The CIA has worked closely with Ukraine’s intelligence services since Russia’s 2014 invasion, growing a partnership built on assistance and training into a two-way exchange of intelligence, according to Forbes. However, the relationship nearly collapsed in February 2025, when a contentious Oval Office meeting between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ended with Washington temporarily cutting off the flow of intelligence and weapons to Kyiv.

But Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., the Senate Intelligence Committee’s ranking member, said this month that the two countries have moved past previous hurdles and returned to a strong intelligence partnership.

“I don’t want to get into any specifics, but it has improved,” Warner told Politico.

The CIA has spent more than a decade and millions of dollars training and equipping Ukrainian intelligence officers, building around a dozen secret forward-operating bases along the Russian border, ABC News reported in January 2025, citing former U.S. officials.

The senator said the current arrangement has helped Kyiv gain an edge, with long-range drones and missiles now hitting targets far inside Russia.

While American weapons deliveries have taken the spotlight in what Washington gives Ukraine, intelligence is the one U.S. asset Kyiv cannot replace, especially for the long-range strikes now making headlines.

That intelligence reaches directly into the strike campaign, including “the targeting packages for strikes on Russian-troop positions in Ukraine and on energy infrastructure inside Russia,” The Atlantic reported, citing American and Ukrainian sources.

Those sources called intelligence “the one thing the United States still provides free of charge,” crediting CIA Director John Ratcliffe with keeping it that way.

Zelenskyy seems to have risen in Trump’s estimation as Ukraine increasingly fights on its own terms, redefining modern warfare by crafting new tech and strategies, clawing back territory and taking the war deep into Russia — leaving Kyiv looking less dependent and more like an ally with something to trade.

“Trump doesn’t like losers,” one Western intelligence official told the outlet.

Sens. John Cornyn, R-Texas, another intelligence committee member, and Roger Wicker, R-Miss., who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Politico they see a direct connection between the White House’s view of Ukraine’s battlefield successes and Kyiv’s access to intelligence.

“It sure seems like that,” Cornyn said. “Everybody loves a winner and looks like Ukraine has turned the tide.”

The strengthening relationship between Washington and Kyiv is apparent on multiple fronts.

Trump’s negotiators to end the war, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, plan to head to Ukraine for the first time later this month, a trip that coincides with the country’s independence celebrations, according to Radio Free Europe.

The intel trade is going both ways, with Zelenskyy stating publicly as early as March that Kyiv had proof of Moscow passing intelligence to Iran that he later promised to put in front of Trump.

“We have irrefutable evidence that the Russians continue to provide intelligence to the Iranian regime,” Zelenskyy wrote on X. “Russia is using its own signals intelligence and electronic intelligence capabilities, as well as part of the data obtained through cooperation with partners in the Middle East.”

American officials are backpedaling too. Trump on July 20 told the Financial Times that the U.S. has to be “a little bit careful of who we license to.” Despite that, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Saturday posted on X that the two sides have “now reached an agreement.”

The glacial progress may reflect American defense giants’ fear that Kyiv could become a defense industry competitor — rather than posing risk to technology or intellectual property — a Republican official on Capitol Hill told The Atlantic.

“Their real worry is that the Ukrainians will find a way to improve the Patriot and then produce them at scale faster and for much less money than what the existing production lines in the U.S. could do,” the official said, adding that the companies will publicly frame their concerns around “IP theft and tech transfer” instead.

Ukraine’s weapons industry, honed by nearly five years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, has been booming since the U.S.-Israel war with Iran began in the spring. The conflict with Iran has drained an estimated two-thirds of America’s pre-war Patriot interceptor inventory, sparking discussion about inventory and strategy.

Some defense partners are eager to work with Ukraine, a country with rare recent experience fighting a large-scale land war, and have shown strong interest in collaborating with Kyiv to develop and field cheaper, faster-to-produce alternatives to million-dollar weapons.

The race toward competition is problematic for the defense giants, the official said — not because Ukraine might steal the Patriot — but because the country’s partners might outbuild it, cutting into the current monopoly on antiballistic capabilities and profits.

