WASHINGTON \u2014 After spending years at the U.S. Army\u2019s one-stop shop for everything related to electronic warfare and sensor development, including a stint as boss, Mark Kitz is moving on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Kitz on June 23 was named the next leader of the service\u2019s Program Executive Office Command, Control and Communications-Tactical<\/a>, or PEO C3T. He\u2019ll succeed Maj. Gen. Anthony Potts, formerly of PEO Soldier, who took the post last year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The change means Kitz is trading missile warning suites, aerial jammers and biometric tools \u2014 the bread and butter of PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, or PEO IEW&S \u2014 for radios, satellite connectivity and networking upgrades once recognized as capability sets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In an interview with C4ISRNET on June 23, Kitz reflected on the state of Army electronic warfare<\/a>, the service\u2019s ongoing reorganization of cyber and networking programs, and some of his accomplishments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This interview was edited for length and clarity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n How has the Army\u2019s electronic warfare environment changed during your time at PEO IEW&S? Is the service on the right track? What are your parting recommendations?<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n I came to PEO IEW&S 12 years ago. I was originally working intel, intel processing, and then migrated toward the electronic warfare portfolio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the time when I started at the PEO, our investment in electronic warfare was very nascent: significant investment in counter-improvised explosive devices \u2014 specifically radio-controlled counter-IED \u2014 getting after remote triggers to threats to our forces, especially ground combat forces. So CREW Duke devices<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n All of our electronic warfare investments were very reactionary. The threat is developing or delivering a capability, and our electronic warfare investments were to counter that threat or to counter that capability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the last three years, we\u2019ve seen a significant investment by our adversaries in affecting the battlespace and spectrum. Jamming and spoofing, and in a much more surgical way. I\u2019ll use counter-GPS as an example. In Ukraine now, you\u2019re seeing significant investment<\/a> in small form factor, surgical ways to deny GPS, which is a significant event if you\u2019re operating without that capability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the last three years, the most significant acknowledgement and investment has been that the U.S. Army can, and needs to, build windows of opportunity by being active in the spectrum. That\u2019s both from collection and from electronic attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\t