On Jan. 7, just days after the airstrike that killed the powerful Iranian officer, Putin flew to Damascus, Syria, to meet with his counterpart, Bashar Assad. More than four years ago, Russian jets first entered the Syrian civil war and decisively swung the conflict in the embattled Syrian president’s favor. It was seen at the time as a major rebuke of U.S. policy as well as a foreign policy coup for Moscow. Both assessments held up.

Following his trip to Damascus, Putin swung through Turkey to meet with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After initially clashing with Erdogan over Syria, Putin has managed to forge close ties with his Turkish counterpart and leverage Ankara’s tensions with Washington to subvert American policy, further Russian goals and undermine NATO cohesion with arms sales to Turkey.

And to top it all off, German Chancellor Angela Merkel flew to Moscow on Jan. 11 to discuss the situation between the U.S. and Iran.

Putin’s movements since U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the airstrike on Soleimani have underscored one of the most consequential trends driving events in the Middle East: Russia’s star is rising as U.S. standing in the region is falling.

Putin has made significant gains on the world stage through the decisive use of limited resources and through U.S. blunder or disengagement.

At first glance, the situation between the U.S. and Iran would seem to provide Putin with similar opportunities to unseat Washington as Iraq’s preferred partner. The Trump administration killed Soleimani while the general was on a trip to Iraq. In response, the Iraqi parliament passed a resolution asking the U.S. military to vacate Iraqi bases used by the American military in the fight against the Islamic State group in Syria. It is unclear whether a withdrawal will happen, but U.S.-Iraqi relations are so far the major casualty in Trump’s larger spat with Iran.

But some analysts doubt whether this void, were it left open by the U.S., is one that Russia could fill.

“I am skeptical that we would rush into Iraq,” Vladimir Frolov, an independent Russian foreign affairs analyst, told Defense News. “At least not a Syria-style operation, or even as a security provider. This would seriously strain the military. I think we would be very open to other forms of assistance such as arms sales, trainers and intelligence sharing. But deploying the Air Force? No.”

To be sure, Russia is always looking to expand arms sales — a tried and true method of geopolitical influence — as well as oil and gas contracts. But it already has a presence in Iraq on both fronts, and it’s unclear that a deeper commitment and level of involvement in Iraq would be required for expanding access to those markets.

One of Russia’s most noteworthy and politically significant arms exports are anti-aircraft and air defense systems. Iraq has already found itself in the crosshairs of U.S. and Iranian missile and rocket strikes, and predictably Russian state media is making noise about a potential sale to Iraq of S-400 air defense systems, a weapon at the heart of U.S.-Turkish tension.

However, there has been no official indication of an S-400 sale to Iraq.

Even before the U.S. assassinated Soleimani on Iraqi soil, Iran held major sway over the country. Russia is an Iranian partner in the Middle East and has never had real problems getting what it wanted from the Iraqi government, said Michael Kofman, head of the Russia program at CNA, a think tank in Virginia.

“A decline of U.S. influence is beneficial to other external actors in the Middle East, but of little real benefit to Russia,” Kofman said. “Most countries are not interested in America’s role in the Middle East and hardly want to take away the job of being security provider for a region in a near-constant state of turmoil.”

More to the point, there is just no geopolitical rationale for fully replacing the U.S. in Iraq.

“The Middle East just isn’t that important anymore,” Kofman asserted, “and the other major powers still prefer the United States manages as much of it as possible, while they are able to selectively engage and attain their interests [at] relatively minimal costs.”

Meanwhile, the mood in Moscow is showing signs of shifting away from the bravado and adventurism that have characterized Russian foreign policy in recent years. As 2024 looms closer, the Russian political elite will be increasingly focused on the question of Putin’s succession; his time as president will reach a constitutional limit in four years.

Putin announced Jan. 15 major reforms to the Russian government that, if adopted, will see some presidential powers shifted to parliament and the formation of a new state advisory council. The proposal saw the resignation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and his cabinet of ministers, a move presented as a response to the coming changes rather than coordinated play.

The moves suggest Putin is embarking on the titanic project of succession in Russia, or at the very least a succession in title. Some see the re-engineering of Russia’s system of government as a means of Putin holding onto power while maintaining some kind of democratic legal decorum. Either way, domestic affairs will likely be more of a priority than in recent years.

The Russian public, too, has a role to play in this shift. The Kremlin is finding it harder to justify bold foreign policy action as the national economy continues to stagnate and public discontent rises.

“There is some sense of skepticism now within the Russian foreign policy community toward rushing to fill every hole vacated by the U.S.,” Frolov said. “This is no longer that popular domestically, and people are starting to ask questions about what we are doing [abroad].”

ANKARA, Turkey, and MOSCOW — A number of Turkey’s NATO allies have suspended arms sales to the country in condemnation of its military incursion into Syria, but analysts and officials are shrugging off the embargo, saying it will have a minimal impact on the military’s operational capabilities.

Several countries, including France, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain and Germany, imposed arms embargoes against the Turkish government after its troops entered Syria to attack the Kurdish militia, which Turkey views as a terrorist group. Turkey said its military operation, launched Oct. 9, will help create a safe zone in northeastern Syria.

The Trump administration announced its own sanctions against Turkey earlier this month over the offensive in Syria, though those sanctions included a Treasury Department waiver to allow foreign military sales to continue, according to a senior defense official. President Donald Trump also threatened via Twitter earlier this month that he would “totally destroy and obliterate” Turkey’s economy if Ankara took any action he considered “off-limits.” But the president said Oct. 23 that he plans to lift all sanctions leveled against Turkey for its recent military operations following reports of a fresh cease-fire agreement.

“Our arms imports from those countries are limited. None has monopoly on any system which we can easily procure from other suppliers,” a senior Turkish diplomat told Defense News. “Non-Western suppliers are keen to replace Western manufacturers.”

Turkey’s top procurement official, Ismail Demir, also downplayed the potential impact of the embargo. “None of that will affect us,” he said. “We have taken precautions regarding alternative sources as well as local production.”

The European Union joined scores of other countries to condemn the Turkish operation in Syria.

“The E.U. condemns Turkey’s military action, which seriously undermines the stability and the security of the whole region, resulting in more civilians suffering and further displacement and severely hindering access to humanitarian assistance,” the organization said in a statement. “Turkey’s security concerns in northeast Syria should be addressed through political and diplomatic means, not with military action, and in accordance with international humanitarian law.”

A senior Turkish military official ruled out operational weaknesses in the Syria campaign resulting from the embargo. “The operation [into Syria] took off on assumption that it would be an open-ended campaign. Equipment and ammunition stocks would suffice for several months,” the official explained.

Shortly after the Turkish military incursion, Washington brokered a cease-fire between Turkish troops and Kurdish fighters. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged to resume the campaign if Kurds did not vacate northern Syria as agreed.

