it’s game over.

Sometimes it’s easier to build a new platform than to redesign existing systems’ digital components. But there is a role for AI in securing these systems. AI can be used to defend if someone tries to compromise them.

Q: You testified that pausing AI research, as some have urged, would be a bad idea because it would favor China and other competitors. But you also have concerns about the headlong rush to AI products. Why?

A: I hate to sound fatalistic, but the so-called “burning-use” case seems to apply. A product rushed to market often catches fire (gets hacked, fails, does unintended damage). And we say, ‘Boy, we should have built in security.’ I expect the pace of AI development to accelerate, and we might not pause enough to do this in a secure and responsible way. At least the White House and Congress are discussing these issues.

Q: It seems like a bunch of companies – including in the defense sector — are rushing to announce half-baked AI products.

A: Every tech company and many non-tech companies have made almost a jarring pivot toward AI. Economic dislocations are coming. Business models are fundamentally going to change. Dislocations are already happening or are on the horizon — and business leaders are trying to not get caught flat-footed.

Q: What about the use of AI in military decision-making such as targeting?

A: I do not, categorically do not, think that artificial intelligence algorithms — the data that we’re collecting — are ready for prime time for a lethal weapon system to be making decisions. We are just so far from that.

WASHINGTON — The Defense Department’s chief software officer is leaning into recent military initiatives that train troops to write code as part of the Pentagon’s efforts to modernize its digital infrastructure and more rapidly respond to threats.

Rob Vietmeyer, who works for the Pentagon’s chief information officer, pointed to the creation of Army and Marine Corps software factories as the Defense Department moves to build platforms that enable continuous updates in a shift away from its previous acquisition-centric approach.

“In the past, we’ve focused on acquisitions of product systems, acquisition of things, and now the focus is on not the end state, but the means for production,” Vietmeyer told C4ISRNET at the publication’s annual conference on Wednesday. “We’re focusing on software factories, platform engineering and cloud components.”

Recognizing the need for more skilled cyber employees, Army Futures Command established in 2021 a software factory in Austin to train soldier coders within its own ranks. More recently, the Marine Corps followed suit, opening up its own software factory in the same city in March.

“We’re seeing this whole blending of development and production into a single environment supported by this software factory ecosystem that’s given us this tremendous agility to move forward,” said Vietmeyer.

He noted that the Pentagon is “now engaging with our industry partners where we’re trying to build combined assets as critical first-class citizens within this future environment.”

Col. Jennifer Krolikowski, the Space Force’s chief information officer, noted the importance of data – and the creation of military software factories to enhance the military’s ability to harvest it – in an increasingly crowded and novel theater, while praising the Pentagon’s shift “out of that industrial way of building and into that digital way of doing things.”

“It’s actually very encouraging that all these people want to start software factories because I think they’re starting to recognize – even just from an agile mindset – we need to build differently than we have in the past,” Krolikowski told C4ISRNET.

She stressed the Space Force’s work on Project Enigma to create a “digital backbone” in a “congested and contested environment,” noting that “China has 300% more assets in space than they had just even a few years ago.”

“We’re seeing kind of an Armageddon year, if you will, by the 2026 time frame,” Krolikowski said. “We need to build our capabilities faster than any demand signal we’ve ever experienced before.”

It was only in the last few years that DoD retired those 8-inch floppies in favor of modern computer capabilities, and the push is on to accelerate modernization of systems that rely on older technology in order to address modern threats.

This accumulation of older software and infrastructure, known as technical debt, takes a substantial amount of budget and resources to maintain, which puts pressure on new innovation required for enterprise functions such as cybersecurity.

The Pentagon recognizes the impact of technical debt on protecting systems and data from cyberattacks. It intends to deploy a zero trust strategy across the whole department by 2027. By assuming every application, network, connection, and user can become a threat, a zero trust framework validates access through control policies for specific functions – a significant advancement from perimeter-based security that can allow unrestricted access once an attacker gets inside the network.

Technical Debt Hinders Cybersecurity

The Biden Administration’s executive order on cybersecurity in May 2021 jump started the movement toward a zero trust architecture. It called for modernized cyber defenses, improved information sharing and stronger responses to attacks, all of which start with zero trust and depend on modern technologies such as identity management, cloud, artificial intelligence, machine learning and data analytics.

To accelerate this implementation of zero trust, DoD must continue to pay down its technical debt.

The Pentagon can look to the Department of Labor as a model to balance legacy system needs and innovation. As CIO Gundeep Ahluwalia explained in a recent interview, “When I joined the department six years ago, we invested only 10% of funds in modernization and development. Now we allocate 25% of our overall funds, and ideally this will increase to 40% in the near future for modernization and development. Modernization is a continuum, and this investment is essentially paying down that technical debt while preventing it from building up again.”

