Although its mandate expires at the end of the year, the future of the security arrangements in southern Lebanon remains highly uncertain, with multiple options still under consideration.

Part of UNIFIL’s international civilian staff was evacuated during the escalation of the conflict that reignited on March 2, while military personnel remained on the ground and continued operations.

“UNIFIL has a mandate until Dec. 31, 2026, and our mission will continue until then,” UNIFIL spokesperson Kandice Ardiel said.

While rumors, public statements and various proposals have emerged about next steps, no clear plan has taken shape.

On June 2, UN Secretary-General António Guterres submitted three options to the UN Security Council, all of which would significantly reduce the number of peacekeepers deployed in southern Lebanon.

Guterres outlined scenarios that would see a light, medium or more substantial presence, with troop numbers ranging from 900 to 1,500 or 3,000, alongside varying numbers of military observers and reserve forces.

However, the UN Security Council has yet to reach a decision and could ultimately opt for a course of action different from the three proposed alternatives.

“The Security Council is currently examining the options. We will wait and see what decision it makes,” Ardiel said. “For us, the priority remains continuing to implement our mandate, and creating the conditions for a smooth handover to whatever comes next.”

There is no timeline yet, but as the end date nears, the risk is that southern Lebanon will be left with a security vacuum.

The three options, meanwhile, are not the only proposals on the table. Over the past few months, several countries have expressed interest in maintaining an international presence in southern Lebanon.

Following a proposal by Italy and France to form a post-UNIFIL multinational coalition — put forward during the bilateral summit held in Antibes in late June — Germany was the last EU country to join the call for an EU force to replace UN peacekeepers in the border area.

The European External Action Service also proposed a three-year civilian and military mission, not as a replacement for UNIFIL but to strengthen the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in enhancing territorial control and border security.

However, any scenario is further complicated by Israel’s continued presence in Lebanese territory and its ongoing military operations in border villages, despite the ceasefire currently in place.

UNIFIL and Resolution 1701, which brought an end to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, have been largely absent from both the initial and now-defunct U.S.-Iran agreement, which included a ceasefire in Lebanon, and the security arrangements outlined in the framework agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel in Washington.

The framework agreement foresees the implementation of “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon that would be placed under LAF control and cleared of Hezbollah presence and weapons before the Israeli withdrawal, which would take place upon verification.

How such verification should be carried out remains unclear, while UNIFIL has not been brought into the discussion. So far, Israel has withdrawn from only one of the two agreed pilot zones. Israeli and Lebanese representatives are set to meet again in Rome on Aug. 4.

Regardless of outcomes, UNIFIL will cease operations on Dec. 31. As the mission’s mandate expires, the tasks outlined under Resolution 1701, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities and supporting the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River, will come to an end, even though the UN Security Council resolutions would technically remain in place.

On a practical level, this means UNIFIL will no longer be on the ground to monitor, report and coordinate daily between the parties, but will instead dismantle its bases and withdraw after nearly five decades of operations.

The Lebanese government has made no secret of its preference for maintaining an international presence along the border.

Officer-in-charge of the United Nations Special Coordinator to Lebanon (UNSCOL) Jean Arnault recently received a delegation representing 86 members of the Lebanese Parliament who signed a petition addressed to the UN secretary-general for the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, expressing their concerns about the consequences of the withdrawal.

According to Paul Salem, a non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former president and CEO of the Middle East Institute, the Lebanese state and the LAF should be able to assume full responsibility instead of relying on an additional international force.

“The time to rely on others is over,” he said. “The LAF should be supported in gradually assuming full responsibility for security, not by bringing in another international force. They are certainly not ready yet, but that should be the end goal, rather than perpetuating the current model.”

According to Salem, from a realpolitik perspective, UNIFIL has not been particularly effective. At least half of the mission’s positions are currently located in areas occupied by Israel, affecting peacekeepers on the ground and delaying or blocking freedom of movement.

“Other countries should step in to support Lebanese authorities, not only the United States, but also the Gulf states, Turkey and Europe,” he concluded. “Everyone should help the LAF through training, resources, equipment and recruitment, rather than by maintaining a presence on the ground.”

