{"id":13970,"date":"2020-02-13T23:01:05","date_gmt":"2020-02-13T23:01:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/uncategorized\/2020\/02\/13\/why-more-research-is-needed-to-craft-good-cyber-policy\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T17:54:31","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T17:54:31","slug":"why-more-research-is-needed-to-craft-good-cyber-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/cyber\/2020\/02\/13\/why-more-research-is-needed-to-craft-good-cyber-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Why more research is needed to craft good cyber policy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

How cyber operations fit into geopolitics and act as a tool of statecraft is still largely not understood despite decades of cyber activity, experts said Feb. 12.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A flood of large scale hacks, data dumps, espionage, sabotage and cyber-enabled information warfare have driven academics and policy makers to better understand the nuances of cyberspace and the application of cyber tools in political affairs. But much work remains, experts said during an event hosted by the Atlantic Council Feb. 12.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe\u2019re trying to build a field in cybersecurity. I don\u2019t think we\u2019ve done that well enough,\u201d said Brandon Valeriano, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University. \u201cI don\u2019t think we have enough empirical background. A lot of people make too many guesses. Too many claims about evidence. There\u2019s a lot of \u2018I think, I believe,\u2019 we want to get towards some sort of version of \u2018I know,\u2019 and doing that through empirical truth claims. A way to do that is through multi-method research.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen, nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University, presented the findings of a study<\/a> they published in November on cyber escalation. The study surveyed participants from the United States, Russia and Israel, proposed different scenarios to understand baseline escalation risks and examined differences of how others in the international community approach cyber operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The conventional wisdom in the cyber world has been that cyber operations can escalate situations unnecessarily, more so than physical or kinetic responses. But many academics now disagree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cDoing all this work, what do we really find? We find that cyber conflict and competition is not what you\u2019re seeing in the headlines. It\u2019s not what it\u2019s being made out to be,\u201d Jensen said. \u201cIf anything, cyber operations proved to be a de-escalation mechanism. It was a way that players opted to try to manage complex interactions underneath the threat of escalation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jacquelyn Schneider, Hoover fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University argued in an October 2019 op-ed in the Washington Post that cyberattacks aren\u2019t likely to deter adversaries for the same reasons they aren\u2019t likely to lead to escalation: in order to deter, one needs to send a signal that there will be consequences for actions. But given that cyberattacks are difficult to attribute and often rely on vulnerabilities that can be eliminated, it can be a troublesome way to send diplomatic signals and thus makes it less escalatory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWhat\u2019s been fascinating is that these cyber operations seem to create space for almost de-escalation,\u201d she said at a January event. \u201cI believe that the U.S. can actually take more risks in cyberspace than it has been taking in the past.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Valariano said he wants to see less guessing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cMore often than not, people believe things are happening in this domain or in this field without really knowing. I think we really need to have a firm baseliner of understanding of how cybersecurity operates,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The results of the survey led Jensen to note that \u201ccyber is just political warfare for the 21st century.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIt\u2019s a vehicle for espionage, sabotage, propaganda, manipulating beneath the threshold of armed conflict. It\u2019s not this decisive super weapon, it\u2019s not the proverbial bomber [that] will get through \u2026 It\u2019s something distinctly different,\u201d he continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One such parallel effort to help craft better understanding, and even lead to policy outcomes, is the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. The commission is a bipartisan organization created in 2019 to develop a multipronged U.S. cyber strategy. It expects to deliver a report in early March.<\/p>\n\n\n\t