In a few months, the bloc’s Responsive Electronic Attack for Cooperative Tasks (REACT) effort will begin its second phase, company officials told Defense News. The consortium, which includes European sensor makers Hensoldt, Elettronica and Saab, was selected in June to receive tens of millions of euros in funds from the European Defence Fund (EDF) for the work.

The REACT program is intended to develop a system capable of jamming any signals used for targeting European aircraft while being able to disable adversary electronic-warfare emitters, according to a European Defence Fund fact sheet. As European forces are facing increasingly sophisticated long-range, integrated air defense systems, airborne electronic attack (AEA) capabilities become “essential to create safe bubbles around formations of aircraft,” said Pablo González, director for NATO and European defense and space programs at Indra.

Going forward, Indra has progress and lessons from the initiative’s first phase to build on, González wrote in a Sept. 7 email to Defense News. The company and its consortium was awarded a grant for REACT I in 2019 under the EDF’s predecessor, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme. The project is linked to a similar Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative focused on airborne electronic attack, a connection that translates into extra subsidies from Brussels.

Indra is also one of three prime contractors on the trinational Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, representing Spanish industry as well as serving as lead contractor for the program’s sensors portfolio. Indra did not respond to questions regarding any commonality between the work on REACT and its work on FCAS by this article’s publication.

The FCAS program – which also includes France and Germany – launched its Phase 1B technological demonstration phase in December 2022, which will go on until 2029 when a prototype demonstrator is expected to see the light of day. Indra is slated to receive €600 million ($640 million) for its work during Phase 1B, the company previously shared.

During REACT I, the industry partners developed operational scenarios and studied the potential threats a new AEA system may need to face in the next 15-20 years, said Raúl Pajarín, director of airborne platforms systems at Indra. Those efforts generated an architecture, specification and preliminary design of the AEA capabilities, he told Defense News.

Indra expects that REACT II will officially start at the end of 2023, once the grant agreement is signed with the European Commission, per Pajarín. The main milestone to achieve is the demonstration of the AEA capabilities by way of testing of different prototypes generated during the project.

“In the meantime, the industrial consortium is planning all the activities and resources needed for the future execution of the project,” he said.

In addition to covering the swath of capabilities set out in the EDF report, the consortium hopes to develop a modular, reconfigurable architecture-based system, Pajarín noted. During REACT II, the plan is also to consolidate a European-wide definition and digitalization of electronic attack missions, and to set a base scenario for coordinating the missions between different assets and nations, he said.

The program is expected to take four years and cost around €69.7 million, including a maximum of €40 million in EU contributions. It will encompass studies, design, prototyping, testing, and qualification of the new capability. The international program management group Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) will manage the program on behalf of the participating nations.

REACT II is financed through the European Defence Fund along with the ministries of defense of Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Poland, González said. Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Poland are also providing industrial participation and support.

The following companies are participating in the REACT II project:

From Spain: Indra, the Technical University of Madrid, AXTER Aerospace, Spika Tech, and Gaerum Engineering; from Italy: Elettronica, the National Laboratory of Radar and Surveillance Systems and Systems and Energy Technologies (SENTECH); from Germany: Hensoldt; from Sweden: Saab and the KTH Royal Institute of Technology; from France: Thales; from Poland: the Warsaw University of Technology and XY Sensing; from Bulgaria: Bianor Software and IT Services; from the Netherlands: the Royal Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR); from Estonia: Rantelon and CAFA Tech Robotics; from Lithuania: the Baltic Institute of Advanced Technology; and from Finland: DA-Group.

KNDS, a Amsterdam-based joint venture between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Nexter, signed a cooperation agreement with the Israeli company at the DSEI exhibition this week in London to begin the joint manufacturing of the EuroPULS rocket artillery system.

Based on the existing PULS artillery rocket produced by Elbit, the new kit will integrate the capabilities of KNDS, such as its modular fire control system, to offer a Europeanized version to countries in the region.

An Elbit spokesperson confirmed to Defense News that the production of the EuroPULS will be carried out in Germany. The open concept of the system does not exclude the usage of missiles from other companies and that KNDS would be acting as the lead system integrator in this program, it said in a statement.

Germany has said it wants to replace its MARS 2 systems, a number of which have been provided to Ukraine and the rest of which are rapidly aging.

When asked whether Elbit could eventually put in a bid for the EuroPULS to act as a replacement for the German artillery systems, the Israeli company declined to answer.

Germany has yes to initiate a replacement program for MARS 2, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense told Defense News on Sept. 14, without providing a timeline for when the Bundeswehr might act.

Lockheed and Rheinmetall have paired up to offer a European-made rocket launcher based on Lockheed’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) system to Berlin. The companies signed a memorandum of understanding to build such a system in April.

G for Germany

The “GMARS” system — with the “G” denoting Germany — would feature a Rheinmetall-built chassis nearly twice as long as that of the HIMARS system, with Lockheed’s launcher loader component integrated onto the truck, and featuring two rocket pods for double loadout capacity.

The chassis would be built in Rheinmetall’s Vienna facilities, and overall integration of the system would be performed in Germany, with some components acquired from the U.S. via combined foreign military sales and direct commercial sales, officials told Defense News in June during the 2023 Paris Air Show.

Were Germany to select the GMARS system, Lockheed and Rheinmetall could have the initial vehicles delivered for testing and acceptance by 2025. A Lockheed official confirmed then that the companies are in conversations with Berlin regarding the replacement of the MARS 2.

As of Sept. 14, Germany has sent five MARS 2 systems and associated ammunition to Ukraine, according to a running report published by the Ministry of Defense.

