Šedivý has extensive experience in the defense domain, having served as defense minister and deputy defense minister of the Czech Republic, NATO assistant secretary general for defense policy and planning, and permanent representative of the Czech Republic to NATO.

His term comes amid a fast-changing European defense landscape and new EU defense initiatives that are under increasing pressure to deliver results.

How will the COVID-19 health crisis affect European defense spending in the near, mid and long term?

Let’s be realistic: We are still in the middle of the pandemic and, at this stage, nobody can foresee what its exact repercussions will be. But being realistic also means that we have to anticipate, already now, that national and European defense budgets might come under pressure as a result of the massive economic and financial costs of COVID-19, whether we like it or not. Here our answer should be straightforward: Rather than cutting national defense expenditure rashly, let’s coordinate, pool and share our resources and invest more in collaborative capability development because a collective approach is much more cost-effective than national solo efforts.

The same goes for defense research where national ministries of defense might face problems to receive the same funding than in the past to finance their individual national programs. The best response to shrinking national budgets for defense research is to join forces and resources and to engage in more cost-effective collaborations at EU level.

We therefore should maintain our European defense ambitions, keep course and pursue the implementation of the new EU defense instruments — the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) — which are all in place, fit for purpose and ready to be used. The COVID-19 crisis could offer us an unexpected and unique opportunity to reinvigorate defense cooperation in Europe.

The defense portion of the proposed EU budget has come under pressure. If the European Defence Fund is indeed curtailed, how do you expect EDA to adjust its objectives?

It is too early to speculate about the Fund’s future budget allocation as negotiations are still ongoing. Therefore, we have to wait and see.

This being said, the EDF will be an essential part of the EU’s defense-cooperation toolbox, together with CARD and PESCO. Therefore, it is crucial that the Fund receives the financial means it needs to play its role properly. I thus hope for adequate funding for this important collaborative tool because for the reasons I just explained, we need more defense cooperation in the future, not less. And the Fund will serve not only as an incentive to that end, but also as a point of leverage for economic recovery.

In any case, EDA’s activities are not directly linked or dependent of the Fund’s budget as we are an intergovernmental agency entirely and directly funded by our member states, not through the EU budget.

U.S. defense companies want to be allowed to compete for EDF money and PESCO participation. How do you believe it is possible to strengthen intra-EU defense cooperation without shutting out trans-Atlantic ties at the same time?

Third-party participation in the EDF is among the topics currently discussed between member states, the Commission and the European Parliament as part of the legislative process on setting up of Fund. So the jury is still out on the outcome of these talks. EDA is not involved in that process and therefore I cannot comment.

However, I want to recall a basic underlying principle of European defense cooperation, namely that the European Union is fully committed to working with the U.S. as a core partner in security and defense matters. The EU defense initiatives must be understood in this context: They are not directed against our trans-Atlantic partnership but aim to enhance Europe’s contribution to our common trans-Atlantic security by sharing a greater part of the burden. PESCO and EDF will help enhance EU member states’ investment in the joint development of defense capabilities and deepen cooperation to make more efficient use of defense spending in the EU. The resulting defense capabilities will not be owned by the EU but by its member states. Which means they will also be available to NATO, at least for those EU member states that are NATO allies. As a result, EU cooperation ultimately also strengthens NATO as well as our trans-Atlantic partners.

What is in store for the dozens of PESCO projects currently underway? For example, do you expect new ones to join the roster at some point, or some to be canceled if they fail to deliver?

As you know, PESCO is a member states driven initiative. It’s therefore up to the 25 participating countries to decide whether they want to launch new collaborative projects in the future. If you ask me, I expect indeed more projects to be added in the future but not this year as it was decided to skip 2020 after three consecutive waves of new projects launched — 47 in total to date — since December 2017, when PESCO was established.

Focusing on the project implementation and delivering tangible outputs is thus the priority now. Equally, it is up to the member states involved in a given project to decide about possible changes or adjustments to be made or, to answer your question, even to cancel a project that would fail to deliver. It’s the member states who own the projects, so it is up to them to implement them in the way they want.

This being said, EDA is available and keen to support them, if they wish, in the implementation. As the European hub for collaborative capability development, we have the expertise and experience needed to do that. We therefore encourage member states to make full use of the Agency and to seek our know-how and support for bringing their PESCO projects forward. And we see that they start to rely more and more on our help. The number of PESCO projects which have been or currently are supported by the agency has constantly increased and now stands at six; two of them (in the areas of CBRN surveillance and deployable underwater capabilities) as EDA projects. Judging from informal expressions of interest received, we have reasons to expect those numbers to further grow in the future.