Turkey boasts that it locally produces most hardware and ammunition required for the campaign. Turkish officials claim local production currently meets 70 percent of the military’s requirements, compared with 20 percent 15 years ago.

Demir said most systems used in the operation including helicopters, smart ammunition, rockets, infantry rifles, armored vehicles and electronic warfare systems are supplied by the local industry. However, the Turkish military did experience a temporary shortage of ammunition, a Turkish security official told Defense News on the condition of anonymity. “Some ammunition stocks we normally bought from the West ran short but was quickly replaced by Russian supplies,” he said.

Alternative suppliers and ice cream

An Ankara-based defense analyst pointed to Ukraine, Belarus, Pakistan, South Korea and China as alternative sources for ammunition. “Especially China would volunteer to sell almost every weapons system,” he said.

It also wouldn’t be difficult to imagine Russia filling the void left by a lack of high-tech Western systems. After the U.S. suspended Turkey’s partnership in the multinational Joint Strike Fighter program in retaliation for Turkey’s $2.5 billion purchase of Russian-made S-400 air defense systems, Ankara turned to Moscow for a stopgap solution to bolster its fighter fleet.

Erdogan visited the MAKS air show in Russia this year with President Vladimir Putin. No deal was announced, but the two leaders ate ice cream together and Erdogan took a photo with Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter.

“Possibly, they [the Turkish government] will make a choice in favor of our combat aviation, nothing can be ruled out,” Russia’s deputy premier, Yuri Borisov, said Oct. 20.

Meanwhile Turkey is trying to design and develop its first indigenous fighter jet. But officials privately admit the country will likely miss its original deadline of 2023 to fly the planned aircraft.

Moscow’s courting of Ankara is likely to increase following the latter’s spat with Washington over the fate of the Kurds in northern Syria, and few things are more attractive to the Kremlin right now than spoiling America’s relations with its NATO allies, according to Russian political analyst Vladimir Frolov.

“It makes sense to sell Erdogan just about anything he wants, so long as it further deepens the strains between Turkey and U.S. and NATO,” Frolov said, noting that nuclear weapons are off the table.

But recent developments in Syria add an element of complication to a potential Turkish shopping spree through Russia’s export catalog. The latest catalyst driving Russia’s opportunity — Turkey’s advance into northern Syria — is at odds with Russia’s own objectives, namely the restoration of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s control over the country.

Erdogan flew to the Russian resort town of Sochi on Oct. 22 to meet with Putin and discuss developments in Syria. Ahead of the meeting, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov predicted “long and complicated” discussions, and he reiterated Russia’s position that only Russian troops — at Assad’s invitation — have any business operating within Syrian borders. However, Peskov said Russia could do nothing to prevent Turkish troops from entering and operating in Syria.

Western arms embargoes on Ankara is nothing new. In May 2018, lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a $717 billion annual defense policy bill that included a measure to temporarily halt weapons sales to Turkey.

In addition, Turkish officials have been unsuccessfully negotiating with German manufacturers to acquire engine and transmission system for the Altay, Turkey’s first indigenous main battle tank in the making. Berlin has cited political concerns for its reluctance to permit any technology transfer for the Altay.

A German diplomat told Defense News that Turkey’s operation in Syria hurts Turkey’s negotations for Altay technology. “We simply don’t want German technology used in any cross-border operation targeting Kurds,” the official said.

The German embargo jeopardizes Turkey’s planned program to upgrade scores of German-made Leopard II battle tanks. The Turkish Army has in its inventory 720 Leopard I and Leopard II tanks. About 200 of them have been upgraded.

Joe Gould and Leo Shane III in Washington contributed to this report.

MOSCOW — At around 6 a.m. GMT on Aug. 8, seismic and acoustic sensors in Sweden, Finland and Norway detected an explosion. The sensors are operated by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and on Monday the group — which monitors the globe for prohibited nuclear tests — said four stations identified an event “coinciding” with an explosion in Nyonoksa, Russia.

The organization did not share any data about the size and nature of the explosion. And though little is known about what happened on Russia’s northern frontier last week, it seems safe to say there was no detonation of a nuclear weapon.

But that does not make the Nyonoksa incident any less concerning.

In the wake of the explosion, the city government of Severodvinsk — a major military shipbuilding town about 40 kilometers from the explosion — said local monitors detected a brief spike in radiation levels. The military was quick to deny, asserting no harmful materials were released into the air. Pharmacies in Severodvinsk reportedly saw a run on iodine tablets.

A statement issued Sunday by the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, an outfit that spends a lot of its time standing watch for undisclosed Russian radiation hazards, said Norwegian monitoring stations detected no such increase. Neither did European or Russian stations to which the agency has access.

Initial reports in the Russian press were confusing and contradictory, and at least some of them were perhaps deliberate fakes. At first, the precise location of the explosion was unclear. Did it happen at sea, as the Tass news agency reported? Or perhaps at the Russian Navy’s missile test range at Nyonoksa, as other, more reputable outlets reported?

Whatever was detected in Severodvinsk was highly localized. Or perhaps never happened all. The city administration quietly withdrew its claim of a brief radiation spike over the weekend. This has only heightened concerns that the military is covering something up.

Unconfirmed reports Tuesday suggested Nyonoksa residents were being prepared for evacuation. However, Tass published a story later quoting the head of the village as saying he got a call from the test range commander, who said all of their planned activities have been canceled. The head of the town then said there’s no need for an evacuation and that residents should proceed as usual.

Unconfirmed videos showing medical personnel responding to the incident in hazmat suits surfaced on social media on Aug. 8. As did videos showing ambulances shielded with plastic tarps transporting the wounded to a Moscow hospital to be treated for radiation burns. In Russia and in the West, concerns quickly grew of a small-scale Chernobyl incident.

The Russian military, for its part, was not helpful. In an Aug. 8 statement, the military said the explosion took place at a military testing ground. As for what exploded, it only referenced a test of a liquid-fuel propulsion system.

Initial speculation within the Russian press suggested several possibilities based on what little evidence was available. One of those included a failed test of a missile already in service with the Russian Navy, perhaps something using a highly toxic fuel known as heptyl. Another story, based on unidentified sources, claimed it was Russia’s new Tsirkon anti-ship hypersonic missile.

But the detection of elevated radiation levels in Severodvinsk has been hard to ignore, and consensus has settled on a third theory: a failed test of one of President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear vengeance weapons announced in a saber-rattling speech last year. Specifically, the 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, known to NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall.

A failed test of Burevestnik would explain the radiation spike, the apparent secrecy, the hazmat response team and the extension on Aug. 8 of a sea lane closure in the region around the Russian military’s Nyonoksa missile test range. Western experts have since compiled additional, compelling evidence that the device in question was indeed Burevestnik.

