After 30 years at Defense News, it’s time to move on. Defense News Editor Jill Aitoro and my colleagues will officially retire me at the upcoming Defense News Conference in Washington, where I’ll compare and contrast my experiences covering political-military-industrial establishments in the U.S., where I started this gig in the closing months of the Reagan administration; and from Israel, where I’ve been a one-woman bureau since 1999.

In all those years of digging for stories, wrangling for context and delivering the news that Defense News readers have come to expect, I’ve been called a lot of things, but never “war industry stooge,” as a social media stalker recently labeled me. That poison-penned piece on how I “built up a career promoting an industry of death and destruction” got me thinking about the people I’ve met and the places I’ve seen that have influenced my body of work at Defense News.

A few highlights come to mind, like the first flight of the B-2 bomber, the evolution of U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation, particularly after the cancellation of Israel’s Lavi fighter; and my feature interview, one of the last, with nonagenarian Edward Teller on ways to “work around” Soviet objections to the Strategic Defense Initiative, aka Star Wars. Or when I spent an afternoon with Ben Rich, shortly after his retirement, when he felt more at liberty to regale me with stories from the Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works. Or the two-part investigation into the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program, which the Defense Security Cooperation Agency director at the time initially fought, but ended up crediting for helping to jump-start needed reforms.

To fuel my coverage of defense procurement matters, I remember spending countless hours on and around Capitol Hill with bulldog sleuths from John Dingell’s Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. Then there was the time when, in exchange for pledges not to report on what was seen or heard, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command invited me, the only journalist, to be a “fly on the wall” for a two-day conference he hosted for the dozens of countries in his area of responsibility.

Those experiences, and so many more from interviews and on-site visits to military bases, government offices and corporate boardrooms across the U.S., in most countries of East Asia, and in the Middle East enriched my understanding not only of the issues, but of the nuances that are too often overlooked. If that makes me an industry stooge, or a shill for the military-industrial complex, fine by me.

In Israel, my home for the past 19 years, I reported on three wars in Gaza, one in Lebanon and multiple operations in that country’s so-called war-between-wars that could easily have spiraled into all-out confrontation. I spent dozens of hours with five consecutive Israeli Air Force commanders and key staffers reviewing imagery, listening to their lessons learned, and reporting on new operational concepts and capabilities that allow Israeli air power to claim the world’s shortest planning-to-execution cycles with the minimal amount of unintended civilian casualties. If that makes me an advocate for the war industry, fine by me.

Face time invested in Israeli brass, industry execs, Ministry of Defense bureaucrats and government watchdogs resulted in regular program, planning and budgeting updates from here, along with occasional scoops on tech transfer, export licensing and funding disputes with Israel’s patrons in Washington. Over my years in Israel, I’ve had my phones tapped; been summoned by the Shin Bet for a “conversation” about one of my Russian sources; and been blacklisted by the Defense Ministry’s Research and Development Authority. I survived numerous run-ins with Israel’s Military Censor; and the skin-crawling sensation of being targeted by Hamas.

That said, I’ve been privileged to have interviewed three prime ministers, six defense ministers and seven chiefs of staff with the Israel Defense Forces, four of whom — Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz and Moshe Ya’alon — in multiple capacities in and out of office.

Two personal stories still bring a smile to my face after so many years. The first was a meeting with Rabin a few months before he was murdered, when the dual-hatted prime minister and defense minister was the object of vile and increasingly dangerous incitement. I was allotted 40 minutes for the interview, but Rabin kept going for nearly double that time, clearly content to smoke cigarettes and talk military strategy with a young American defense reporter with no agenda or political ax to grind.

The second was two years later, in the office of Lt. Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shakak, IDF chief of staff. I arrived promptly for our 7 a.m. interview flushed with excitement, not necessarily at the prospect of engaging Israel’s top officer, but from the fact that just hours earlier — in a romantic sunrise ceremony — my husband proposed marriage. Israel’s 15th chief of staff and his spokesman at the time were the first two people in the world with whom I shared news of my engagement and my sparkling new ring.

On a more serious note, I acknowledge that my coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Iranian conflicts has been heavily Israel-centric due to the location of our bureau, my Jewish-American identity, and the fact that my husband and two children enjoy dual American-Israeli citizenship. Nevertheless, I’ve endeavored to seek out the other side as much as possible, and have always been rewarded for my efforts.

