{"id":18557,"date":"2017-09-01T15:34:33","date_gmt":"2017-09-01T15:34:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/uncategorized\/2017\/09\/01\/the-fy18-defense-authorization-and-insider-threat-commentary\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T17:59:56","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T17:59:56","slug":"the-fy18-defense-authorization-and-insider-threat-commentary","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/opinion\/the-compass\/net-defense-blogs\/2017\/09\/01\/the-fy18-defense-authorization-and-insider-threat-commentary\/","title":{"rendered":"The FY18 Defense Authorization and insider threat [Commentary]"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As the fiscal 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) winds its way through Congress, it is worth noting how differently the House and Senate are treating matters related to reducing threats from insiders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the FY17 NDAA, the final bill had an entire section (951) devoted to \u201cenhanced security programs,\u201d which included requirements on insider threat detection capabilities. This year\u2019s House version contains no Section 951 \u2014 and very little language about insider threats throughout the version that passed in July.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The House emphasizes only two areas of insider concern: 1) \u2018green-on-blue\u2019 attacks by military partners overseas; and 2) operations by nations such as China and Russia aimed at espionage and exploitation of technologies and institutions. These are indeed important provisions. However, there is nothing in the House version that addresses insider threats as the term has come to be known today: threats from insiders who have knowledge and access to proprietary systems that allow them to bypass security measures through legitimate means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Senate bill, however, focuses directly on insider threats \u2014 what it sees as the inability of the U.S. Department of Defense to \u201corchestrate the creation of an integrated, automated, enterprise-wide insider threat detection and analysis capability.\u201d It goes on to say that it is concerned that \u201cthe Department\u2019s leadership has not realized the level of resource commitment and time that will be involved in creating digital access and analysis capabilities to the data collected and held by all the different functional organizations \u2014 counterintelligence, personnel security, human resources, physical security, combatant commands\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This language goes to the heart of a serious challenge at DoD \u2014 namely, the inability of the department to access and integrate data to effectively and efficiently prevent malicious and accidental insider incidents. However, Senate authorizers did not address several other areas of critical importance:<\/p>\n\n\n\n