Trump first pledged the license at the July NATO summit in Ankara, promising Ukraine permission to produce Patriot missiles for the first time.

“We’re going to give a license to you to make Patriots. That’s pretty cool. This way, you can’t complain that we’re not giving ‘em enough,” Trump said, adding that the companies had not yet been consulted on the plan.

Zelenskyy said the next day that the question had been “resolved politically,” telling reporters that technical teams needed to start work “without delay, so that we can get licenses very quickly and start production in Ukraine as soon as possible.”

Five days after Trump’s pledge, Ukraine, nine European countries and defense heavyweights including Eurosam, Leonardo, Thales and Saab launched a coalition in Paris to field Freyja, an entirely new antiballistic system built around a Ukrainian interceptor priced at roughly one-fifth of a Patriot round.

A week after that, Lockheed unveiled its own cheaper, faster-to-produce Patriot missile at the Farnborough International Airshow, advertising the PAC-3 ACE at roughly $2 million a round – less than half the price of the round Ukraine fires at Russian ballistic missiles today.

The Patriot line rarely moves that fast. Its current top round, the PAC-3 MSE, was first accepted by the U.S. Army in 2015 and took until 2018 to reach full-rate production, per the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.

On July 21, one day after the ACE debut, Tim Cahill, president of Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, described production talks with Ukraine as simply “early,” telling reporters the company will “support the US Army and the [Trump] administration on what they want to go do,” according to Breaking Defense.

Raytheon’s process “has just started,” with the company working with the U.S. government “to determine what is feasible and what is best for Ukraine,” its president of land and air defense systems, Tom Laliberty, said at the same show.

Two days later, Zelenskyy wrote in a post on X that he was “grateful for the company’s readiness to take our partnership to an even higher level, where Ukraine would co-produce, together with Raytheon, some of the most vital air defense assets – Patriot interceptors,” after meeting representatives of the group.

But when Zelenskyy asked Trump for “several hundred” interceptors at a July 28 Oval Office meeting, the president refused, citing America’s shrunken stocks, The Atlantic reported.

Three days later, Trump reversed course on the license entirely.

“We have not agreed to that,” he said at a Camp David Cabinet meeting. “We’re talking about it, but it’s a hard thing to give away that kind of technology.”

Then, U.S. NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker dampened expectations further on Aug. 3, telling Fox News that “we do not allow anybody but US manufacturers to make those in the United States,” adding that a long-term production agreement “will not be concluded before this winter,” per Euronews.

The deal’s current status is unclear.

“The decision has been made,” Zelenskyy said during an interview on Ukrainian television over the weekend, according to United24. “It was made by the President of the United States and other important American government institutions.”

American officials have yet to respond to Zelenskyy’s latest comments.

The report, published Wednesday, examined Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data sourced from FlightRadar24 for aircraft models historically linked to Russian private military contractors or the Ministry of Defense, filtering for flights touching Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger.

Burkina Faso received the most flights of the three countries, at 56, followed by 38 to Mali, while Niger recorded only six, the report found. C4ADS attributed Burkina Faso’s volume in part to its position as a transit point between Mali and Niger, and to the intensity of attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara during the period.

The busiest single operator was Flight Unit 224, a Russian Ministry of Defense-owned airline sanctioned by the United States in May 2023. The Russian Special Flight Squadron, which transports senior officials, conducted 14 flights, while Russia’s Ministry for Emergency Situations carried out 12. Despite the ministry’s ostensibly humanitarian mandate, prior media reporting linked it to military cargo transport to Mali, Syria and Iran.

C4ADS also flagged several private carriers it said remain unsanctioned by the U.S., EU or U.K. despite documented links to Russian military logistics, including Kyrgyzstan-registered Sapsan Airlines.

On routing, C4ADS said state-owned aircraft such as Flight Unit 224’s RA-82030 typically refueled at Russia’s Khmeimim air base in Syria and at Libyan sites including Al-Khadim before continuing to the Sahel. Private carriers more often transited commercial hubs in the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Türkiye.