In Gaza, I was whisked from an Israeli crossing point by two AK-47-armed civilian-clothed guards for an interview with Palestine Liberation Organization strongman Mohammed Dahlan. It was just weeks before a bloody coup ushered in the era of Hamas, yet he refused to acknowledge the writing that was literally on the wall, in the form of English and Arabic graffiti, attesting to the growing rage at PLO rule.

In the West Bank, I was one of the few to ever interview Majid Faraj, the powerful head of the Mukhabarat, or General Intelligence Service. My report on security coordination between Ramallah and Jerusalem — and his claims to have prevented some 200 attacks on Israelis in the preceding three months — sparked outrage from Palestinian and Arab journalists, who branded him a collaborator.

So many stories over so many years, and now it’s time to move on. There will always be a special place in my heart for my editors and colleagues at Defense News, past and present; and to my longtime trusted sources and advisers, many of whom I count as dear friends. Over three decades, I’ve built a career covering the threats driving requirements, the budgets driving programs, the competition driving industry and the regulations driving us crazy. I’ve done my best to keep you informed and provide the details and context that you deserve. It’s been a terrific run for which I’m eternally grateful.

And if that makes me an industry stooge, I’m proud to claim: “Guilty as charged.”

TEL AVIV, Israel — Israel’s pre-emptive attack a decade ago on a plutonium reactor in the Syrian desert not only derailed Damascus’ drive for nuclear weapons, but spared the world the specter of mass destruction capabilities falling into the hands of the Islamic State group.

That’s the message behind Israel’s first-ever official account of its operation Outside the Box, the four-hour mission that began before midnight on Sep. 5, 2007, to destroy Syria’s top-secret and nearly operational al-Kibar nuclear facility just weeks before it went hot.

“Imagine if today there was a nuclear reactor in Syria, what kind of situation we would be facing,” said Israeli Air Force Commander Amikam Norkin, the man who led the planning and execution of the “precision, low-signature” strike mission when he was chief of operations.

“From an historical perspective, I think the Israeli government decision to act and destroy the reactor is one of the most important decisions that were taken here over the last 70 years,” he added.

Why declassify now?

Until Wednesday’s release of newly declassified documents and images from the operation, Israel had never acknowledged the eight front-line fighters that delivered nearly 20 tons of ground-penetrating explosives on the reactor concealed deep in a ravine near the Euphrates River in northeastern Syria. To this day, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s evidence to the contrary, the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad continues to deny that the site built with the assistance of North Korea was a nuclear facility.

Despite media and think tank reports based on WikiLeaks documents, U.S. congressional testimony and even reference to the event contained in the 2010 memoir by former U.S. President George W. Bush, Israel’s military censor continued to impose blanket gags on all details surrounding the operation.

For more than a decade, Israel stuck to its policy of deniability aimed at preventing undue embarrassment to Assad that could have forced the Syrian leader to respond in ways that could have spiraled into war.

“In 2007, I was very worried that the operation could trigger war with Syria,” recalled retired Israeli Air Force Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, who was the head of military intelligence at the time. “Our mission was to eliminate an existential threat to the state of Israel, while minimizing the risk of a broader war.”

Yadlin, the only person to have played a lead role in Israel’s destruction of two nuclear reactors ― first as a pilot in the 1981 attack in Iraq, and later as military intelligence chief during the 2007 operation ― recalled opposite concerns associated with both missions.

“In 1981, the challenge was operational. It was far away. We didn’t have aerial refueling, satellite imagery, GPS or the advanced munitions we have today. Our biggest worry was conducting the mission with ultimate success. Back then, Iraq had no missiles that could reach Israel and there was no real danger of a wider war breaking out.

“But in 2007, it was the other way around. I wasn’t worried about operational success of the attack, but about the danger of it triggering a war. Syria could have launched 100 missiles at us the following morning and we would have been in an entirely different situation.”

It was only last autumn, sources in Israel noted, that the Jewish state’s internal security bureaucracy reached consensus that its draconian policy of deniability was no longer relevant given the strategic changes driven by Syria’s protracted civil war.

