The robots demonstrated how they could keep soldiers out of harm\u2019s way, allow for sensors in new positions that were previously impractical and present new data to commanders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But even as the service makes these strides, it\u2019s unclear whether the 2021 demonstration marks a substantial technological advancement, or simply minute progression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The question of whether the robots are ready for the battlefield is emblematic of a long-term issue, as the Army has struggled for decades to get its modernization programs from promising technology to fieldable equipment. Over the past four years, the service has implemented a new strategy to solve its development woes. Events like Project Convergence have stressed the importance of experimentation and prototyping to accelerate modernization, but next year the Army plans to get more than two-thirds of its signature systems to soldiers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Experts say the service is on track, but they warn that leadership changes, potential budget cuts, and several contracting and technological hiccups could jeopardize those efforts. But for Bradley Bowman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank, the real question is whether the U.S. is building world-class capabilities faster than its adversaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWhen the history books are written about Army Futures Command, did they do that or not? And, boy, that\u2019s quite an expectation, isn\u2019t it?\u201d Bowman told Defense News. \u201cThat\u2019s war and peace; life and death; \u2018mission accomplished or not\u2019-type stuff there.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Enter Army Futures Command<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Just over four years ago, Gen. Mike Murray<\/a> was plucked from the halls of the Pentagon and dropped into a few empty floors of an office building in Austin, Texas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Murray was hand-picked to open a new four-star command tasked with modernizing the Army\u2019s technologies for a future fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Army Futures Command wasn\u2019t charged with simply updating the service\u2019s technologies. After all, the Army has been updating its technologies and replacing legacy systems with new ones for decades. Instead, AFC was established to reform what many have described as a broken acquisition pipeline \u2014 one that takes too long and ultimately produces the wrong items.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Army Futures Command and its flagship demonstration, Project Convergence, emphasize a new, more flexible developmental approach than the Pentagon\u2019s traditional buying process. Instead of selecting a single provider from the outset, the Army now wants to use more flexible contracts that task multiple vendors with quickly building prototypes; this way, the service can find out what works and what doesn\u2019t before moving forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The approach is meant to reduce risk early in the process, increase competition and ultimately give the Army more pathways to successful technological development. Whereas technology failures are the bane of the traditional process, one goal of Project Convergence is to fail early, understand those challenges and address them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cTo the degree that Army Futures Command is succeeding, I think the prototyping process \u2014 we get things in the hands of soldiers sooner rather than later, and it\u2019s an iterative feedback loop \u2014 is really, really positive,\u201d Bowman said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The command also emphasizes the importance of soldier touchpoints, where those who will use the technology can try out prototypes early. That enables the Army to incorporate soldier feedback into the end design.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other AFC initiatives, such as the Army Applications Laboratory, have also born fruit. That lab has been successful in using Small Business Innovation Research dollars, forming cohorts and starting with problems upfront. This is counter to taking a solution and figuring out how to fit it into operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In an interview last year, Murray told Defense News the command is headed in the right direction<\/a> with experimentation and prototyping. And perhaps more importantly, he said, Congress accepted the process for those experiments and gave the command the acquisition authorities it needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many of the systems AFC chose as priority modernization efforts, such as the Precision Strike Missile<\/a>, are expected to reach initial fielding in a few short years. By then, the Army expects there to be even more working prototypes, such as the future vertical lift aircraft and new unmanned vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Roughly four years after Murray\u2019s tenure began, analysts say Army Futures Command has a mixed record. On the plus side, it\u2019s on track to deliver new capabilities at breakneck speeds for the Defense Department. While major acquisition programs have historically taken up to 14 years to field, some of the command\u2019s programs are expected to take four years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, the Extended Range Cannon Artillery system<\/a> hit a 70-kilometer range goal in tests over the past two years, and the Army has already accepted two systems. The service also awarded Northrop Grumman<\/a> a contract last month to produce the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, which will serve as the command-and-control platform for a variety of sensors and shooters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Also last year, the service fielded the first maneuver battalion of the Short-Range Air Defense system<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Still, the Army has faced setbacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thomas Spoehr, director of the Heritage Foundation\u2019s Center for National Defense and a retired Army lieutenant general, pointed to three programs that have suffered from high-profile delays: the Integrated Visual Augmentation System, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle and the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI gave the Army a B-minus, which is higher than I thought it was going to be when I started this,\u201d Spoehr said of the command\u2019s performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bowman said it may take a few more years to determine whether the service is succeeding, but he noted several positive developments so far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe good news is that we have seen that clear guidance and support from Army leaders,\u201d he said. \u201cAlso, one of the great benefits that we\u2019ve seen in the establishment and initial performance of Army Futures Command is kind of clearer lines of accountability, a real sense of urgency and an improved perspective on the role of risk and failure.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Army officials also say the new path should lead to smoother upgrade processes and more affordable technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That\u2019s because the Army is focused on avoiding the stovepiped status quo of the past, where a single contractor would build a system rife with proprietary technologies. All too frequently, that left the military stuck with that same contractor for upgrades. Instead, the Army has shifted its focus toward modular systems with open standards, allowing the service to hold competitions for upgrades instead of returning to the same vendor \u2014 often at a premium.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe designed in [2021] around a modular concept. I have a capability gap. I don\u2019t care when a vendor solution shows up to the table: They\u2019re all going to be evaluated against each other in a competitive fashion, and the best of breed gets plugged in and integrated,\u201d Col. Garth Winterle, project manager for tactical radios under Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, said of Army networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn a year from now, [there\u2019s] a different capability [that] is either cheaper, better, \u2018fill in the blank.