Watch:

Guest Speakers:

• Brig. Gen. Daniel Duncan, Commander, Joint Munitions Command, U.S. Army
• Nicholas (Nick) Bucci, Vice President, Defense Systems and Technologies, General Atomics, Electromagnetic Systems

Vice President for Government Affairs, Strategic Communications and Marketing

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.

On Feb. 4, President Biden delivered his first major foreign policy address, calling for a renewal of U.S. leadership on the world stage.

Rebuilding relationships with partners and allies is a core goal of the new U.S. administration. A robust program of foreign military sales (FMS) and direct commercial sales (DCS) can strengthen ties abroad while empowering countries to both defend themselves and contribute to collective security efforts.

Biden praised alliances as “among our greatest assets” and called for the U.S. to stand “shoulder to shoulder with our allies and key partners once more.” Biden pledged to rebuild “the muscles of democratic alliances that have atrophied from four years of neglect.” Throughout his presidential campaign, Biden stressed the importance of U.S. engagement overseas and has since staffed his administration with committed internationalists, including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Secretary of State Tony Blinken, and CIA director nominee William Burns.

Building partner military capacity through arms sales allows the U.S. to improve regional and global security without the additional deployment of U.S. troops. In Taiwan and India, U.S. sales of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and many other systems allow these countries to more effectively deter Chinese aggression. U.S. arms sales are also especially useful in the Middle East, where American military deployments have become politically sensitive, both in the U.S. and in local countries. By exporting critical defense equipment and associated training to its strategic partners in the region, the U.S. can counter Iranian influence without specifically committing troops to new engagements. Arms sales give partner governments the ability to defend themselves while reducing demands on the U.S. taxpayer.

Strong overseas demand for high-quality defense equipment also creates incentives for cooperation with the U.S. During international summits and negotiations, the prospects of obtaining U.S.-made systems is an important bargaining chip, building agreement on issues sometimes unrelated to defense. In the summer 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, the prospect of U.S. arms sales to the UAE was an important motivating factor in reaching a final agreement. This agreement has proved durable, as President Biden and Secretary Blinken have both voiced their support for preserving the Abraham Accords. Successful sales can include years of support and training, further fostering security cooperation between the U.S. and equipment buyers. The relatively long lifespan of many systems, particularly airframes, can result in decades of follow-on military-to-military engagement after the initial sale. Egypt has been flying F-16s for nearly four decades.

This follow-on engagement includes end-use constraints on how partners and allies can use or transfer U.S. equipment, allowing the U.S. to exert a moderating influence on future conflicts. This is in sharp contrast to certain major arms exporters such as Russia, which rarely impose restrictions on use. U.S. regulatory regimes, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), ensure that even systems manufactured overseas with only U.S. components cannot be exported without approval. For example, when Brazil sought to sell Embraer Super Tucano aircraft to Venezuela in 2006, the U.S. was able to block the sale on ITAR grounds due to the presence of U.S. components, preserving regional security. That countries are willing to accept such constraints is a testament to the quality of U.S. equipment and the value they place on their ongoing relationships with Washington.

Maintaining a vigorous arms export posture also allows the U.S. to push back on Chinese and Russian influence in buyer countries. Keeping the U.S. as the “supplier of choice” to partners maintains trusted security relationships and prevents adversaries from building decades-long defense ties rooted in the sustainment and training relationships that come with the sale of advanced systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia is the second-largest arms exporter after the U.S., while China is the fifth-largest. Pursuing sales in historically Russian-dominated markets such as India allows the U.S. to displace rival manufacturers and cement new relationships. While China is a smaller exporter than Russia, it has outpaced the U.S. in exports of certain systems, especially Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Adopting a more flexible export strategy would enable the U.S. to fully compete with Chinese exporters in this space.

When relations between the U.S. and partner nations grow difficult, existing arms export relationships can create leverage for U.S. policymakers that would not have existed otherwise. After Turkey opted to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system over repeated U.S. objections, Congress and the DoD moved quickly in July 2019 to remove the country from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. Iranian preference for U.S. equipment under the Shah left Iran militarily vulnerable after the Iranian revolution, when a cessation of arms sales prevented the regime from maintaining its materiel stock. Washington stanched the flow of components for combat aircraft and denied the regime a batch of warships it ordered, among other measures, denying their use against American forces or allies.