The technology, a hallmark of the fighting in Ukraine, arrived here shortly after Hezbollah launched an attack against Israel on March 2, following the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran that began days prior, reigniting a new large-scale war.

The tethered drones rely on a spool of fiber-optic cable that maintains a direct link between the operator and the aircraft, making them immune to jamming and to other regular electronic warfare measures. In the context of southern Lebanon, their appearance represents a major shift in the nature of the conflict.

Hezbollah released the first video footage of a fiber-optic drone attack on an Israeli tank in late March 2026.

Asked about the technology, Hezbollah referred to Ali Jazini, a military expert close to the group, who said that the drones are estimated to cost between $300 and $400 each. The craft appear to be manufactured locally using 3D printing technology, relying on available electronic components commonly used for civilian purposes.

“Hezbollah is one of the most sophisticated non-state actors in the world. But when it comes to FPV’s drones, they’re learning themselves,” Samuel Bendett, a military analyst and Russia defense expert with the U.S.-based Center for Naval Analyses, said.

Fiber-optic FPV drones have quickly become a critical weapon, and the only real requirement is having experienced operators, as improper handling can easily damage the cable.

“But if you are in your 30s or 40s, you grew up with PCs and PlayStations and know how to maneuver a joystick,” said Luxembourg-based defense commentator Hamzé Attar.

As part of the growing gamification of warfare, simulation tools now allow operators to train across a wide range of scenarios, significantly shortening the learning curve, “ultimately enabling Hezbollah to also deploy night-vision-capable FPV systems”, he said.

Fiber-optic FPV drones represent a solution born out of necessity to evade electronic warfare and enable more precise strikes, after the group’s supply line from Syria was disrupted following the fall of Assad regime. These drones do not require runways or any specialized launch infrastructure, and they also allow the pilot to retain visual contact with the target until the final seconds before impact.

Intelligence about launch sites and a pilot’s location is significantly more difficult to obtain than intelligence on other drone activity, and actors are banking on that asymmetry.

In that sense, Israeli forces seem to have been caught flat-footed. “No one is more aware of technological and drone developments around the world than Israel,” said Bendett. “So it was rather surprising to see the Israeli military not fully accounting for the potential use of these drones.”

This created a battlefield advantage for Hezbollah, alongside its deep familiarity with the terrain and geography of southern Lebanon.

Knowledge transfer of technologies and tactics typically occurs through multiple channels, including observation of other battlefields, widely available open-source footage, and training, according to analysts. Some of the expertise developed in Russia may have been transferred to Iran, and passed on to Hezbollah.

“Just as Iran has supplied technology and training for Russia’s use of Shahed drones, it is likely that Iran may have received training from Russian forces on the use of certain types of tactical UAVs”, Bendett said.

Analysts believe that any military engaged in conflict will, in one form or another, encounter technologies first seen in Ukraine, driven in part by the trade-off between efficiency and cost.

“We are seeing some of that in conflicts across the Middle East, Africa, the Sahel, and South Asia. We are also seeing the use of drones by drug cartels in Latin America,” Bendett said.

Countermeasures against the flying warheads include nets, acoustic warning sensors, spinning cables, or electromagnetic systems intended to disrupt electronics, but such measures can also risk affecting a force’s own assets operating in the same area.

According to Jazini, solutions remain limited at present, even for larger armies.

Said Attar: “They changed the battlefield and will continue to be a destabilizing factor in warfare until a proper solution is found.”

After years of U.S. pressure, the decision was taken by the UN Security Council in August last year through the adoption of Resolution 2790. The decision also tasks the Secretary-General with presenting options by June 1 of this year for the future implementation of the resolutions currently overseen by UNIFIL, most notably Resolution 1701 (2006), which recalls a number of earlier ones.

Following the 2006 war between Israel and the armed group Hezbollah, Resolution 1701 ended the conflict and expanded the mission’s mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities, ensure humanitarian access for civilians, and support the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon.

UNIFIL currently fields around 8,500 peacekeepers from nearly 50 troop-contributing countries. Established in 1978 to oversee Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and help restore peace and security, the mission operates exclusively on the Lebanese side of the border and also assists the Lebanese government in re-establishing its authority in the area.

