Consequently, DARPA wants a hypersonic scramjet cruise missile that is capable of evading enemy interceptors.

“Future U.S. military operations face increasingly significant challenges from the rapid proliferation and advancement of highly capable Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) by peer adversaries,” warned DARPA’s Request for Information, which is due October 6. “These systems threaten to restrict the operational freedom of U.S. forces and diminish the effectiveness of current stand-off strike capabilities.”

The Next Generation Hypersonic Cruise Missile, or NGHCM, aims to demonstrate that it is possible to develop a cruise missile that is both survivable and affordable enough to be manufactured in large quantities.

“This demonstrator must establish the foundation for a next-generation capability that delivers a revolutionary leap in operational performance—specifically in range, cruise speed, and/or altitude,” DARPA said. “DARPA strongly encourages responses to this RFI from non-traditional defense contractors and emerging technology developers.”

The RFI asks companies to address three “focus areas.” The first is the overall missile concept.

“How does the architecture balance advancements in foundational physical parameters (payload, range, speed, altitude) against other critical factors (e.g., midcourse maneuverability, signature, or platform capacity) to achieve a revolutionary leap in mission effectiveness and survivability?” the RFI asks.

The missile’s launch platform is another consideration. Potential options listed in the RFI include tactical fighters, external or internal mounts on heavy bombers, surface-based vertical launch systems, and “Heavy Ground-Launch / Strategic Defense Class” platforms that would “maximize the range/payload advantages of an airbreathing cruiser paradigm at larger scales.”

DARPA is also looking for a weapon that could be quickly fielded. Companies are asked to “identify an optimized, accelerated schedule to reach first flight for the major technical milestones and review gates, rather than relying on traditional, sluggish acquisition models.”

The second focus area involves demonstrating technologies such as “air-breathing propulsion systems, high energy density fuels, advanced booster technologies, high-temperature materials, thermal management solutions, and high-performance power generation/ actuation/fuel systems.”

The third focus area seeks innovative ways to test the missile quickly. While the RFI doesn’t specify technical parameters, it does note that testing should address “the ability to scale to different missions and distances from 250 nautical miles – 2000 nautical miles.”

The RFI does not specify a speed requirement, although hypersonic is defined as an object traveling faster than Mach 5.

DARPA also wants a hypersonic missile that can be tested without drawing too much attention.

“These concepts should advance the state-of-the-art for collecting critical flight test data allowing for rapid deployment and execution while providing fewer observable indicators of imminent testing,” the RFI said.

Russia has already fielded a hypersonic scramjet cruise missile in the form of the 3M22 Zircon.

Russia has launched Zircons at Ukraine, and Ukraine claims to have downed some of them with U.S.-made Patriot interceptors.

Boeing’s BSU-111/B Payload Delivery Unit is a wing-and-turbojet engine kit that converts a 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) into a long-range JDAM (JDAM LR) dubbed the GBU-75. The result is a gravity bomb with the reach of a cruise missile.

Boeing said it has spent nearly $100 million of its own money on the program.

“Scaling production of the GBU-75 will provide the fleet with an affordable, sustainable solution designed to eliminate long-range land and sea-based threats to U.S. and international forces,” said Bob Ciesla, vice president of Boeing Precision Engagement Systems.

The BSU-111/B wing-and-engine kit is the latest modification to the JDAM family, which has previously seen the gravity bomb receive a tail kit that steered it roughly 15 nautical miles and a wing kit that further stretched that distance to 40.

The Kratos-designed TDI-J85 engine pushes that past 300.

The JDAM LR’s capabilities go beyond land strikes. The QuickStrike Long Range mining variant pairs it with a bomb carrying a ship-tracking sensor. Boeing has shown concepts loading large numbers onto Air Force bombers, though no Air Force buy has been announced.

The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, buys JDAM for both the Air Force and U.S. Navy. The first GBU-75s are bound for the Navy.