“Considering all the attacks Israel has routinely waged on Syrian soil since the start of the civil war, the bureaucracy here finally realized this is no longer an issue … that it was time to end this ridiculous censorship, get the official version on record and give credit where credit is due,” said Amir Oren, a veteran defense analyst at the Israeli daily Haaretz.

Timing it right

In an eight-page summary with accompanying documentation released by the Israeli military, the operation Outside the Box began with intelligence received in late 2004, when “military intelligence and the [Israeli intelligence agency] Mossad obtained sensitive information in regard to foreign experts helping Syria with nuclear activities.”

By January 2006, Israel secured “substantial evidence” that Syria was building a nuclear reactor. And in April that same year, Israel was able to identify “suspicious buildings” in the Deir ez-Zor region some 450 kilometers northeast of Damascus.

During the months of 2007 leading up to the early September attack, Israeli intelligence focused on assessing progress at the complex and calculating when the reactor would begin operations. The understanding was that once fuel was loaded in the core, an attack would cause prohibitive casualties and environmental damage. At the same time, Israeli intelligence was working to supply “micro-tactical” targeting data needed to support accurate strikes on the reactor’s critical systems, while specialists calculated the most effective timing for the preemptive attack.

“The greater complexity was to prepare the IAF for a war just one year after the Lebanon war, and [most in] the IAF didn’t understand why.”

In videotaped remarks released in Israel, Norkin emphasized that only a very small number of people were read into real mission planning, with a slightly larger group privy to only part of the secret plan. Only one pilot in each of the three squadrons tasked for the mission was connected to IAF headquarters, with the rest exposed to target info just a few hours before the mission.

“We all understood that leaks could cause the reactor to go operational before its planned time and that afterwards, we wouldn’t have been able to attack,” Norkin said.

The attack operation began 30 minutes before midnight on Sept. 5, 2007, with four F-15Is from Squadron 69 and two pairs of F-16Is ― from Squadron 119 and Squadron 253 ― taking off from the southern Hatzerim and Ramon air bases. By 2:30 a.m. on Sept. 6, after Israel verified that the reactor was destroyed “beyond any chance of rehabilitation,” all eight planes returned safely to base.

Preventing ‘severe strategic implications’

“Intelligence assessed that the nuclear reactor had been totally disabled, and that the damage done was irreversible,” according to the Israel Defense Forces briefing papers. “The success of the mission has been measured, then and now, by three components laid forth by the chief of the general staff: destruction of the nuclear reactor, prevention of escalation in the region and the strengthening of deterrence.”

Now, more than a decade later, the IDF is crediting the operation with added significance, given that the Deir ez-Zor region was seized by forces loyal to ISIS.

“The security implications of a nuclear reactor falling into the hands of [ISIS] or other extremist groups during the war in Syria are vast,” according to the IDF. “The nuclear reactor being held by Assad would have had severe strategic implications on the entire Middle East.”

Among the newly declassified documents was a six-point letter from Maj. Gen. Eliezer Shkedy, IAF commander, to war fighters tasked for the mission that would take place later that night. In characteristically clipped Air Force style, Shkedy’s pre-op letter of Sept. 5, 2007, stated:

1. You are being sent today to participate in a mission of supreme importance to the state of Israel and the Jewish people.

2. The mission is to destroy the target and to disengage with no fallen aircraft, and to do so through as much “low signature” as possible.

3. The intention is for this action not to be connected, at least in the first stage, to the state of Israel and to minimize the potential for broader war.

4. The action is top secret before and after its implementation, until a clear decision directs otherwise.

5. Counting on you. Believe in you and am convinced of your success.

6. Good luck.

“It depends on the scenario at some point, but we will have fighting forces moving within 72 hours,” U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Richard Clark, 3rd Air Force commander, told reporters at Hazor Airbase on Thursday during Juniper Cobra, a biannual air defense drill aimed at honing the ability of both nations to operate as a joint task force, or JTF, against an Iranian missile attack.

“We can phase in our forces as required, but almost immediately, we can start moving forces.”

And given the growing and evermore direct involvement of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps beyond Israel’s border with Syria, this year’s Juniper Cobra ― the ninth held here since 2001 ― marks a dress rehearsal for a joint response that is becoming less hypothetical.

“For us, we call it a dress rehearsal because we understand that this can happen, and [the joint task force] can be activated at any moment,” Lt. Col. Tal Kaduri, head of cooperation for the Israel Air Defense Force, told Defense News.