The tenets of Resolution 1701 remains central to follow-on arrangements, as its implementation will technically continue beyond UNIFIL’s withdrawal. “This is why the Security Council asked the Secretary General to present options, in June, to implement Resolution 1701 when UNIFIL leaves,” UNIFIL spokesperson Kandice Ardiel told Defense News.

The Security Council has given no indication that it is revisiting the decision of ending the mission in southern Lebanon, and UNIFIL is not involved in the process of developing proposals.

The decision to end the mandate was largely driven by Washington, where leaders have argued the time had come for the Lebanese army to assume greater responsibility without the presence of UN peacekeepers.

Some analysts see the proposition as a contradiction in terms. Largely under-equipped, underfunded and understaffed, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are in no position either to forcibly disarm Hezbollah, a move that could also trigger internal sectarian strife, or to confront the Israeli military.

As part of the process of winding down the mission, UNIFIL has developed plans for the withdrawal of personnel and the disposal of bases and equipment.

“Based on other cases, facilities could become Lebanese state buildings where the Lebanese Armed Forces could potentially be stationed,” said Chiara Ruffa, professor in political science at the Centre for International Studies (CERI) at Sciences Po Paris. “Ultimately, however, it depends on Israel’s intentions. If the objective is to maintain an occupation, then these sites could be taken over by the Israeli forces.”

As the process remains ongoing, analysts describe potential scenarios. “The UN Security Council could choose to dismantle UNIFIL and assign a greater role to the military Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) which still is a UN-led mission, but much smaller than UNIFIL,” Ruffa explained.

“In any case, Resolution 1701, together with Resolution 1559, is likely to form the backbone of the future configuration in southern Lebanon,” said Raymond Murphy, former UNIFIL peacekeeper and professor at the Irish Centre for Human Rights at University of Galway. Both resolutions call on foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and on the disarmament of all armed groups in the country.

According to analysts, the UNIFIL withdrawal will have significant implications for southern Lebanon, particularly in terms of shedding light on potential war crimes, creating humanitarian corridors, and reducing civilian casualties and protection.

Other implications include the loss of coordination mechanisms, in particular the Tripartite series of military meetings organized by UNIFIL and held between 2006 and 2023, which brought together the Israeli and Lebanese armed forces and helped defuse minor tensions along the Blue Line.

UNIFIL’s withdrawal also is expected to have an economic impact on an area already neglected, as it has acted as “a financial lifeline for the area,” said Dina Arakji, a UAE-based analyst at Control Risks and non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute. The mission has also provided employment opportunities for locals and worked with municipalities.

Overall, the result is a diminished role for the multilateral system and the United Nations in addressing conflicts worldwide, said Ruffa, the political science professor.

“Shutting down the mission suggests that the UN is not important in conflict resolution, which runs counter to the evidence, as research shows that, notwithstanding its limitations, the United Nations does reduce the number of killings and helps protect civilians,” she said.

The U.S.-brokered talks will be conducted through their respective ambassadors in the United States, attempting to halt the Israeli bombardment in Lebanon through a diplomatic settlement.

Lebanon had called for direct talks from the early stages of the latest Israeli escalation against Hezbollah, which has killed more than 2,000 people in the country. Israel had initially rejected the proposal, later agreeing to talks following a two-week ceasefire proposal and unsuccessful talks between the U.S. and Iran.

Lebanon does not recognize the State of Israel and they remain formally at war since Israel’s founding in 1948 and the expelling of Palestinians.

While Israeli leaders have instructed the army to scale back attacks on Beirut at Washington’s request — following the coordinated, multi-front attack that targeted more than 100 locations within 10 minutes and killed over 350 people — Israeli military operations continue in southern Lebanon.

Clashes remains intense in several areas, particularly around the strategic village of Bint Jbeil, where the Israeli army seeks to consolidate positions. Hezbollah has been firing rockets into northern Israel while fighters in the area are attempting to contain the advance and inflict casualties on Israeli forces.

Several members of Israel’s Cabinet have repeatedly indicated the goal to control southern Lebanon and stretch the Israeli northern border up to the Litani River, approximately 30 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.