The Navy demonstrated the weapon back in April, when Super Hornets released two JDAM LRs over the Point Mugu Sea Range off California.

The April 1 round separated cleanly, fired up its engine and flew 34 minutes before landing within meters of its target. The April 3 round added altitude changes and maneuvering. Each covered roughly 200 nautical miles.

When announcing those tests in April, Capt. Sarah Abbott, the Navy’s Precision Strike Weapons program manager, emphasized the need to give the fleet’s JDAMs greater standoff range.

“As Naval Air Forces in theater continue to rely heavily on JDAM systems, the program recognizes a critical need to provide the fleet with greater standoff range,” she said. “This new capability allows pilots to engage targets from significantly safer distances, maintaining a tactical advantage in contested environments.”

Reusing existing infrastructure is a key aspect of the program’s appeal.

Navy budget documents describe JDAM LR as a modification to the baseline program, built on the existing production line and guidance hardware. Any jet that can drop a conventional JDAM can carry the new variant without modification, according to Boeing’s release.

The award, which had not appeared in the Pentagon’s daily contract announcements as of Aug. 5, is an undefinitized action, meaning Boeing began work before the two sides agreed on a price. The Government Accountability Office has long called these contracts risky because contractors are reimbursed for allowable costs, regardless.

Boeing’s release did not say how many GBU-75s the contract buys, how much they cost or when deliveries begin.

The Next Generation C-sUAS Missile project comes as the U.S. and other nations are pursuing lasers, microwaves and other alternatives to kinetic anti-drone weapons, such as missiles and cannon, which are seen as too expensive and in short supply.

The Army wants to quickly develop an “extended-range, quick-response missile to defeat Group 2 and Group 3 small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) threats,” according to the Army’s Sources Sought notice. The deadline is August 20.

The initial specifications are for a missile that can intercept a drone flying at 6 kilometers altitude, at a range of more than 16 kilometers. The ultimate goal is to destroy drones flying 8 kilometers high, at a range of more than 25 kilometers. Missile guidance would be via a radar seeker.

NGCM appears intended as a step up — but still compatible — with the Army’s Coyote C-UAS missile system.

“The Army is looking for NGCM to be produced and integrated into the existing Coyote Launch System to provide extended range, rapid launch time, and reduced time-to-target over current effectors,” the notice said.

The weapon is intended to stop Group 2 and 3 drones. Group 2 drones have a maximum gross takeoff weight of 21 to 55 pounds, fly below 3,500 feet and have a speed of less than 250 knots, according to the Department of Defense’s UAV classification system. This includes models such as Boeing’s ScanEagle. Group 3 drones, such as Insitu’s RQ-21 Blackjack, have a takeoff weight under 1,320 pounds and fly below 18,000 feet at a speed of less than 250 knots.

The NGCM missile should take less than five seconds to leave the launcher after the operator gives the fire command.

“The missile must be compatible with the Coyote Launcher with minimal to no modifications,” the notice said.

In addition, the missile must also fit with existing air defense systems, including the Sentinel A3/A4, LTAMDS and TPQ-53 radars.

The Army envisions the NGCM missile system in two versions. The fixed-site version would be equipped with a variety of sensors. A mobile version would be “mounted on tactical vehicles for employment at the halt and on-the-move, providing a scalable capability at the tactical edge.”

The Army is aiming for Technology Readiness Level 7 — prototype testing in the field — by the end of fiscal 2027. Contractors will need to have 50 missiles ready for operational assessment by the beginning of 2028.

Significantly, the Army desires missiles costing less than $150,000 apiece as part of a bulk purchase of 5,000 missiles. While that’s a bargain compared to a $4 million Patriot air-defense missile, critics may still question the economics: An Iranian Shahed-136 drone costs around $35,000.

That’s one reason for the drive to develop anti-drone lasers that, theoretically, cost only pennies per shot. On the other hand, missiles can function in bad weather that disrupts laser beams.