The program’s prime contractor and lead system integrator successfully demonstrated this final component of its system for the MMCM program, dubbed SLAM-F in France.

The sea trials took place remotely from the company’s command center in Brest, France, alongside representatives of the French Navy, the French defense procurement agency DGA, the British Royal Navy and the U.K. Defence Ministry, as well as the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation, according to a Thales news release. OCCAR is an international weapons management group.

The Thales operations center controlled the systems with the support of French Navy personnel.

The trials, which were “recently” held, demonstrated the ability of Thales’ M-Cube mission management system to relocate and identify mines at sea, after which the underwater drone successfully installed exercise charges on a bottom mine and a moored mine; the latter are deployed when the water is too deep for bottom mines.

France and Britain first launched the MMCM program in 2015 with a contract signing between Thales and OCCAR, intending to demonstrate and qualify a novel, fully integrated, unmanned mine countermeasures system of systems. The goal is for MMCM to replace all current mine warfare platforms, including Tripartite-class mine hunters, sonar towing vessels and diver support vessels.

Per the French Armed Forces Ministry, one MMCM system architecture comprises two surface drones — one of which is equipped with a towed sonar and the other with a remotely operated robot — and two underwater drones responsible for detecting, classifying and localizing the mines. The remotely operated robot makes it possible to identify and neutralize mines.

Thales serves as the overall project manager of the system as well as the sonar manufacturer, while ECA Group — which now operates as Exail — developed the underwater drones.

Those drones will be capable of recognizing submerged objects with very high resolution thanks to Thales’ “multi-aspect sonar,” the ministry previously said.

The sonar can take images from three different angles in one pass, allowing the operator to more easily and quickly characterize an object.

The MMCM system will also be able to detect, identify and neutralize mines up to 300 meters (984 feet) deep, compared to 120 meters (394 feet) today, the ministry has said.

The first two prototype MMCM systems were delivered to the French and British navies in 2021 and 2022, according to Thales. The two services will take delivery of the six series-produced systems in 2024 and 2025, for a total of eight systems split between the two nations.

At the 2022 Euronaval conference held outside of Paris, French military officials announced the MMCM program will align itself with a separate Belgian-Dutch de-mining program meant to deliver new mine hunter vessels and unmanned systems, dubbed the Belgian-Dutch Mine Countermeasures system.

U.S. airmen and officials stood ready to perform and observe the demonstration of a novel, mobile satellite launch and recovery package for the American drone, opening up a host of new land-based sites from which the Reaper could operation in inclement weather.

The proof of concept — which ultimately succeeded and involved U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, Air Combat Command, and the 435th Contingency Response Group assigned to Ramstein Air Base in Germany — took place at the Polish Air Force’s 12th Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Base outside of Mirosławiec.

Should an MQ-9 need to land there, a handful of maintainers qualified to service Reapers would need only to hop on a commercial flight with the clothes on their back, as all the necessary gear will already be in place.

The base is now “open for business” and ready to welcome any MQ-9A that needs to land there for basic maintenance, said Air Force Maj. Philip “Flip” West, the project lead for the satellite launch and recovery package, or SLR-P, for U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa.

West, a former Reaper pilot, envisioned the package as including the absolute minimum equipment maintainers would need to service an MQ-9A on any base in the world, contained in two conex boxes. The SLR-P includes the Portable Aircraft Control Station developed by MQ-9 manufacturer General Atomics, a starter cart, an electric towbarless aircraft tractor to transport the aircraft into a hangar, and refueling capabilities.

The event last month sought to demonstrate that a handful of maintainers could turn on the aircraft and hand control over to drone operators with the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, using only the equipment contained in the SLR-P, after which the Reaper would then take off and perform a routine sortie.

A thunderstorm had settled over Eastern Europe during the Aug. 30 proof of concept, grounding the aircraft until the following day. Nonetheless, the SLR-P operated as intended, with maintainers using the Portable Aircraft Control Station to get the MQ-9 up and running before handing over control to operators in Pennsylvania, West said.

This wasn’t the only “first” to take place on the Polish base for that Reaper; its landing at the 12th UAV Base prior to the proof of concept was the first weather diversion for the drone to a previously unrecorded runway in Europe. Now, that MQ-9 has mapped the entire runway, allowed any U.S. Air Force Reaper to access the file for easy landing in Mirosławiec.

“This was a huge deal for us,” West said. “Instead of canceling, we diverted the aircraft to the alternate airfield and proved that it can be done [in the] real world, not in a training environment.”

U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa unilaterally acquired the Portable Aircraft Control Station in February, a move that caused consternation at Air Combat Command, a representative told Defense News at Mirosławiec, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the individual was not authorized to speak to the media on behalf of the military.

For West, the need to move quickly to develop the SLR-P — and thus directly procure Portable Aircraft Control Stations — was justified. “The events of last year were the driving factor behind the need for us to move faster than the rest of the MQ-9 community,” he said, referring to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022.

“When I acquired our own PACS, we were the first air component to own and control our own equipment, which means we can do with it what we want and how we want to do it,” West said. “We maintained our relationship with ACC by following the exact same regulations and maintenance rules that they follow, and we are open with its maintenance so ACC can still observe what we are doing. But overall, it is USAFE-AFAFRICA-owned and -controlled.”

A greater presence

The MQ-9 is a critical asset for U.S. troops in Europe. Starting in 2021, the Defense Department began operating more Reapers on the continent as it deployed fewer personnel. The Russian invasion last year placed a renewed emphasis on the aircraft’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

The drone type currently operates out of two sites in Europe: Larissa Air Base in Greece and 71st Air Base at the Campia Turzii airfield in Romania.