The Lebanese government has reiterated its commitment to disarm Hezbollah, though officials acknowledge that such a process would take time.

Through direct talks, Beirut seeks to reassert state authority, which has weakened in recent years, and to secure a ceasefire as a basis for further negotiations. In a reference to Hezbollah and Iran, Lebanese officials have stressed that no third parties should represent the country in negotiations.

Hezbollah, for its part, has opposed the talks, particularly in the absence of a ceasefire, viewing them as a free concession to Israel under fire. This divergence risks further straining Lebanon’s already fragile domestic balance.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has stated that Lebanon wants a sustainable solution but cautioned that efforts cannot be “one-sided.” Israeli officials are not expected to agree to a ceasefire during today’s meeting. Instead, the talks are likely to focus on establishing a framework and timeline for future negotiations.

But enforcing the ban has proven difficult.

Hezbollah’s missile attacks, in response to the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have unleashed a punishing response from Israel that could further weaken the government and even lead to sectarian strife, according to analysts.

The government had instructed its army to “prevent any attacks originating from Lebanese territory” and declared its commitment to the cessation of hostilities outlined in a 2024 ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel.

“The Lebanese government’s decision is an attempt to contain the political and security fallout from Hezbollah’s preemptive strike on Israel, which has reignited the conflict in Lebanon amid the broader regional escalation,” said Dina Arakji, United Arab Emirates-based analyst at Control Risks and non-resident fellow at Middle East Institute.

“Hezbollah has lost what it is called ‘deterrence balance,’” said Hisham Jaber, a former major general of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). “So, it believes it has no choice but to continue the battle.”

Since March 2, the Israeli army has ramped up its attacks on Lebanon and issued evacuation orders that have led to the mass displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from large areas of the country. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Health, more than 800,000 people have been displaced, and at least 773 people have been killed.

Before the current escalation, near-daily Israeli strikes have pummeled the south of the country, despite the 2024 ceasefire agreement.

The decision by the Lebanese government of directly targeting the group’s arsenal is unprecedented and sends a political message to regional and international interlocutors.

“Since the end of the civil war, Hezbollah’s weapons have been practically exempt from all decisions related to disarming militias, as they are considered weapons of resistance against Israeli occupation,” explained Mounir Shehade, a former brigadier general in Lebanon’s armed forces.

Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has stressed that the government remains committed to disarming Hezbollah and ultimately restoring the state’s monopoly over weapons and decisions of war and peace.

The ban provides political legitimacy for the army to take action, dismantling unofficial military structures and arresting individuals carrying unauthorized weapons.

However, according to Jaber, the army is in no position to search for weapons while the country is under Israeli bombardment.

Previous governments have avoided dealing with the issue of weapons. The reasons include the sensitivity of the sectarian balance, Hezbollah’s military and political power, and the limited capacity of the Lebanese state and the army.

According to analysts, these reasons continue to stall the implementation of any political decisions. Mounting Israeli and U.S. pressure on the Lebanese state further exacerbates the situation.

“This makes the enforcement of a decision to disarm it by force virtually impossible without a major internal conflict,” Shehade said.

The Lebanese army had begun arresting non-state actors and individuals carrying unlicensed weapons. But following one such arrest, the Military Court released three Hezbollah supporters on financial bail of approximately $20 for the illegal possession and transport of weapons.

According to Jaber, any conflict between the army and Hezbollah could even threaten the unity of the army itself. “Throughout the last five decades, the Lebanese army has been divided four times,” he noted.

Earlier this month, footage circulated on social media showing a group of UNIFIL forces stationed in the southern part of Lebanon pointing a jammer at the sky in an apparent operation against a drone.

The French military command confirmed to Defense News that the personnel shown in the video, filmed by a local resident on Jan. 5, 2026, are French UNIFIL peacekeepers. They were on foot patrol at the time, when a drone began illegally flying over them in the municipality of Meiss Ej Jabal, after which they moved closer to their light armored vehicle.

“In accordance with the rules of engagement and with a constant concern for proportionality and protection of civilians, the patrol carried out a jamming operation, aimed solely at stopping the drone from flying overhead, without causing it to crash, in order to avoid any risk of material damage or bodily harm,” Lt. Laura, a spokeswoman for the French Armed Forces General Staff, said in an emailed response to questions.