In addition to empowering partner nations and maintaining influence overseas, arms sales can also enhance interoperability between the U.S. and arms purchasers. Nations using U.S. equipment can more easily operate in coordination with U.S. forces, as the systems employed are already designed to integrate with U.S. systems. Furthermore, U.S. arms sales typically include training and support through security cooperation frameworks, ensuring partners are using the same tactics, training, and procedures as U.S. forces. Arms sales provide improved interoperability not only in active operations, but also in maintenance and logistics.

Just weeks into governing, the Biden Administration still has the opportunity to define its arms exports policy. Clear, early support for the FMS and DCS process would signal to partners and allies that the new Administration is serious about promises to rebuild relationships. Following through would demonstrate continued U.S. leadership and maintain influence overseas, with a lighter footprint and reduced cost at home.

Nicola “Niki” Johnson leads government affairs and global marketing efforts for GA-ASI’s products and services. She previously served the U.S. government as a senior policy advisor for the Defense Technology Security Administration, and as a regional program director in both the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, among other roles. She holds a master’s degree in Security and Defense Policy and a bachelor’s in International Affairs from George Washington University, and a master’s in National Resource Strategy from National Defense University.

Operational roles for RPA are in transition in conjunction with changes to U.S. and Allied warfighting priorities. While support to land forces will remain a core role for these systems, employment focused on high-end and ‘gray-zone’ warfare (warfare below the threshold of armed conflict including asymmetric methods, and often involving militia and constabulary forces) in the maritime environment, are shaping current development priorities for GA-ASI and its customers.

The GA-ASI MQ-9 Medium-altitude, Long-endurance (MALE) series of RPA had their genesis in the 1990s, with an early version of the ‘Predator’ RPA with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Predator operated over Bosnia in 1995, with more capable, armed versions commencing operations in the Middle East theatre in 2001. The more advanced USAF MQ-9A ‘Reaper’ RPA variants followed, along with the U.S. Army’s MQ-1C ‘Gray Eagle’ Unmanned Aircraft System. Today the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain operate the MQ-9 system with great success. The Netherlands have also procured the MQ-9 with deliveries to commence in the near term.

Less well known is the MQ-9′s non-military utility. For example, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has effectively employed MQ-9 platforms for both overland and maritime surveillance activities since 2005. In the past two years, GA-ASI has conducted maritime and civil surveillance demonstrations in Japan and Europe, with further trials planned for later in 2020. Additionally, the California Air National Guard has used the MQ-9s with great success combatting forest fires by identifying hot spots, and providing critical environmental intelligence to allow more targeted and safer deployment of firefighters and equipment.

Now, production has commenced on GA-ASI’s most advanced RPA variant – the MQ-9B SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian. The UK and Australia intend to acquire these systems, and the Government of Belgium has approved Belgian Defense to negotiate the acquisition of GA-ASI’s MQ-9B. Significant customer interest is also expanding throughout the world. From a coalition perspective, the MQ-9B is well suited to be networked and interoperable during coalition operations due to its open system architecture and common communications protocols.

With the focus of U.S. and Allied forces now turning to multi-domain, high-end warfare in the great power competition, including an increased focus on ‘gray-zone’ warfare, the traditional roles for MQ-9 series RPA are transitioning to multi-role and multi-domain applications, including maritime warfare. With this refocus comes an increased requirement for networking and synergies with other tactical and operational platforms. System testing of these new capabilities is ongoing in operational environments at various threat levels.

New, Innovative Capabilities

Capability development and the integration of systems for MQ-9 series platforms is proceeding at an unprecedented pace within GA-ASI to meet U.S. and Allied requirements. The most prominent developments relate to ASW, EW, IR and EW Self-Protection systems, and advanced networking solutions, with flight trials on these configurations planned in 2020. Meanwhile, developments to the baseline MQ-9B SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian, including a Detect and Avoid System (DAAS) to aid in seamless operations in all classes of airspace, Portable Pre/Post-Flight Equipment (P3E) to enable austere expeditionary operations, and a range of automation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications for operations and processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED), are either operational or nearing completion.

