{"id":17794,"date":"2019-04-30T20:31:37","date_gmt":"2019-04-30T20:31:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/uncategorized\/2019\/04\/30\/is-there-such-a-concept-as-cyber-deterrence\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T18:01:14","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T18:01:14","slug":"is-there-such-a-concept-as-cyber-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/home\/2019\/04\/30\/is-there-such-a-concept-as-cyber-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"Is there such a concept as \u2018cyber deterrence?\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As the U.S. Department of Defense increasingly worries about damage that could result from a massive cyberattack, national security leaders are debating the best strategy to prevent such incursions. Should they adopt a philosophy that aims to stop an attack of any kind or should they try to dissuade enemies from specifically pursuing a cyberattack?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cJust because you have an issue in cyber you don\u2019t have to respond in cyber. We use all the instruments of power,\u201d Donald Bray said April 29 during an event hosted by the New America Foundation. Bray formerly led the Army\u2019s Cyber Protection Brigade and is now director of cyber initiatives of global training solutions at Raytheon. \u201cHow you formulate your particular deterrence plan for the issue just depends on what\u2019s the best approach for that particular problem.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His comments echo similar sentiments made by government officials, who have scoffed at the idea that the Defense Department should respond to cyber incidents only with tools within the cyber domain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A senior Department of Defense official told reporters in April that as part of a formal review of the department\u2019s cyber posture, Pentagon leaders focused on deterrence, although not specifically cyber deterrence. Instead, they studied how cyberspace operations would factor into a broader deterrence efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For years, national security experts have said the pure threat of retaliation, either from the conventional U.S. military or from the country\u2019s economic power, has prevented a serious cyberattack on critical infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThat\u2019s why you don\u2019t see strategic attacks on the nation is because of the weight that we can bring to bear conventionally,\u201d the official said. He noted most of the work in the posture review focused on actions below the threshold of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amy Zegart, senior fellow at Stanford\u2019s Hoover Institution, argued it\u2019s worth parsing what types of cyber activities are most preventable and what types aren\u2019t. In an April 26 podcast interview with the Brookings Institution<\/a>, she pointed to the Pentagon\u2019s most recent nuclear posture review that states the United States reserves the right to use nuclear forces to retaliate against non-nuclear strategic attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cDo we really think the United States government would launch a nuclear retaliatory strike after a cyberattack of how ever consequential damage might be on the United States?” she asked. “Lots of debate about that. Is that really a robust deterrence strategy? Probably not.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some experts also believe Cyber Command\u2019s new, more assertive approach in its defense of daily cyberattacks, known as \u201cdefend forward,\u201d may not be a deterrent in and of itself but will have a collective deterrent effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\t