In a thread on Twitter, arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies laid out the case for Burevestnik: Commercial satellite imagery of the Nyonoksa range suggests the site has been modified to resemble a remote range at Novaya Zemlya where Western experts believe earlier Burevestnik tests were conducted.

In the same photo of the Nyonoksa, taken by Planet Labs on Aug. 8, Lewis and his team identified a nuclear fuel-carrying ship that has shown up in suspected Burevestnik tests at Novaya Zemlya. A report by The New York Times on Monday featured other Western experts and officials signing on to the Burevestnik theory.

But the simple fact is that almost nothing is known about Burevestnik. And it is entirely possible the entire program, perhaps a real budget item, is doomed to fail. Its real purpose is likely to coax the U.S. into talks on future arms control treaties that limit its missile defense ambitions.

The entire point of Burevestnik is unlimited range to maneuver around missile defenses. Over the past year, a basic understanding of the Burevestnik design has been adopted by observers, essentially by default. The U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s experimented with a nuclear ramjet engine called Project Pluto. The entire concept was scrapped, both for being a bad idea and for being too large to fit into a cruise missile design.

The assumption has been that Burevestnik is a nuclear ramjet. But such a concept does not square nicely with official descriptions of the device in question issued over the weekend by Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear concern.

On Saturday, an official statement from Rosatom confirmed five of its specialists died in the blast, and identified them as employees of the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF, by its Russian acronym). This institute is Russia’s equivalent of the United States’ Los Alamos National Lab, and it’s Russia’s premier nuclear research facility where the Soviet atomic bomb was born.

VNIIEF was also identified last year by newspaper Kommersant as the design house for the Burevestnik propulsion system.

In its statement, Rosatom explained that the explosion took place during the test of an “isotopic power source” within or mounted to a “liquid propulsion system,” depending on how you interpret the Russian-language phrasing. Either way, this is not the description of a ramjet system — which would work by a nuclear reactor heating air as it passes through an intake.

On Sunday, the scientific director of VNIIEF, Vyacheslav Solovyov, issued a statement on camera in which he described work on miniature nuclear power devices, such as new kinds of radioisotope thermoelectric generators or small nuclear reactors like NASA’s Kilopower project. The implication was that this is what the specialists were working on.

Neither Rosatom nor Solovyov gave any other indication that a missile was involved.

Taken at face value, the Rosatom statements suggest at least two possibilities: The Burevestnik uses some other form of nuclear propulsion other than a nuclear ramjet, or that the Nyonoksa incident involved something other than the Burevestnik. And given the scope of current Russian nuclear efforts, this possibility should be seriously entertained.

If Burevestnik is not powered by a ramjet, then perhaps the vague descriptions issued by Rosatom point to a different — perhaps even more risky — form of propulsion. This could be a nuclear thermal rocket, which sees liquid fuel pushed through a reactor. But why, then, would testing be moved from Novaya Zemlya, as Lewis claims, and closer to population centers?

A likely candidate for an alternate explanation would be Poseidon, announced by Putin last year alongside Burevestnik. Poseidon is an underwater drone packed with a large nuclear bomb. It is intended to crawl up to a coastline and detonate, causing massive damage. An another possible explanation is an underwater atomic battery for Russian seafloor infrastructure.

Another scenario, according to Russian aerospace analyst Pavel Luzin, is that the test involved — as Rosatom suggested — a of new kind of radioisotope thermoelectric generator or a small reactor for use in spacecraft. Luzin speculates that Russia may have been testing the impact of rocket engine vibrations on the new power source.

Ultimately, the problem with the Nyonoksa incident is that it’s unclear what anyone, on any side, is actually talking about. And attempts to connect the dots between certain observations and vague official statements can lead one to reasonably argue several plausible scenarios.

If the evacuation were still on, it would have at least suggested the Russian government was ready to continue testing whatever exploded last week.

It also helps that Russia is willing to sell to just about anyone.

But global arms sales have always had a political element, and Russia is no different. Many of Moscow’s friends and allies are more cash-strapped than the clients typically enjoyed by Western defense firms. And if a regime is close enough to the Kremlin, Russian state banks and corporations will often provide loans to finance large purchases of Russian hardware.

Click here to see the Top 100 global defense companies.

“Often, loans are provided for politically driven arms contracts,” said Robert Lee, a former fellow at the Russian think tank Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, who is currently studying for his doctorate in war studies at Kings College London.

“Russia generally won’t make a profit off of these contracts, but they do provide work for Russian defense companies by supporting employment, keeping production lines running and lowering costs for domestic procurements,” he added.

The practice of issuing loans to coax sales from less prosperous customers has become increasingly common over the past decade as sales slumped and Russia’s political ambitions on the world stage began to broaden. President Vladimir Putin endorsed the practice during an April 2013 meeting on the arms export industry.

“Some countries are simply short of money at the moment and find it more expedient to prolong the service life of the arms and equipment they already have,” Putin said. “Timely loans made on market terms will help to promote our goods and create markets for subsequent maintenance of goods and for later sales of additional equipment and spare parts.”

There are many examples of this in practice, though they tend to be on a small scale. Last year, Moscow approved a $200 million loan to Armenia for anti-aircraft and radar systems. Bangladesh in 2013 was given an $800 million loan for training jets. Cuba, too, was issued a $50 million loan. The financial risk to Russia, if these customers default, is low.

Not only are the majority of these loan arrangements minor, but they often exclude high-end Russian weaponry and are targeted at members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a loosely bound post-Soviet security bloc. They help keep post-Soviet states locked into Russian military equipment — and, by extension, Russia’s sphere of influence.

However, these customers represent a very small slice of Russia’s export business. Economic considerations trump all others when it comes to Moscow’s largest customers: India and China. Russia knows both can and will pay in cash.

But when the conditions and politics are right, Moscow will offer a loan to states ready to spend; look no further than Turkey.

In December 2017, Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov said that 55 percent of Turkey’s $2.5 billion purchase of four Russian S-400 air defense systems was financed by a Russian loan. The deal was a major political coup for Moscow, sparking tensions between Turkey and its NATO allies, who eschew the use of Russian equipment.

Though he has specifically endorsed the practice, Putin in 2013 was careful to qualify the nature of his support. “These loans must be based on market principles and not be like the loans the Soviet Union used to accord for ideological reasons, and that no one ever saw again,” he said. One example: Algeria racked up more than $10 billion in loan-financed Soviet hardware by 1989.

Whether or not this has been taken to heart is open to debate. Russia’s largest-scale finance scheme — over $10 billion in loans to Venezuela since the mid-2000s — has blown up in its face.

The first $2 billion loan came in 2009, after former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez became one of the first leaders to recognize two Russian-backed breakaway republics on Georgian territory. The second and third loans, worth $4 billion each, were issued in 2012 and 2014. Each loan was used to buy tanks, airplanes, helicopters, missiles and small arms.