The exhaustive study by the Warsaw Institute, a leading European think tank, warns that the U.K.’s exit from the EU means existing arrangements and defense cooperation agreements “will need to be reassessed, completely changing the defense landscape of Europe.”

It says, however, that an extension to the current transition period, set to end on Dec. 31, would “mitigate damage” caused by the split.

Conversely for the EU side, it suggests that the British departure may have a “healing result,” as both France and Germany will be able to pursue “more comprehensive” defense policies for the remaining member countries.

Such moves, it adds, was often blocked by the UK, “which believed that NATO would be sufficient as European peacekeeper.”

Publication of the report by the Polish Institute is timely as the 1 July deadline set by both the EU and U.K. for deciding if there will be an extension to the talks is fast approaching.

The document paints a largely grim picture for the post-Brexit defense sector, pointing out that companies from across Europe buy or sell parts to various British companies.

A no-deal Brexit, which, given the lack of progress in the ongoing trade talks, most analysts currently say is by far the most likely outcome at the end of the year, “would mean price hikes and possible delays in European projects relying on British parts or know-how.”

Companies likely to be impacted include industry giants like Airbus and products as “complex and important” for European security as the Eurofighter Typhoon.

The independent institute, which specializes in geopolitics and international affairs, notes, “The expected crisis can be averted either by a free trade agreement or, should this option not be possible, a bilateral trade agreement between UK and several if not all EU27 states abolishing tariffs and border checks.

“Should these measures not be in place, many projects run by European companies may be hit with delays or even cancellations.”

The predicted consequences of Brexit for the British army and U.K.’s defense sector are more harmful and long-lasting than those expected to be felt by the EU.

This, the non-profit Institute argues, is because Brexit “will strip the U.K. from valuable training opportunities and will take away some of its international power-projection abilities.”

“The U.K. will no longer be able to affect the policies that are agreed upon as the part of the Common Security and Defence Policy,” or CSDP.

But the “biggest downside” of the divorce will be that fewer resources will be available to make up the future peacekeeping and advisory operations run by the EU worldwide.

“There will also be less finances available for these operations coming from the CSDP as there will be less contribution paid towards it.”

The third round of talks between the two sides concluded last Friday with little progress being made. The UK government has ruled out an extension to the transition period.

David McAllister, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the European Parliament, said, “From the very beginning, it was to be expected that the negotiations would not be easy. But we started them from a position of certainty, goodwill, shared interests and purpose.”

The German MEP, also chair of the UK Coordination Group in the Parliament, added, “In my opinion, there is still a strong, shared interest of both the EU and the U.K. to sign an ambitious and comprehensive new partnership governing their future relations.”

At a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels it was agreed NATO will take over some of the training activities carried out by the American-led coalition against the Islamic State.

NATO last month suspended training of Iraqi forces to ensure the safety of several hundred mission members amid fears for regional stability after a U.S. drone strike killed Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport.

Defense ministers also discussed the situation in the wider Middle East and agreed to “strengthen” the security forces in Afghanistan.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters the alliance’s Iraq mission would restart “as soon as possible” but said there had been no decision on how many troops would be re-assigned from the U.S.-led coalition.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly called on the western alliance to do more in the region.

Stoltenberg, speaking at a news conference at the end of the first day of a two-day meeting, pointedly said the “enhanced” NATO presence in Iraq “would be with the consent of the Iraqi government.”

NATO and the coalition have non-combat, “train-and-advise” missions that aim to develop Iraqi security forces, but Stoltenberg declined to give further details on the beefed-up NATO involvement in Iraq.

He said, “Today, allied ministers agreed in principle to enhance NATO’s training mission. In the first instance, this will consist of taking on some of the global coalition’s current training activities.”

The aim, he said, was to contribute more to stabilizing a region where “conflict and turmoil has caused untold suffering.”

“This also poses challenges for us,including fueling the spread of terrorism.”

He added, “This is why we are considering taking on some of the coalition’s current training activities. We will also explore what more we can do beyond this first step.”

Stoltenberg stressed, “NATO, though, is in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and will only stay in Iraq as long as we are welcome because NATO respects Iraq’s sovereignty.”

