Defense News convened a panel of experts to examine what it actually takes to scale missile production in today’s security environment. Panelists explored the supplier ecosystem that supports prime contractors and missile programs, with a focus on the specialized component providers that enable production capacity, reliability, and rapid replenishment. The discussion addressed where bottlenecks typically emerge across the supply chain, how trusted suppliers reduce risk and compress timelines, and what investment and operational changes are needed to expand output without compromising performance in mission-critical systems.

Watch Recording:

Guest Speakers:

• Dr. Jahara ‘FRANKY’ Matisek, Senior Fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy & Visiting Scholar at Northwestern University
• Jason Meredith, President of Solid Missile Systems, Ursa Major
• Jason Reynolds, VP of Integrated Air & Missile Defense, Lockheed Martin
• Jeffrey Coffed, Senior Industry Manager, Aerospace and Defense, Regal Rexnord

The announcement gives operational shape to the so-called “Drone Deal” signed on June 9 between Kulbergs and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the Nordic-Baltic Eight summit in Tallinn, the first meeting between the two leaders. Latvia is the sixth country to join Ukraine’s bilateral drone cooperation framework.

Under the agreement, Ukraine will supply Latvia with strike drones, ground robotic complexes, and maritime drone systems, while Latvia will supply Ukraine with domestically produced anti-drone systems, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and his Latvian counterpart Raivis Melnis previously confirmed during a meeting in Kyiv on June 13. No specifics were offered.

The Latgale region, where the new drone factory is to be built, is historically one of Latvia’s most economically disadvantaged. Kulbergs said the area needs investment and jobs, and that his government would “do everything necessary” to site the plant near the Russian border. Construction should start this year.

Moscow has been publicly outraged at the Baltic states’ alleged role in Ukraine’s drone warfare against the Russian hinterland, accusing the three small republics of opening their airspaces to Ukrainian drones on their way to strike targets over a thousand kilometers from Kyiv in Russia’s Baltic region and the St. Petersburg area.

More outlandish Russian claims have even included accusations that the Baltic States are allowing Ukraine to launch drones from their territories. The Russian foreign intelligence service SVR, which is renowned for making unsubstantiated and wildly escalatory claims regularly, published a press release with this accusation earlier this year.

The opening of the drone production facility will surely face criticism from Moscow and is all but certain to be seen as an escalatory move. It may also strengthen Russian propaganda’s case for singling out the small Baltic states as particularly hostile − and a particularly urgent problem − for Moscow.

Key details − including the plant’s precise location, cost-sharing arrangements between Riga and Kyiv, and which drone types will be produced − have not been publicly disclosed.

In addition to the joint drone factory, the Latvian prime minister also announced that counter-drone systems will begin operating along Latvia’s borders with Russia and Belarus in July and August − removing the need, he said, to scramble fighter aircraft in response to every drone incursion. “In the event of a threat from drones, we won’t have to take aircraft into the air every time, which is a very expensive and effective solution, but not the best and most productive,” Kulbergs said.

A top Latvian official previously described to Defense News a system of launch canisters stationed along the border.

Yesterday’s announcement comes against a fraught political backdrop in Riga. A suspected stray Ukrainian drone that entered Latvian airspace from Russia exploded at an oil storage facility in Rēzekne on May 7, damaging four empty fuel tanks. The incident triggered the resignation of both the defense minister and Prime Minister Evika Siliņa within days. Kulbergs took office shortly thereafter.

The company released the Saildrone Spectre design, a vessel 54 meters long and 250 metric tons that’s capable of a speed up to 30 knots, making it the company’s “most capable” platform, Salidrone said.

Spectre is meant for ASW missions, which demand “extreme endurance and an ultra-quiet acoustic signature,” according to an advanced company release shared with Military Times. The release states that the vessel utilizes the wing system’s endurance and silent propulsion to fulfill ASW operations.