Technical debt has taken on new importance with its reference in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, which authorizes the DoD to a study it and make recommendations on its impact to software-intensive systems. DOD CIO John Sherman recently emphasized the connection between technical debt and zero trust as a cyber defense, and he confirmed the department’s commitment to addressing it as adversarial threats increase.

The scope of the technical debt problem is difficult to calculate, but if historical patterns have continued then 75 percent of the federal budget goes to operations and maintenance of legacy systems. That’s older technology that is not prepared or hardened for today’s cyber attacks.

Technology That Stays Ahead of Evolving Threats

There are ways to surround legacy systems with newer, resilient technologies and provide a layered defense of mission critical applications and data.

Identity management, for example, distinguishes a digital identity, while authentication confirms the identity to allow permission-based access to networks, applications, and data. Moreover, operating within a zero trust environment prevents users from gaining access unless they have the appropriate authentication and authorization.

The sheer amount of data from cyberattacks requires innovations in artificial intelligence, machine learning and analytics so that data quickly gets aggregated and filtered, patterns are detected, and threats are elevated for further review.

Because the Pentagon is such a large target for cyberattacks, the Defense Department needs these technologies and a zero trust methodology to eliminate both older technology and processes performed manually, which will reduce threats and fend off penetration.

While perimeter security has become standard for many networks, the executive order on cybersecurity and the DoD’s strategy for zero trust represent the government’s intention to change that. It will require more than technology to nullify existing threats and prevent unknown ones from becoming attacks.

For DoD to reach its full potential for cybersecurity, it must instill a shift in thinking that goes beyond perimeter defenses. Users need to embrace requirements such as multiple logins for enterprise-wide zero trust as well as information sharing that allows for better threat detection and response.

As the Pentagon tackles its technical debt to improve cybersecurity and overall asset protection, it can take the opportunity to renew users’ passion for the mission and good cyber behavior.

Kynan Carver is Defense Cybersecurity Lead at Maximus, an IT services management company focused on the federal government.

The office, dubbed Program Manager Cyber and Space, will fall under the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, which tests and fields equipment such as aerial jamming pods, biometric information systems and battlefield navigation tools.

Its creation will shift offensive cyber responsibilities away from an existing PEO IEW&S enclave tasked with electronic warfare and cyber.

“That’s one of the things we’re driving toward,” Brig. Gen. Ed Barker, the deputy at PEO IEW&S, said Aug. 30 during a roundtable with reporters at the Open Innovation Lab. “So we’re definitely trying to realign to some of those emerging priorities and areas.”

The offensive cyber portfolio includes the Joint Common Access Platform, a program initiated by the Army a few years ago, according to Mark Kitz, the leader of PEO IEW&S. ManTech, a defense technology firm, in 2020 won a $265 million contract to support the platform for nearly four years.

Offensive cyber is defined as “cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace,” according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

JCAP provides underlying infrastructure for Department of Defense cyber missions and target acquisition, C4ISRNET previously reported. It’s part of the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture, an overarching vision for U.S. Cyber Command.

PM Cyber and Space, reporters were told, will be led by a colonel, or O-6.

The breakout is necessary, in part, because of increased workloads and demands spanning the military services.

“Because we’ve seen mission growth in that area,” Kitz said, “we’re going to spin off.”

Among them is what’s known as identity, credential and access management, or ICAM, a means of tailoring what information is available to a person while also keeping tabs on those plugged in.

The Department of Defense published an ICAM strategy in March 2020, in which the department recognized its own failures to “maximize the strategic, operational, and tactical benefits of information sharing.” Leaders have more recently said ICAM realization is pivotal to Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Pentagon’s ambitious vision of seamless communication across land, air, sea, space and cyber.

In a recent interview with C4ISRNET, Army Maj. Gen. Jeth Rey, director of the Network Cross-Functional Team, and Nicholaus Saacks, deputy program executive officer for command, control and communications-tactical, talked about ICAM, its repercussions and potential timelines.

Portions of the conversation below were edited for clarity and brevity.

What is ICAM? Why does it matter?

Maj. Gen. Jeth Rey: Identity, credential and access management is huge.

This is where we’re trying to move away from the complexity on the transport and now secure the data at the data layer. If we’re going to truly move to this data-centric environment, identity management is part of that zero-trust architecture that’s going to actually get us there.

So that’s a big bet we’re making. I think all the services, across the board, are on board when it comes to that. When you think about JADC2, identity management is going to be a big part of us achieving it, so that we can know all identities, including our coalition partners.