The Reaper regularly patrols NATO’s eastern front and performs maritime surveillance in the Black and Baltic seas. In March, two Russian Su-27 fighter jets intercepted an MQ-9 over the Black Sea, striking a propeller and causing operators to down the aircraft in the waters below.

As demand grows for its services, U.S. Air Forces in Europe wants to stand up “designated alternate” bases where Reapers land if inclement weather prevents them from returning to home base, or to refuel the drones closer to the front line. That’s where the SLR-P comes in, said West.

“Our northern launch location experiences adverse weather on average 52% of the time during the winter months, based on historical weather data from the last 10 years,” he told Defense News.

While the launch site might not experience poor weather every winter, unpredictability has already led to the cancellation of sorties when the MQ-9 can’t return to its home base. However, the SLR-P allows Reapers to operate out of alternate airfields “in the event we foresee adverse weather that is inbound to the airfield,” West explained.

For now, he said, the SLR-P is equipped for maintainers to only perform what’s known as “code 1″ maintenance, such as refueling; anything more complex, such as a flat tire or an engine failure, would require transporting the aircraft to its home base.

To date, Poland is the only partner to have formally agreed to host an SLR-P system. For now, the two conex boxes used in the demonstration will remain on the base until the system is needed.

Hosting the proof of concept at the 12th UAV Base underscored “the Polish commitment to not only Polish sovereignty, but also to fulfilling its obligation as a key member of the NATO alliance,” said Polish Air Force Col. Marcin Szubiński, the base’s commander.

For the past five years, the Mirosławiec base has been at “the forefront” of implementing cutting-edge intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies that focus on interoperability with NATO allies, Szubiński told Defense News.

West hopes to eventually set up similar “designated alternate” bases in the Arctic Circle, the Baltics, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa. Conversations are ongoing with NATO allies and partners who might become future hosts, he said, emphasizing cost savings from using an SLR-P. West declined to identify those potential hosts.

“With this version, it cost a little more than $400,000; whereas a single, one-way flight on a [military jet] could cost around [$500‚000] to $550,000,” he said.

Putting the ‘A’ in ‘ACE’

According to the Air Combat Command representative present at the proof of concept, it can take 90-120 days to move an MQ-9 force package that includes personnel, equipment and other required support for a launch operation. It can require up to eight aircraft — compared to the SLR-P, which can fit in one C-17 transport plane — and up to two dozen maintainers.

The representative described U.S. Air Forces in Europe as “ahead of the power curve” in its efforts to implement the service’s Agile Combat Employment doctrine. ACE, which Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown kicked off in 2022, calls for the the development of “multi-capable Airmen” qualified to perform a wider swath of duties “to minimize equipment and personnel footprints to increase dispersal capabilities and complicate adversary targeting.”

“With ACE, we’re going to have to get used to the idea of sending out a smaller group of people … with a limited amount of equipment,” the representative told Defense News.

Indeed, the SLR-P technology demonstrated in Poland, with its slim footprint of personnel and equipment, is “putting the ‘A’ in ‘ACE,’ ” West said.

The maintainers who demonstrated the SLR-P proof of concept at Mirosławiec were not originally trained to handle MQ-9s. The 435th Contingency Response Group traditionally serviced heavy-lift aircraft at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. But since March 2022, its airmen have undergone a series of training and qualifications to provide ground support on the front line to F-16 and F-15E jets as well as MQ-9s, said the group’s commander, Air Force Col. R. Patrick Rayner.

The team also qualified in so-called hot pit refueling for fighter jets, when an aircraft lands and receives fuel without turning off the engines, Rayner said at the base. The group is now set to qualify in providing ground support to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by October.

“Multi-capable airmen: That’s what we’ve been doing for 25 years,” Rayner said of his unit.

The SLR-P proof of concept was the first time this squadron of maintainers serviced an MQ-9 on their own, an airman with the 435th told Defense News.

The self-sustaining group is naturally suited to provide its own equipment, said the airman, who spoke on background per an agreement with the U.S. Air Force. Now, with the new package, any maintainer can “get out the door a lot quicker” and use equipment already on site, the service member added.

Following the proof of concept, the 435th provided feedback to West and his team about what else an SLR-P could include, the airman said.

And given extra room in the conex boxes, future versions could help maintainers perform more complex services, West said.

Next steps

The anticipated proliferation of “designated alternate” MQ-9 sites is poised to increase partnerships across NATO and encourage more buy-in from allies in Europe and beyond, stakeholders said at the 12th UAV Base.

In the Indo-Pacific region, for example, SLR-P could be set up at various allied bases, allowing Reapers to island hop to avoid sortie cancellations from weather issues.

In the European region, Poland previously committed to spending 3% of its gross domestic product on defense beginning in 2023 — up from 2.2% in 2021 — and doubling its troop numbers up to 300,000 personnel.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army established the U.S. Army Garrison Poland this past March, intended to host about 10,000 permanent U.S. troops in 11 sites around Poznań and other Polish cities, as well as 4,000 rotational forces and 2,500 surge or exercise personnel.

Poland has also committed to buying new Reapers in the near term. In October 2022, the Polish Defence Ministry signed a $70.6 million deal to lease an undisclosed number of MQ-9A Reapers from General Atomics.

Additionally, the ministry unveiled plans to buy MQ-9B Reapers, which would make the Polish Armed Forces the first military along NATO’s eastern front to buy the medium-altitude, long-endurance drone. Before the deal was signed, a ministry official told Defense News the drone acquisition is related to “the difficult situation on Poland’s eastern border” with Ukraine, which is still fighting off a Russian invasion.