Venezuela began to default on its payments at least two years ago, forcing Russia to restructure the deal into a 10-year financing plan. And the country has now reportedly fallen behind on these adjusted payment schedules. In 2019, Venezuela demonstrated the limits to which political favor and utility for the Kremlin can be stretched, and business again becomes business.

Over the past several months, Rostec and Rosoboronexport have reportedly withdrawn most of their presence from Venezuela — once up to 2,000 personnel, according to some estimates.

Caracas cannot pay, and these entities are primarily concerned with profit. Even in cases where they’re supporting Russia’s foreign policy interests and accepting low margins, money is still coming in. But when the money dries up, the Russian defense industry leaves.

Recently, as the Russian Defence Ministry’s overall budget and equipment surplus has grown, the military has played a direct role in equipment transfers. Syria receives free or reduced-cost surplus hardware and services from the Russian military. This is now happening in Venezuela.

Beyond Syria and Venezuela, the Russian military’s turn of fortune has allowed it to play a more active role in foreign policy by arms transfers — all for the same reasons Rostec and Rosoboronexport are tapped to help the Kremlin’s political ambitions. For example, Russia has reportedly persuaded Nicaragua into hosting an intelligence outpost in exchange for free hardware.

“These small states might vote with Russia at the U.N. or provide other political benefits with minimal cost,” Lee said. “Virtually all of the weapons delivered for free are from the Russian Defence Ministry, and sometimes they’ll modernize them a little before delivery. But for the most part, they receive cheap military stockpiles.”

The possible sale comes after the U.S. booted its NATO ally from the F-35 fighter jet program in response to Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems.

The U.S. decision was the culmination of two years of growing tension with Turkey, which launched efforts to to purchase four S-400 batteries in 2017. At various times, Washington suggested Turkey could face sanctions for purchasing Russian defense hardware.

In an official Rostec statement released Thursday, Chemezov was quoted as saying Russia is prepared to help Turkey procure advanced fighter jets. But the jets on offer are hardly an analogue of the stealthy F-35. Rather, Chemezov is offering up the Su-35, a heavily souped-up version of the Su-27.

“If our Turkish colleagues express a desire, we are ready to work out the deliveries of Su-35 fighter jets,” Chemezov said.

The Su-35 is a heavy multirole fighter jet and has recently become a popular export item. One of the jet’s standout features is extreme maneuverability. There are several videos online of Su-35s performing the demanding and impressive Pugachev’s Cobra maneuver.

The jet had its combat debut in Syria in early 2016 to beef up escorts of Russian Su-24 and Su-34 fighter-bombers deployed in the conflict there. It was, ironically, part of Moscow’s message to Ankara after Turkish air defenses shot down a Russian Su-24 in November 2015.

The Su-35 is not a stealth fighter, like Russia’s developmental Su-57. The Su-57 project is years behind schedule, and expectations have been downgraded several times in recent years. The Russian Air Force has focused on more Su-35 procurements while delaying the Su-57.

ABOARD THE CARRIER ABRAHAM LINCOLN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA — Relations between the United States and Russia have seen a number of ups and downs since Russian President Vladimir Putin first came to power in 2000. Both sides have their lists of grievances, and at various points have contributed in some way to the sorry state of their relationship.

But Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on the Black Sea from neighboring Ukraine was the decisive moment, sparking five years of consistent tension between Moscow and the West. Since then, the Kremlin has gone all-in on projecting an image of new strength — and part of that has been a rebirth of Russian naval activity across the board.

On April 23, Defense News landed aboard the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in the Mediterranean Sea for an exclusive interview with Adm. James Foggo, commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, and U.S. Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman. The two shared their views on Russia’s resurgent Navy, and how the two individuals coordinate military and diplomatic messaging.

Huntsman’s visit to the Lincoln did not go unnoticed by Moscow. In a U.S. Navy release, he was quoted as saying American aircraft carriers represent “100,000 tons of international diplomacy.” This comment drew flak from the Russian Foreign Ministry and the state media apparatus.

The Russian Navy is modernizing, but we’ve seen a few setbacks in recent years — among them the cutting off of engine turbine deliveries from Ukraine, which has put a lot of Russian surface fleet projects on hold. In terms of great power competition with Russia, from your perspective on the water, what are you most concerned about?

Adm. James Foggo: The Russian Navy has definitely modernized. They have put some of their capital into faster, leaner, more agile and smaller warships — the Admiral Grigorovich- and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates, as well as the Steregushchy-class corvettes. Gorshkov is out participating in China’s fleet review this week. Russia is working on problems with their aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, and they have never stopped putting money into the undersea domain, and their submarine force is very capable.

So to tell you the truth, I respect the Russian Navy for the capability that they have, but nothing comes close to this: a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group, two at the same time in the Med. We are not here to do anything but deter and defend, and while we are at it, we have seen an increased presence of Russian naval forces in the Med, particularly in the eastern Med, and the USS Abraham Lincoln will experience that while they are here. And I would expect nothing short of professional conduct from both navies.

About two years ago, the Kremlin sent the Admiral Kuznetsov with a battlegroup that included the battlecruiser Peter the Great through the English Channel, into the Med and onto Syria. It was, in a way, Putin’s Great White Fleet moment. Russians were shown on television that Russia was again a great naval power, deploying an American-style carrier strike group. What did you see?

Foggo: The Russians want what we have right here on the deck of this ship, they want a powerful carrier strike group. What I saw with Kuznetsov: She was ordered in 1981 — the year I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy — so we are talking 38 years ago. She’s a [very short-takeoff-and-landing] carrier. She does not have the incredible capability of the steam catapult like the Lincoln, and nobody has anything like electromagnetic-assisted launch that is on the brand-new Ford-class carriers. So when you do an apples-to-apples comparison, there is no comparison.

The Russians wanted to prove with that deployment that they could get underway for a long period of time, and they did that. But as they came around [northern Europe and the English Channel] they were blowing some pretty nasty black smoke, so I think the engineering system on that ship is in dire need of upgrade. And today you saw cycling air operations — launching and recovering aircraft. We do that 24/7, including at night. These guys in the Lincoln air wing are proficient, same with the [carrier John C.] Stennis.

The Russians didn’t do that with Kuznetsov. They basically drove the air wing down to Syria and offloaded them, so it was more like a fly-on/fly-off type of ship. So there is no comparison, and I am very happy the U.S. Navy has got two of these fantastic carriers in the Med right now to send a very strong message to all of our adversaries, and also to our friends.

Last year you spoke at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, where you addressed the situation between Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. You said it was not a situation in which the U.S. could perform a freedom of navigation operation in support of Ukraine. After those remarks, Russia seized three Ukrainian naval vessels attempting to transit the Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov. Did that change your views? What can the U.S. do in the region to assist Ukraine in any future clash there?