According to Kaduri, who has played an active role in planning multiple Juniper Cobra drills, scenarios driven by the Iranian threat are increasingly relevant. “It’s not just Iran’s involvement in Syria, but everywhere. We understand Iran has its arms spread around a lot of places in the Middle East, and we can safely say that’s our main threat.”

The main goal of Juniper Cobra 2018, Kaduri said, “is to see how both forces can answer the evolving threats that Iran is posing.”

To that end, the two allies have put in place Joint Task Force—Israel to plan and command thousands of interoperable land- and sea-based forces, all training in a common doctrine, language and rules of engagement.

U.S. Air Force Col. Justin Hickman, chief of staff of JTF—Israel, said the two countries have honed tactics, techniques and procedures to a point of very rapid interoperability.

“We use the JTF format. It allows us to bring our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines together to train that way. It’s in our doctrine,” he said. “Especially given the immediacy of the threat in Israel … we welcome the opportunity to work together in a challenging training environment.

“From the moment we get here, the Israel Air Defense Forces are all working together in a combined effort. Those relationships you have to build up over time. You can’t just get here and expect to work together effectively. That’s why we have these exercises every two years, with routine conferences and meetings in between.”

This year’s Juniper Cobra drill involves about 2,500 U.S. forces deployed in Israel from Europe. And while that’s slightly less Americans on the ground than in previous years, Kaduri insisted that it doesn’t indicate lower priority, but rather improved interoperability mastered by both sides.

“It’s not only the forces physically deployed here in Israel, but forces stationed in the [U.S. European Command] arena in Germany. We connect via communication lines and other methods of interoperability. So the fact that you’re not seeing them on the ground here doesn’t mean they aren’t here. The mission is much, much bigger, with a larger network of participants even though they’re not physically here.”

Hickman noted that it’s not only Israel that benefits from the joint training and contingency planning.

“We benefit from bringing the soldiers here for realistic training, improved mobility and the lessons we learn from working with our Israeli partners. They have the Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome. We have Patriot, THAAD and Aegis. It’s amazing technology, and we all gain from interoperability,” he said.

In early December, the Air Force declared initial operational capability of the nine F-35s now in its possession. And from the aerial activity reported by residents near its home base at Nevatim, southern Israel, the aircraft are accruing significant flight time.

Yet none of the operational F-35s were part of the eight-aircraft force package tasked with destroying an Iranian command center in central Syria. The command center was reportedly operating the unmanned Shahed 171 drone that Israel says penetrated its airspace in the early morning of Feb. 10.

Nor were they tasked to lead the follow-on wave of strikes on 12 separate Syrian and Iranian assets in the punitive operation launched later that day in response to the F-16I downing.

But why not?

Perhaps these costly stealth fighters are too precious to use. Or perhaps the Israeli Air Force is not sufficiently confident in the aircraft or its pilots’ proficiency in operating the fifth-generation fighter.

Given pledges by Syria and its Hezbollah allies of “more surprises” should Israel venture additional attacks on Syrian soil, will the Israel Air Force opt to use these front-line assets next time around?

The official answer to all these questions, according to Israel Defense Forces spokesman Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus, is: “No comment.”

Unofficially, former Israeli Air Force officers offer a spectrum of explanations and conjecture, including:

• Anemic operational experience by the service’s F-35 pilots.
• Failure thus far to integrate required Israeli weaponry in the aircraft’s internal weapons bay.
  
• The need to reserve these assets for only the most strategically significant missions against a much more sophisticated array of enemy air defenses.
  

However, all conceded — and on condition of anonymity due to the ongoing investigation — that the Air Force miscalculated. By failing to anticipate the threat from saturation attacks by Syrian-based air defenses — however antiquated those SA-5 and SA-17 missiles, which were deployed to support the Syrian government, might have been — Israel suffered not only the loss of its first fighter to enemy fire in 36 years, but a serious blow to its carefully crafted and well-earned aura of invincibility.

‘A dangerous precedent’

With the acknowledged benefit of 20/20 hindsight, some in Israel are wondering where the F-35 was.

“They were sure the F-16I could easily survive the environment, as it has done so many times before,” a retired Air Force major general told Defense News.

