{"id":18134,"date":"2019-02-05T22:07:28","date_gmt":"2019-02-05T22:07:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/uncategorized\/2019\/02\/05\/the-pentagons-red-team-hackers-need-more-time-personnel-and-money\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T17:55:42","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T17:55:42","slug":"the-pentagons-red-team-hackers-need-more-time-personnel-and-money","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/cyber\/2019\/02\/05\/the-pentagons-red-team-hackers-need-more-time-personnel-and-money\/","title":{"rendered":"The Pentagon\u2019s red team hackers need more time, personnel and money"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Pentagon\u2019s chief weapons tester said that the red teams the military uses to find cyber vulnerabilities and to mimic enemy actions \u201curgently\u201d need more resources, including additional personnel, training and advanced capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The director of operational test and evaluation, in its annual report<\/a> released Jan. 31, said that in several instances in the past year, red teams were not available to support assessments of systems. In addition, red teams currently lack time and funding to develop new tools and capabilities, the report notes, and manning models for service red teams vary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThere remains a gap between DOD cyber red team capabilities and the advanced persistent threat,” the report read. \u201cAssessments that do not include a fully representative threat portrayal may leave war\ufb01ghters and network owners with a false sense of con\ufb01dence about the magnitude and scope of cyber-attacks facing the Department.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, reviews of red teams in fiscal 2018 showed the best teams where overscheduled and overworked. This is problematic because DOT&E relies on these teams to conduct assessments of cyber vulnerabilities in DoD systems. In October 2018, a report from the Government Accountability Office said testers found \u201cmission critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems that were under development.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, DOT&E weapons testers documented \u201ca growing number of instances where the Red Team needed more time to achieve objectives,\u201d the report said. \u201cThis was due in part to improved network defenses, but also due to insu\ufb03cient time to prepare the array of representative cyber-attacks attributed to the portrayed adversary.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Without having more time, red teams struggle to \u201cprobe deeper into networks and system vulnerabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report said the Pentagon monitored more than 70 such tests across 38 acquisition programs, including the Command Post Computing Environment, the Family of Beyond Line of Sight Terminals known as FAB-T and the Global Command and Control System. In the document, the weapons testers noted that \u201cat the request of the DOD Chief Information O\ufb03cer and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DOT&E participated in classi\ufb01ed cybersecurity assessments to characterize the status and identify options for improving the mission assurance and cyber-related aspects of the Nuclear Command, Control and Communications capability.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fiscal 2019, DOT&E says it plans to conduct assessments in which more advanced threat portrayals will be required. However, it notes the ability of red teams to meet these requirements is in question.<\/p>\n\n\n\t