The aim of the expanded training mission, he went on, “is to increase the capacity of Iraq’s armed forces so that they no longer need our support in the fight against terrorism and to ensure that ISIS does not come back.”

NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), made up of several hundred trainers, advisers and support staff from countries of the 29-member alliance and non-NATO partner nations, includes military and civilian personnel. Established in Baghdad in October 2018 after three years of war against Islamic State, NMI is a non-combat, train-and-advise mission to help Iraqi security structures and institutions fend off future insurgencies. Its personnel do not deploy alongside Iraqi forces during their operations.

The defense ministerial concludes on Thursday, and Stoltenberg will then attend the Munich Security Conference on Friday and Saturday along with the Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană.

In a keynote speech at the 12th European Space Conference here, the Danish official said, “We have to make sure that money is there to support work on new ideas and new technologies – technologies in space, but also new products or services that make use of satellite data.”

“That’s why it’s enormously important that the EU’s next seven-year budget makes the money available that we need for new investments, including the space program.”

Her comments come after Finland proposed deeper cuts to EU spending to try to break a stalemate over the bloc’s long-term budget plans, the seven-year multiannual financial framework (MFF). Finland, which held the EU’s rotating presidency until Jan. 1, is suggesting a budget of 1.07 percent of gross national income in the EU, or €1.087 trillion, over between 2021 and 2027. That is less than the figure proposed by the European Commission, which had asked for 1.11 percent, or that of the European Parliament, which asked for 1.3 percent.

Vestager, speaking on the first day of the two-day conference, said Europe has “some of the world’s very best and most competitive satellite makers” which already account for one-third of the world markets, and is home to leading satellite communication companies.

“This decade of new and valuable uses of space technology and data can be – and should be – a European decade,” declared the official.

She also argued that it is impossible to make the most of Europe’s space and space defense industry without proper funding, adding that “we have to make sure we give Europe’s space industry the attention and support it needs.”

She told a packed audience of defense experts, EU officials and others, “Part of that, of course, will be about money.”

This means, she noted, continuing to develop and improve Europe’s space infrastructure, like Copernicus, an Earth observation program, and the Galileo satellite navigation system.

“There are a whole lot of ways that we can get more for our money, by making use of the links between defense and space industry. Not, of course, by militarizing space but by recognizing that these industries share many challenges and their needs, when it comes to tackling those issues, are very similar,” Vestager said.

Her comments were echoed by Philippe Goffin, Belgium’s foreign affairs and defense minister, who warned that Europe risks “lagging behind” the U.S, India and other “rivals” unless it invests more heavily in the space industry.

Meanwhile, the conference heard that the European Commission, in partnership with the European Investment Bank, plans to invest some €200 million into the EU space sector to support “ground-breaking innovation” in the industry.

The EIB and ArianeGroup on Tuesday signed an agreement to confirm a €100 million contingent loan for the new Ariane 6 launcher program.

The Commission and the European Investment Fund (EIF) also announced the first-ever, EU-backed InnovFin Space Equity Pilot, a €100 million program dedicated to support innovation and growth of European small and mid-sized companies operating in space technologies.

Thierry Breton, the European commissioner for the bloc’s internal market, added, “The two announcements of today represent a game changer for Europe in the support of the European space industry. We are sending a clear signal that space business in Europe is an attractive opportunity. This is a crucial initiative to support the development of European space start-ups so they can scale up.”

The report by the European Defence Agency (EDA) says there has been a “worrying” decrease in both equipment procurement and research-and-technology spending by the 27-strong bloc.

European collaborative defense R&T still remains significantly below 2008 levels, according to the agency’s annual report for the year 2018.

Despite an overall rise in total defense expenditures, spending on fulfilling collective benchmarks has failed to keep pace, it notes. Those benchmarks include defense investment; defense research and technology; European collaborative defense equipment procurement; and European collaborative defence R&T.

Jorge Domecq, EDA’s Brussels-based chief executive, said the findings “paint a mixed picture” in terms of European collaborative defense, a trend he called “worrying.”

Jamie Shea, senior fellow at the Friends of Europe think tank and a former NATO deputy assistant secretary-general, told Defense News, “We found out at the NATO leaders’ meeting in London just a few days ago that European defense spending is continuing to rise. This has been confirmed today by the EDA in its report, and the 3-percent overall increase since 2017 will be welcome news on both sides of Brussels – both by those who look to reinforce NATO as well as those who support the goal of European strategic autonomy.