“The current industrial base has demonstrated significant challenges, including production delays, quality control issues, and critical obsolescence (i.e., diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages) across key engine components,” warned the Air Force’s Request for Information. The deadline is Aug. 28.

“The government will pursue a strategic competition requiring industry to innovate manufacturing and guarantee supply chain resiliency,” the RFI said.

The initiative comes as the Air Force struggles with its jet engines.

For example, F-35 fighter deliveries and upgrades have been delayed by engine issues, with a Government Accountability Office report noting last year that “the engine contractor is still not delivering engines to contract specifications after 20 years of production.”

Meanwhile, B-52 modernization has been stalled in part by engine issues that have raised costs by $3 billion and delayed initial operational capability by 15 months, according to GAO.

In turn, the Air Force is now embarking on a multiyear fighter engine procurement project that envisions more than 180 engines per year by 2034. The RFI specifically cites engines for the F-15EX and F-16.

The RFI promises “five foundational pillars designed to drive a paradigm shift in engine procurement and sustainment,” as the government shifts from “legacy procurement toward incentivizing industry-led technological evolution and capacity expansion.” These include “holding vendors accountable” for delivering new engines that are more capable, reliable and cheaper.

The Air Force will focus “on the total lifecycle cost of the engine, not just the initial purchase price.”

Contractors are also responsible for ensuring reliable supply chains.

“We will implement an acquisition strategy that prioritizes ease of maintenance and establishes a resilient, sustainable supply chain from day one,” the Air Force said. “This effort is designed to solve key fleet-level issues by requiring a newer engine with improved supportability.”

“The result is a streamlined logistics footprint that reduces downtime, lowers the burden on our maintainers, and ensures the continuous flow of parts and support to maximize flightline readiness.”

Ultimately, the question is whether the U.S. defense industrial base can deliver. The Air Force intends to “enforce stringent producibility requirements.”

“We will select a partner capable of scaling production to meet surge requirements, guaranteeing a steady and uninterrupted supply of engines for USAF/FMS [Foreign Military Sales] aircraft (e.g. F-15EX and F-16) programs,” the RFI reads.

Companies responding to the RFI are asked to provide a variety of details, such as a timeline for developing and manufacturing an engine. They should also specify “at what minimum volume your supply chain can justify private capital investments (such as facility expansion, tooling modernization, or advanced automation) and how those investments will structurally lower your long-term unit costs.”

With nations competing to obtain raw materials — and China restricting sales of rare earths — the Air Force wants to be certain manufacturers can find the raw materials they need.

“From your company’s market perspective, what are the primary raw material constraints (e.g., specialized titanium/nickel alloys) or manufacturing process bottlenecks (e.g., advanced casting or forging capacity) that pose the highest risk to scaling up fighter engine production?” the RFI asks.

The program, described as “extreme teaming” with industry partners, entered the phase with “unprecedented maturity,” Gen. Dale White, director of Critical Major Weapon Systems, said in a Wednesday keynote address at an event in Dayton, Ohio.

The engineering and manufacturing phase includes maturing, integrating and testing all parts of the F-47. It will produce a small number of test aircraft for evaluation and includes priced options for low-rate initial production. White did not specify the number of test aircraft being produced.

The first Boeing F-47 is on track for its first flight in 2028. The Air Force plans to buy at least 185 F-47s, matching the size of the F-22 Raptor fleet it intends to replace.

“The F-47 will fly in this administration,” White said during his speech at the Life Cycle Industry Days, hosted by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center.

White, who also acts as direct reporting portfolio manager to the deputy defense secretary, is tasked with managing weapons systems, such as the F-47 and B-21 programs.

In March 2025, President Donald Trump announced that the force will proceed with development of sixth-generation Boeing F-47s under the Next Generation Air Dominance program, or NGAD, intended to replace the F-22 Raptor.

“In terms of all of the attributes of a fighter jet, there’s never been anything even close to it, from speed to maneuverability, to what it can have, to payload,” Trump said at the time, insisting that the aircraft will be built and in the air during his administration.