Polish forces are using the leased MQ-9As “in surveillance areas of interest, including along Poland’s eastern border” in order to “facilitate the collection of surveillance data within the field of imagery intelligence … and signals intelligence,” a spokesperson for the ministry told Defense News last month.

Meanwhile, Poland is advancing talks with General Atomics. “Currently, there are ongoing negotiations with the supplier of this weaponry. In line with the Technical Modernization Plan [for the Polish Armed Forces], the MQ-9B Reaper acquisition is planned for the year 2024,” the spokesperson said.

Once that acquisition is complete, the 12th UAV Base will be ready to support the new Reapers with lessons learned from hosting the U.S. Air Force’s 52nd Expeditionary Operations Group Detachment 2 and its MQ-9 fleet for the past several years.

The base became familiar with some support functions such as fueling, fire protection and pre-accident planning, said Szubiński, the base’s commander.

“Learning to operate the aircraft and, more importantly, integrating it into combined arms of the Polish military requires some time,” he explained. “But we’ve certainly taken the first and, by some accounts, the most critical steps.”

Jaroslaw Adamowski in Warsaw, Poland, contributed to this report.

The new order — placed last month with a value in the “high double-digit million-euro amount” — doubles the total number of Marders to be sent to Ukraine, according to Rheinmetall’s news release. Germany previously commissioned two batches of 40 total refurbished vehicles beginning in 2022.

The Schützenpanzer Marder 1 has been in service with the German Army since the 1970s, and has undergone a series of combat upgrades in the decades since. Rheinmetall said the vehicles for Ukraine are overhauled Marder 1A3 systems formerly owned by the German military, and that the company began retrofitting the vehicles in spring 2022.

The company can deliver up to 10 infantry fighting vehicles per month, and the first 20 Marders were shipped to Ukraine in March. The second order of 20 Marders was placed in June, and those vehicles are currently being overhauled and delivered.

“Rheinmetall is pressing ahead with work to overhaul these older vehicles and ensure that the latest lot of Marder IFVs can be delivered as per contract starting in 2023,” the company said.

In January 2023, the United States and Germany announced they would both begin sending infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine, with the former providing Bradleys built by BAE Systems, and the latter sending Marders. Ukraine is currently fighting off a Russian invasion.

Nestled in the recent Vilnius, Lithuania, summit’s communique as line item 36, the document describes the Defence Production Action Plan as a way to leverage NATO’s role as “a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler to promote sustainable defense industrial capacity.”

The plan will initially focus on land munitions, the communique states, and serve to help understand the inner workings of the alliance’s vast defense industry, including small- and medium-size enterprises.

Beginning last fall, one of the most immediate lessons identified from the war in Ukraine was the realization that NATO didn’t have sufficient ammunition stocks for the nation, said Wendy Gilmour, NATO assistant secretary general for defense investment.

“The firing rates … were far beyond anything that had been anticipated,” she said in an exclusive interview with Defense News last month.

Last September, the alliance’s Conference of National Armaments Directors, or CNAD, held a special meeting to examine the needs for land warfare equipment and battle-decisive munitions, she said. The stakeholders agreed that a new type of industrial base — or at least a different scope and organization for the post-Cold War industrial base — was required.

The procurement chiefs studied how the alliance could collectively work to increase production and determine the level of risk that might be acceptable while drawing from existing stockpiles.

Between the CNAD meeting in September 2022 and the February 2023 NATO defense ministerial in Brussels, the armaments community was given a mandate to brainstorm how NATO could address bottlenecks, which is how the Defence Production Action Plan emerged, Gilmour explained.

A public version of the document should be available in the fall, she noted.

‘Activity buckets’

The new plan includes three main “activity buckets,” Gilmour said. The first bucket involves looking for efficiencies in the acquisition and delivery of defense equipment, as well as supporting and encouraging multinational procurements.

The second bucket will examine how to more effectively match NATO’s defense planning processes with the production capability of its members’ defense-industrial bases. Gilmour said the alliance will set up a “planning board” where leaders can discuss issues such as appropriate levels of supplies for a given requirement. The idea is to better manage supply chain risks both as an alliance and as individual member nations, depending on how badly certain defense goods are expected to be needed over time, she explained.

The third bucket aims to address “fundamental challenges inherent to defense industrial cooperation,” Gilmour said. That includes reexamining the policies, procedures and contracting approaches related to intellectual property, and developing best practices so that a contractual mechanism won’t somehow prevent two nations in a battlegroup with the same equipment from simply exchanging spare parts when deployed.

It will also analyze policies surrounding mutual logistics assurances as well as examine export control regimes and sanctions from across member nations. “We are all very aware these are sovereign decisions on the part of all alliance members, but the operational impact needs to be understood so that the decisions can be made consciously,” Gilmour said.

Wait and see

The plan, as envisioned, is “long overdue” for the alliance, said Nicholas Nelson, a nonresident senior fellow for emerging technology at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

But what has yet to emerge is a mechanism for how NATO will guide its members in harnessing their defense-industrial bases, he told Defense News.

“NATO itself is not going to be the purchaser of last resort for [these procurements]; it’s going to be the member states under NATO’s direction,” he added. “So how do you incentivize them to engage better with the industry?”

Expediting contract awards will be “the central challenge” for the Defence Production Action Plan, said Rob Murray, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council think tank. Murray spent nearly a decade at NATO before leaving in September 2022. While working for the alliance, he served as its inaugural head of innovation.

In a June article for the Atlantic Council, Murray laid out three options for NATO to help speed up government contracts, urging more adaptable sourcing strategies and better coordination among allies.