Another former officer surmised that the weaponry Israel used in that initial strike on the T-4 airfield in central Syria was not yet integrated into the weapons bay of the F-35 stealth fighter. “If it was determined to use our own special weapons for this particular scenario and this specific formation, what good would it do to hang it under the wings? You’d lose the stealth,” the officer said.

The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, refused to specify which missiles were used in the initial attack on the Iranian command-and-control trailer, but multiple sources point to the Israeli SPICE, an autonomous, all-weather, precision-attack weapon that the Air Force is well-practiced in delivering at standoff range.

In conjecture officially denied by Conricus, the IDF spokesman, one officer suggested Washington may have discouraged or even vetoed Israel’s use of the F-35 at this point in the multinational program out of concern that Russian and Iranian specialists in Syria could gather information on its radar-evading capability and other characteristics.

“That would be highly unlikely and would set a dangerous precedent,” a former U.S. ambassador to Israel told Defense News. “Once delivered, these aircraft are wholly owned and operated by the Israelis.”

Retired Israeli Air Force Brig. Gen. Abraham Assael, IAF Reserve Brig. Gen. Abraham Assael, CEO of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, was the only officer who agreed to be identified by name. According to the former fighter pilot, the Air Force had no reason to risk “strategic assets” against what was termed a “strategically insignificant” target.

“In the past, everything went very well, so why jeopardize something so valuable and precious in an operation that used to entail no significant obstacles?” Assael said.

He cited the small number of F-35s in Israel’s possession and the relatively meager operational experience accrued on the aircraft as reasons for not including them in the Feb. 10 strike operations.

“If they thought that the targets were so strategically important, I’m sure they’d consider using them. But they weren’t. So why risk use of the F-35s at such an early point in their operational maturity?”

“Glitches and mishaps happen,” he added. “So now they’re investigating, and it could be one of the lessons will be that in this new strategic environment, we’ll see the F-35 called into action.”

“It’s a copy of a similar system that fell in Iran,” Brig. Gen. Tomer Bar, chief of staff of the Israeli Air Force, said of the drone in Israel’s possession, which he identified as Shahed 171.

“They more or less duplicated it … but I won’t grade them,” said Bar, referring to Iran’s reverse engineering capabilities.

Iran released a video of the Shahed 171 in flight back in 2014. Two years later, Iran showed another knockoff based on the Lockheed Martin Sentinel, an armed version known as the Saeqeh, according to Tal Inbar, director of the UAV and space program at Israel’s Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies.

“There are two copies that Iran made out of the RQ-170. One is Shahed 171, and this is supposed to be jet powered and for reconnaissance missions. Then there is the other variant of this vehicle — similar in design to RQ-170, with a piston engine and a propeller — named Saeqeh. This variant was shown in 2016 armed with four laser-guided munitions,” Inbar told Defense News.

Officers here said Israel maintained persistent intelligence of the drone as it took off from the Palmyra area of Syria, made its way through northern Jordan and entered Israeli airspace, where it was shot down by an Israeli Apache helicopter. “We have full situational awareness, 24/7 … and we remain steadfast in the face of the strategic aims of Iran and Hezbollah,” Bar said.

In response to the Feb. 10 breach of Israeli territory by the Iranian reverse-engineered U.S. system, Israel deployed a force package of eight F-16Is to target the Iranian command trailer near Palmyra in central Syria.

It was during that retaliatory raid that one of the Israeli F-16Is was hit by a Syrian-based air defense missile on its return to Israel. The front-line fighter fell in Israel’s Galilee region after the pilots ejected over Israeli territory.

Shortly after its Feb. 12 interception of the Iranian drone, Israel released grainy video footage of the aircraft flying in Israeli airspace, but has yet to release images from the wreckage of the Iranian knockoff now in its possession.

“I don’t know what was the specific vehicle that penetrated Israel. But if it was the Shahed, as the Air Force general said, it’s more sophisticated since it’s supposed to be jet powered. But from the video released by the Israel Defense Forces, you don’t see any trails of hot air typical of jet-powered vehicles,” Inbar noted.

“Either way, the fact that it was tracked and shot down by the Israel Air Force was a test for both sides: For the Iranians, it showed that they need to improve upon their stealth properties. And for the Israelis, it was validation of its air defense network,” he added.