“And this has been in the works for a long period of time,” he continued. “America’s enemies will never see it coming.”

NGAD is a “family of systems” that includes the F-47 and Collaborative Combat Aircraft designed to achieve air superiority. The F-47’s modular design is intended to accommodate emerging technology and integrate long-range strike capabilities to counter threats in contested environments.

The F-47 program was allotted $3.45 billion in fiscal year 2026 funding and over $5 billion in the fiscal 2027 budget request.

Frank Kendall, the Air Force’s 26th secretary who served under former President Joe Biden, said in a Thursday roundtable hosted by Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that gathering experience in the field and through simulations help operators establish trust with autonomous systems, like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft.

“You have to accumulate a basis for trust over time, and so I think we just need to think carefully about how we structure things in order to make that opportunity,” Kendall said during the roundtable.

Earlier this week, the Air Force announced that it conducted the first-ever live-fire test of an inert AIM-120 from an Anduril-made YFQ-44A. The CCA recently completed an end-to-end, beyond-line-of-sight strike against a simulated target, the service announced, but did not specify when the exercise occurred.

The Air Force is scheduled to continue live-fire testing with General Atomics’ YFQ-42A this fall.

Kendall said that using the aircraft in Red Flag, the service’s leading large-force aerial combat training simulation held at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, will be “fascinating,” but he worries about the force using initial setbacks as an excuse to “retreat” instead of pushing ahead.

The former secretary was optimistic that institutional support will be enough to overcome those setbacks, saying that enthusiastic operators want to see the aircraft’s full potential realized.

Kendall recalled when he once asked an Air Combat Command crew who were developing CCA tactics why there wasn’t more resistance.

“[A young fighter pilot’s] answer was, ‘Sir, these things are going to save our lives.’” Kendall recalled.

The simulations define the exercises, he added, saying that it showcases how the aircraft protects crew fighters effectively right now even as the force needs to develop more sophisticated tactics.

“The guys with the CCAs are beating the crap out of the guys without them, and not losing any manned fighters,” he said.

Kendall said that computerized, man-in-the-loop simulations are the best tool to assist operators in learning how to use the aircraft effectively since more trials can be completed. Integrated simulations have been used by the Air Force for roughly 30 years.

“In simulators with cockpits their sensors are showing them simulated threats as well as their friends, and then they basically fight a battle together,” he explained.

Kendall referred to a time when he took a flight in an F-16 modified by artificial intelligence. In flight, the aircraft’s testers would collect data points, he said, and run a million simulations to adjust the software overnight to complete the flight again the following day.

The first increment CCA aircraft in the program are “all the same” as weapons carriers, but in Increment II, Kendall stipulates that the force can begin equipping them with sensors and possibly distributed electronic warfare capabilities.

China is working on this autonomous system capability as well, he added, stating that air battles could soon be CCA versus CCA. Intelligence is going to play a significant role in how well the U.S. understands their systems, tactics and vulnerabilities, he said, noting that it’s a “hard game” to play.

In Increment I, the Air Force showed interest in obtaining 100 to 150 aircraft, the first phase of a longer-term goal of eventually fielding 1,000 CCAs.

Merz told lawmakers he had sealed the deal with the U.S. government on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Ankara, adding that the meetings on Tuesday and Wednesday had exceeded his expectations.

“We are closing a critical strategic gap in our defence, while simultaneously working to develop our own European systems and station them in Europe,” he said.

According to German government sources, Washington committed to granting approval in August for Germany to procure Tomahawk missiles and corresponding ground-based Typhon launchers in a letter of intent signed on Tuesday.

The number of missiles and launchers Germany plans to acquire has not been disclosed as it is classified information.

The planned purchase appears to fit with U.S. President Donald Trump’s push for European allies to pay for their own security, for example by buying U.S. weapons.

The fate of the Tomahawk supply had been unclear after Trump announced in May that he would reduce U.S. military presence in Germany.