The MQ-9B is ideally suited to operate from a range of airfields throughout the world, including fields as short as 4,000 feet, by using an Automatic Takeoff and Landing Capability (ATLC). ATLC enhances the MQ-9B’s versatility and employment options due to its small footprint and it only requires a handful of essential personnel for support. The capability to auto-land at un-surveyed airfields is also in development by GA-ASI (recently demonstrated by the U.S. Air Force). With such capabilities, the MQ-9B could operate more flexibly and rapidly reposition between deployed operating sites, when compared to other strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare (ISREW) and Strike assets. With expanding multi-role capability options, the MQ-9B offers impressive future employment potential.

Many of GA-ASI’s customers are acquiring a range of very capable ISREW platforms, including the E-7A Wedgetail, P-8A Poseidon, and the MQ-9B SkyGuardian weapon systems. Operational roles for these systems overlap in some areas, with each providing an important contribution to the layered and networked aerospace force. This networked force creates a unique opportunity to maximize cross-domain capabilities for all. No longer can an Air or Defense Force afford to operate platforms within a narrow set of roles. With the need to focus more fully on multi-domain, high-end and gray-zone warfare, with reduced warning times and asymmetric challenges, the requirement for versatility and flexibility of weapon systems has become more acute.

The acquisition of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian enables a system of Multi-Domain Operations in direct support of Land, Maritime Surveillance, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Strike, EW roles and expeditionary roles. The MQ-9B’s ability to network with other Air, Sea, Land and Space systems creates an exceptional opportunity to further expand force employment options.

Contact Info for General Atomics:

ASI-MediaRelations@ga-asi.com

(858) 946-8430

Twitter: @GenAtomics_ASI

Q. The GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom) Gap has re-emerged as one of NATO’s major strategic maritime concerns. What solutions can Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) deliver to NATO customers to address maritime security concerns in the GIUK Gap?

We understand the increasing need for our NATO partners to secure contested areas like the GIUK Gap, which has become a focus of Allied naval strategy. The GIUK Gap is the waterway between Russia’s Northern Fleet and its strategic interests in the North Atlantic and all points south. Russia’s aggressive actions in recent years have reminded us of the importance of transatlantic resolve and of maintaining strong deterrence.

We need to consider areas of vulnerability that have not been in focus following the end of the Cold War. For example, a 2017 report from CNAS cited that 99 percent of our transoceanic communication flows through undersea cables that are highly vulnerable to threat from our adversaries. NATO allies must seriously consider the importance of monitoring and securing these pathways, especially in the GIUK Gap. As we see it, the need for persistent ISR capability on a cost-effective and highly reliable platform has never been greater.

The long-endurance unmanned aircraft that GA-ASI produce can add wide-area, all-weather sensors – like a multimode maritime radar – to NATO’s maritime security and defense. This provides a persistent surveillance capability over water and when combined with a maritime Automated Identification System (AIS) receiver, Electronic Support Measures/Electronic Intelligence (ESM/ELINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMINT), a full picture of all activity is presented, even when there’s cloud cover.

Q. There are also increasing concerns over the Baltic and Black Seas. Do those same capabilities address NATO’s issues in those regions as well?

A. Yes. The Baltic region is perhaps the most vulnerable to Russian military aggression. Any Russian conventional attack on or invasion of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania would trigger a response, leading the United States and its NATO allies to take defensive action, further escalating tension between the great power adversaries.

During peacetime, crisis, or conflict in the Baltic region and in the “gray zones” that separate them, NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities will be critical. Timely, high-quality JISR will be critical in providing political and military leaders with the right tools to accurately assess the threat and to facilitate the decisions neces­sary for a prompt and effective response. Last November, Atlantic Council released a report that discussed NATO’s need to expand ISR and defensive capabilities in the Baltic region in response to the region’s growing vulnerability. State-of-the-art UAS like our MQ-9A and MQ-9B can help allies understand the movements of regional actors and provide context for making fast decisions.

As for the Black Sea, a recent report from CSBA says that Russia could escalate hostilities and further expand its military presence in eastern Ukraine and northern Georgia. That could increase the threat to U.S. partners and NATO allies in the region, and further normalize Russian violations of national sovereignty and disregard for international rules and norms.

Q. What are the drivers for GA-ASI’s new Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability you’re developing?

A. We’ve seen the Russian Navy emerge with one of the most powerful submarine fleets in the world. NATO allies are faced with addressing a growing threat of undersea warfare while maintaining existing maritime priorities. It’s become one of a navy’s most difficult missions.