“But what neither side will welcome is the evidence that all this extra money is not being used fast enough to modernize Europe’s forces with new equipment and 21st-century technology. It makes the success of initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund all the more urgent if Europe is to remain a serious military actor in a more dangerous world.”

The year’s report finds that overall defense spending by the member states has almost returned to pre-financial crisis levels, €225 billion in 2007 compared to €223.4 billion in 2018, equal to 1.4 percent of GDP and 3.1 percent of total government expenditure.

Domecq added, “It is extremely positive that defense budgets have almost fully returned to pre-financial crisis levels, with 2018 marking the fifth consecutive year of increased spending. Our report is evidence that member states have put a renewed impetus into defense spending after suffering heavily in the years following the financial crisis.”

The European Defence Agency, an EU arm, said 14 countries spent 20 percent or more of their defense budget on investment in 2018, up from 7 states in 2014, and 21 nations now dedicate more than 10 percent of defense budget on investments.

Curiously, the new report uses only anonymous, shorthand descriptions for each of the member states.

Paul Taylor, a Brussels-based defense analyst, said, “The thing that strikes me looking at the charts is that this is a typically half-hearted exercise in shaming without naming. Member states are numbered, like anonymous samples in a blind tasting, to spare the blushes of the guilty. The second observation is that this is the last year in which the UK will be included. If, as I suspect, the UK is the member state that spends most on R&T and among those that have the highest percentage of investment in equipment, next year’s figures will look really dreadful.”

But British future involvement in EU-led initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) remains unclear, with EU member states yet to decide on a legal framework for third-party participation.

With Brexit, the UK will technically become an outsider to the European Union’s push for greater defense autonomy. That means London will no longer take part in EU decision-making or operational entities, and any British contribution to an EU operation will be subject to the rules that apply to third countries.

Adm. Rob Bauer, chief of defense in The Netherlands, told Defense News he believes it is “imperative” that the UK remains “very closely” involved in such projects.

Speaking at the sidelines of the annual European Defence Agency conference in Brussels on Thursday, Bauer said, “Remember, from a military point of view, the UK, even after Brexit, will still be a member of NATO and part of Europe. It is leaving the EU, not Europe. If the focus in Europe is on security then the UK should be part of that. To do otherwise would be stupid.”

The PESCO initiative aims to develop and deploy forces at the EU level. Nearly 50 projects have been unveiled to date with the aim of pushing member states to work more closely together in the area of security and defense.

So far, €13 billion has been allocated to the EDF which seeks to promote cross-border collaboration on defense research and technology projects, plus another €6.5 billion in the pipeline to upgrade roads, bridges, rail lines, ports and airports for military mobility, and €16 billion on space programs.

Formal rules on third-party access to PESCO projects and the EDF are still being decided. Discussions are continuing at EU member state level, and no final decision is expected until the UK formally exits the EU, officials here said. London’s departure has been delayed for the third time until Jan. 31, 2020.

Bauer said, “I have spoken to the Brits about this and they have told me how difficult these discussions have been and continue to be. It is clear that agreement on access is certainly not a done deal.”

“But we need to be pragmatic about this and continue to work together in the future.”

His comments were broadly echoed by Lieutenant General Franz Leitgeb, Austria’s Military Representative to the EU and NATO, another attendee at the EDA summit who told Defense News, “After Brexit, the UK will have third-party status, so third-party partnership rules will apply regarding its contribution to and participation in EU-funded projects like PESCO.

“We still need to decide what precisely this means in the UK case but, whatever transpires, the UK has to realise this is a two-way street. That means that if the UK and its defense industry is to have access to EU-funded schemes and projects it has to contribute to these.”

“Whatever happens we’re going to need the current close relations on defense between the two sides to continue.”

Further comment came from Benedikt Zimmer, state secretary at the German defense ministry, who took part in a session on PESCO and the EDF and said, “The more open cooperation is after Brexit, the better.”

In a keynote address, Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, warned that UK involvement in EU defense and security would only become clearer once discussions start, probably at the start of 2020, on a political agreement between the two sides.

Barnier told the packed audience, comprising senior military officials and personnel, that reaching agreement will be an “enormous challenge,” adding, “I do not want to interfere in the current UK election campaign but I am sure the Brits will still have an appetite for continued cooperation in the defense field. But, even so, they have to realize it will no longer be business as normal. I hope that UK defense companies, providing the rules are met, will still participate in European defense. We have the tools to make it happen but we still need to find a new framework for future cooperation.”