Last May, in an indication that U.S. or allied forces could face knockoffs of the RQ-107 in battle, the U.S. Army included the Lockheed Sentinel system in its manual of “Visual Aircraft Recognition.”

A frontline Israeli F-16I was destroyed on Saturday after it came under heavy attack by Syrian-based anti-aircraft missiles during a round of strikes and counter-strikes prompted by an early morning breach of Israeli airspace by an Iranian UAV.

Pilots of the F-16I waited until they returned to Israeli airspace before ejecting from the single-engine fighter, which fell near a kibbutz in the central Galilee region. Both were taken to hospital, where they are being treated for injuries. It was the first time an Israeli fighter plane was destroyed by enemy action since 1982.

In response to the extraordinary downing of an Israeli frontline fighter jet, Israel launched what a military spokesman characterized as a “broad attack” against 12 Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria, including Syrian SA-17 and SA-5 anti-aircraft batteries and Iranian assets deployed in country in support of Syrian regime leader Bashar al-Assad.

“Twelve targets were attacked, including three Syrian air defense batteries and four targets belonging to Iran that constitute part of Iranian entrenchment in Syria,” Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus, an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman, said Saturday.

The latest escalation beyond Israel’s northern border was prompted by an early morning infiltration into Israeli airspace by an Iranian UAV, which was tracked and ultimately downed by an Israel Air Force AH-64D Apache helicopter.

In response to the initial UAV infiltration, Israel targeted an Iranian UAV command and control trailer at a base near the Syrian capital of Damascus. When Syrian-based anti-aircraft batteries fired on the Israeli F-16 formation sent to bomb the Iranian command and control trailer, Israel launched the second, much broader wave of attacks on Syrian and Iranian assets.

“Iran is the aggressor here. They sent a UAV on a military mission, violating Israeli sovereignty. The IDF is ready for all scenarios, and urges Iran and Syria to cease aggression,” Conricus said.

All Israeli fighters returned safely from the second wave of retaliatory attack.

In response to the Feb. 10 attacks, Russia, which controls the skies in Syria where the Iranian UAV was launched and where Israel launched its own retaliatory strikes, called on “all sides” to exercise restraint. “We urge all sides to exercise restraint and to avoid any actions that could lead to an even greater complication of the situation, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced on Saturday.

It added, ”It is necessary to unconditionally respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and other countries in the region.”

Inspired by the Israeli Iron Dome, which combines radar, a discriminating battle management system and kinetic interceptors against short-range rockets and other cross-border threats from the air, the so-called steel dome is a multilayered system of new technologies, tactics and procedures aimed at denying militants from Hamas and Gaza-based terror organizations the ability to attack Israel from underground.

The latest demonstration of the new system came in the early morning hours of Jan. 14, when the Israel Air Force — supported by ground forces from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Southern Command — detected and destroyed a tunnel that extended nearly a kilometer within southern Gaza, traversed some 200 meters under Israel’s border, and continued about 400 meters into neighboring Egypt.

“The tunnel was located using combined technological, intelligence and operational capabilities,” the Israeli military noted in its Jan. 14 statement. “Locating these tunnels is part of a wide-scale defensive effort led by the IDF and Southern Command.”

In an interview to the Arab-language, U.S.-based satellite television station Alhurra, Maj. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, coordinator of Israeli government activities in the West Bank and Gaza, indicated that Israel has detected additional cross-border tunnels and warned Gazans working in or near them that they, too, would be destroyed.

“Just like there’s Iron Dome for [threats coming from] the air, there’s a technological umbrella of steel underground,” Mordechai said. “I want to send a message to everyone who is digging or gets too close to the tunnels: As you’ve seen… these tunnels bring only death.”

Since late October, Israel has employed ground- and air-based detection capabilities that not only locate the tunnel, but provide Israeli authorities with clearer indication of their route.

In addition to the new detection capabilities and means of destroying the tunnels, Israel is constructing a sensor-fused, underground barrier on its side of the border at an estimated cost of some $800 million, or $11 million for each kilometer its 65-kilometer border with the Gaza Strip.

That physical barrier is scheduled for completion by the end of next year.

TEL AVIV, Israel — The Israeli Air Force on Wednesday declared its initial squadron of nine F-35 stealth fighters ready for operational use, less than a year after the first two fifth-generation fighters were delivered to the country by the U.S. Air Force.