GA-ASI is developing ASW capabilities for our UAS to affordably bolster maritime defense in this area. The extended endurance and low cost per flight hour of our UAS are optimal for conducting searches over vast areas that is common for maritime missions. Our UAS can stay on station more than twice as long as manned aircraft providing a solution for maintaining a continuous ISR presence in high priority theaters in the Western Pacific and critical European waterways. In addition, the ability of platforms such as MQ-9A and MQ-9B to deploy sonobuoys to track, detect, deter, and when necessary, engage submarines.

And of course, UAS cost a fraction to buy and operate compared to their manned counterparts. In a recent Defense News article, Bryan Clark, from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CBSA), recommended using UAS to conduct some aspects of ASW due to the inherent persistence and affordability of systems like the MQ-9. Mr. Clark made a similar argument in his June 4th testimony to the house Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. We similarly believe the navies of the U.S. and NATO countries should increase the use of UAS with ASW capability across the board. Using manned platforms to conduct command and control, and unmanned vehicles to cover a wide area of surveillance, we could significantly reduce the costs of ASW operations (particularly important in a post-COVID budget environment). This Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) would not just perform command and control, but also locate and cue manned platforms to take whatever action is required.

Q. We know countries like the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Spain – as well as the United States – are operating UAS from GA-ASI, with Belgium and the Netherlands set to acquire MQ-9 variants in the near future. What are the primary advantages of the new MQ-9B platform?

A. There are many. Endurance is always a driver for UAS manufacturers. The MQ-9B can fly for more than 40 hours depending on payload. Delivering this kind of persistent surveillance capability has always been our expertise. We also boast one of the highest mission capable rates across the entire U.S. Air Force fleet, and our aircraft become a force multiplier when teamed with manned platforms like the P-8.

Another important advantage of MQ-9B is its configurability, enabled in part by the system’s “open architecture”. With nine external hard points, operators have the flexibility to configure the aircraft for any number of missions in multiple domain, whether that be maritime capabilities, land based radar, comms relays, or civilian specific payloads such as our NASA-utilized wildfire sensor. MQ-9B is built with a number of new safety enhancements, including lightning protection, de-icing systems and an Automatic Takeoff and Landing Capability. In addition, we are working on new pod development for our platforms that will enable nations to integrate their own sovereign capabilities.

Perhaps most noteworthy, MQ-9B is our first aircraft that we’re building to earn certification to fly in civilian airspace. It’s designed to meet airworthiness requirements. Earning certification and giving a UAS the ability to “file and fly,” just like commercial aircraft, will open up the skies to more missions and higher customer value.

A key enabler to airspace integration and International Airspace is our Detect and Avoid System (DAAS). Our DAAS answers the remote pilot to “see and avoid” other airborne traffic and meets RTCA DO-365 & 366 certification requirements. Utilizing existing ADS-B and TCAS technologies correlated with GA-ASI developed dual AESA Due Regard Radar (DRR) for all weather operations detecting cooperative and non-cooperative intruders. The correlated airborne traffic is downlinked and displayed on our Conflict Prediction & Display screen in the ground control station for pilot maneuvers or automatic maneuvers when required.

I’ll also add that operating MQ-9B, or any GA-ASI aircraft, is very cost-effective. Our aircraft consistently deliver the lowest lifecycle cost, lowest cost per flight hour and lowest operating costs when compared to other aircraft fleets.

We look forward to the first MQ-9B customer delivery to the UK Royal Air Force as part of their Protector program. The aircraft has also been selected by Australia and Belgium, and is being considered by a number of NATO allies. The multi-mission capability of this system is truly game changing. Built for interoperability, we look forward to more partners and allies operating this system in the near future.

Contact Info for General Atomics:

ASI-MediaRelations@ga-asi.com

(858) 946-8430

Twitter: @GenAtomics_ASI

Recently and for the first time since the 1980s, the U.S. Navy and the U.K. Royal Navy conducted maritime security operations in the Barents Sea, with an eye towards promoting regional security and stability, while also “reinforcing a foundation of Arctic readiness.” (1) The question of readiness and an overall persistent presence of the U.S. and its allies in the Arctic is one of concern to those watching Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Experts have testified in front of Congress that the failure of the U.S. and its allies to develop an “operational plan that envisions a persistent security presence in the Arctic,” (2) will erode the ability to shape policy outcomes, exacting national security consequences and working in favor of China’s and Russia’s interests. Further, commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, General O’Shaughnessy told Congress that the Arctic now serves as a means for our adversaries to potentially launch conventional missile or other attacks. (3) Such threats demand a persistent U.S. and allied presence. However, as both the U.S. and its allies grapple with the realities of their post-COVID defense budgets, policymakers and acquisition officials will need to think creatively about using existing and cost-effective technologies that enable persistent, and sustainable situational awareness in the Arctic region.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) identifies the Arctic as critical to the U.S. and its allies because of its position as a “shared region” and also as a “potential corridor for strategic competition” between two critical regions identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) – the Indo-Pacific and Europe. (4) More specifically, environmental changes facilitating greater access to natural resources, robust fisheries, shortened sea routes, and the ability to exploit the area for military operations essentially makes this region a potential battlefield. (5) But while a shift to near peer competition with Russia and China has caused the U.S. and its allies to hone in on advanced, exquisite, and expensive technologies as necessary countermeasures, the realities of defense budget and manpower resources, and the vast and harsh environment of the Arctic render some of these solutions as unviable and impractical.

In general, the DoD’s approach to the Arctic, which is largely shared by U.S. allies with Arctic interests, includes the following:

• Effective surveillance of air and maritime approaches with the ability to detect, track, and deter adversary’s assets throughout the region
• Enhancing maritime surveillance of the GIUK Gap and North Atlantic
• Improving Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR)
• Predicting environmental changes that inform mission requirements
• Supporting missions in the region with homeland security implications (6)

This diverse mission set, combined with budget realities and requirements for a persistent presence, demand a long-endurance and cost-effective ISR platform. General O’Shaughnessy noted that improved situational awareness capabilities are needed to “understand what is there, and be able to react to it.” (7) Recognizing this and with Arctic security operations in mind, many of the U.S.’s closest allies are turning to General Atomics Aeronautical Systems proven MQ-9 and its latest variant, the MQ-9B, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for a solution.

With the right concept of operations, the MQ-9 or the MQ-9B can provide affordable 24/7 coverage of the territory and without risk to human lives, which is important due to harsh environmental conditions and recent provocations by Russian aircraft. The MQ-9B in particular offers all-weather features, allows for persistent surveillance with up to 40 hours of endurance, and provides a significant reduction in manpower enabled by automation. These features combined with ‘plug and play’ architecture and variety of sensor and payload options makes MQ-9B the ideal multi-role platform needed to address the range of capability gaps in the Arctic. Its affordable acquisition and operating costs relative to other aircraft, also allows it to be the perfect complement to other air and surface assets by providing constant situational awareness with the ability to identify, detect, track, and deter potential air and maritime threats, and optimize the use of more expensive manned platforms for interdictions or other operations. Additionally, the MQ-9B can conduct low-cost environmental monitoring and other civil missions critical to the overall stability of the region.

The MQ-9B can cover much of the territory in the Arctic and with ongoing developments, it will have the ability to conduct unrestricted operations by 2024. Further, as experts have indicated, maritime forces could use UAVs of this type to improve over-the-horizon surveillance and communications and augment satellite-based surveillance and communications systems. (8) This persistent situational awareness closes a well-known gap that the adversaries regularly exploit to gain a military advantage.

However, General Atomics also recognizes that certain operational requirements dictate a faster, higher altitude, jet-powered platform like the Avenger. Due to consistent provocation in the region, Avenger can provide a quick-reaction response to rapidly track air and naval assets far before they reach the North American coastline. Similar to the MQ-9B, the Avenger can operate in or above adverse weather conditions and offer a relatively low cost, 24/7 persistent solution to augment or optimize other U.S. or allied assets operating in the region.

The Arctic’s role in the ongoing strategic competition and the need for the U.S. and its allies to preserve international principles and stability there will only increase as the Russians and Chinese feel emboldened by unchecked action and as environmental changes hasten easier access. A reassertion to an enduring presence of ‘like minded’ allies in the Arctic is critical to reestablishing the international order and maintaining our mutual security interests.

Already challenged by resource-constrained environments and competing priorities, the U.S. and its allies have arguably not kept up with its peer competitors, who are attempting to undermine the existing order and gain access to natural resources, shipping routes, and advantageous positioning for military operations. Moreover, it is almost assured that the squeeze on defense budgets will be even tighter as the U.S. and its allies continue to address the immense financial and public health devastation brought on by COVID-19. At the same time, there is no question that China and Russia will continue their incursions in the Arctic and may step up their efforts, while Washington and other capitals are distracted by the pandemic. Accordingly, policymakers in the western world need to demand their militaries consider existing capabilities that enable a flexible and dynamic 24/7 presence, at an affordable cost.