More than 50 non-EU states have participated in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations since its first mission in 2003, including four regional powers – namely Turkey, Russia, Brazil and South Africa.

The official British position on security and defense is ambitious about the possible scope of the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit, talking about a “deep and special partnership” that would go “beyond existing third country arrangements.”

However, little in the recent past suggests the UK would seek much CSDP involvement once no longer a member: the UK has not been the most enthusiastic supporter of the EU’s defense agenda thus far, and it’s questionable if this would change after Brexit.

The announcement at a meeting in Brussels on Wednesday means space will now be regarded as equally important for NATO alongside air, land, sea and cyberspace. The move illustrates the growing significance of space for the alliance.

“This can allow NATO planners to make requests for allies to provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters.

“Space is part of our daily life here on Earth. It can be used for peaceful purposes. But it can also be used aggressively. Satellites can be jammed, hacked or weaponized. Anti-satellite weapons could cripple communications and other services our societies rely on, such as air travel, weather forecast or banking,” he said. “Space is also essential to the alliance’s deterrence and defense, including the ability to navigate, gather intelligence and to detect missile launches.”

It is estimated that about 2,000 satellites currently orbit Earth, with half owned by NATO member countries.

Ministers agreed that space is “essential” to NATO’s deterrence and defense, from its ability to navigate and track forces, to satellite communications and detecting missile launches.

The agreement comes ahead of next month’s NATO leadership meeting in London, England, and it places space firmly on to the agenda when NATO military commanders plan or review the alliance’s posture and activities.

NATO insists it has “no intention” to put weapons in space or develop its own space-based capabilities. Stoltenberg on Wednesday specifically said NATO has no plans to “weaponize space.”

“Our approach will remain defensive and fully in line with international law. NATO has no intention to put weapons in space. But we need to ensure our missions and operations have the right support,” he said.

“But,” he added, “we have to relate to the fact that space is becoming more and more important for our military operations and missions. This is to do with the vulnerability and resilience of our civilian societies because space is so important for navigation, communications and for many other things.”

NATO’s largest ally, the United States, recently stood up a Space Command.

Speaking at a news briefing on Tuesday, Stoltenberg had refused to be drawn into a discussion about the relationship between U.S. Space Command and NATO’s possible future space-based early-warning capabilities. “I will not go into the specifics of how we are going to communicate with national space commands and national space capabilities,” he said. “What NATO will do will be defensive, and we will not deploy weapons in space.”

The decision, announced on Tuesday, brings to 47 the number of projects that are currently in place under the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, initiative. The first two batches were adopted in the spring and fall of 2018.

Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipilä, whose country is the current holder of the EU’s rotating presidency, welcomed the bloc’s progress in security and defense cooperation, saying the PESCO schemes are “steps in the right direction.”

“We should now concentrate on implementation and reaching results,” he said.

The eventual aim of PESCO is to develop and deploy forces together, backed by a multibillion-euro fund for defense research and development

Two of the 13 new projects relate to efforts to counter cyber threats.

An envisioned EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub (EU CAIH), for example, could enhance the creation of an innovative web of knowledge for cyber defense and cybersecurity education and training.

The aim of another scheme, the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center (CIDCC), is to create a “standing multinational military element” where the participating member states “continuously contribute with national staff but decide sovereignly on case-by-case basis,” reads an EU announcement.

The Integrated European Joint Training and simulation Centre (EUROSIM) will integrate tactical training and simulation sites in Europe into a “real-time, networked, connected system.”

Another of the new PESCO projects, the European Union Network of Diving Centres (EUNDC), will coordinate and enhance the operation of EU diving centres in order to better support defense missions, while the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) will design and develop a prototype for a new class of military ship.

The Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System (MUSAS), meanwhile, aims to develop and deliver an advanced command, control and communications service architecture for anti-submarine warfare.

Elsewhere, the Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre (SMTC) will focus on medical support for special operations and expand the Polish Military Medical Training Centre in Łódź.

One other new scheme is the CBRN Defence Training Range (CBRNDTR), which intends to accommodate what the EU calls a “full spectrum of practical training, including live chemical agents training.”

The Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA), also included in the latest batch, will allow European and NATO air forces to safely operate within EU territories while the Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based TheatER surveillance (TWISTER) scheme seeks to strengthen the ability of Europeans to better detect, track and counter air threats.

