{"id":26537,"date":"2019-03-13T20:13:48","date_gmt":"2019-03-13T20:13:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/uncategorized\/2019\/03\/13\/waging-war-against-the-troll-farms\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T19:42:52","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T19:42:52","slug":"waging-war-against-the-troll-farms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/c4isrnet\/cyber\/2019\/03\/13\/waging-war-against-the-troll-farms\/","title":{"rendered":"Waging war against the troll farms"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The U.S. military has the capability, the willingness and, perhaps for the first time, the official permission to preemptively engage in active cyberwarfare against foreign targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first known action happened as the 2018 midterm elections approached: U.S. Cyber Command<\/a>, the part of the military that oversees cyber operations, waged a covert campaign<\/a> to deter Russian interference in the democratic process.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It started with texts in October 2018. Russian hackers operating in the Internet Research Agency<\/a> \u2013 the infamous \u201ctroll factory<\/a>\u201d linked to Russian intelligence, Russian private military contractors and Putin-friendly oligarchs <\/a>\u2013 received warnings via pop-ups<\/a>, texts and emails <\/a>not to interfere with U.S. interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then, during the day of the election, the servers that connected the troll factory to the outside world went down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As scholars who study technology<\/a> and international relations<\/a>, we see that this incident reflects the new strategy for U.S. Cyber Command, called \u201cpersistent engagement<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It shifts Cyber Command\u2019s priority<\/a> from reacting to electronic intrusions into military networks to engaging in active operations<\/a> that are less intense than armed conflict but still seek to stop enemies from achieving their objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In late 2018, the U.S. goal was to take away Russia\u2019s ability to manipulate the midterm election, even if just briefly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In this file photo taken Feb. 18, 2018, is a view of a business center believed to be the location of the St. Petersburg, Russia-based Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” whose members were indicted by U.S. special investigator Robert Mueller. (Mstyslav Chernov\/AP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Cyber Command\u2019s operation against the troll factory was part of a sophisticated campaign that targeted individuals \u2013 Internet Research Agency workers \u2013 and systems, such as the organization\u2019s internet connection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In military terms, that effort generated \u201cfriction,\u201d or difficulty for opposing forces to perform even mundane tasks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian hackers and trolls may wonder how a foreign government got their information, or was able to take their workplace offline. They might be worried about personal vulnerabilities, weaknesses in their own systems or even what else Cyber Command might do if they don\u2019t stop trolling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our research has found that covert activities that are not as clear as armed conflict don\u2019t always change a target\u2019s behavior.<\/a> Successful coercion efforts tend to require clear signals of both capability and resolve \u2013 assurance that the defender both can respond effectively and will do so, in order to prevent the attacker from taking a desired action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Digital operations are often the opposite \u2013 concealing that anything has happened, as well as who might have done it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even when a defender shows an adversary what it is capable of, there are few guarantees that deterrence will work. It is tough to force a determined aggressor to back down. Most scholarly studies of coercion \u2013 whether in the form of cyber action<\/a>, economic sanctions<\/a> or limited air strikes<\/a> \u2013 show how hard it is to change an adversary\u2019s behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As we have found, all of these signals, digital and otherwise, are most effective<\/a> when used by more technologically sophisticated countries, like the U.S., who can combine them with other instruments of national power such as economic sanctions and diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Actions in the shadows can produce friction, but on their own are unlikely to change an opponent\u2019s behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through targeted social media posts<\/a>, Russians have amplified political fault lines in the United States. Social media makes it easy for misinformation to spread, even long after false stories are planted. There will always be \u201cuseful idiots<\/a>\u201d who will circulate disinformation and misinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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FILE In this file photo taken on Saturday, Feb. 17, 2018, A views of the four-story building known as the “troll factory” in St. Petersburg, Russia. U.S. indictment charged 13 Russians with running a hidden social media trolling campaign in a bid to disrupt the 2016 U.S. presidential election. (AP Photo\/Naira Davlashyan, File)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s not clear that U.S. military hacking of Russian internet connections will put a damper on Putin\u2019s global information warfare campaign<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s also not yet clear whether there will be \u2013 or even has already been \u2013 any sort of retaliation. There may be a point at which the conflict escalates, threatening the electricity grid<\/a>, civic groups<\/a>, private homes<\/a> or voting systems<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s valuable for the U.S. to introduce friction against enemies who seek to harm the American way of life. But it\u2019s equally important to consider the potential for escalation to more widely harmful forms of conflict. This type of cyber offensive may succeed at pushing back Russian disinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Or it may just be the government\u2019s attempt to do something \u2013 anything \u2013 to convince the public it\u2019s engaging the threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quick wins, like shutting down a troll factory for a few days, could produce much bigger longer-term consequences in a connected world.<\/p>\n\n\n\t