According to UNIFIL spokesperson Kandice Ardiel, the peacekeepers were “aggressively” approached by the drone that flew as close as 30 meters above them. This prompted them to employ defensive measures that ultimately forced the drone to turn back.

The jammer used by the UN peacekeepers seen in the video is the Nerod F5 manufactured by the France-based M2 Technology, according to a company representative.

The device is designed to counter commercial drones by carrying out non-destructive jamming, which means that it does not physically damage or destroy them, rather interfering with their radio signals. The interference occurs once an operator has positioned the target in his sights and pulled the trigger, transmitting jamming signals on up to five different frequency bands.

The French military command declined to comment on whether the drone was deployed by Israel, and UNIFIL was not able to confirm its provenance.

The Long War Journal, a project from the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies research institute, tracked Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah from Jan. 5-11. During that period, it recorded that the Israeli Defense Forces conducted missions across 37 Lebanese localities, which included eight quadcopter activities and nine drone strikes.

On Jan. 5 the Lebanon National News Agency, or NNA, reported that an Israeli drone had targeted a vehicle, though in a different district than the one the French peacekeepers were located in. The following day, the NNA stated that an Israeli quadcopter had dropped an explosive in Meiss Ej Jabal.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense said it had no comment on the incident.

In a Facebook post, the Israel-based Alma Research and Education Centre shared the Jan. 5 video, writing that “UNIFIL is trying to disrupt the IDF’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah.”

Rules of engagement

In the Jan. 5 incident, UNIFIL said its peacekeepers acted “in self-defense” to ensure that no bystanders were harmed, as it took place in a crowded civilian area.

The UN-mandated force and its contingents have been provided with various kinds of equipment that allows them to jam drones, following several cases of drones, at times armed, operating above their locations and patrols.

According to the spokeswoman, peacekeepers posted in southern Lebanon and along the Blue Line – a 120-kilometer UN-demarcated line that follows the country’s southern border with Israel – have observed daily drone intrusions.

“In all actions, peacekeepers are guided by the established rules of engagement – they use necessary countermeasures only when the field commander determines that the drone poses a [direct] danger to the ones operating in the area and such actions are taken strictly in self-defense,” Ardiel told Defense News.

Beyond Israeli drone overflights, personnel stationed in areas close to the Blue Line are themselves observing frequent jamming of their equipment, which Lebanese officials and analysts say comes from Israel.

“Israeli jamming is carried out without any respect for Lebanese sovereignty or international laws. … It disrupts military communications, weakens navigation and data exchange, and complicates field coordination and routine tasks,” retired Brig. Gen. Mounir Shehade, a former Lebanese Armed Forces officer and government designated coordinator for UNIFIL, said.

Shehade said that while the Lebanese Army does have some counter-drone capabilities, they are not comparable with its southern neighbour’s “technical superiority used without international accountability.”

A UNIFIL statement published on Jan. 16 stated that an Israeli drone hovered and dropped a grenade approximately 30 meters away from peacekeepers that were conducting a planned patrol near Adeisse. The peacekeeping body said that it sent a stop-fire request to the IDF, adding that such activities on Lebanese territory are a violation of the Security Council’s 1701 resolution.

The 19-paragraph long resolution was adopted unanimously in 2006 with the purpose of ending hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, with the Council calling for a permanent ceasefire based on the creation of a buffer zone. It urged the immediate stop of all Hezbollah attacks and Israeli offensive operations.

When Israeli or Lebanese authorities want to carry out any activities in proximity to the Blue Line, UNIFIL calls on them to provide an advance notice to allow the peacekeepers and all parties informed to avoid misinterpretations that could escalate tensions.

Rudy Ruitenberg in Paris contributed to this report. Stracquadanio reported from Beirut.

“The agreement is vague and open to interpretation,” said Ali Rikz, Beirut-based security and political analyst, referring to the Nov. 27, 2024, ceasefire deal. “Each side is reading it in its own favor.”

According to the pact, Lebanese state authorities would be the only actors authorized to carry weapons, requiring the disarmament of non-state factions in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, starting from south of the Litani River, with government security forces deploying to positions across the area.