Richard Jenkins, Saildrone’s founder and CEO, revealed the two vessels, one without a wing and one with, to reporters at Monday’s Sea-Air-Space Exposition and said it marked the first time the company is selling a Saildrone vessel without a wing.

“While the Saildrone wing is very good for very long endurance, we do appreciate what other roles require more stealth, more speed, and don’t have a mission requirement for that exceptional endurance without the wing,” Jenkins told reporters on Monday.

Saildrone is partnering with Lockheed Martin, who works as a “mission integrator supporting the mission autonomy,” Paul Lemmo, a vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin, said to reporters Monday alongside Jenkins.

Lemmo described the vessel class as being a lower-priced way to put more “players on the field.”

The design was approved in principle by the American Bureau of Shipping, meaning it complies with High Speed Naval Craft class certification. The statement asserts that the two years of design and testing “entirely de-risked” the design and performance.

Jenkins said Spectre is completely self-funded, and each vessel is priced at around $40 million.

Construction is set to begin soon at the Fincantieri system of shipyards in Wisconsin, which is capable of manufacturing five Spectre vessels per year. The first of the sea trials is slated for early 2027.

“Following the successful completion of our critical design review, construction on our first ASV is underway, and the ship is on track to be in the water and tested by the end of this year,” according to an Anduril statement to Military Times.

Anduril has been conducting daily at-sea testing to give insights into moving the vessel from production to operation, as it collects open-water operation data that will transfer to the first production hull when it delivers, per the statement.

Alongside HD Hyundai, Anduril is joining forces with Edison Chouest Offshore, a maritime transportation company, to produce the ASVs at their U.S. shipyards.

Speaking with reporters at the Sea-Air-Space Exposition on Monday, Anduril’s General Manager and Vice President of Surface Dominance Cory Emmons did not give a specific number of the ship’s production rate.

The vessel being built right now is set to be in the water this October, Emmons said, and its testing and sailing takes place from there. Anduril will be taking ownership of the vessel for testing off the U.S. coast by the end of 2026.

Emmons declined to comment on the vessel’s price tag.

The Army Corps of Engineers’ research and development component is working to disprove old assumptions about the risks of landing on frozen lakes and other “terrestrial ice” in hopes of opening up as much as 25% more space for soldiers to land on, take off of and even use as a base for firing and maneuvers from the aircraft.

The Corps’ Engineering Research and Development Center, or ERDC, conducted a critical test in January, completing a controlled and monitored landing with a CH-47 Chinook in Alaska’s Yukon Training Area, southeast of Fort Wainwright.

It proved that the aircraft could safely touch down on 21 inches of what researchers call “quality ice,” some 10 inches less than prescribed by the decades-old assessments that the Army still uses.

The research started around 2021 with Jenna Williams, an ERDC cold regions scientist who formerly served in the 11th Airborne Division, headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

“One of [Williams’] personnel contacted me asking, ‘Hey, can we land helicopters on ice?’” said Kevin Bjella, a research civil engineer with ERDC. “‘We don’t have that in our doctrine, and we’re just wondering, if that’s possible, what could we do to make that happen?’”

Without established doctrine, the Army has been passing up opportunities to take advantage of what might be choice landing zones, operating with an excess of caution based on old and untested assumptions. Bjella said he expressed surprise that no clear doctrine existed for ice landings. So, the team got to work.

According to ERDC officials, the 1960s-era standards that have governed ice landings in the past require 31 inches — nearly three feet — of ice to support a loaded Chinook.

“It was kind of this chicken-or-the-egg thing,” Bjella said. “It’s like, ‘Well, it isn’t in the doctrine; therefore, it isn’t safe.’ And so, what we wanted to push is, for the Army’s needs, is it perhaps actually safe? And just from a desktop perspective, it’s like, ‘Yeah, absolutely we can do this.’”

For years, the Army and the other services have been ramping up emphasis on gear, training and preparation for operating in the coldest environments.