Gold standards?

Another priority area for the Defence Production Action Plan includes NATO’s extensive standards portfolio. The goal is to identify whether the alliance needs to revisit some material standards, the bedrock of many Western weapons projects, to keep pace with technological change.

“We’re never going to get every nation in NATO buying the same kit, nor would we necessarily want to,” Gilmour said. “There would be risks associated with that. But we do want all of the kits to be interoperable with one another and adhere to the same standards.”

The current standards development process typically spans about 36 months, according to Murray, and often leads to “broad compromises due to competing national interests, limiting interoperability and, ultimately, deterrence.”

He has advocated for NATO’s new industrial plan to involve companies more directly in the standards development process, to shorten the time frame to establish new standards, and to adopt “civil, open standards” for new and emerging technologies.

Getting it right

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, NATO’s rhetoric surrounding defense procurement has amped up, with the most senior political leaders now more frequently discussing ways to improve procurement practices and ensure capability deliveries, Gilmour said.

“There is absolutely an understanding on the part of our political leaders that this is not a portfolio that they can afford to do badly, that they have to get this right,” she said.

Before arriving at her current post in November, Gilmour spent more than three decades in Canada’s foreign affairs and defense departments, and served as the country’s deputy national armaments director from 2011 to 2015.

“Being in the armaments community, I can say that there’s always been this sense of ‘rhetoric is great, but show me the money,’ ” she said.

“Every country is now trying to ensure their defense equipment, their processes, their spare parts and supply chains are ready for whatever the eventuality may be. And that means everything is being done at once,” she added. “Decision-making processes and collective cooperative program processes are not necessarily geared to producing things quickly. We’re taking a look right now internally to see how we can make that better.”

Time is of the essence for NATO to enact its new Defence Production Action Plan, Nelson noted. In two years, the momentum prompted by Russia’s war in Ukraine could dissipate as member nations pivot to other security priorities.

“Is NATO going to be responsive enough to real-world challenges which are underpinning why this action plan was needed?” he wondered.

“We are left in a space where it’s very difficult to see the way forward other than — at some point after a Ukrainian victory in this war — we’re going to have to reconstitute the basis of a new European security architecture,” Michael Carpenter told Defense News in an exclusive interview.

By a new architecture, he means a set of institutions that makes OSCE’s participating states more secure and war less likely, Carpenter noted. That would mean restoring conventional military deterrence and, eventually, a new regime of transparency and confidence building, including through arms control.

“Needless to say, a new European security order will take a long time to build given how badly Russia has undermined the institutions that were built up over the last two decades,” Carpenter said.

When that occurs, OSCE will be front and center in discussions about what that security architecture should look like.

The organization is positioned for that job because of its “unique membership” of 57 nations, which includes all members of NATO and the European Union as well as every post-Soviet state, he argued.

“It is the right place in which to build a new European security architecture,” he said.

The organization is focused on countering Russian narratives regarding its invasion of Ukraine, while also supporting Kyiv diplomatically and on the ground.

While Ukraine’s backers across the globe are coordinating military support via the regularly held Ukraine Defense Contact Group — also known as the Ramstein Group, as the inaugural meeting was held at Ramstein Air Base in Germany — OSCE is trying to counter Russian disinformation and documenting its war crimes, which will diplomatically “isolate” Moscow, Carpenter said.

“At the moment, there is not a single other participating state in the OSCE that supports Russia’s war,” Carpenter added. “By exposing Russia’s actions each and every week, we … provide a historical record for future accountability efforts.”

Russia has remained the only participating state to defend its invasion of Ukraine to the rest of the members since February 2022, the organization confirmed in an Aug. 11 email. Belarus, another participating state, continues to aid Russia with active logistical support and by hosting training sites for Russian forces.

However, at OSCE, Belarus refrains from speaking in support of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, a spokesperson said.

The organization was already on “a downward slope” with Russia for many years, which was “not living up to the letter or spirit” of OSCE’s Vienna Document, said Carpenter, who served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia and conventional arms control from 2015 to 2017.

In the Vienna Document, OSCE’s participating states commit to sharing detailed information on their armed forces and major weapon systems on an annual basis, along with data about their military budgets, defense and armed forces planning, and scheduled maneuvers.

Moscow announced in 2007 that it was suspending its participation from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The government of President Vladimir Putin also positioned troops in the Transnistria region of Moldova, in Georgia, and in Ukraine — moves that each respective government has declared illegitimate.

In recent years, Russia also withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; the United States also withdrew from those under former President Donald Trump.

Although the the customers of those programs all include European nations, OCCAR is an international entity. It functions independent of other institutions, such as NATO and the European Union.

Notably, OCCAR manages a €6 billion (U.S. $7 billion) defense program portfolio that includes the A400M airlifter, the FREMM multi-mission frigate and the MAST-F air-to-ground tactical missile.

Joachim Sucker, who directs the organization, shared his vision for OCCAR and information about several program updates in a recent interview with Defense News. Sucker took on the leadership role in February. He previously held senior positions at the German Defence Ministry beginning in 2014, and was most recently responsible for the technical supervision of all air domain armament projects there.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What is OCCAR’s purpose? How do nations benefit from using OCCAR as a contract manager?

OCCAR was founded with a mission to manage complex, cooperative defense equipment programs throughout their life cycle. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom established OCCAR on the basis of a treaty known as the OCCAR Convention, which was ratified in 2001, giving OCCAR its legal status as an independent international organization. Belgium and Spain joined OCCAR, respectively, in 2003 and 2005.