\u2019 Most of these things can be reprogrammed and integrated in a modular fashion fairly quickly,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One analogy officials like to use is how people buy smartphones: Consumers will typically purchase a new one every two years or so, but they won\u2019t purchase a new car on that same timeline. Similarly, if the Army needs to upgrade its communications capabilities, it\u2019s much easier to have a standard port for an upgraded terminal, rather than reconfiguring the entire vehicle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of course, Army Futures Command\u2019s path hasn\u2019t been perfectly smooth. The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle<\/a> \u2014 a planned replacement for the long-serving Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle \u2014 is a poster child for the organization\u2019s early growing pains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When it started the OMFV competition in 2019, the Army asked contractors to submit physical prototypes to potentially advance in the competition. But only one team delivered a sample before the deadline eight months later, marking an embarrassing early stumble.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Army had two choices: It could proceed with one company into a prototyping effort that could lead to a lucrative production contract, or it could revamp the competition process and timeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Army Futures Command chose the latter and committed more fully to its principles of maintaining flexibility throughout development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem with the initial competition, according to service officials, was the Army\u2019s overly restrictive list of requirements for OMFV. For the new competition, the service provided a more flexible list of what the vehicle needs to do, giving contractors freedom to innovate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And instead of requiring physical prototypes up front, the service is using digital engineering for its design process. In October, officials said<\/a> the five teams it selected had already submitted digital designs that will be run through virtual simulations. Those simulations will refine the Army\u2019s requirements ahead of a downselect to three contractors, who will then build physical prototypes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Officials are confident the new path is an improvement, but the program\u2019s initial public misstep left it vulnerable. If budgets continue to decline, analysts and Army leadership have warned the service will likely need to begin slicing from previously untouchable modernization programs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even without additional budget cuts, Spoehr said, the program\u2019s delay may prove problematic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIts opportunity has come and gone. And so now with the revised schedule, when they start to need the big money, the big money\u2019s not going to be there for OMFV,\u201d he said. \u201cThat is my fear.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Congress wants to keep a closer eye on OMFV, according to the recently released fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act. The legislation would prohibit the Army from entering into a contract to develop a physical prototype for OMFV until the Army secretary submits a detailed report on how the service determined its requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So how much did reworking the OMFV competition delay production? It\u2019s impossible to say, and that\u2019s one of the issues with a development pipeline reliant on other transaction authorities \u2014 a flexible contract designed for rapid prototyping and experimentation that avoids the stringent reporting requirements and lengthy timetables of traditional federal acquisition regulations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Army officials see those features as an obvious boon, they also make it difficult to compare these programs to development under traditional DoD contracts. Even the Government Accountability Office said it has a tougher time tracking and assessing programs developed under OTAs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Which goes back to the robots shuffling around in the desert.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Army officials are quick to highlight the advances they\u2019ve made since Project Convergence in 2020, but they are hesitant to say how close the service has come to fielding an actual capability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the one hand, what may seem like minute advances can involve very difficult challenges. While artificial intelligence is currently able to detect potential threats \u2014 i.e., enemy tanks \u2014 it has difficulty tracking their movements. That difference may seem small, but following a moving object is far more complex than sensing and identifying an inert object. To get there, the Army needs to feed its machine-learning AI massive amounts of training data and build more intricate algorithms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLeadership wants advances in capability, and that\u2019s \u2026 completely reasonable. But as you might expect, that requires more complexity and algorithms and software development,\u201d said Eric Stirs, a senior data engineer with the Army\u2019s Artificial Intelligence Integration Center.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps the Army\u2019s network team can offer a middle path, one that emphasizes experimentation while setting hard deadlines for deliverables.<\/p>\n\n\n\n About four years ago the Army conducted a series of reviews that found its network was unprepared for a sophisticated threat. In response, the service embarked on a multiyear path to modernize key pieces of its network with a focus on combining new technologies with legacy systems, hosting soldier touchpoints and experiments, and seeking modular solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Army\u2019s network team has adopted an incremental approach that sees new technologies delivered to soldiers in two-year blocks, each building on the last. Under this strategy, the service outlined technologies it wants fielded every two years by placing them in so-called capability sets. Those capability sets go through cycles of experimentation, procurement and fielding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The plan also allows for rapid insertion of technology if it becomes available, as well as mechanisms to move tech to a future capability set if it isn\u2019t mature enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Throughout this process, the Army is balancing concurrent efforts of fielding gear associated with Capability Set \u201821, experimenting for Capability Set \u201823<\/a> and building design goals for Capability Set \u201825.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the two-year incremental approach to tech delivery may seem aggressive, officials argue it\u2019s necessary to match the pace of cyberthreats and other developments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThat process that the team applied to this is necessitated by the fact that our kit only lasts so long based on obsolescence and things like near-peer cyber opportunities,\u201d Col. Shane Taylor, project manager for the tactical network within PEO C3T, said on the sidelines of an industry engagement in Nashville, Tennessee, on Dec. 2. \u201cI think it lends itself to this kind of construct to begin with, or else you end up with systems in the field long beyond their effectiveness.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Officials say units are eager to participate in this modernization process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe constantly get requests from units like: \u2018When can I get it next?\u2019 \u201d said Matthew Maier, project manager for interoperability, integration and services under PEO C3T. \u201cThere\u2019s a handful of units that were selected by [Army headquarters] to get [Capability Set] \u201821, and now other units have come to the table and want their priority pushed up so that they can get some stuff.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n What remains to be seen is whether current Army leadership, especially the new service secretary, buys into the construct, said Todd Harrison, a defense budget expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/32_coverjump_modernization.jpg_3a7d9a.jpg\")
The learning curve<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Bradley.jpg.jpg\")
The problem of measuring progress<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
A third way: Incremental developments<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
The future of Futures Command<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
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