Foggo: I was disappointed with the Russian reaction to the Ukrainian Navy’s attempt to pass through the Kerch Strait into the Sea of Azov. Three ships have been impounded, 24 sailors are being treated inappropriately in Moscow’s Lefortovo Prison. They’re being treated like common criminals, but they are uniformed members of a military force, so they are guaranteed some proper respect and treatment under the Geneva Conventions. So that is point one.

Point two: The body of water that we are talking about, the Sea of Azov, if I am not mistaken, is governed by a memorandum of agreement between Ukraine and Russia from about 2003. Now, things changed when Russia illegally invaded Crimea in 2014, but that agreement still stands. And the two signatories of that agreement are supposed to control standards of behavior on the maritime domain, and in the air in and around the Sea of Azov. So this is not a place I would consider international waters where I would sail a NATO warship.

However, we have a big presence in the Black Sea and have always had one. Between NATO and the U.S. Navy, we are running about 260 days of presence in the Black Sea. The USS Ross is there right now, and she is conducting a port visit in Batumi, Georgia — I was just there myself and participated in the NATO-Georgia exercise. We do the Breeze and Sea Breeze exercises with the Romanians, the Bulgarians and the Ukrainians.

I think it is time to kind of pause and see what happens now as a result of the recent presidential elections in Ukraine. Since things like the memorandum of understanding from 2003 exist for the Sea of Azov, let’s see how the new president forms a government and gets back to the negotiation table with Russia on matters of importance.

What knowledge and insights have you gained about Russia over your past two years as ambassador to Moscow that you can bring to Adm. Foggo and his staff that they might not have otherwise known?

Ambassador Jon Huntsman: Well, there’s nothing quite like being on the ground and working across the negotiating table on a day-to-day basis, whether its things like North Korea, Afghanistan, Syria, the multitude of issues where we are trying to find collaboration with Russia — but also the issues where we have huge disagreements. In Moscow, we are able to pick up perceptions that are possible to get anywhere else: how the system works internally and what the trends are likely to be going forward, because they are obviously going to impact the strategic dynamic in a broader context.

So this [Huntsman’s visit to the Lincoln and meetings with Foggo] is a pretty good example of the integration you seek between diplomats and our men and women in uniform. And it is good that we are doing it more and more, this is always something you aspire to. So we have been consulting with each other on a pretty regular basis — with [U.S. European Command] and now [U.S. Naval Forces Europe] — and it makes each side a little better and stronger.

How does working with the Navy help you in your diplomatic role in Moscow? What knowledge does the service bring that you do not have?

Huntsman: They can help us understand the strategic overlay, how all the component parts are moving, what you are able to identify, interpret and analyze from outside Russia. All of this allows us to get a better sense of where Russia chooses to deploy its resources, how it strategically sees the region, where they see their priorities versus areas that are less of a priority — and, quite frankly, it allows us to see how they respond to some of our deployments. So this is all very helpful for us, for me as chief of mission. This is why chiefs of mission come out here and do this kind of thing, particularly when you are from Russia because a lot of what we are doing here is being watched and analyzed. We are watching and analyzing, too, and it is best if we do it together with our colleagues in uniform.

How do you, as ambassador to Russia, ensure Moscow doesn’t see the dual-carrier operation about to start here in the Med as nefarious?

Huntsman: This is what countries do, they exercise. Russia does their exercises, too. It is better when countries are transparent about what they are doing. We are very proud of the 70-year history of NATO, probably the most important collective security organization that has ever existed. And in order to maintain it, to keep it fully lubricated and operational, you’ve got to get out and do this kind of thing.

As you see just right next to us, we have a Spanish ship, and others will participate along the way. This is to be expected, this kind of collaboration. It sends a very important message of deterrence, which is part of our overall strategy in the region, but it also reassures our NATO partners that we are all in this together, that we share common values and a common view of geography. And that can only be achieved when you are out here doing this kind of thing.

Defense News experienced a carrier landing firsthand on April 23, hitting the deck of the Abraham Lincoln aboard a U.S. Navy C-2A Greyhound aircraft with U.S. Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman and Adm. James Foggo, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe. The purpose of the visit was twofold — to kick off a dual-carrier exercise with sister ship John C. Stennis on April 24, and to deliver a sternly worded message to Russia: Stand down.

“Each of the carriers operating in the Mediterranean as this time represent 100,000 tons of international diplomacy,” Huntsman said aboard the Lincoln, according to a Navy news release. “Diplomatic communication and dialogue, coupled with the strong defenses these ships provide, demonstrate to Russia that if it truly seeks better relations with the United states, it must cease its destabilizing activities around the world.”

Moscow received the message loud and clear, and though the response was predictable — at least publicly — it may not be the one Huntsman and Foggo were hoping for.

“I would like to believe that American megaphone diplomacy will not turn into megaton diplomacy,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, the ministry’s point man on arms control issues, “ because in that case there would be no winners, and American diplomats will regret how they failed to find opportunities for normal, constructive dialogue with partners around the world. We regret the U.S. ambassador in Russia made such a statement.”

In a briefing at the Foreign Ministry on April 25, spokeswoman Maria Zakharova advised Huntsman to study up on his history.

“Throughout its long history, Russia has repeatedly faced threats disguised as recommendations, and each time managed to demonstrate that it is futile,” she said, listing off examples such as France’s Napoleon Bonaparte and Sweden’s Charles XII, Russian news agency Tass reported.

Zakharova suggested the timing of Huntsman’s remarks and visit to the Lincoln was a slight toward Russia, as the country is gearing up to celebrate its victory in World War II on May 9. The U.S. Navy’s explanation for the timing of his visit was that it just happened to occur when the Lincoln and Stennis were crossing paths in the Mediterranean Sea, as they made their way to different regions.

In a video statement published on the U.S. Embassy’s Twitter page on April 25, Huntsman paid tribute to the 74th anniversary of Soviet and American soldiers meeting on the banks of the river Elbe in Germany, saying the event reminds Russians and Americans that, despite tensions between their nations, the world is safer when they commit to dialogue and discussion on areas of disagreement.

Meanwhile, in the Russian media, a political cartoon ran by state-owned RIA Novosti depicted Huntsman as Freddy Krueger, with aircraft carriers for fingers rather than razors. A talk show host on Vesti-FM, a state-owned radio station, said on Twitter that Huntsman “forgot to stomp his foot. Without this, it did not sound convincing enough.” Across the Russian media on April 24th, variations on this theme were abundant.

Much of this reaction is typical of the Russian government and the state-owned media machine that carries the government’s preferred narratives. But there are open questions about the utility of carrier-based messaging, according to Michael Kofman, an expert in the Russian Navy at the CNA think tank in Virginia.