Defense News published an investigation in April on a shadowy fleet of Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft making more than a hundred flights to Algeria over the preceding year. Flight-tracking data, interviews and satellite imagery suggested the network was being used both to deliver fighter jets to the Algerian air force and as a logistics system for onward flights into the Sahel and West Africa.

C4ADS said its findings were preliminary and intended to identify avenues for further inquiry rather than draw firm conclusions, citing limitations including inconsistent ADS-B coverage and the possibility that operators manipulate transponder data to conceal destinations. The organization pointed to a growing number of flights through Togo and Algeria before or after Sahel stops as a subject warranting additional scrutiny.

Lt. Gen. Charles Costanza, who was leading V Corps, was removed from command. The Army did not provide the date of his removal or disclose a reason for his departure but confirmed in a statement that “the matter has been referred to the appropriate authority in accordance with Army regulations.”

Brig. Gen. John B. Mountford, the deputy commanding general of readiness for V Corps, is serving as the acting commanding general.

According to the Army last week, Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Feltey, who was selected for promotion to lieutenant general, is set to assume command of V Corps at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Before assuming command of V Corps in April 2024, Costanza served as the Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe-Africa. He also commanded the 3rd Infantry Division.

V Corps oversees ground forces in Europe, including those along NATO’s eastern flank. The Corps works with allied forces to integrate defense, counter-drone systems and long-range fires in the region. Costanza was the Corps’ second commanding general since its reactivation in October 2020.

In 1991, he commissioned as an armor officer from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

The removal was not political and had nothing to do with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, an Army official told Military Times.

Costanza’s removal comes amid mass leadership shakeups at the Pentagon. Since entering the position, Hegseth has removed or replaced at least a dozen senior leaders.

In early July, U.S. Army Gen. Christopher Donahue, who previously led the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division, unexpectedly relinquished command of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. The Army did not provide a reason for his departure.

Here is what is known about the growing military ties:

THE LATEST REPORTS

A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for attacks on Ukraine, an official at Ukraine’s GUR military intelligence agency said.

The unit comprises about 90 North Korean personnel and is expected to be based in Russia’s Voronezh region, the official said. The United States is aware of the North Korean deployment, a source familiar with the issue told Reuters.

Forty North Korean missiles have already been supplied, at least two of which were launched at Ukraine last week during a deadly strike, the Ukrainian official said.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in July that Russia wanted to bring in 30,000 North Korean troops and was preparing facilities in Voronezh to receive them.

Reuters could not independently verify that statement.

HOW MANY NORTH KOREAN TROOPS WERE SENT TO RUSSIA IN 2024?

North Korea sent around 14,000 to 15,000 soldiers to Russia’s Kursk region, according to Ukrainian and South Korean estimates, helping Moscow’s forces repel a surprise Ukrainian ground incursion.

Russia and North Korea confirmed in April 2025 that North Korean troops had fought Ukrainian forces in Kursk.

Russia’s top military commander praised their role after Moscow said it had retaken Kursk territory, while Pyongyang said the deployment was ordered by leader Kim Jong Un.

The Ukrainian official said this month that around 9,500 North Korean troops remained in Kursk, but were not directly involved in operations against Ukraine.

WHAT OTHER PERSONNEL HAS NORTH KOREA SAID IT WILL PROVIDE?

In June 2025, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said North Korea would send 1,000 sappers and 5,000 military construction workers to Kursk to clear mines and help rebuild infrastructure damaged in the fighting.

That same month, South Korean lawmakers, citing a briefing by the National Intelligence Service, said that North Korea appeared to have begun recruiting personnel for an additional deployment to Russia, while continuing to supply Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles in exchange for economic cooperation and technical assistance.

It remains unclear how many engineers, deminers or additional troops have arrived in Russia, or whether they have been used in combat roles.

WHAT WEAPONS HAS NORTH KOREA PROVIDED?