That was seen as a cancellation of a plan under the previous administration to deploy a U.S. battalion equipped with long-range Tomahawk missiles to Germany.

It was intended as an interim solution that would serve as a powerful deterrent against Russia while Europeans developed their own version of such weapons.

Germany makes its own cruise missiles, the Taurus, but their range of around 311 miles is three to five times shorter than the Tomahawks’.

The balloon-born missile, DART, drops from a balloon at about 7 to 11 miles and runs on satellite guidance until it falls to about 4 miles, where its navigation cuts out and a solid-fuel engine carries it along a fixed course, according to its creators at the Ukrainian company Center of Innovative Technologies Program.

Once the navigation shuts off, Russian jammers can not pull the missile off target.

The company built DART to drop from a balloon rather than fire from a plane or a launcher as a cheap, silent and electronic warfare-resistant vehicle to carry guided weapons deep into Russia.

Its roughly 22-pound warhead scatters conductive graphite filaments designed to short out Russian power grids, according to Militarnyi, though it has not yet cleared Ukrainian military codification.

“Balloons are actively used by the Defense Forces of Ukraine mainly as support platforms and as means for medium and deep strikes,” retired Col. Viktor Kevliuk, a 35-year veteran of the Ukrainian Army now with the Kyiv-based Center for Defense Strategies, told Euromaidan Press last month.

“They are inexpensive, inconspicuous on radars, can hang in the air for a long time and carry a payload,” Kevliuk said.

Ukraine has already floated more than 1,000 of them into Russia, he said.

Now Kyiv is using those balloons to launch a guided missile. They ride the prevailing west-to-east winds deep into Russia and have drifted as far as Moscow, where air defenses tracked them at an altitude of about 6 miles during a strike last September.

The debut comes at a turning point in the war. Ukraine has clawed back more ground than it has lost for the first time since its 2023 counteroffensive, a shift the Institute for the Study of War has linked to Ukraine’s emerging drone dominance over Russian technology across land, sea and air.

That edge has begun to reshape Kyiv’s leverage at the negotiating table, drawing American interest in its battlefield technology as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presses a mid- to long-range strike campaign that sends cruise missiles and one-way drones as far as over 600 miles into Russia, what he has branded the country’s “long-range sanctions” on Moscow’s war economy.

Balloons are a cheap way to reach into that same fight. They can drift over a hundred miles on the wind before they release anything, then hand off to a drone or a missile that flies hundreds more, stacking the two ranges to put a strike far deeper than either could manage alone.

Ukrainian forces have used military balloons in the past, most often for surveillance or as decoys.

The cheap, wind-borne balloons can bait Russian defenses into firing million-dollar S-300 and S-400 interceptors at a target that costs about $200, draining the batteries that guard Russian cities.

Ukraine floated several balloons over Moscow and Tatarstan during an overnight combined strike in September, a strategy that analysts assessed was meant to confuse Russian air defenses, according to United24, citing Russian sources.

The strike side of the story broke into view in May when video circulated online of an American-made attack drone falling from a Ukrainian balloon over the front. The clip, which spread across Ukrainian military channels, was the first public glimpse of Kyiv pairing a balloon with a precision weapon.

The drone was a Hornet, a roughly seven-foot, AI-guided strike drone built by the American firm Perennial Autonomy, and already in wide Ukrainian use against Russian supply lines. Ukrainian troops launched it from a balloon that carried it dozens of miles and released it at over 26,000 feets’ altitude, with the drone just using a tiny percentage of its battery along the way, according to Euromaidan Press.

Launched from Ukrainian-held territory, that balloon reportedly carried the drone dozens of miles toward its target before the flyer ever fired its own engine.

Ukrainian operators say that head start roughly doubles the Hornet’s reach from about 93 miles to at least 186 by adding the balloon’s distance and altitude to the range the drone flies on its own, according to The Defence Blog.