The core business of OCCAR is to deliver defense capabilities to nations through cooperation in a cost-efficient way. OCCAR’s structure also allows other nations to participate on equal terms as the member states in specific OCCAR programs, as long as they accept its rules and regulations. Currently, eight additional nations participate in our programs: Australia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Lithuania and Turkey.

For over 20 years we have had a successful track record in managing complex, cooperative programs. OCCAR is more than a procurement agency, as our focus is the program stages of development and production, rather than buying off-the-shelf equipment. Nations, through our business model, guide OCCAR and stay in control of whatever actions we undertake.

What are the criteria for OCCAR to serve as an armament program manager? Are there limits to the size and scope of the desired capability, program cost, timespan or partners?

OCCAR is flexible in terms of participants, size and scope of a program, cost and time scale. It is up to the program-participating states to decide on what they want OCCAR to do and how they want OCCAR to do it. Our strength is our flexibility.

Our portfolio is composed of programs in all domains — air, land, sea, space and cyberspace — and although we focus on complex programs such as the A400M, frigates or armored vehicles, we are enabled to manage less complex programs as well, for instance our Night Vision Capability program.

When might it be better for a joint program to use internal defense management agencies rather than OCCAR?

That decision depends on the nations’ will to cooperate and compromise. What we offer to nations is a choice — a chance to cooperate — and we endeavor to be a center of excellence, ensuring that OCCAR is the optimum choice available.

Since you took over as OCCAR director, what have been your goals and agenda?

OCCAR can look back at more than 20 years of success. I took over a well-positioned organization, but we must not rest on our laurels.

My main focus will be in two areas. Firstly, I will continue to promote OCCAR as a center of excellence for managing complex and cooperative armaments programs within Europe and abroad. We are doing this through the establishment of cooperation agreements with more and more countries. This allows us to integrate new programs with more partner states into OCCAR at short notice.

Secondly, I want to accelerate our continuous improvement. We are facing an increased level of digitalization, which offers great opportunities for our processes and cooperation with nations and industries. This enables OCCAR to manage an increasing number of programs, but we have to adapt our organization to these new needs. Our ambition is to always apply the latest methods and approaches for managing defense equipment programs.

How have Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global inflation and ongoing global supply chain challenges affected OCCAR´s portfolio?

As for many players in the defense industry, finding reliable supply chains has become more challenging in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed weaknesses in the global supply chain of our programs.

OCCAR’s portfolio has been impacted less than others, as the supply chain of our programs relies more on local, or participating, states than on global suppliers.

You currently manage 18 programs with a total operational budget this year of about €6 billion. What major milestones are ahead for larger projects, specifically the Eurodrone medium-altitude, long-endurance remotely piloted aircraft system; the Boxer armored vehicle; and the Tiger MkIII helicopter modernization efforts?

The Eurodrone MALE RPAS contract began March 1, 2022. Since then, a number of significant events were achieved. The program moves forward at a very fast pace, with the next big milestone being the preliminary design review scheduled at the end of 2023. The program is a clear example of successful European cooperation at both the political and industrial levels. MALE RPAS will provide to its participating states, for the first time, full sovereignty in a capability of this type.

Regarding the Boxer program, the knowledge transfer from German to U.K. production lines continues, while vehicle production has begun at both U.K. sites. Furthermore, we are focusing on retrofit activities for the Netherlands, deliveries for Lithuania and new developments for Germany.

OCCAR’s focus for the Tiger helicopters lies in supporting nations to achieve the highest operational readiness possible. Our main priorities are, firstly, to tailor the in-service support contractual scheme to nations’ needs; and secondly, in minimizing the impact of a number of important obsolescence cases. OCCAR continuously works to maintain the effectiveness of the Tiger helicopter fleets by updating the configuration and upgrading capabilities.

What plans exist to take over additional programs in the near future? What is still to be done before OCCAR formally takes over the facilitation and management of those programs?

We are constantly integrating new programs and expect a total of 25 programs by early 2024, and further increases to this number in the years thereafter.

We are currently integrating eight new programs, five of which are related to the European Defence Fund. We are also working on the integration of non-EDF programs, such as the “wide wet gap” crossing capability for the U.K. and Germany, and a four-wheel drive armored vehicle for France and Belgium.

Our integration process covers agreements between nations, agreements between nations and OCCAR, and contracts between OCCAR and industry. In the case of EDF projects, there is also a need for an agreement between the European Commission and OCCAR. We are continuously working with our partners to jointly facilitate the integration and management of future cooperative armament programs.

And while it took more than a year, soon European and American tanks headed to the Ukrainian battlefield. This support for Kyiv has injected an almost mythical expectation into the tank as a guarantor of victory.

Indeed, Ukrainian leaders long had modern tanks near the top of their wish list of military equipment, though some Western officials tried to temper expectations that the steel behemoths’ arrival alone would yield miracles on the battlefield.

As the war draws new attention to the power and promise of the ground platforms, German and French officials are moving to reignite a joint next-generation tank program, perhaps one of the most high-profile illustrations of a renewed push for defense cooperation in Europe. After years of inaction, leaders from both countries are now vowing to make their vision for the Main Ground Combat System, or MGCS, a reality.

The stakes are high, essentially setting up yet another case study to see if European leaders can shake their national vanities and come up with a next-level weapon system. As German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius put it, the question is the “load bearing capacity” of a French-German armament program in the first place.

MGCS — a system of systems, in military speak — entails a novel main battle tank, accompanied by robots and enhanced by artificial intelligence. It is meant to replace the Leopard 2 and Leclerc fleets in Germany and France, respectively, beginning sometime between 2035 and 2040.