In addition to potential future operating theaters in Asia and Europe that might require cold weather proficiency, the Pentagon has trained a wary eye on the contested Arctic, where China and Russia have made claims and where warming weather has opened new sea lanes and increased opportunities for maneuver.

Bjella also emphasized that landing on ice represents a massive expansion in the ability of the Army to operate in Alaska and other icy regions.

“When we talk about Arctic missions, lakes are just all over the place,” he said.

Researchers estimate that being able to land on lake ice confidently, with established safety parameters, will open as much as 20% to 25% more available space for pilots to consider.

As ERDC put together its research plan, Williams said scientists were interested in developing landing parameters for a range of helicopters.

They also wanted to determine if soldiers could safely jump out of fixed-wing aircraft like C-130 transports and C-17 Globemasters onto ice, and set up a makeshift base of operations there.

While ice has been used “as a mobility platform” throughout history, as Bjella put it, some of the work had to do with changing incorrect thinking about the risks involved.

“The hard part is the risk assessment of it. They’ve got multi-million dollar aircraft that they don’t want to get wet,” Williams said. “[Commanders imagine that the second they land down on that ice, it’s going to be too thin. They’re going straight through. So, a lot of it is education and teaching them that it’s okay and you’re not going to go straight through, and even if the ice does break, that’s not how it breaks, and your aircraft is still going to be safe.”

Testing and validation has involved pressure transducers to measure how far the ice gets pushed down into the water below in a helicopter landing, along with other factors like ice fatigue — how many times or how long an aircraft can land in one spot before the ice becomes less reliable.

Along with new doctrine, one of the goals of the research is to disseminate a smartphone app called “Ice Guardian” that does calculations based on available information and determines if ice is landable.

While a version of the app has already been revealed, it was never pushed into broad circulation with soldiers in the Arctic.

“Right now, it’s a lot of communication with unit leadership,” Williams said. “We have a lot of buy-in from [Fort Wainwright’s 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment]. They want the app, like, last month. … But then also socializing it with the aviation units [and] potentially doing some sit-down classes with a few leaders, and just teaching them how to use the app.”

Interest also extends beyond Alaska-based units, they said.

“The more northern [units], especially National Guard, they’re tasked with putting out ribbon bridges and things like that, [as well as] Special Forces,” Bjella said. “We’re getting a lot of inquiries about utilizing ice in general.”

The companies’ tie-up follows sea trials, funded by the United States Office of Naval Research, during which Saildrone’s Surveyor USV, equipped with Thales’ BlueSentry sensor package, operated almost uninterrupted for 26 days.

Conducted off the coast of California, the tests demonstrated that the systems detected and classified underwater and surface threats, with an uptime averaging more than 96%, according to Saildrone.

In the context of underwater drones, the notion of “uptime” generally refers to the percentage of time the system is available and able to perform its intended missions continuously.

“The trials showed that, under wind propulsion, the Surveyor provided a near-zero self-noise environment, significantly improving the detection capabilities of the BlueSentry sonar system,” a Saildrone press release stated.

A fleet of USVs, integrated with these sonar arrays, is intended to be able to operate for extended periods of time, autonomously patrolling large ocean areas and reduce the costs of coverage, per the Thales website.

The companies said that the team-up could pave the way for greater “naval interoperability” between the trilateral AUKUS partners – Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States – and deliver on the security partnership’s technology-focused Pillar 2 scope. That line of work is intended to harness the joint industrial and innovation bases of the three countries to ensure that their respective militaries are equipped with advanced and interoperable capabilities.

While during the trials the systems relied on Starlink and Iridium satellite communications, Saildrone recently announced a GPS-denied option not reliant on satellites.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) issued new guidance following President Trump’s Executive Order designating drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. The Trump Administration’s stance represents a pivotal and long-overdue shift in US counter-narcotics and counterterrorism policy.