North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery and mortar rounds, ballistic missiles, long-range artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, according to Ukrainian and independent assessments.

A Reuters analysis with the British-based Open Source Centre found four Russian-flagged cargo ships made 64 voyages to North Korea’s Rajin port between September 2023 and March 2025, transporting nearly 16,000 containers of ammunition to Russian ports.

Ukrainian officials said North Korea was supplying about half of the munitions Russia needed on the front lines.

Ukraine’s military intelligence agency said that North Korea had delivered 4 million artillery shells since mid-2023, excluding mortar rounds. It said North Korea had supplied 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles by the start of 2025.

WHY IS NORTH KOREA HELPING RUSSIA?

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty during Putin’s June 2024 visit to Pyongyang. The pact includes a mutual assistance provision if either country faces external aggression.

North Korea has cast its deployment as assistance to a treaty partner. Kim said in May 2025 that participation in the war was justified as an exercise of North Korea’s sovereign rights in defense of a “brother nation.”

Analysts say Pyongyang stands to gain hard currency, oil and other economic support, as well as access to Russian military technology and battlefield experience for its forces and weapons.

North Korean soldiers have gained combat exposure to drones, electronic warfare, artillery coordination and modern battlefield tactics, while its missile and ammunition makers have been able to assess their equipment in wartime conditions.

THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION

The United States and its allies have said the troop deployments and arms transfers violate U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.

Pyongyang has been subject to U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The sanctions prohibit countries from hosting North Korean trainers, advisers or other officials for military, paramilitary or police training.

Washington imposed additional sanctions in December 2024 on North Korean and Russian entities connected to Pyongyang’s military and financial support for Moscow. South Korea also blacklisted individuals and entities linked to illicit military cooperation between the two countries.

NATO has said Russia’s growing military and economic ties with North Korea, China and Iran pose a threat beyond Europe, extending to the Indo-Pacific and North America.

Rheinmetall now expects sales in the range of €13.7 billion to €14.2 billion ($15.8 billion to $16.4 billion), down from €14.0 billion to €14.5 billion previously, based on a €300 million hit to its naval division.

It also cut its order book guidance to more than €100 billion, from roughly €135 billion previously, and lowered its capital expenditure target to 8%-9% of sales from 16%.

The company left its free cash flow conversion ratio and margin targets unchanged and said it remained on track for record growth.

JPMorgan analysts said they had expected the canceled frigate program to have made more of an impact beyond 2026 and said the downgrades could signal slower growth in 2027-28.

Rheinmetall had reported a nearly 70% jump in second-quarter sales to about €3.3 billion, with all business segments contributing to the rise, in an unscheduled release last month.

Its shares fell as much as 4% in early trading before paring losses to trade 1.2% down by 0745 GMT.

DENTED AMBITIONS

Rheinmetall has seen its fortunes soar with Europe’s renewed interest in building up its defenses after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, with Europe’s largest ammunition maker targeting annual sales of up to €50 billion by 2030.

The company completed the acquisition in March of the warship division of German shipbuilder Luerssen as part of its ambitions to become a bigger player in the naval sector.

It has also been considering acquiring German Naval Yards Kiel and promised to reach a final decision within weeks after a rival bidder withdrew from the process last month.

The German government’s decision in June to scrap a delayed frigate program for which Rheinmetall had looked likely to secure the contract tempered the company’s upward momentum.

“In the naval business, too, we are looking to the future and are working hard to fulfil our current maritime orders as a reliable partner with a high level of expertise, and to secure new ones on the international stage as well,” said Chief Executive Armin Papperger on Thursday.

Since the start of the year, at least six defense-automotive tie-ups have been announced, as President Emmanuel Macron’s government seeks to combine the scale, automation and cost discipline of France’s car sector with one of the fastest-growing segments of military technology.

Ukraine and Russia’s use of drones has reshaped warfare, and that has prompted France and its European allies to prioritise drone production, as pressure from Washington on Europe to boost its military capabilities has added urgency.