In a Dec. 6 announcement, the Israel Defense Forces noted that Israel is the only country besides the U.S. to declare operational capability for the F-35 — a weapon system that “enhances strategic and operational capabilities” and improves readiness “in a wide range of scenarios and threats in all arenas.”

While an early December initial operational capability had been long-planned by the Israeli Air Force and F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin, the announcement comes after multiple strikes in Syria attributed to the Israeli Air Force earlier in the week. In at least two attacks over a 72-hour period earlier in the week, the Syrian regime announced that it had launched surface-to-air missiles against Israeli aircraft.

Israel has not confirmed or denied its role in the recent Syrian attacks. Yet, it has publicly insisted it would act to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent presence in the war-torn country north of its border. At a Jerusalem Post conference on Dec. 6, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel’s most immediate challenge “is not to allow Iran to take over Syria.”

“We mean what we say and we act on our words,” he added.

In a letter to men and women of the Israeli Air Force, Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin highlighted the service’s high-tempo operations on multiple fronts in what he termed a “dynamic Middle East.”

The announcement of initial operational capability for the F-35, he said, “comes at a time in which the IAF is operating on a large scale on a number of fronts in a dynamic Middle East. The constantly evolving and complex challenges are met with a high-quality and professional aerial response. The operationalization of the [F-35] adds another level to the [Israel Air and Space Force]’s capabilities at this time,” Norkin wrote.

In a recent interview, retired Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan, the former Israeli Air Force commander who signed off on the decision to procure the F-35, told this reporter that the fifth-generation fighter offers “unique strategic advantage here in this neighborhood, both in terms of deterrence and also operational capabilities.”

According to Nehushtan, the service is working methodically and capably to integrate “unique Israeli capabilities” into the new F-35 force and to integrate the new fighters into a network that encompasses the rest of Israel’s combat air power.

“We certainly will see the benefits of having the unique virtues of these F-35 capabilities in the Middle East,” he said. “This know-how is developing, and I’m sure the IAF will know how best to utilize the F-35 and integrate it into the greater IAF and to apply these holistic capabilities to the challenges Israel faces.”

When asked whether the F-35 would play a lead role in a possible strike on Iran, the former Air Force commander replied: “If or when the state of Israel determines the need to exercise its sovereign right to self-defense, the F-35 absolutely will be a key player.”

He noted, however, that given Iran’s apparent compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal between world powers and Tehran, he doesn’t foresee near-term use of military force. “The agreement actually put Iran at some distance away [from a nuclear bomb] in the short term. But in the long term, it certainly has holes. Nevertheless, we’re now living in an international context of the agreement. So I don’t see, in that context, any attack coming soon.”

Israel has contracted for 50 F-35s, and long-term plans envision another 25 aircraft later in the coming decade.

As far as sophisticated instruments for accurately measuring and tracking such long-range, high-velocity objects goes, the test range at this seaside base is similar to the sprawling Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site in the Pacific Marshall Islands, the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in the New Mexico desert or even Moscow’s Kura range in the far east of Russia.

From here, Israel deploys front-line optical, radar and telemetry instruments up and down the Israeli coast, with hundreds of kilometers of fiber cables and air- and sea-based communications links providing redundant layers to ensure each point of the target missile trajectory and of the ground-based defender are properly covered.

What distinguishes this range from the vastly larger but no less technologically advanced ranges in the U.S. or Russia is that this site sits squarely in the heart of the country, with the Port of Ashdod to the south, Ben Gurion Airport to the north, and multiple desalination plans and other critical infrastructure all around, according to Lt. Col. Ofir, the commander of an Israeli Air Force missile-testing unit.

“More than 2 million people live in a 15-kilometer radius of here,” said the commander, whose last name was withheld from publication for security reasons. “Obviously these people weren’t here in 1969 when the site was established, but back in those days, it was determined that this place offered the most optimum point along our entire coast for launching westward over the sea.”

In an interview months before the Dec. 4 Arrow-3 “no test,” Ofir noted that such intercept tests can take up to six months to plan. Hundreds of people from Israel’s defense establishment are involved in such tests, as are dozens of aircraft, ships and ground-based assets. Tests of the Arrow-3 exo-atmospheric interceptor, he noted, are actually two tests run in parallel, where planners must always prepare for the worst.