Cartels and other TCOs have long exploited the sovereignty of countries lacking the capacity or, in some cases, the will to control them. These groups operate with near impunity within the borders of countries like Mexico. In contrast, despite its vast resources and capabilities, the US upholds international norms that respect state sovereignty. Historically, US enforcement efforts relied on coordination with host countries to combat cartels, but this dependence has often been a double-edged sword. While collaboration is essential for effective cross-border operations, it limits the US’s ability to act decisively against these organizations when host governments are unable or unwilling to cooperate fully.

By formally naming cartels and other TCOs as existential threats to national security, the Trump administration elevated them to the same threat level as terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Just as ISIS destabilized entire regions of the Middle East through violence, terror, and global criminal networks, cartels have similarly evolved into sophisticated, quasi-insurgent entities that undermine governance, fuel mass violence, and wreak havoc on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.

Mexican cartels and other TCOs dominate the production and trafficking of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine, accounting for over 80 percent of illicit drugs entering the US. Since the early 2000s, over 700,000 Americans have died from opioid overdoses. Beyond drugs, according to a US House Committee on Homeland Security report, in 2021, cartels earned an estimated $13 billion in human trafficking. Of equal importance, thousands of Mexicans—including politicians, students, and journalists—die in battling the counter-narco-terror conflict every year. Mexico has seen more than 431,000 homicides since 2006.

Addressing Near-Peer Competitors and Emerging Threats

President Trump’s executive order characterizes cartels as national security threats that have “functionally controlled nearly all illegal traffic across the southern border of the United States.” These groups are responsible for committing acts of violence that destabilize both Mexico and the US. New Trump directives indicate that halting the flow of fentanyl and other illicit substances is no longer sufficient and instead has shifted focus to the “total elimination” of cartels and TCOs.

In his first administration, President Trump shifted US defense priorities toward countering near-peer competitors. The Trump national security assessment recognized that the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism, which dominated US defense policy for nearly two decades, had come at the expense of addressing challenges posed by rival nation-states like China and Russia. Trump’s national security plans formalized this pivot, declaring that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”

The US needed to shift. The global war on terror had achieved significant milestones, including the decimation of ISIS and al-Qaeda’s diminished capacity to carry out large-scale attacks on US soil. The prolonged focus on counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere drained the US and its allies’ resources and attention from emerging threats posed by near-peer competitors. China’s rapid military modernization and economic expansion, coupled with Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and its interference in Western democracies, were seen as existential challenges to American power and influence, both of which continue to exist.

Regardless of the US defense priority pivot from counterterrorism to great power competition, cartels, and TCOs have long exploited a legal and strategic gray area, allowing them to flourish. The lack of clear categorization as traditional criminal enterprises or terrorist organizations enables these groups to operate with relative impunity. The resulting ambiguity in enforcement frameworks creates a vacuum that cartels skillfully exploit to expand influence and power. These organizations have evolved into quasi-governmental entities, controlling vast territories in Mexico, dominating drug trafficking routes, and flooding American communities with lethal substances like fentanyl. Yet, with the US drawing attention back to counterterror groups and including Cartels in TCOs in these groups, the gray area has essentially vanished.

DOJ’s Push for the Elimination of Cartels as National Security Threats

Newly confirmed Attorney General (AG) Pam Bondi issued the latest policy memo outlining its approach to prosecuting cartels and TCOs as a step toward addressing organized terrorist threats requiring the full weight of US national security resources. The memo calls for the complete elimination of cartels and TCOs, highlighting the need for a change in mindset—moving beyond mitigating the damage these groups cause and towards a more aggressive, proactive strategy. It stresses that halting the flow of deadly substances like fentanyl is no longer sufficient; instead, the US must marshal the full resources of the DOJ and empower federal prosecutors to collaborate urgently with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other government agencies to eliminate threats to US sovereignty and national security.