The projects indicate France is building an industrial base capable of producing tens of thousands of drones a year — a scale difficult for defense startups to achieve alone, albeit one still dwarfed by Ukrainian and Russian efforts.

FRANCE AIMS FOR SCALABLE DRONE PRODUCTION

“Why now? Because the need is now, drones are now,” Christophe Périllat, chief executive of auto parts supplier Valeo, told reporters at the end of July. “And why in France? Because we’re being asked to guarantee our sovereignty.”

French defense officials do not anticipate a near-term need to deploy a large number of drones in the skies above France, but say it must be prepared for conflict.

The goal is to give France the ability to produce drones quickly and ramp up output should a crisis arise, they say. A July report by the French Senate’s defense committee described France’s stock of just a few thousand drones as “insufficient to achieve a critical mass.”

Valeo has said it will manufacture electric drone motors in France for defense technology firm Harmattan AI. Meanwhile, Forvia unveiled a partnership last week with a European defense company specialising in AI-powered counter-drone systems and is weighing plans to build capacity in France to manufacture 1,000 interceptor drones each month.

Renault, already working with Turgis & Gaillard to develop a long-range drone, partnered with Thales in June to industrialise production of the Toutatis kamikaze drone, targeting up to 1,000 units per month from 2027.

French drone maker Delair teamed up with German automotive supplier Schaeffler the same month to establish a French production line capable of producing around 100 drones per day by November.

SIMPLIFYING DRONE PRODUCTION FOR SCALE

If the plans announced by Renault, Schaeffler and Forvia are realized, combined output could reach 60,000 units per year. In a conflict, many more would be needed.

Drones have been used in warfare for decades, but the war in Ukraine has seen an explosion in scale.

Drones now dictate the flow of the battlefield, notching up the vast majority of kills. The front line has turned into a “kill zone,” with soldiers hiding underground from the constant aerial threat.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine quickly accelerated its use of drones for reconnaissance, battlefield combat and long-range strikes. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in July that it will produce 10 million in 2026.

Ukraine now has hundreds of drone makers, big and small. Some even produce more than Ukraine’s military can buy, and the government has cautiously moved towards allowing them to export some excess production.

Patrick Pailloux, head of France’s defense procurement agency, said he was working in particular with auto subcontractors to design drones that France will be able to produce in large quantities.

“It’s not the same: producing a drone in a defense start-up and making something that can be reproduced in very large volumes using production-line robots,” he said.

Renault CEO François Provost said in June the Toutatis kamikaze drone was being redesigned with fewer components and from injection-moulded plastic, enabling cheaper, higher-volume production than the current 3D-printed model.

ENOUGH DRONES TO TRAIN ON, BUT NOT MILLIONS

Defense officials say the challenge is scaling up production capacity while not building stockpiles that could soon become obsolete.

Patrice Caine, CEO of French defense technology group Thales, said this summer that drones were “objects that evolve quickly” under the impetus of technological advances.

Pailloux said France needed “enough so that we can train, and (the production capacity) to be able to withstand a shock”.

Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu pledged a €150 million ($175 million) investment to develop a dedicated drone sector last December.

But Antoine Level, head of France’s drone industry association, said Germany was ahead of France in funding short-range drones, and that there were still “not enough orders to truly stimulate the industry.”

Ukraine had urgently sought partners to develop a weapon capable of stopping Russia’s ballistic missiles. The pan-European project was launched officially in Paris last month by 10 governments and 12 defense firms – including Eurosam, Leonardo, Thales and SAAB.

Kyiv currently relies on the U.S.-made Patriot system to down ballistic missiles that fly at several times the speed of sound, but global shortages of its interceptor missiles, exacerbated by the war in Iran, have left Ukraine exposed.

“Pretty much everything is agreed,” CEO Iryna Terekh told Reuters, saying 13 industrial partners had already joined. Fire Point aims to achieve its first successful interception by mid-2027, she added.

Ukraine’s Fire Point builds pan European Freyja missile

The Ukrainian company is providing the FP7.X – a faster version of its FP7 ballistic missile – as the interceptor and is now integrating that with the guidance system, known as a seeker.