This is not only from a U.S. service perspective, but also from a joint and coalition perspective.

How does ICAM work? Is it like a banking app?

Rey: Exactly.

You secure a connection with the data environment. It identifies your identity through your eyes, your biometrics, and then it allows you access to data that your credentials will allow for.

And it has boundaries, so you don’t go left or you can’t go right. It quarantines you.

Nicholaus Saacks: I think a good example — just to take that banking app example further — is in our house, we have USAA.

So I have a USAA number, my wife has a USAA number, my kids have USAA numbers. We all have our own accounts, we have joint accounts.

If I log into USAA, I can see all the joint accounts, I can see the kids’ stuff. I can’t see my wife’s IRA. When she logs in, she can see all the joint stuff, the kids’ stuff. She can’t see my IRA. If we log in with one of the kids’ credentials, we can see their stuff. They can’t see our checking account.

Depending on which one I choose to log in with, it’ll show me the data I’m allowed to see.

What is the value of ICAM on the battlefield or other areas?

Rey: We believe that in order for the enterprise network and the tactical network, which haven’t been joined as a unified network since the inception, we believe this is the key to getting those two things connected.

If we can truly have identity in our enterprise and have the same seamless identity in the tactical environment, we can truly connect the unified network.

Saacks: I think there’s a correlation. It really drives at data centricity and transport-agnostic. So the more you secure the data, the less reliant you are on a certain type of transport, the security of the transport.

The better you secure the data, the more flexible your transport options are.

I think that ICAM is one of the key ideas behind achieving the secretary’s vision of a data-centric network. You have to be able to secure the data and control the access management.

How soon will ICAM be implemented?

Rey: I don’t want to give an exact timeframe, but I believe that by fiscal 2024, we’ll be there.

We should be where we need to be in FY24. That’s one of Army Lt. Gen. John Morrison’s goals, to get us there.

The implementation plan for the unified network allows us incremental steps to get there.

Inside an unassuming office building, a few floors up and tucked into a spread of austere rooms, is Operation Cyber Dragon. The brainchild of Chief Warrant Officer Scott Bryson, the hands-on endeavor authorized by U.S. Fleet Cyber Command aims to fix virtual vulnerabilities — shoring up systems bit by bit — while also fostering a new wave of cybersecurity expertise.

“We’re doing it so that we can continue to mitigate and fortify our attack vectors and secure our networks even better,” Bryson told reporters July 22, while standing among computers, cubicles and colleagues.

Cyber Dragon kicked off in March, with the second phase of the program now underway. In its current form, the operation is focused on fortifying unclassified networks and rooting out common, widespread digital weaknesses: lax security settings, easily guessed credentials, unpatched software and more.

Doing so, officials said, makes its more difficult for hackers to break in and wreak havoc. According to the Navy, some 14,500 issues were initially identified on service networks as in need of addressing. Each could be a foothold for an adversary, especially at a time of heightened cyber conflict. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare Vice Adm. Jeffrey Trussler in a February memo warned sailors that “cyberattacks against businesses and U.S. infrastructure are increasing in frequency and complexity.”

To tackle such a large and evolving workload, manpower was needed. So Bryson turned to the reserves, including to people not necessarily cyber fluent.

“I went to the reserve forces that we have at 10th Fleet, and I requested some bodies, and I came up with a training plan. And I said, ‘Well, if you give me X amount of sailors for X amount of days, I think that we can get after a percentage of our vulnerabilities, patching and scanning.’ The reserve force came through with the manning, they came through with the space,” Bryson said.

“When we did the posting, it wasn’t limited,” he added. “I said I’ll take anybody.”

Among the dozens of participants were, by day, a long-haul truck driver, a banker and a small-business owner. The operation offers reservists the chance to fulfill annual training requirements while also making a tangible difference.

Cyber Dragon teams have thus far identified and remediated thousands of issues — everything from several “high-profile exposures” to default usernames and passwords to discovering “data where we didn’t want data to be,” according to officials involved with the effort.

“A default username and password means that anybody could could log in and execute on here, on these particular machines. Now, they weren’t national security-related. There was no major issue directly to national security,” said Rear Adm. Steve Donald, the deputy commander of Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet. “But in some cases, it could have caused harm to individuals, identity theft or something of that nature. We were able to shut that down.”

Teams have also zeroed in on potential spoofing certificates, risky software use and cloud management hiccups. Some 50 sailors have been trained on state-of-the-art attack surface management software, used to discover, classify and assess the security of an organization’s assets, with 100 more expected to undergo the same education in the coming months.