“Military signaling is fraught with misperception,” Kofman said. “Most of the time it simply feeds an iterative cycle where both forces justify the other’s presence or behavior as the rationale for their demonstrative activity. Deterrence or competition are often cited as the catch-all bywords for much of the activity.”

“Moscow is generally indifferent to an American carrier in the Mediterranean, or even two or three” said Mikhail Barabanov, a naval analyst at the Centre the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow-based think tank. “I do not believe it is a ‘signal to Moscow,’ if only because no one in Russia seriously believes in the possibility of a conventional military conflict with the United States.”

Back in the game

“We are not here to do anything but deter and defend,” Foggo told Defense News in an exclusive interview aboard the Lincoln’s flag bridge, “and while we are at it and in the Med, we have seen an increased presence of Russian naval forces, particularly in the eastern Med. And the USS Abraham Lincoln will experience that while they are here. And I would expect nothing short of professional conduct from both navies.”

Russian naval activity in the Mediterranean goes beyond the presence of American carriers. Revival of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet — and, by extension, the old Mediterranean flotilla — was one of the key provisions of Russia’s updated naval doctrine in 2015. The annexation of Crimea the year before gave Moscow unhindered access to the key naval base at Sevastopol and opened the door to modernization of that fleet, once prohibited under an agreement with Ukraine.

Crimea also enabled much of what Russia has done in Syria since its surprise intervention in that Middle Eastern conflict in late 2015. Equipment is regularly ferried from Sevastopol, on down through the Bosphorus, into the eastern Mediterranean and then delivered to the Russian naval station at Tartus on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, Russian warships set up shop in the eastern Mediterranean and have been a regular fixture ever since.

But renewed activity by Russia’s Navy extends beyond the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The service as a whole has been a key beneficiary of President Vladimir Putin’s military modernization efforts. New submarines — nuclear and conventionally powered — are coming online across all of Russia’s major fleets, as are smaller surface platforms. Russia is again active in the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the Arctic.

“The Russian Navy has definitely modernized. They have put some of their capital into faster, leaner, more agile and smaller warships,” Foggo said, referring to Russia’s Admiral Grigorovich- and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates as well as the Steregushchy-class corvettes. “And they have never stopped putting money into the undersea domain and their submarine force, which is very capable. So, to tell you the truth, I respect the Russian Navy for the capability that they have.”

However, Foggo noted, nothing the Russian Navy can muster compares to the show of force assembled in the Mediterranean. “Nothing comes close to this,” Foggo said, gesturing around the flag bridge of the Lincoln, “a [U.S.] carrier strike group, two at a time in the Med.”

Kuznetsov blues

To be sure, Russia has itself tried to pull off an American-style carrier-strike-group operation. In 2016, the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov departed its base at Severomorsk, on Russia’s northern frontier, with a group of escorts that included the powerful battlecruiser Peter the Great. Together they sailed around Scandinavia, down through the English Channel and into the Mediterranean on their way to Syria.

In many ways, it was Putin’s Great White Fleet moment. The strike group was paraded across Russian television, boasting that Moscow was again a great naval power and the Kuznetsov could do anything a ship like the Lincoln can. The reality, however, was a bit underwhelming compared to the story sold to Russian audiences.

The Kuznetsov was even used as a diplomatic tool when returning to Russia from Syria in 2017, stopping off the coast of Libya to pick up the local military leader Khalifa Haftar. There, he was given a tour of the ship by Kuznetsov’s officers and ended the visit with a video conference with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.

“The Russians want what we have right here on the deck of this ship, they want a powerful carrier strike group. But she does not have the incredible capability of the steam catapult like this ship,” Foggo said, referring to the mechanism installed on American carriers like the Lincoln that accelerate heavily loaded aircraft to takeoff speed in the course of about 300 feet.

“So when you do an apples-to-apples comparison, there is no comparison,” the U.S. Navy officer added.

The cruise was not without its utility, he noted. Russia did prove Kuznetsov could deploy for a prolonged period of time. But the ship’s shortcomings were also put on display. “As they came around, they were blowing some pretty nasty black smoke, so I think the engineering system on that ship is in dire need of upgrade,” Foggo said.

Then there is the case of Kuznetsov’s air wing. Because the ship lacks catapults, its fighters can only take off with a reduced fuel and weapons load. And even then, the jets have to charge the end of the deck at full speed, with the ship sailing into the wind. At the end of the deck there is a large ski ramp to give the planes a little kick into the air. It gets the job done, but it severely limits what the Kuznetsov can put up, and relegates the wing to defensive rather than offensive duties.

To be fair, this is by design. Kuznetsov was never envisioned as a strike carrier, but rather as an “aircraft-carrying heavy guided missile cruiser,” as it is technically designated in Russia. The ship was built with guided-missile tubes and hangar space for a modest air wing. The idea was Kuznetsov would largely act as a guided-missile cruiser, throwing planes up to defend the battle group. This was the greatest obstacle for Moscow’s desire to use it as an American-style strike carrier.

“Today you saw cycling air operations, launching and recovering aircraft,” Foggo said. “We do that 24/7, including at night. … The Russians didn’t do that. They basically drove the air wing down to Syria and offloaded it, so it was more like a fly-on/fly-off type of ship. So there is no comparison, and I am very happy the United States Navy has got two of these fantastic carriers in the Med right now to send a very strong message to all of our adversaries, and also to all of our friends.”

It’s unlikely Russian leadership would seriously argue the U.S. is not a formidable, much stronger naval power. But Russia’s entire defensive posture on the water is arrayed to keep U.S. carrier strike groups away; beyond surface ships and submarines, Russia has coastal defense cruise missiles, and the country’s Air Force plays a significant role with its bombers such as the Tu-22 and Tu-142, which can be fitted with standoff cruise missiles to hit U.S. ships at range.

“Waving about carriers is a standard attempt at bolstering coercive credibility, but it is of limited utility when dealing with a continental land power,” said CNA’s Kofman. “The Russians are perfectly aware that we can put together two carrier strike groups, but they are able to effectively contest maritime approaches and project power into adjacent seas nonetheless. I wouldn’t expect them to be terribly impressed.”

Coordinated messaging

Huntsman’s arrival on the Lincoln was an unusual move for a U.S. ambassador to Russia. But it is part of a growing relationship between Huntsman and Foggo. “We have been consulting with each other and comparing notes on a pretty regular basis,” Huntsman said. “There is nothing quite like being on the ground and working across the negotiating table on a day to day basis.”

“We are able to pick up on perceptions that are impossible to get anywhere else, how the system works internally, and what the trends are likely to be going forward — because they are going to impact obviously the strategic dynamic in a broader context,” Huntsman added. “So this is a pretty good example of the integration you seek between diplomats and our men and women in uniform. And it is a good thing that we are doing that more and more.”