Furthermore, AG Bondi’s directive removes what the DOJ defines as bureaucratic impedances. One of the most significant policy shifts is the prioritization of terrorism-related charges for cartel leaders. Under the new directives, prosecutors can file terrorism charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B alongside traditional charges like drug trafficking and racketeering. This change allows for far harsher penalties, including life sentences or capital punishment, for those leading these violent organizations. Prosecutors no longer need to go through the usual lengthy review process before filing charges that could lead to the death penalty for individuals linked to cartels or TCOs. Because these cases are considered urgent public safety threats, the process is streamlined, allowing prosecutors to act more quickly.

Secondly, the DOJ has suspended the approval requirements traditionally administered by the National Security Division for filing most terrorism charges, International Emergency Economic Powers Act charges, and seeking search warrants related to such cases. The suspension significantly accelerates the timeline for terrorism-related cases involving cartels and TCOs. Removing the need for prior authorization from the National Security Division allows prosecutors to file charges, obtain search warrants, and apply for material witness warrants more swiftly. This change eliminates delays in the traditional approval process, enabling law enforcement to act quickly in high-priority cases that pose immediate threats to public safety or national security.

Expanding Legal Tools to Combat Cartels and the Fentanyl Crisis

Under AG Bondi’s leadership, the DOJ is actively pursuing legislative reforms to strengthen its fight against cartels and address the fentanyl crisis. Historically, both Congress and the Executive Branch have been slow to respond to drug-related public health emergencies. For instance, the Food and Drug Administration took nearly a decade to address the deceptive marketing practices of Purdue Pharma, which contributed significantly to the opioid epidemic. In a 2020 press release, the DOJ announced that Purdue admitted to conspiring to defraud the US from May 2007 through at least March 2017 by obstructing the lawful function of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Purdue also admitted guilt in conspiring to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute.

Despite escalating fentanyl-related deaths and economic harm, it was not until October 26, 2017, that Acting Health and Human Services Secretary Eric D. Hargan declared the opioid crisis a public health emergency under President Trump’s first administration. Congress followed a year later with the passage of the SUPPORT Act in 2018, a comprehensive legislative effort aimed at addressing opioid addiction through expanded Medicaid coverage, treatment programs, and harm reduction measures.

While the SUPPORT Act was a step forward, it did not sufficiently address fentanyl’s unique challenges. It neglected to focus on synthetic opioids, failed to implement adequate enforcement measures, delayed funding for harm reduction tools, and did not tackle emerging drug trends tied to fentanyl’s synthetic nature, potency, and ease of production. Congress did take additional steps and passed a temporary scheduling order to classify fentanyl-related substances as Schedule I drugs under the Controlled Substances Act.

These measures were repeatedly extended through continuing resolutions but failed to provide a permanent solution with the 2023 legislation proposal for the Halt All Lethal Trafficking of Fentanyl Act. This resolution seeks to classify all fentanyl-related substances as Schedule I permanently, impose the strictest controls and penalties for trafficking these substances, and streamline research into fentanyl analogs to understand effects and medical utilization better.

However, critics raise concerns about the legislation’s reliance on punitive measures, which could arguably exacerbate racial disparities in the criminal justice system and divert resources from public health solutions. Advocacy groups and some lawmakers call for a more balanced approach prioritizing harm reduction, treatment, and prevention alongside enforcement. Additionally, some scientists warn that permanently scheduling all fentanyl-related substances without evaluating potential benefits could hinder research into life-saving treatments for overdoses.

As of February 9, 2025, the HALT Fentanyl Act has passed the US House of Representatives but has not yet become law. Despite these efforts, critics argue that Congress’s actions have been reactive rather than proactive, allowing fentanyl trafficking and fentanyl-related deaths to escalate dramatically.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Congress must classify xylazine, a veterinary sedative increasingly discovered in illicit drug supplies, as a Schedule III controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act. The rising prevalence of xylazine in street drugs, often mixed with fentanyl, results in devastating public health consequences, including overdoses that remain unaffected by naloxone. Federal scheduling would standardize control across states to eliminate critical gaps traffickers exploit, enable more effective testing and interdiction efforts, and empower law enforcement agencies to act decisively.