“Right now we are in the most intense and also in the most complicated stage of finally assembling everything together with surveillance radars, with tracking radars, with the seekers,” Terekh said.

Norway’s Kongsberg is working on the command center integrating the various systems. The company did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Industry publications have reported that Germany’s Diehl Defence — which produces a seeker for its own IRIS-T air defense system — will provide the guidance system.

A Diehl spokesperson confirmed the firm was in talks with Fire Point but declined to discuss details. Terekh declined to comment.

Fire Point aims to produce a ballistic interceptor for less than €1 million ($1.2 million) per missile, Terekh said — a quarter to a sixth of the cost of a Patriot.

“We’re trying to squeeze a program that usually takes 20 or 30 years into a matter of a couple of years,” Terekh said, adding that there had been at least five tests of the interceptor missile.

The project would use open-source architecture and allow different options to be swapped in and out — such as a Weibel radar for one made by Saab, according to Ukrainian officials.

The number of industrial partners could rise to around 20, increasing production capacity, Terekh said. She added Fire Point was in talks with Ukrainian state-owned missile makers, but declined to name them.

Terekh said the participating companies would finance research and development until a minimum viable product (MVP) was reached — which she said would mean the successful interception of a ballistic missile.

Attack missiles nearly ready for combat

“We expect the launcher to have from four to six missiles. So if from one batch there was an interception of a ballistic missile for MVP, this would be a wonderful result,” Terekh said.

A missile gets through only if all the interceptors in a launcher miss. Keeping the probability of six misses in a row below 5% — an industry standard — requires each interceptor to hit roughly 40% of the time, according to Fabian Hoffmann, missile expert at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.

If it could really be done for €1 million, it would be “pretty impressive,” and “very cheap,” Hoffmann said.

The FP7 missile has an attack variant that can be used to strike ground targets. This has undergone about 15 test launches and is now being certified by the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, which she expected to take two to four more weeks.

Fire Point aims for first combat use of this version in early autumn, and late autumn for the much larger FP9 ballistic missile, which it says will be able to reach Moscow.

Terekh said the FP7’s architecture was based on Soviet-era designs for the S300 and S400 interceptors, but that Fire Point’s missile now shared only 20% similarity with those weapons.

In a recent interview, Fire Point co-founder Denys Shtilierman said the Soviet plans had been procured as a favor by Timur Mindich, a former business associate of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy who faces charges of corruption and is now a fugitive in Israel.

Fire Point says it declined an offer from Mindich to buy a stake in the company.

Fire Point is pressing ahead with building its own engine for its FP5 cruise missile, known as the Flamingo, which has hit several prominent military targets in Russia this year.

It had been using second-hand jet engines — “digging through the cemetery of the engines … like in a thrift store,” Terekh said.

But these are getting harder and harder to find, so Fire Point is assembling the first 10 units of its own prototype.

“As soon as we’re happy with the results of tests of these test engines, there’ll definitely be many more Flamingos,” Terekh said.

Meanwhile, the Polish military is strengthening cooperation with Germany’s Bundeswehr under the East Shield project to boost the resilience of its eastern borders to attacks and hybrid warfare from Russia and Belarus, while negotiating with the United States, France and the United Kingdom to also involve their forces.

A spokesperson for the Polish Ministry of National Defence told Defense News that the military exercise, which is scheduled to be held this fall, is part of the group’s preparations for the post-war reality in Ukraine. Before the conflict ends, coalition nations want to reach a higher level of force coordination, and the drills are expected to contribute to their increased interoperability.

“The exercise planned on the territory of Poland is part of the preparatory activities of the Coalition of the Willing as part of future security guarantees for Ukraine. Its objectives include testing the command-and-control system, the organization of logistical support, and the deployment of troops, thereby confirming the force’s ability to operate once hostilities have ended,” the spokesperson said.