In return, Israel agreed to halt any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets, including civilian, military or other state targets, by land, air or sea. The deal also called for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces, within two months, behind the so-called Blue Line, vacating areas currently occupied inside Lebanese territory.

At the same time, under President Joseph Aoun, the new Lebanese government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam publicly committed for the first time to bringing the monopoly of arms under state control.

Progress has been slow, as the process of disarming the Iran-backed group and political party Hezbollah presents a complex challenge, according to Dina Arakji, UAE-based analyst at Control Risks and non-resident fellow at Middle East Institute.

“In the south of the Litani, Hezbollah has been fully cooperative,” said Mounir Shehade, a retired brigadier general of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the government’s designated coordinator for the United Nations interim force for south Lebanon, UNIFIL, established in 1978.

“The Lebanese Army has destroyed the arsenal and weapons including Katyusha rockets, Kornet missiles, drones, artillery, Burkan rockets and individual weapons,” he added.

All told, the disarmament south of the river, in UNIFIL’s operation area, is considered completed, sources told Defense News.

“We helped the LAF to redeploy to nearly 130 permanent positions and discovered more than 360 illegal weapons caches and other infrastructure,” said UNIFIL spokesperson Kandice Ardiel.

Over the past year, Israel has continued its attacks on Lebanon, conducting near-daily strikes in areas both south and north of the Litani River, including the southern suburbs of Beirut. Israel says that it is adhering to the ceasefire terms and targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters to prevent the group from rebuilding or rearming.

That assessment appears to be at odds what UN troops are seeing, as least as it pertains to the south.

“We have not observed any new illegal infrastructure or rebuilding of capabilities within our area of operations in south Lebanon,” Ardiel said

South of Litani River, UNIFIL peacekeepers operate under challenging conditions. “The presence of Israeli soldiers in Lebanese territory prevents our full freedom of movement, and the full re-deployment of the Lebanese army,”, Ardiel said.

On the first anniversary of the cease-fire agreement, UNIFIL reported in a statement that more than 10,000 air and ground violations had occurred over the past twelve months. “We have also continued to monitor and report impartially on what is happening in the south, despite challenges,” Ardiel noted.

However, the disarmament of south Lebanon has had no bearing on full disarmament of the group.

“Hezbollah still retains weapons, including drones and missiles, in the north of the Litani, the Beqaa Valley and in other regions,” said retired Lebanese Maj. Gen. Hicham Jaber.

Rikz argued that, in Hezbollah’s view, weapons north of Litani River are not part of the ceasefire agreement, making the disarmament process there a matter of Lebanon’s internal politicking.

Moreover, other factors add to the complexity of the issue, including the Iran-Hezbollah special relationship and the broad support from the long-marginalized Shia community to the group.

According to a source within Hezbollah, any discussion on the future of the group’s weapons remains contingent on Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory, an end of the purported ceasefire violations, and guarantees on national security.

“Any future transition must take place within a framework that strengthens the state’s role, rather than leaving it exposed to threats,” the source said, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the affiliation with the group.

In essence, according to Arakji, the situation amounts to a catch-22 that could escalate at any time: Israel interprets the agreement as allowing it to conduct strikes against Hezbollah-linked sites and other militant infrastructure deemed a threat while demanding Hezbollah’s complete disarmament. At the same time, the ongoing Israeli military actions in Lebanon are used by Hezbollah to justify the goal of retaining weapons, while the LAF lacks capacities and remains heavily reliant on foreign security assistance, particularly from the United States.

“In this situation, the Lebanese state emerges as the weaker actor,” noted Rikz.

Some analysts here hope that the U.S. government can help mediate.

“The only available solution is for the U.S. to pressure Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and stop its escalation. If Lebanon remains unable to resolve the issue of the resistance weapons, there is a real possibility that the war could return,” former LAF general Shehade said.

And while Lebanon’s national military is working closely with a United Nations-led force to deescalate tension and improve border security, economic and political factors are hindering these efforts, analysts have told Defense News.