Additionally, Congress must designate large-scale fentanyl trafficking as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Fentanyl’s unparalleled lethality—just two milligrams can prove fatal—and capacity for mass harm make it a clear candidate for WMD classification under federal law. Such a designation would grant federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Agency, the authority to coordinate resources and strategies at an unprecedented level. Furthermore, this policy shift would underscore the gravity of the fentanyl crisis to international partners and adversaries, signaling a commitment to safeguarding US citizens and national security while deterring misuse by malicious actors.

Cumulatively, these legislative actions represent a comprehensive framework to combat the intertwined threats of xylazine and fentanyl trafficking. By classifying xylazine as a controlled substance and designating large-scale fentanyl trafficking as a WMD, Congress would significantly enhance the US’ ability to protect public health, strengthen national security, and assert the needed leadership in the global fight against cartels and TCOs.

Nicholas Dockery is a national security professional and military policy expert. He is a decorated Green Beret and combat veteran—awarded two Silver Stars and two Purple Hearts. He is also a White House Fellow, Wayne Downing Scholar, and a United States Military Academy and Yale University graduate.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Government, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

President Trump swiftly stepped into action during his first week since returning to the White House, declaring drug cartels pose an unprecedented national security threat, far surpassing the dangers of traditional organized crime. These cartels have waged a relentless “campaign of violence and terror” across the Western Hemisphere, destabilizing regions and flooding the United States with deadly drugs, violent criminals, and ruthless gangs. In the face of this growing crisis, United States continues to face a devastating fentanyl crisis that has evolved into a national emergency, threatening public health, economic stability, and national security. This synthetic opioid, originally developed as an intravenous anesthetic in the 1960s, has become the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18 to 45.

Over the past 25 years, more than 727,000 Americans have died from opioid overdoses, marking a tenfold increase in mortality rates from 1999 to 2022. Nearly half of these deaths occurred between 2017 and 2022, with 81,806 lives lost in 2022 alone. Synthetic opioids, primarily illegally manufactured fentanyl, contribute an estimated 90 percent of these deaths.

Global Supply Chain, Geopolitical Challenges, and the Role of Transnational Criminal Organizations

The global supply chain for fentanyl involves complex geopolitical dynamics, particularly with the Peoples Republic of China and Mexican Cartels. From 2014 to 2019, approximately 70-80 percent of confiscated fentanyl in the United States originated in Chinese labs. Today, most fentanyl is produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals sourced from China. Mexican cartels, including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel, dominate this trade by leveraging alliances with Chinese triads to access chemical precursors.

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) play a significant role in facilitating the movement of these dangerous substances, exploiting economic disparities and endemic corruption within state institutions and security forces. These organized crime groups have shifted their focus toward synthetic drugs due to their high potency and compact nature, making them easier to smuggle while yielding higher profits than traditional narcotics.

The cartels employ sophisticated tactics to evade detection, including mislabeling shipments, pressing fentanyl into counterfeit prescription pills, and exploiting regulatory loopholes. They utilize existing logistical networks to move substances through Mexican ports and into the United States via multiple routes, including land, air, and sea. Concentrated illicit activities in strategic locations suggest advantages for smuggling operations, even in high-volume legal cargo areas.

Socioeconomic Impact and Economic Toll

The socioeconomic consequences of the fentanyl crisis are profound. The National Survey on Drug Use and Health reveals a troubling trend among Americans under the age of 25, with nearly 40 percent engaging in illicit drug use in the past year. This demographic is also the least likely to seek treatment for substance use disorders, highlighting a critical gap in intervention efforts.