Perennial Autonomy, which produces the Hornet, was founded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt out of his earlier White Stork and Swift Beat drone ventures in Ukraine, which won the biggest counter-drone award in American military history, valued at up to $500 million, last month.

“We must be proactive with creating a layered defense that deploys and scales low-cost, attributable air-to-air drone interceptors at all our facilities at home and abroad,” Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, who directs the task force that awarded the Perennial contract, told Inside Unmanned Systems last month.

Weaponized balloons may be part of that plan, evidenced by the U.S. Army’s own testing of balloon carriers.

The service has been evaluating a tethered balloon known as an aerostat, or lighter-than-air, to detect drones and relay communications, with an eye toward launching drone swarms from it.

Russia has gotten wind of the idea too — if not the backing of the breeze itself.

The prevailing winds across the front blow west to east, so a Russian balloon launched at Ukraine tends to drift back over Russia instead — a quirk of geography that runs in Kyiv’s favor.

Moscow is trying to field them anyway.

After SpaceX restricted unauthorized Starlink terminals over occupied territory, cutting Russian units off from a link they had leaned on, the military began trialing the Barrazh-1, a stratospheric balloon meant to haul a 220-pound relay station to an altitude of 65 feet, Defense Ministry adviser Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov told Defense Express last month.

Russian developers say the balloon is built almost entirely from Russian parts, a hedge against the same sanctions that grounded its Starlink link.

The Air Force made the announcement Wednesday, saying it reached the decision four months ahead of schedule. The contracts went to General Atomics for its FQ-42A and Anduril for its FQ-44A, as part of CCA Increment 1.

The two aircraft were previously designated the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A. Dropping the Y prefix signals their shift from prototype to production.

Often referred to as “loyal wingmen,” CCA are jet-powered, semi-autonomous unmanned aircraft built to fly alongside crewed fighters such as the F-35 and the planned F-47, extending their sensors and weapons while taking on risk that would otherwise fall to pilots.

“Collaborative Combat Aircraft change how we project power and generate mass in highly contested environments,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach said in the release. “Delivering this capability to our warfighters faster ensures our forces maintain the tactical edge required to deter and, if necessary, defeat any adversary.”

The Air Force is committing to a large CCA fleet, though it won’t happen all at once. Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said the contracts reaffirm the service’s confidence that it can buy more than 150 combat-capable CCA by the end of the decade, well below the program’s long-term goal of roughly 1,000.

“By moving fast from competitive selection into full-scale manufacturing, we position ourselves to field highly credible and combat-ready semi-autonomous systems to stay ahead of the pacing challenge,” Meink said in the announcement.

Separately, the Air Force opened a competition for the software that will operate the CCA.

“Mission autonomy is the cornerstone of the CCA concept, and leveraging a competitive, multi-vendor environment ensures we capture the latest technology,” Meink said, noting that this approach capitalizes on current technology while leaving room for future breakthroughs.

Six companies won spots in a six-year pool: Anduril, General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, RTX Collins Aerospace and Shield AI.

From that group, the service picked three to begin work on autonomous software right away. Anduril, RTX Collins Aerospace and Shield AI will take part in the first of two six-month rounds of head-to-head competition.

The service said those three were chosen based on their ability to meet the program’s schedule and cost demands. The Air Force plans to name a single primary software provider for Increment 1 by summer 2027.

Using an approach the Air Force calls first-of-its-kind, the service will pay the full licensing fee only if a vendor “provides a combat capability aligned with warfighter needs and feedback.”

This arrangement affords the Air Force the ability to acquire and implement state-of-the-art technology that is continually evolving.

Despite three companies getting first crack at developing the autonomy software, the Air Force may award software licenses to any of the six vendors within the pool at any point over the next six years.

Providing the foundation for this strategy is the government-owned Autonomy Government Reference Architecture, a modular, open-systems approach that enables the Air Force to move software between aircraft and avoid being locked into a single vendor.