A scheme called “Materials and Components for Technological EU Competitiveness” (MAC-EU) will develop the European defense technology and industrial base while the EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities (ECoWAR) initiative hopes to increase the ability of the EU armed forces to face “collectively and efficiently the upcoming threats that are more and more diffuse, rapid, and hard to detect and to neutralize.”

Jamie Shea, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO, said the new projects “are good news for the EU at a time when President Macron is calling for the EU to step up its defense efforts and stand on its own feet. They show that PESCO is gaining traction in EU capitals and nations are buying in to the long overdue need to pool and share capability programs.”

Dozens of unmanned underwater, surface and air vehicles from NATO countries gathered in Portugal in September for Exercise REP (MUS) 19 to do just that: test technological advances in unmanned maritime systems networks.

Defense News recently received details about the exercise from a NATO official.

In a nutshell, what is Exercise REP (MUS) 19?

REP (MUS) 19 was built on the 10th annual Portuguese underwater exercise Recognised Environmental Picture (REP), with support from NATO’s Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) initiative, the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation, and the University of Porto’s Laboratory for Underwater Systems and Technology.

The NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative (MUSI) was launched in October 2018 to promote capability development and interoperability in the field of maritime unmanned systems.

What did NATO hope to learn from this exercise?

The focus of REP (MUS) 19 was on technological and procedural interoperability. Participating nations tested the integration and coordination of activities between multiple unmanned systems from allied nations in the three domains — above the water, on the water and underwater.

This was the first time that so many NATO nations had the opportunity to test together the effectiveness of systems, concepts, techniques and procedures related to maritime unmanned systems, ensuring they can work seamlessly together, bringing together dozens of unmanned underwater, surface and air vehicles for maritime operations.

Who participated?

The systems were from the Portuguese Navy, as well as from the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation, from Belgium, Italy, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. During REP (MUS) 19, participants from naval forces, from industry and from academia jointly contributed assets to the operational demonstrations and worked together to test new technological advances and procedures for maritime unmanned systems in real-life operational scenarios.

What is the potential for unmanned systems among allies?

New maritime unmanned systems technologies can be a game-changer in countering multiple threats in the maritime domain. Using maritime unmanned vehicles can help effectively counter new submarines armed with more powerful weapons. They can also prevent military personnel from moving into risky situations in countering threats like sea mines.

As prospective EU commissioner for the bloc’s single market Goulard will be tasked partly with coordinating the EU’s fragmented defense industry on research and development projects.

Some will see the move as a signal that the incoming European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, formerly Germany’s defense minister, wants Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense.

Goulard will first face a nomination hearing in the European Parliament next month but this is expected to be a formality before she takes up her new post on Nov. 1.

The appointment has fueled concerns that ever closer EU integration on defense could trigger renewed turf wars between member states, NATO and the United States.

But a European Commission source said that if Europe is to compete worldwide, “it will need to pool and integrate its best defense capabilities, as it is estimated that by 2025 China will become the second-biggest defense spender in the world after the United States.”

While there is currently no EU army and defense remains a matter for member states, the bloc has recently taken big steps to boost cooperation.

The Commission has proposed a marked increase in the EU budget for defense and external security: €22.5 billion for 2021-2027, compared to €2.8 billion for the 2014-2020 period. If agreed, the draft seven-year EU budget from 2021 allocates €13 billion to a European Defense Fund (EDF) to promote cross-border collaboration on defense research and technology projects, plus another €6.5 billion to upgrade roads, bridges, rail lines, ports and airports for so-called military mobility, and €16 billion on space programs.

Several defense-related initiatives and mechanisms have been set up in recent years, including the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund. These initiatives and the proposed increase in funding at the level of the EU and national budgets can be regarded as a “step change” for European defence.

Concern about deeper EU integration often comes from the UK, which is due to exit the EU on Oct. 31 and traditionally has been highly critical of Brussels assuming more control over defense. British Tory MEP Geoffrey Van Orden, a former senior British Army officer, believes the EU is attempting to duplicate the NATO command structure and to duplicate “all aspects of NATO.”

“While I remain a strong supporter of our defense industries – in the UK, for example, they are major strategic contributors, hi-tech innovators and employers – I do not believe that European interference is what is required to assist them,” he said.

Denis Macshane, a former Europe Minister in the UK, said, “If Europe and the EU is to move to a coherent defence policy this will have to be driven from within the member states themselves. It cannot be ordained by Brussels.”