Huntsman also said Foggo’s insights are useful for his work in Moscow, since they bolster his understanding of the strategic situation and Russia’s priorities. It also helps him better comprehend how the Kremlin responds to American deployments, such as the dual-carrier op with Lincoln and Stennis.

“This is all very helpful for us, for me as chief of mission,” Huntsman said, “particularly when you are from Russia because a lot of what we are doing here is being watched and analyzed, and we are watching and analyzing [Russia], and it is best if we do it together with our colleagues in uniform.”

MOSCOW — If there’s one thing Russian Helicopters wants you to know about the Mi-26, it is that this monster of a machine is the largest helicopter in the world. Bigger than the Chinook, and bigger than the Sea King. When it comes to helicopters, the Mi-26 rules the skies, and Russia is looking to leverage this unique capability to dominate the heavylift market.

Defense News was given access to the Mi-26 and elements of its production line at the Russian Helicopters plant in Rostov-on-Don as part of a press tour organized by the company in early April. Defense News can confirm that the helicopter is very big. And in a post-tour interview, Russian Helicopters Director General Andrey Boginsky admitted he was showing off.

“We wanted to demonstrate our competencies in the field of developing and constructing super-heavy-lift helicopters, and this is embodied by the Mi-26,” Boginsky said.

Measuring at 131 feet in length with a rotor diameter of more than 100 feet, the Mi-26 boasts a 20,000-pound cargo capacity. Russian Helicopters says the vehicle can fly higher than other heavy-lift helos, and — with each new generation — is easier to operate. The helicopter has been in production for almost 40 years and is exported across the world.

Russia is taking this expertise to China, with whom it will soon sign a contract to co-develop a new heavy-lift helicopter for Chinese customers. The project is known as Advanced Heavy Lift and will draw heavily on the Mi-26 design. No technology will be transferred — something Russian Helicopters is quick to point out. Russia is acting more as a consultant to Chinese engineers.

Russian Helicopters already works with China to modify, modernize and service a large fleet of Russian-built helos already used by Chinese customers. It is building on these relationships as part of the AHL project, which will be locally produced by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China. Early renderings and models of AHL look a lot like the Mi-26.

“We have long-standing and historic relations with China,” Boginsky said. “Discussions about creating a heavy-lift helicopter for China have been ongoing for about six to eight years, as Chinese specialists have familiarized themselves with our capabilities and defined the technical specifications themselves. They differ from the Mi-26 — it is smaller.”

Russian Helicopters, a subsidiary of state-owned holding company Rostec, is one of Russia’s largest and most successful aviation enterprises. The company did not participate in the 2018 Defense News Top 100 survey, but in 2017 it ranked as the 36th largest defense industry firm in the world as measured by defense-related revenues.

The establishment of a joint development and production model is new for Russian Helicopters, but not for Rostec. Viktor Kladov, Rostec’s point person for international cooperation, said in a statement that customers are “moving away from simple ‘purchase-sale’ transactions,” and instead are showing more interest in localized production.

“Rostec is keeping pace with the times,” Kladov said, “and we are ready to offer the localization of technologies that our customers need … and are ready to consider a wide range of conditions and cooperation options.” Rostec has signed seven such agreements with Chinese state corporations, Kladov added. The AHL project is just one of them.

One way to think of AHL is “Mi-26 lite,” a version deeply optimized for Chinese requirements: The takeoff weight will be 38.7 tons, with a payload capacity of 15 ton, a flight range of 800 kilometers and a max speed of 300 kph.

One requirement that was especially important for the Chinese, Kladov said, is the ability to fly up tall mountains, like those found in Tibet.

Russian Helicopters will continue to produce, sell and upgrade the Mi-26 to the Russian military and foreign customers. Defense News was shown a test flight of the new Russian military modification of the helicopter, the Mi-26T2V, which has entered state trials. While touring the factory, several older Mi-26 helicopters were seen undergoing full refurbishment.

“Right now we already have a large number of projects planned,” Boginsky told Defense News. “We have versions of the Mi-26 on order for countries such as Jordan and Algeria, who have certain demands. But the Russian Ministry of Defence has demands of their own.” Some of those requirements are brand new, while others involve the modernization of older models.

While heavy lift is a unique capability, Russian Helicopters is pursuing multiple markets and projects, Boginsky said, including high-speed helicopters. The company also offers a large selection of smaller and medium-sized helicopters designed by their two famous design bureaux, Mil and Kamov. As for which markets to target, Rostec is enthusiastic about Southeast Asia.

“We see great prospects and expect growth of civilian helicopter technology exports to Southeast Asia,” Kladov said. He claims Rostec recently “scored hard and soft orders for at least 70 civilian vehicles for over $500 million over the next three years from China and the countries of Southeast Asia.”

Alliance officials are putting together the largest common construction project in recent memory, at $260 million, to realize a storage site for American combat vehicles in Poland. The equipment will be enough to outfit an armored brigade combat team, which comes with Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and countless support vehicles.

The depot is meant to stash U.S. war-fighting equipment in the eastern European nation in case a confrontation with nearby Russia becomes a possibility. Pentagon officials consider the future facility in Powidz, western-central Poland, part of a global network of hardware stashes meant to serve as faraway armories for U.S. soldiers when there is fighting to be done.

“Current plans call for 650,000 square feet of controlled humidity warehouse space, a vehicle maintenance facility and supporting facilities,” U.S. Army Europe spokeswoman Beth Clemons told Defense News. Another 58,000 square feet is designated for earth-covered ammunition magazines.

“The facility will operate at a very high level of readiness – with vehicles, communications, weapons and munition deployable at a moment’s notice,” she added.

‘High-readiness’ storage

Following approval of the funds last month at the alliance level, construction of the site is slated to begin this summer and take about two years, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told the Wall Street Journal in a recent interview. But the decision to build the depot was made some years ago, predating Poland’s formal “Fort Trump” proposal, an attempt to flatter U.S. President Donald Trump into deploying a permanent American troop presence in the former Soviet Bloc country.

Former U.S. Army Europe head Ben Hodges is on record in 2017 envisaging the Powidz air base as a hub for American forces on NATO’s eastern front. The Army Corps of Engineers published an industry solicitation in 2018 requesting tree-cutting services for 38 hectares, or 71 football fields, around the base.

Money for the project comes from the so-called NATO Security Investment Program, or NSIP, to which all 29 alliance members contribute according to a key tied to their gross domestic product. As the wealthiest contributor, Washington’s share is capped at somewhere between 20 and 25 percent of a given project.

U.S. defense sources cautioned that the Powidz storage site should not be taken to mean that the Trump administration is also considering any kind of permanent troop footprint in Poland. For now, at least, Washington is simply treating the facility as one of five sites across Europe capable of scrambling together the equipment to make up an armored division when needed.