The decision to hold the forthcoming exercise in Poland reflects the country’s particular role as the logistical and infrastructure hub for the Multinational Force Ukraine (MNF-U), according to the Polish ministry representative.

“The core participants in the exercise on Polish territory will be France and the United Kingdom, acting as the framework nations of the Coalition of the Willing,” the spokesperson said.

The coalition is an informal group of nations led by London and Paris, established in 2025 to coordinate military and political support for Kyiv. While coordinating efforts with its French and British counterparts, the Polish ministry is also negotiating the participation of further allies in the fall drills.

“At the same time, military-to-military discussions are underway regarding the participation of other countries that are members of the Coalition of the Willing,” according to the spokesperson.

Under the country’s 10 billion zloty ($2.6 billion) East Shield initiative, the Polish military is advancing projects to bolster defensive infrastructure, including fortifications and natural terrain obstacles along the roughly 800 km (497 miles) of border with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus.

In a statement, the Polish military said that rather than a single continuous line of trenches, bunkers and reinforced concrete anti-tank obstacles, the East Shield is a diversified defensive infrastructure system that incorporates the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, including the rapid increase in the use of drones and other unmanned systems.

“Depending on operational requirements, the project will also include the construction of logistics hubs, material storage facilities, fortification elements and shelters, as well as drone detection and tracking systems using radar, thermal imaging and acoustic sensors,” the statement said. “These capabilities will help effectively counter unmanned aerial systems, which, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, are being used with increasing frequency.”

Poland is seeking to make East Shield a priority project for NATO, and, as part of its discussions with allies, the nation’s military has established cooperation with Germany’s Bundeswehr.

In July 2026, the Polish Army said that a German military engineering unit had been deployed to Poland on a rotational basis to participate in developing the infrastructure.

“At the invitation of the Polish side, German soldiers are supporting the Polish Armed Forces in expanding defensive infrastructure on NATO’s north-eastern flank,” said Colonel Marek Pietrzak, a spokesperson for the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. “The involvement of the German contingent is a practical demonstration of Allied solidarity and the result of the steadily expanding military cooperation between Poland and Germany. The initiative forms part of NATO’s broader efforts to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities on the Alliance’s eastern flank.”

Meanwhile, Polish defense officials say they are in talks with Baltic and Nordic states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, to exchange experiences and join forces on border strengthening efforts.

Deputy Prime Minister and National Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz says that Poland also wants to strengthen its cooperation with the United States, the UK and France.

“Polish and German soldiers are working side by side to strengthen defensive infrastructure along the border and reinforce deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank,” Kosiniak-Kamysz said in a July 22 social media post. “This is only the beginning. Reconnaissance is underway ahead of support from French troops, and in September, reconnaissance involving American soldiers will begin.”

Denmark said in 2024 it would extend conscription to include women for the first time and increase standard service time to 11 months from four, while the number of conscripts is set to increase to 7,500 annually by 2033 from 5,000.

The new intake arrives as Denmark prepares to deploy conscripts to Greenland for the first time later this month, with a company of more than 100 soldiers set to serve for one month, taking over operational tasks from professional troops.

The deployment carries added political weight as U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly sought to annex the semi-autonomous Danish territory, citing national security, a demand firmly rejected by the governments of Greenland and Denmark.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at last month’s NATO summit in Ankara said her nation was ready to defend every inch of territory in the military alliance, “including our own”.

Silas Nohr, a 19-year-old first-day conscript from the town of Varde in western Denmark, said he welcomed the longer service period.

“Now we have 11 months, and I feel like you can really get into it, really experience it and get a lot deeper into the military,” he said.

The new recruits face five months of basic training followed by six months of operational service. The Danish Armed Forces are also introducing new conscription tracks, including a drone platoon at the Special Operations Command.

The Nordic country’s program operates as a ballot system for all healthy young adults who turn 18, but has for many years consisted almost entirely of volunteers, with the lottery used only to fill remaining quotas.

Nordic neighbors Sweden, Finland and Norway also have a conscription-based military service, as does the Baltic region of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.