The Lebanese Armed Forces, or LAF, is struggling to fulfill its mission due to Hezbollah’s “position in national politics, the spillover effects of the Syrian and Gazan conflicts, the severe and prolonged economic depression and an ongoing governance crisis,” according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank.

Formed in 1982, Hezbollah is an Iran-backed armed group and also a Shiite political party in Lebanon. The U.S. considers the organization a terrorist group.

In the years leading up to Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war and throughout the conflict, the presence of militant groups affiliated with sectarian parties grew. The sectarian leaders themselves preferred to create their own armed groups instead of empowering a government institution with the mandate to defend the whole country, according to Dina Arakji, a defense analyst with the Middle East Institute think tank.

In October 2019, Lebanon was plunged into a severe financial crisis, stemming from decades of corruption and mismanagement by a political class that has ruled the country since the end of the civil war. The state of the economy was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the deadly Port of Beirut explosion in August 2020, per the World Bank.

The government has predominantly allocated its defense budget to salaries and benefits over the last two decades, limiting procurement programs. The situation is worsened by the absence of a political will to empower the military, Arakji told Defense News.

Hassan Jouni, a former Lebanese Armed Forces brigadier general who now works in academia, agreed.

“There is no accordance neither in politics, nor in strategy. We lack a national view,” Jouni told Defense News.

While the military does have governmental support, Jouni added, some perceive it as weak and unable to defend the country’s borders, “especially people in south Lebanon, who have firsthand experience with the Israeli threat.”

Foreign aid

Since the 2019 economic collapse, foreign security assistance to the LAF has largely focused on supporting and sustaining existing capabilities, including providing the force with spare parts for its equipment, Arakji noted.

Until recently made up of approximately 80,000 troops, the military likely lost about 7,000 personnel due to early retirement and a failure to adjust salaries following the economic crash, according to Jouni. To avoid mass resignation, the military allowed personnel to work other jobs, such as driving for ride-hailing services.

“When I was commander of the Staff College, the yearly budget used to be around $160,000 for approximately 100, between trainers and students. After the collapse, it went down to $10,000,″ Jouni said.

In current U.S. dollars, Lebanon went from a $2 billion defense budget in 2019 to a $432 million fund in 2020, after the economy crashed, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank. Its 2023 defense budget dropped to $241 million.

“The LAF remains dependent on foreign support to replace and modernise its ageing equipment. Lebanon has no significant domestic defence industry,” the IISS think tank wrote in a February report analyzing militaries around the world.

Amid its financial troubles, the military lacks advanced air defense systems that would defend against the increased proliferation of drones and missiles in modern warfare. However, “the LAF has some capabilities that Hezbollah does not, and most of those are derived from the fact that the LAF is a conventional military, whereas Hezbollah remains fundamentally an asymmetric paramilitary force,” said Aram Nerguizian, a Middle East military expert at the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank.

He noted the military fields the A-29 Super Tucano plane and the MD-530F+ helicopter for light attack capabilities and to fulfill intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Both aircraft types can deploy U.S.-supplied weapons systems that let the force launch precision strikes against soft, high-value targets.

He pointed to the military’s drone fleet, which includes the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle provided by the United States. The force has also significantly expanded its artillery inventory with the M109A5 self-propelled howitzer.

In addition, some LAF units, such as the special forces, have counterterror and warfare experience, and they receive training abroad. Indeed, Lebanon’s armed forces are one of the most operationally capable among Arab militaries, Nerguizian said. As an example, he cited the military’s response to the threat of the Islamic State group along the border with Syria from 2014 to 2017.

“The U.S. military looks at the LAF as the only case of a national military in the Middle East decisively defeating and ejecting ISIS,” he told Defense News.

The United States is a major financial contributor to Lebanon’s security. Since 2006, the U.S. has provided more than $5.5 billion in total foreign assistance to Lebanon, according to the U.S. State Department, with more than $3 billion meant to boost the military and security as well as counter Hezbollah’s influence.

“The Lebanese security environment is not organized the way you would have it in Jordan or Egypt in terms of the bilateral relationships. For example, there is no explicit U.S.-Lebanon state-to-state military relationship. It’s a U.S.-LAF military-to-military relationship,” Nerguizian said.

Together with Qatar, the U.S. also helps pay the salaries of security personnel.