The service said in February that it had integrated government-owned autonomous software into both prototypes using that architecture, which it called proof the software could move across vendors and platforms.

The contracts come on the heels of the service’s fiscal 2027 budget request, which marked the first time it asked Congress for money to buy CCA rather than just develop them.

The service declined to disclose the value of the contracts or how many of each aircraft the two companies will build.

An attack helicopter went down off the coast of Oman this month after a Shahed drone engaged with the aircraft. Though the Pentagon said that its two crew members were rescued by an unmanned surface vessel hours later, public details surrounding the incident remain sparse.

The military’s investigation may ultimately determine what happened between the Apache and drone, but for experts and analysts, the event is a snapshot into how warfare is changing: attack helicopters, once the apex predators of the battlefield, must learn to navigate an ecosystem crowded with unmanned systems that are smaller, cheaper and deadlier than ever before.

The interaction itself seemed an anomaly.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones are typically programmed to fly to set coordinates before launch, which makes them adept at striking targets that do not move, according to Kelly Campa, Middle East Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.

“A Shahed hitting a helicopter is highly unusual,” Campa said, noting that Russia has increasingly used remotely guided Shahed variants capable of striking moving targets, like trains.

Campa added that Russia, however, generally has not used those variants to attack aircraft without additional modifications like small missiles, and Iran has not publicly demonstrated similar capabilities.

The unusual nature of the incident — and the scarcity of publicly available information — has made drawing definitive conclusions difficult.

Kelly Grieco, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, said several explanations for the Apache’s downing are plausible.

The helicopter may have collided with the drone while attempting an intercept, interacted with a more advanced variant than the baseline Shahed design or encountered a drone with a proximity fuse, which detonates near a target instead of on contact.

“The fact that both crew members survived and appear to have made a controlled water landing argues against a direct impact with the warhead,” she said, because if a drone’s warhead blasted into the Apache and detonated, the damage would likely be catastrophic and unsurvivable.

To some analysts, the more pressing question is not what happened between the Apache and drone, but what the incident says about the helicopter’s place in modern warfare.

Apaches, heavily armed to destroy tanks and support ground troops, have historically occupied a fearsome skyward position atop the battlefield hierarchy. However, experts say the proliferation of increasingly capable unmanned systems is challenging that dominance.

Doug Birkey, the executive director of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the incident is a warning sign after operating in relatively permissive environments during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“This should be the last fight where we use a lot of legacy constructs, technologies, etc.,” he said, calling the conflict a “transition” into a different way of war.

“It’s time to move on to some newer capabilities and ways of warfighting,” he said.

The Army is moving in that direction, and in March, the service received its first pilot-optional Black Hawk helicopter for testing.

Birkey also pointed to the need to couple crewed-capabilities with uncrewed assets.

“Could you partner that Apache with an uncrewed asset to net similar effect?” he asked, adding that the military could “keep the human cognition and some of those mission capabilities proximate, but you don’t put them in the immediate line of fire.”

Those changes may already be taking shape. One expert sees the early June incident as evidence that developments associated with the war in Ukraine may be appearing elsewhere.

“It was the Shahed being used as anti-helicopter,” said Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “That had happened in Ukraine. It had not happened in the Gulf.”

Apache helicopters routinely fly missions over and around the Strait of Hormuz, Cancian said, attacking Iranian speedboats and shooting down drone threats.

The helicopters can still do those things, he added, but doing so may require more controls — like potentially moving the aircraft in groups — and less freedom than in the past.

For crews, that means operating in an environment where the margin for error is shrinking and the risks are heightened.

One helicopter pilot who underwent underwater escape training recalled being taught to expect disorientation and complete darkness while trying to egress from an inverted cabin after an aircraft goes down in water and rolls over.

Before the training, Kurt Rosell described the experience as his “biggest fear.”

And while exactly how the two rescued crew members survived remains undisclosed, they certainly trained for the risk of going down over water: a scenario with a water-filled cabin where there was only one certainty: bubbles always rise.