Lt. Blake Blaze, a reservist with a cyber and tech background, said the operation has improved both his understanding of the field and the cybersecurity of the Navy.

“My biggest motivation for staying in the reserves was I wanted to be close to the fight in case things get interesting with some of our near-peer adversaries,” Blaze said. “We’re not directly engaging with the enemy, so to speak, but we are trying to prevent their avenues of access to our networks.”

Both Bryson and Donald said they foresee a bright future for Cyber Dragon. As long as there are bugs to fix and the will to fix them, they said, the operation is viable. And Cyber Dragon’s format makes it mobile and replicable, appealing to workspaces and workforces of all sizes across the U.S.

All that’s really needed is floor space, network connectivity and a few tools from third-party vendors.

“The interesting thing in the IT world or the network world is what’s patched and 100% compliant today might not be patched tomorrow, because vulnerabilities ebb and flow,” Bryson said. “So do I think that this has legs to continue on? Absolutely.”

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and its Ukrainian counterpart, the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection, announced the deepened partnership at the end of July, calling it an important step toward a more secure future.

Priorities of the agreement include the exchange of best practices, studying how critical infrastructure is guarded, and establishing joint cybersecurity projects and exercises.

Both the U.S. and Ukraine participated in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence’s Locked Shields exercise in April. Specialists with U.S. Cyber Command have also worked alongside Ukrainian forces to fortify networks and root out malicious behavior.

Oleksandr Potii, the deputy chairman of the SSSCIP, in a statement said the new accord “represents an enduring partnership and alignment in defending our shared values through increased real-time information sharing across agencies and critical sectors and committed collaboration in cultivating a resilient partnership.”

CISA Director Jen Easterly applauded the agreement — saying she was “incredibly pleased” to sign it — and noted that she has been “moved by the resiliency and bravery of the Ukrainian people throughout this unprovoked war.”

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine, launched Feb. 24, was preceded by cyberattacks, including one on Viasat, a California-based company involved in commercial and military markets worldwide. The digital attack was meant to cripple Ukrainian command and control as Russian forces advanced. U.S. government clients were unharmed.

Some five months on, cyberattacks continue in Ukraine, with hackers mostly focused on the defense, government, finance and telecommunications sectors, according to a July 12 bulletin from the SSSCIP. Russia has historically denied involvement.

President Joe Biden in March warned of Russia potentially targeting U.S. networks and critical infrastructure as its fight flounders. The U.S. Navy also cautioned in an unclassified memo that adversaries are seeking to exploit digital vulnerabilities, like weak passwords and mistakes made on military or at-home, private networks.

“Cyber threats cross borders and oceans,” Easterly said in a statement, “and so we look forward to building on our existing relationship with SSSCIP to share information and collectively build global resilience against cyber threats.”

Feared attacks on U.S. assets, though, have yet to materialize.

The addition of six months to the deal accounts for the inclusion of the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNet, in the zero-trust program and the “complete development, testing and deployment planning for the original unclassified prototype,” DISA said in an announcement July 28.

SIPRNet is a communications network used by the Defense Department to transmit classified information across the world. DISA, the Pentagon’s top IT office, described the framework as “antiquated” and in need of updating.

The agency awarded Booz Allen a $6.8 million contract in January to develop a Thunderdome prototype, its approach to zero-trust cyber protections. Folding in SIPRNet is a significant evolution. The extension lengthens the pilot to a full year, with completion now expected at the start of 2023.

“With this additional time, we can conduct operational and security testing that was not originally planned for in the initial pilot,” Jason Martin, director of DISA’s Digital Capabilities and Security Center, said in a statement. “It will also permit us the necessary time to strategize on the best way to transition current Joint Regional Security Stacks users who will be moving to Thunderdome.”

The Pentagon in 2021 decided to sunset Joint Regional Security Stacks — meant to reduce cyberattack surface and consolidate classified entry points — in favor of the zero-trust Thunderdome approach, C4ISRNET previously reported.

The six-month add-on comes amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was preceded by cyberattacks that jeopardized command and control and forced offline government websites. Ukrainian networks continue to be buffeted, with hackers often targeting the defense, financial and telecommunications sectors.

Such attacks, DISA said in its announcement, highlight the importance of SIPRNet and the Pentagon’s need for a modernized, classified network with steadfast data protections. Defense Department systems are under constant attack, as is the defense industrial base.

“DISA has made clear that we will not forget that the ‘fight’ is fought on SIPRNet,” said Christopher Barnhurst, the agency’s deputy director. “While we have been working on developing a zero trust prototype for the unclassified network, we realized early on that we must develop one, in tandem, for the classified side. This extension will enable us to produce the necessary prototypes that will get us to a true zero trust concept.”