The idea hails from 2017, the heyday of the Berlin-Paris connection. The duo of then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled two major military projects — a new tank and a new warplane — intended to underpin Europe’s newfound defense ambitions with hundreds of billions of euros over their life cycles.

Neither project went according to plan, as the initial top-level enthusiasm gave way to industrial and political infighting over the question of which country, and which company, would lead them.

While the warplane program limped along, the tank initiative simply went quiet.

Speaking to reporters in Berlin this summer, Pistorius and his French counterpart Sébastien Lecornu said they were ready to turn the page after a drawn-out workshare distribution kerfuffle paralyzed the program. French officials had been wary that the inclusion of Germany’s Rheinmetall into the contractor pool, led by KNDS (a German-Franco joint venture of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Nexter), would make the project lean too Teutonic.

Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall are Germany’s Leopard vendors; Nexter is the prime contractor for the French Leclerc.

But besides proclaiming a new can-do attitude and the pledge to meet again this month, there was little to announce in Berlin other than the fact there is now a mutual understanding that Germany will lead the tank program while France spearheads the warplane push, known as the Future Combat Air System, or FCAS.

Defense officials from both countries now hope experience with the FCAS program’s structure and workshare arrangements, however shaky, can propel the tank program forward. That includes the so-called pillar design — groupings of discrete capabilities like propulsion or sensors, each led by one company and supported by a smattering of subcontractors — that could be harvested even if the overall program fails.

In the case of the new tank, the two nations’ army chiefs are expected to come up with a kind of vision paper for the vehicle before the next Pistorius-Lecornu meeting scheduled for Sept. 22. By the end of the year, officials plan to digest the ideas into a single document that Macron and now-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz can use to chart a course.

From there, industry executives have said the onus is on the two governments to convey everything from cost expectations to envisioned performance features.

Ralf Ketzel, who leads Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, told the Münchner Merkur newspaper in August that “nobody has spoken with us about the financial requirements.” Rheinmetall is similarly taking a wait-and-see approach.

So far, government officials are sure only about a certain unpredictability of the end result: The tank that will one day roll out of a factory “will look nothing like today’s tanks,” Lecornu said in Berlin.

Built from scratch

The emphasis by both ministers on a new development comes after Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall signaled privately and publicly they would be able to go it alone with their tank expertise if the Main Ground Combat System program fails.

“We are certain that the Leopard 2, as the world’s most advanced main battle tank, will remain the European main battle tank for decades to come,” a KNDS spokesperson told Defense News.

As for MGCS, the Franco-German company’s “conceptual understanding” is that the envisioned architecture will entail “large-caliber duel capability” as well as unmanned turrets, manned-unmanned-teaming, the ability to deploy and defeat drones, laser technology and beyond-line-of-sight strike weaponry, the spokesperson said.

The main focus of the requirements is likely the vehicle’s firepower, including the type of gun and shell ammunition the tank will employ, said Gaspard Schnitzler, research director at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs.

KNDS has proposed a 140mm cannon, while Rheinmetall prefers a 130mm cannon. It remains to be seen which design will make the cut, but the winner will likely determine the NATO standard for a future tank cannon, Schnitzler noted.

Another decision pertains to the balance between mobility, weight and the ability to withstand hits. During Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, both sides have used missiles, unmanned systems, artillery and loitering munitions to crack open armored vehicles. Planners are expected to study those engagements, determining the placement and types of armor reinforcement — to protect elements like the more vulnerable roof and engine sections — while keeping the future tank light enough to use civilian transportation infrastructure for a ride into combat.

To be sure, the German Defence Ministry doesn’t see a direct link between the war in Ukraine and the renewed MGCS push. Asked about lessons learned from the war that could inform features of the envisioned tank, a spokesperson told Defense News there aren’t any because “such scenarios” are already baked into whatever requirements officials previously defined.

The program delay so far makes it difficult to predict if the project will be ready for a time when both nations’ tank fleets are inoperable. That means the pressure is on for France and Germany’s industries to launch this project, but especially for the former.

Germany dominates the European land vehicle market, and its products, chiefly the Leopard tank, have been exported far and wide, compared to Nexter’s Leclerc. France needs the MGCS to reinvigorate its production lines since the Leclerc ceased production in 2008, Schnitzler said.

Meanwhile, German news reports have indicated Krauss-Maffei Wegmann expects to produce its most modern Leopard 2, the A8 variant, through 2032.

“The French really need this tank by 2035, or even 2040 at the latest, while the Germans have an intermediate solution,” which means they could wait until 2045 or so, Schnitzler said. “There’s a risk of a timetable that’s not the same.”

The objectives of the MGCS project, meant to push the envelope of what tanks can do in the 21st century, make the compressed timeline even more “ambitious,” said Dan Darling, a market analyst at the U.S.-based firm Forecast International. When factoring in a potential change in government for both nations in the next several years — Germany’s next federal elections are scheduled for 2025, while France will elect a new president in 2027 — the pressure just keeps increasing, he noted.

Neighborly interest

As German and French industry officials remain skeptical, some neighboring governments are cautiously rooting for the project, weighing their options for getting involved.

Italian junior defense minister Isabella Rauti said in July a planned purchase of Leopard 2 A8 tanks would keep Rome in play for a role in the Main Ground Combat System program, helping Italy get more closely involved with German industry.

Britain is believed to have retained an interest in the Franco-German program but is also undertaking studies of its own, keeping the door open on other possible platforms, technologies and partner options.

“The U.K. is conducting studies into a future ground combat system along with its technology enablers,” a spokesperson for the British Defence Ministry told Defense News. “This is in coordination with MoD’s science and technology and [British] Army experimental work, and aligns with similar initiatives in Europe and the U.S.”