“We follow and track two systems at the same time since the target missile ― the family of the Sparrow ― is actually being launched by our pilots toward Israel. That means we have to be prepared for the possibility that the intercept won’t happen and the target will continue flying towards Israel. We have to make sure that all safety precautions are being taken; and that’s all separate from all the other safety procedures in place regarding the intercepting system,” he said.

Whether it’s the periodic launch of an Israeli spy satellite or the much more frequent milestone tests of Israel’s Arrow and David’s Sling missile defense intercepting systems, Ofir said, the same four-pronged safety assurance process applies:

“The first green light we get is from my technical manager, who works and checks all the instrumentation. If it’s a green range, the second green light is from the operational manager, who conducts the operational mission, ensuring that aircraft are deployed to keep air routes clear and help from the Israel Navy to make sure sea corridors are clear. We also have forces checking that all the ground area inside the hazard zone is clear. And if all that is green, we still need clearances from the safety manager and, finally, from the industry. There is a test manager from the industry who has his own protocols and makes sure the weapon system [or systems] have passed each phase and are ready for launch. Only after all four green lights are given will the test manager initiate countdown.”

In the aborted Dec. 4 test, an Israeli Air Force F-15 deployed at long ranges above international waters launched an upgraded version of the Sparrow target missile toward the Israeli coast. The plan was for the Arrow’s Super Green Pine radar to detect and track the target, launch its interceptor and destroy the incoming target hundreds of kilometers in space.

The entire test was to have lasted about 10 minutes, but just seconds after the F-15 launched its target missile ― way before Arrow’s radar could even pick up the target missile heading toward Israeli shores ― a decision was made to abort the test.

“Shortly after the target was launched, it started behaving in a way that was not conforming to safety parameters determined in advance and we were forced to declare a ‘no test,’ ” said Moshe Patel, director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization at Israel’s Defense Ministry.

“Shortly after the target was launched, it started behaving in a way that was not conforming to safety parameters determined in advance and we were forced to declare a ‘no test,’ ” said Moshe Patel, director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization at Israel’s Defense Ministry.

Patel said engineers were evaluating data to determine why the target — an upgraded version of the Sparrow family of air-launched missiles built by Rafael — did not perform as expected. Once that data is analyzed, he said, program officials could begin planning a retest.

Boaz Levy, executive vice president for state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries — the prime contractor for the Arrow intercepting program — insisted that the planned Dec. 4 intercept test was a developmental test aimed at validating new capabilities planned for future block versions of the Arrow-3. The declared “no-test,” he said, has no bearing on the operational capability of the Arrow weapon system or its continuously upgraded Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 intercepting missiles deployed by the Israeli Air Force.

“We were fully prepared for this test. In today’s case, the decision was made to abort the process even before the interceptor and all its supporting systems were activated,” Levy said. “We will learn all about what happened today and get prepared for the next test as quickly as possible.”

Arrow-3 is Israel’s highest layer of a multitiered and intentionally overlapping network of active defenses against rockets and tactical ballistic missiles aimed at intercepting advanced, possibly nuclear-tipped threats hundreds of kilometers in space. Below Arrow-3 is the Arrow-2 designed to intercept threats very high in Earth’s atmosphere, followed by the David’s Sling weapon system, which was declared operational in April, and Iron Dome, a system that has been credited with more than 1,700 successful intercepts since first deployed in 2011.

The Israeli Air Force declared Arrow-3 operational in January; and IAI, supported by its U.S. partner, Boeing, continues to provide serial-production interceptors to round out Israeli Air Force inventories.

Other contractors contributing to the jointly developed U.S.-Israel Arrow program include Elta, a subsidiary of IAI that produces the Super Green Pine radar; Elbit Systems, provider of the Citron Tree battle management system; Rafael; and IMI, which produces a critical booster stage of the Arrow intercepting missile.

A Dec. 4 announcement by Israel’s Defense Ministry noted that Monday morning’s planned test was part of a series of tests periodically conducted by Israel and the U.S. to continuously validate the nation’s multitiered defense network.

“The test was stopped at an early stage once it was discovered that the target launched did not meet the predetermined test standards,” according to the ministry. “Given this, on-site engineers declared a ‘no test.’ Test data is being collected and analyzed by engineers to continue Arrow-3 development.”