SIPRNet is already undergoing several other renovations. The secure network was among those accessed by Chelsea Manning, the former U.S. Army intelligence analyst who provided thousands of military and diplomatic documents to WikiLeaks.

Zero trust is an approach to cybersecurity that assumes networks are always at risk and, thus, continuous validation of users and devices is necessary. The model is often likened to “never trust, always verify.”

President Joe Biden last year ordered federal agencies to move toward zero trust and to produce the requisite plans. His executive order included several other cybersecurity provisions, as well. The Biden administration followed up in January with a memorandum focused on improving the cybersecurity of Defense Department and intelligence community systems.

“Thunderdome will be a completely comprehensive and holistic approach to how the network operates,” DISA said, “a major shift from the current architecture.”

Contrast that with the day of a typical U.S. Department of Defense or Intelligence Community staff member working with classified information, where network access is only possible after passing through the secured doors of a concrete building, logging into a computer with a dedicated line, and having no access to any other information outside of the network while at work.

The two are worlds apart – and that’s a big problem when it comes to recruitment and retainment. On one side is the need to protect American citizens and data from cyber attackers looking to disrupt our way of life by keeping networks and access locked away in a building. On the other side is the best and brightest talent that will bring innovative solutions to our nation’s defense and security organizations who expect flexible remote access – and can easily find it in the private sector.

To maintain our status as a global world power and stay one step ahead of our adversaries, we are going to have to find a balance between the two. To do that, the way we work across the DoD and IC must change.

What is the Commercial Solutions for Classified program?

The Federal government understands the significance of remote access on meeting mission objectives now and in the future. Agency leaders are looking to the private sector for technology that helps them maintain the highest security levels while meeting the ease-of-access demands of today’s worker – and can be implemented quickly. To support this, the National Security Agency developed the Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program.

CSfC is based on the principle that properly configured and layered commercial IT solutions can provide sufficient protection of classified data in a variety of applications. Under CSfC, secure access to classified information is no longer tied to the hardwired computer sitting in a concrete building. Through an approved CSfC solution, people who need access to classified information can work anywhere.

To maintain strict security standards, NSA has published four solution-level Capability Packages under CSfC:

· Mobile Access

· Campus WLAN

· Multi-Site Connectivity

· Data at Rest

To take it a step further, through the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), NSA works with government and industry technologists to develop and publish product-level security requirements that fall under each Capability Package.

Capability Package Use Cases

Innovative solutions are endless, but there are some immediate use cases that can be addressed by industry under the CSfC program. These include helping field agents gain access to classified networks so they don’t have to drive into a secure location to input investigative notes or to do research. Another is implementing wireless capabilities on DoD and IC campuses, allowing workers to bring their devices to different locations across the campus to do their job – or simply use their mobile devices to check in with their families while at work.

Making the Change

Implementing a CSfC solution enables top level security and flexible remote access. Here are a few things DoD and IC technology teams should consider when evaluating CSfC solutions:

Stay Disciplined

“Good enough” with security protocols is not an option with the NSA. After all, we are talking about access to classified information and our national security. Educate your team to remain vigilant – no default passwords, no easy workarounds. Stay alert and always disciplined.

Make it Easy

Not all CSfC solutions are created equal. Agencies go down this path to improve the lives of their staff. Implementing solutions that are too complex can have unintended consequences – including, worst case, forcing employees to find an unsecure workaround. When implementing a CSfC solution, evaluate for ease of use.

Ensure it is Scalable

CSfC solutions are just like other enterprise IT solutions – you want them to scale as your agency and its needs grow.

Do Your Due Diligence

Research the options. DoD and IC agencies have the same goals. If a solution works for one team, consider how you can leverage similar capabilities.

Resist Going It Alone

When reviewing the Capabilities Package, there will be familiar elements that might lead to a temptation to build the CSfC solution in-house by piecing together the components. This is extremely difficult and very time consuming. CSfC is built on principles of layered security. Getting all of those layers right and retooling off-the-shelf solutions to meet the strict CSfC standards is hard to do.

To achieve the desired results in a timely and cost effective way, look to vendor partners who have experience with NSA security protocols and the CSfC Capability Packages. Balancing security and flexible access is achievable, and will directly support workforce recruitment, retention, effectiveness, and ultimately, mission outcomes.

Jimmy Sorrells is president, INTEGRITY Global Security, a DoD and IC community partner.

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This article is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the authors. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please email Military Times Senior Managing Editor Kent Miller.

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