America’s support signals its confidence the Lebanese military is “an innovative and adaptable partner in a complicated region” Nerguizian said. But this commitment remains subject to periodical review, and is vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of U.S. politics.

Still, there are other sources of foreign aid, Jouni noted: NATO members, such as the U.K., support Lebanese special units; Italy trains Lebanese forces on military combat techniques; and Canada provides winter weather training and the necessary equipment for such conditions.

The British, American, Italian and Canadian embassies in Lebanon did not respond to requests for comment. The Lebanese Army also did not respond to Defense News’ inquiries.

However, Kai Zimmermann, a military official with the German Embassy in Beirut, told Defense News the country has supported the LAF as part of the Enable and Enhance Initiative started in 2017, with a focus on rebuilding the military infrastructure in the port of Beirut as well as strengthening the Lebanese Navy’s training activities and ability to deploy vessels at sea.

Twofold threat

For Jouni, the LAF faces two challenges: defending itself against Israel and countering the threat of terrorism.

“When we talk about [the] Israeli threat, we talk about the implementation of the Resolution 1701,″ the former officer said, referring to the U.N.’s call to end the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.

It also encouraged the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese troops along the southern border with Israel, although the military contingent there currently numbers about 5,000, according to Abdallah Bou Habib, Lebanon’s foreign minister, who spoke to the Lebanese daily newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour.

Indeed, there’s support among the partners of Lebanon and Israel for “an expanded and consolidated LAF deployment” along the U.N.-drawn border demarcation line, Nerguizian said, adding that this is also preferable to the Israel Defense Forces and would benefit the region, within a larger international framework.

One of the LAF’s missions is to fully implement that U.N. resolution, preferably “in a nonconfrontational way,” Jouni said; others include neutralizing the threat of militias and resistance groups as well as uniting a divided population. Failure to achieve these aims could lead to further conflict, Jouni said, and the force can only reach its goals with “a military and defense strategy, backed by a political vision.”

“There are events happening in the Middle East that are relatively routine and predictable,” Nerguizian said.

“Then you have once-in-a-generation, but potentially dramatic, changes,” he added, citing Hamas’ attack on Israel in early October, and before that the formation of Hezbollah, “which ultimately led to a tectonic change.”

According to the expert, Lebanon’s military proactively understood the scale of potential change to come, more so than any other Lebanese institution or faction.

However, “the only missing element is the national political willpower to commit the LAF to its national security duties,” Nerguizian said. Without this, Lebanon risks remaining unprepared for these rare but significant events.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

The Kuwait Naval Force is to receive the semi-autonomous, remotely operated system through the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program.

Asked about details, a Saab spokesperson pointed to a Dec. 4 Navy contract award notice, which said the deal is worth almost $16 million.

The Double Eagle can launch from several types of craft and from the shore to carry out mine countermeasure missions. Users can store the vehicle in standard containers.

According to Saab, the system can both detect and dispose of mines.

“We are excited to introduce the production of this undersea vehicle capability to the U.S.,” Erik Smith, president and CEO of Saab’s U.S. subsidiary, said in the release.

The company said its American division will produce system parts in collaboration with other production centers located in Sweden, the U.K. and Denmark.

The purchase follows Paramount’s delivery of equipment to Mozambique, where the Mwari is already operational. According to the firm, the aircraft is designed for a wide range of missions, such as counterinsurgency, border patrol, precision strike, reconnaissance and surveillance.

The company did not respond to Defense News about how many Mwari were on order by the DRC and the contract value. Defense News has contacted the DRC consulate in Lebanon for additional information.

The aircraft, touted as requiring a minimal logistical footprint, can operate in remote and austere environments as well as equip different payloads.

“With decades of experience in asymmetrical warfare, we’ve designed the Mwari as a tool that is not only robust but incredibly adaptable, fitting the needs of modern militaries in Africa and around the world,” Steve Griessel, the chief executive of Paramount Group, said in a statement.

Paramount also announced during DSEI it integrated “advanced weapons systems” on the Mwari, noting it will disclose specifics “at a later date.” Weapons testing and certification are expected later this year or in early 2024, the news release stated.