The crisis has disproportionately affected certain communities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Black and Latino populations experienced the steepest increases in overdose mortality rates. In 2020, Black males in Washington, D.C., faced the highest recorded mortality rate, with 134 fentanyl overdose deaths per 100,000—9.4 times the rate for White males.

The economic toll is staggering. The US Joint Economic Committee estimated that the opioid crisis cost the country $1.5 trillion in 2020, a 37 percent increase from 2017. This figure encompasses healthcare costs, lost productivity, criminal justice expenses, and reduced quality of life for overdose survivors. The crisis has significantly impacted the US labor market, accounting for 43 percent of the decline in men’s labor force participation rate and 25 percent for women between 1999 and 2015.

Implications for National Security

The fentanyl crisis has evolved into a significant national security threat, diminishing the United States’ ability to protect its national interests. It creates challenges for military recruitment, mobilization, and vital industries. The pervasiveness of the epidemic and its ties to TCOs create vulnerabilities that foreign actors, like the PRC, can exploit. The effects of fentanyl and the necessary efforts to combat it reduce American power and strain resources, preventing their allocation to more productive and beneficial purposes.

The global nature of fentanyl production and trafficking has cemented its position as a critical component of geopolitical competition and US foreign policy. With the supply chain primarily running through China and Mexico, addressing this crisis is inherently a diplomatic challenge. U.S.-Mexico relations have been strained by decades of failed counternarcotics cooperation despite substantial investments.

Historical efforts such as Operation Fast and Furious—a covert operation allowing firearms trafficking without Mexican consent—and strategies like targeting cartel leaders have only exacerbated violence while failing to dismantle drug networks effectively. The Kingpin Strategy, designed to combat drug cartels by assassinating high-level leaders, has ironically resulted in increased violence. An analysis revealed that 415 additional deaths were associated with the plan during its first four years of implementation under Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s administration.

The Need for Comprehensive Action

The first administration of President Donald Trump focused intensely on controlling migration flows from Mexico, inadvertently granting Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration significant leverage in bilateral relations. By regulating the flow of migrants to the US border, Mexico effectively deflected US pressure on other critical issues, including fentanyl trafficking and the erosion of democratic institutions. The manipulation of leveraging immigration against the US in place of assistance in combating drug warfare created a political impasse that limited US influence on Mexican policy.

The fentanyl crisis represents a nexus of public health emergency, economic disruption, and geopolitical challenge. Its impacts reverberate through communities, workplaces, and international relations with stark disparities across racial and age demographics. As fentanyl continues to reshape American society and foreign policy, it demands a response that is as robust as the crisis itself. An America First plan would include:

• Enhancing intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities to disrupt TCO operations and supply chains.
• Strengthening border security measures and interdiction efforts using advanced technologies and increased personnel.
• Implementing economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on nations facilitating the production and trafficking of fentanyl and its precursors.
• Developing robust public health initiatives to address addiction, including expanded access to treatment and harm reduction programs.
• Investing in research and developing non-addictive pain management alternatives and improved detection technologies.
• Reforming domestic policies to address the root causes of addiction, including socioeconomic disparities and mental health issues.
• Enhancing international cooperation through multilateral agreements and joint law enforcement operations.
• Implementing strategic communication campaigns to raise awareness about the dangers of fentanyl and combat misinformation.

The fentanyl crisis represents a clear and present danger to US national security, requiring a coordinated, sustained, and comprehensive response. By leveraging diplomatic, military, economic, and social instruments of national power, the United States can work towards mitigating this threat and safeguarding its citizens and interests. The complexity and scale of this challenge necessitate innovative strategies, cross-sector collaboration, and a long-term commitment to addressing both the supply and demand sides of this deadly epidemic.

Nicholas Dockery is a national security professional and military policy expert. He is a decorated Green Beret and combat veteran—awarded two Silver Stars and two Purple Hearts. He is also a White House Fellow, Wayne Downing Scholar, and a United States Military Academy and Yale University graduate.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Government, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.