NATO officials said the Powidz site is an outlier in an alliance program that normally funds infrastructure upgrades anywhere between a few hundred thousand dollars and several tens of millions. Additional smaller projects in the pipeline target facilities in the Baltic nations and Turkey, for example.

The Trump administration requested $144 million for the NSIP program for fiscal year 2020, compared to a $171 million request for 2019.

“NATO heads of state and governments have acknowledged that the North Atlantic Alliance is at a defining moment for the security of our nations and populations and that the Alliance was ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges,” defense officials wrote in the FY-20 budget request. “Russia’s aggressive actions have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”

Russian reaction

Russia follows a pretty standard script when reacting to the U.S. and NATO as a whole, and though it has been slower to react to murmurs of Fort Trump than, say, Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty, Moscow has begun to strike similar notes. Take, for instance, one op-ed run by the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency: “With Suicidal Pleasure: Poland to Make Itself into a Battlefield.”

Low-level officials have echoed this sentiment, but the Kremlin has been quiet. As with the Russian reaction to the downfall of the INF treaty, senior leadership is likely to stay out of the fray until there is a concrete development to react to. And even then, Moscow’s counter-moves are unlikely to be any more specific than Putin’s position on INF and possible U.S. missile deployments in Eastern Europe: “We have to ensure our security,” he said in December.

Fort Trump would certainly give the Russian government a perceived justification to deploy more troops and equipment in its Western Military District, and bolster support for the Kremlin’s military spending at home. But, according to Vladimir Frolov, an independent Russian foreign policy analyst, “there might be some marginal increases, but we are already maxed out in the Western Military District and in Kaliningrad,” a small exclave between Poland and Lithuania.

Rather, one key development that Fort Trump is likely to provoke, according to Frolov, is increased pressure by Russia on neighboring Belarus to accept Russian air and ground forces based there. “Not that we really need to deter NATO,” Frolov said, “but it would be a great pretext to tighten the noose on Belarus and limit its freedom to maneuver West. A new large U.S. base would deprive Belarus of its arguments that a Russian base in Belarus isn’t really needed.”

The Belarusian government has at various times since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine made overtures to the U.S. and European Union, but Minsk plays a delicate balancing act between the West and Russia – with which it is economically, politically and culturally intertwined. Over the past year, Belarusian officials have asserted their military is sufficient for their national security needs and that accepting a foreign military base would not contribute to regional security. But they have also warned that a new U.S. base in Poland could change that calculus.

A railway bottleneck

Meanwhile, there are a few planned U.S. investments in Powidz that could be sacrificed to pay for President Trump’s controversial border wall with Mexico – an ironic twist of fate for a government in Warsaw eager to please Washington. Among them are a bulk fuel storage facility, worth $21 million, and a “rail extension and railhead” project budgeted at $14 million, according to a Defense Department fact sheet.

Those expenditures run under the heading of the European Deterrence Initiative, a Pentagon account independent of the NATO funding stream. Some projects under that initiative, including in Powidz and elsewhere in Poland, fall under a recent Defense Department directive that says overseas construction projects not put under contract by October could become bill payers for the U.S.-Mexico barrier.

But upgrades to the rail connection for the storage site are essential, Hodges, the former former head of Army forces in Europe, told Defense News. That is because the architecture and ramp space of the existing cargo loading dock is wildly insufficient to accommodate the type of high throughput envisioned for a high-readiness depot.

For example, the existing one-line setup was built for side-loading of tanks into rail cars, a typical feature of Soviet-era logistics planning. That technique works for relatively light tanks, but not for the much heavier, modern U.S. tanks, Hodges explained. What is needed, he said, are end-loading ramps, where tanks roll forward along the length of the rail cars to enable a smooth and quick transfer.

“Until the railhead is developed, it will be a limiting factor,” Hodges said.

Permanently in Poland?

The question of permanently stationing U.S. troops in Poland, for which Warsaw is prepared to pay $2 billion annually, is still unresolved. Some military officials have said they prefer retaining elements of the rotational scheme that is currently used to manage between 4,000 and 5,000 U.S. service members working in the country, many at the Powidz air base.

According to Hodges, a rotational forces make sense especially for the Reserve-heavy jobs in logistics and maintenance that would be required by the new armor and ammunition storage site. Others have said a mix between both deployment types would be ideal.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Tod Wolters, nominated to lead U.S. European Command, told senators at his April 2 confirmation hearing that he would continue the rotational track.

Defense Department officials were expected to submit their assessment of the Polish offer by March 1, though sources said the department has requested an extension because preparation of the fiscal year 2020 budget proposal interfered with the timing.

As mandated by Congress, the Pentagon analysis is expected to include a section on “political considerations” within NATO of permanently stationing U.S. troops there. Also requested by lawmakers is an analysis of what actions Russia may take in response.

Whatever decision the Trump administration makes, if any, the NATO angle should be taken into consideration as an important criterion, Hodges argued. “I’m really glad they [lawmakers] put that in there,” he said.

As for Russian pressure on Belarus to move its military into the country, Hodges noted that there are already construction projects underway to store military equipment and fuel in support of joint operations. “Clearly it’s in the best interest of everybody that there are no Russian ground troops in Belarus,” he said.

Jen Judson in Washington contributed to this report.

But you wouldn’t know that from the English-language press release, in which KUB was introduced simply as a “high-precision unmanned attack complex…designed for defeating remote ground targets.” Kalashnikov says the drone — which boasts a payload of 3 kilograms and a flight time of 30 minutes at 80 to 130 kilometers per hour — is silent, covertly launched.

Kalashnikov, like many Russian defense companies, is a subsidiary of Rostec — a massive defense and high-technology holding company. Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov was quoted in a statement on Feb 17 as saying KUB delivers a warhead to the target “whether the target is concealed or not, both at low and high altitudes.”

“It is [an] extremely accurate and efficient weapon,” Chemezov said at IDEX on Sunday, adding that it is “very hard to combat by traditional air defense systems.”

Kalashnikov did not respond to a request for clarification on how the drone delivers its payload to its targets before this article was published. However, Russian media reports elaborate that KUB is, in fact, a suicide drone that detonates itself when in range of the target. With a payload of 3 kilograms, it is probably something akin to a flying grenade. Kalashnikov is displaying a 1:2 scale model of the drone at IDEX. The real KUB is also tiny, sporting dimensions of 1210х950х165 mm, according to the Kalashnikov statement. The drone was developed by Kalashnikov subsidiary ZALA Aero, a major Russian drone manufacturer. Russia still lags behind the U.S. in terms of large strike drones.

Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi is reportedly working on a heavy stealth strike UAV known as Okhotnik (Hunter). Deputy Defense Minister Alexei Krivoruchko told military TV channel Zvezda in December that the drone is expected to make its first appearance sometime in the spring.