(1) Snow, Shawn. “U.S. Navy Surface Ships Enter the Barents Sea for the First Time since mid-198s,” Defense News, 4 May 2020.

(2) “The Cost of Doing Nothing: Maritime Infrastructure Vulnerabilities in an Emerging Arctic,” Heather A. Conley, (Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic Center for Strategic and International Studies). Congressional testimony: May 8, 2019.

(3) Statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee: February 26, 2019.

(4) “Report to Congress, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, June 2019.

(5) Clark, Bryan and Sloman, Jesse. “Securing the Frontier: Challenges and Solutions for U.S. Polar Maritime Operations,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Everstine, Brian. “NORTHCOM: More Training, Improved Comms Needed for Arctic Operations,” Air Force Magazine. May 4, 2020.

(8) Clark, Bryan and Sloman, Jesse. “Securing the Frontier: Challenges and Solutions for U.S. Polar Maritime Operations,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Contact Info for General Atomics:

ASI-MediaRelations@ga-asi.com

(858) 946-8430

Twitter: @GenAtomics_ASI

During the summit, NATO reaffirmed that “Russia’s aggressive actions” and “terrorism in all its forms” remain a persistent threat to European security. How do General Atomics aircraft remain relevant against such a threat?

At General Atomics – Aeronautical Systems we believe we have been at the forefront of delivering ‘game-changing’ capabilities for decades, going back to conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s. Just as our unmanned aerial systems revolutionized warfare two decades ago, we continue to do so by providing a multi-domain/multi-role, and cost-effective solution that can enable NATO to maintain constant situational awareness, uphold freedom of navigation, and protect critical infrastructure. The MQ-9B is particularly suited for operations in norther Europe and at high latitudes, by providing state-of-the-art and persistent maritime capabilities, including strategic and tactical ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), kinetic strike, and more. On ASW, we are proud that the MQ-9B offers the most cost effective and persistent ASW capabilities as either a stand-alone system or complement to manned maritime patrol aircraft.

The value of the MQ-9B ultimately comes down to its ability to address a wide-range of threats, at a relatively low-cost and reduced manpower. Essentially a modular system, with open architecture, the user can rapidly modify the aircraft based on their assessment of the threat. For NATO, MQ-9B offers a single platform that adds value across mission sets through simple ‘bolt on, bolt off’ capabilities. The resulting efficiencies in training, acquisition and operating costs should be important considerations as Allies continue to assess their contributions to the Alliance.

How would you characterize the performance of General Atomics aircraft for the United States?

Our aircraft are the most reliable and ready aircraft for the U.S Air Force, U.S. Army and Department of Homeland Security. We are proud that the Predator series aircraft has flown over 6 million flight hours in over 430,500 missions, to include protecting ground units on the battlefield, participating I experiments for NASA , and supporting first responders in the wake of natural disasters. Beyond leading the pack in flight hours, they also maintain the highest mission capable rates at greater than 90% and operational capacity over 94%, the highest in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army. Of course, they are known to be the workhorse of the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency fight, but the capabilities of these systems goes well beyond this narrow mission set.

Who among European NATO countries fly General Atomics aircraft and what are the advantages of your aircraft?

We are proud that close NATO allies, United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Spain currently fly our aircraft with Belgium and the Netherlands set to acquire MQ-9 variants in the very near future. That so many partners have chosen this platform is a testament to the Alliance, and the importance they place on interoperability.

The MQ-9B has been innovated to enable 40+ hours endurance and a service life of 40,000 flight hours – double the service life of the MQ-9A aircraft. In the European context, this endurance can expose and deter acts of gray zone aggression by delivering persistent surveillance. The ability to track and detect activity and mobilization in gray zone areas offers a NATO advantage in great power competition. The redesign of the MQ-9B was done in order to earn certification to fly in non-segregated airspace and integrate seamlessly with manned aircraft. We expect MQ-9B to achieve certification in the early 2020s, when the aircraft initially will meet NATO STANAG-4671 airworthiness standards, and subsequently will meet commercial airworthiness certification standards in cooperation with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.