Britain has discussed signing up at some level on the European program for at least two years, and previously responded positively to taking on an observer status with the MGCS program. British officials said they expect France and Germany to discuss the status of the MGCS program and outline the next steps in the coming months.

For the moment, though, the prime focus of British heavy armor interest is centered not on a next-generation tank but rather upgrading the Army’s aging Challenger 2 tank fleet under a contract awarded to Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land. That work, to the tune of £800 million (U.S. $1 billion) would extend the vehicles’ service lives to around 2040, with 148 tanks of the new Challenger 3 standard to reach the force beginning 2027.

Poland’s government considered partaking in MGCS, but ultimately decided to focus on the more near-term threat of Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, by signing tank contracts with the United States and South Korea.

“Poland was observing this project with interest, and was analyzing the possibility of joining it as it was awaiting the reception of indispensable data, as it has been notified to our German and French partners during talks at various levels,” a spokesperson for the Polish Defence Ministry told Defense News. “Due to the distant implementation schedule of the MGCS project and the lack of decisions on its final form, a decision has been taken to reinforce the Polish Armed Forces with M1 Abrams and K2 Black Panther tanks.”

This said, should Warsaw receive the data it is awaiting, “we will make relevant analyses” with regard to MGCS, according to the spokesperson.

The representative also said the Polish military’s Technical Modernization Plan foresees the acquisition of new tanks under the Wilk program “based on the [Polish] industry or in cooperation with a foreign partner, taking into account the necessity to develop the Polish defense potential.”

This indicates that in the coming years, Warsaw could opt to develop a new tank model in partnership with foreign industry players, including European groups.

Last year, Poland signed a deal worth about $4.75 billion to buy 250 M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 tanks. In January 2023, the country inked a second contract, valued at about $1.4 billion, to acquire 116 used M1A1 Abrams from the United States.

Poland also signed a deal last year to procure about 1,000 K2 Black Panther tanks: 180 units produced by Hyundai Rotem in South Korea, and 820 tanks in the K2PL version to be jointly manufactured by the two nations’ industries.

Across the pond

Meanwhile, the U.S. military appears in no hurry to replace its main battle tank, the venerable Abrams. First fielded in the 1980s, the U.S. Army has banked on upgrade programs ever since, a strategy that is unlikely to change anytime soon, according to analysts.

Manufacturer General Dynamics unveiled its own concept for a next-generation tank, dubbed Abrams X, at the 2022 annual convention of the Association of the United States Army in Washington, but no government program has emerged to that end.

That is because other programs are deemed more important to the U.S. military portfolio, said Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington.

For one, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle is “more vulnerable” and needs to be replaced sooner, Cancian said. Additionally, “there is much more interest in air defense and long-range precision strike.”

There is also the question of whether investments in newfangled tanks are worth it, given the ubiquity of stand-off anti-tank missiles and mines.

“If the Army went to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Congress and said, ‘We want to start a new tank program based on what we’re seeing in Ukraine,’ most people would say, ‘That’s not what we see,’ ” Cancian said.

Sebastian Sprenger reported from Cologne and Vivienne Machi from Stuttgart in Germany; Andrew Chuter from London; and Jaroslaw Adamowski from Warsaw, Poland.

This first lot of new 35mm ammunition comes months after Rheinmetall invested in new production capacity in the German state of Lower Saxony. It also follows an announcement by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius at a February meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group that the country would begin producing the Gepard’s munitions locally.

The contract with Rheinmetall was signed a few days prior for 300,000 rounds, at a total cost of €168 million (U.S. $181 million). Half of those rounds are bound for Ukraine, 40,000 of which will be delivered to Kyiv by the end of 2023, the company said.

This initial delivery includes “a five-digit number” of munitions, according to the German military.

“The war in Ukraine reminds us almost every day that air defense and sufficient ammunition are what count when defending one’s own country,” Pistorius said in the release. “With the resumption of production for the Gepard ammunition, we are focusing precisely on these two crucial aspects.”

“We will continue to support Ukraine in the areas that are our strengths: artillery, ammunition and ground-based air defense,” he added.

The self-propelled Gepard wields two 35mm guns, and Germany has provided 46 of the systems to Ukrainian troops, with another six to come. The anti-aircraft system has proved critical in helping Ukraine protect its airspace from Russian drones and other weapons. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

But ammunition for the Gepard is tough to come by, as the German military retired the system from service about 15 years ago, and national ammo stocks had since dropped to zero.

According to a Rheinmetall news release, other nations declined to contribute from their existing stocks of ammunition, “citing either political considerations or constitutional restrictions.” Rheinmetall typically produces its munitions for medium-range artillery in Switzerland. The long-neutral nation has not sent any weapons to Ukraine, but has earmarked about 1.5 billion Swiss francs ($1.7 billion) for humanitarian and development aid to Kyiv over the next five years.

Local reports indicate the Swiss government is considering whether to allow third-party operators of locally made weapons to send them to Ukraine, under stringent export guidelines.

As a result, Rheinmetall modified existing 35mm ammunition from the main armament of an infantry fighting vehicle for use in the Gepard, then ensured the Gepard fire control unit could reliably recognize the ammunition.

Rheinmetall performed multiple tests at the company’s proving ground at Unterlüss in Lower Saxony, and successfully fired the ammo by a Gepard in May.

The company is providing two types of ammunition to Ukraine as part of the aforementioned commitment, including a subcaliber APDS-T munition containing heavy metal penetrators, intended for engaging hardened targets. The second type is a conventional high-explosive incendiary designed for air defense and for attacking aircraft and guided missiles.