“The assumptions of 2010 [Strategic Defence and Security Review] — that we were always going to be part of a U.S. coalition — is really just not where we are going to be,” Ben Wallace said in an interview with the Sunday Times on Jan 12.

Justifying Britain’s need to rethink how much it can rely on its key ally in the future, Wallace said: “Over the last year we’ve had the U.S. pull out from Syria, the statement by [U.S. President] Donald Trump on Iraq where he said NATO should take over and do more in the Middle East.”

The thought of the U.S. relinquishing its leadership role “keeps me awake at night,” he said.

“It would be bad for the world and bad for us,” he added. “We plan for the worst and hope for the best.”

The British government recently began a thorough review of the currently underfunded military, a move that could radically reshape the armed forces and their capabilities.

Wallace also used the interview to make a pitch for investment in capabilities.

“We are very dependent on American air cover and American intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. We need to diversify our assets,” he said.

Howard Wheeldon, of defense consultancy Wheeldon Strategic Advisory, said he admires the underlying tone of Wallace’s interview, affordability will remain a serious stumbling block.

“To believe that even if we have now raised our international ambitions and accepted the need for raised presence that, all of a sudden, we are going to reverse decades of scaling back defense capacity is quite frankly at odds with Downing Street and Treasury messaging,” Wheeldon said. “Thus, whilst I might love the gist of a belief to be less reliant on others and spend more on developing what we believe we might need in the future, it will take a lot more convincing that what Mr. Wallace is attempting to say is merely anything more than an effort to balance what others are suggesting in the form of further defense cutbacks.”

The government plans to complete the defense review this year, possibly ahead of the governmentwide spending review timed for September. The spending review will likely focus on health and infrastructure projects in northern Britain rather than defense. Prime Minister Boris Johnson promised the defense review would be the most “radical reassessment” of Britain’s place in the word since the end of the Cold War.

Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Nick Carter also recently weighed into the defense review debate. In a speech at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London just before Christmas, Carter said the review must be upfront about the state of the military, noting government actions that have risked military readiness and resilience in the pursuit of efficiency.

In December, Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, became the first official from the government of Volodymyr Zelenskiy to visit Washington. Speaking at the German Marshall Fund on Dec. 13, Kuleba said joining NATO and the European Union is vital amid his country’s ongoing conflict with Russia.

“We are moving [our country] West, to full member in the EU and NATO. We do it in a discouraging environment because EU is not even giving us a promise of European membership. NATO says, ‘doors are open,’ and one day we’ll become members, but that day is not specified or marked in red anywhere on the calendar,” Kuleba said. “But we are still doing it, because we are not doing it either for EU or for NATO — we are doing it for our country.”

Ukraine signed a partnership agreement with NATO in 1997 and launched talks on full membership in 2005. But those talks never progressed far, and the situation was dramatically complicated when Russia invaded Ukrainian territory in 2014, annexing Crimea and launching irregular warfare in other parts of the country.

Kay Bailey Hutchison, America’s ambassador to NATO, told Defense News in 2018 that she was open to both Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO if they can figure out the details.

“I think, by and large, every one of us [allies] wants to have more members that are in our sphere because we don’t want them to go into the Russian sphere and cause more problems and more disruptions,” she said.

Kuleba, in his comments, described a “very simple ambition” to make NATO members view Ukraine as a desirable asset. And Ukraine’s plan to convince the alliance to accept it as a member is a simple one: Just keep showing up.

For its part, Ukraine spent 3.8 percent of its gross domestic product on defense in 2018, according to the World Bank, meaning the country surpassed the 2 percent target that is a major focus for U.S. President Donald Trump and a goal set by NATO.

In addition, Kuleba explained, “we integrate Ukraine in as many fields and markets when it comes to the EU, or fields of cooperation with NATO, as possible, so one day the guys in Brussels in NATO and EU look around and say: ‘Oh, these Ukrainians are already everywhere, so why shouldn’t we make this next step?’ And that’s what we’ve been doing in the last three months [since the new government took over]. We adopted laws, we intensified political dialogue, we adopted bylaws, we engaged in very ambitious conversations with both EU and NATO.”

“We do not only want to receive support from NATO. We are also contributing to NATO security, to NATO operations,” including in Afghanistan, he added. “What we want to hear from NATO is: ‘Guys, we are ready to let you here, we want you to be there, we can help you with the following reforms so that you introduce those famous NATO standards in your life.’ ”

Ian Brzezinski, of the Atlantic Council, sees Kuleba’s comments as “a clear commitment to trans-Atlantic ambition, a clear expression of determination and a clear sense of realism.” The strategy of acting as “de-facto ally” is a solid one that, if executed properly over time, should help enable Ukraine to build up political support among NATO members, the analyst told Defense News.

But NATO politics can be tricky. Internal politics can scuttle agreements, as exemplified by Greece’s longstanding hold on Macedonia’s path to membership, which eventually led the latter nation to rename itself to appease Athens. Ukraine is currently embroiled in a political fight with Hungary, a NATO member who would have a vote. Other nations, such as France, have a history of skepticism about enlargement. In addition, Ukraine’s involvement in the Trump impeachment saga could have political repercussions.

Then there is the reality that Ukraine is itself still embroiled in conflict, and nations would likely be concerned about letting in a country that could immediately invoke Article 5, requiring military aid from the allied nations.

Georgian ‘brothers and sisters’

Ukraine is also eyeing another pathway through Georgia — who Kuleba described as “brothers and sisters” to Ukraine — in the form of a joint push for membership.

In many ways, the situation is the same between the two nations; like Ukraine, Georgia has dealt with ongoing Russian military incursions into its territory, dating back to 2008. And like Ukraine, Georgia abuts Russia on the Black Sea, a key strategic area for Moscow.

That last point is another argument made by Kyiv, said Kuleba. “If you [NATO] really want to create strategic balance against Russia in the Black Sea, you cannot achieve that without aligning with Ukraine and Georgia,” he said. “You are strong, but having us on board will make you even stronger.”

Brzezinski is skeptical that either Georgia or Ukraine would have a significant impact on the naval balance of power in the Black Sea anytime soon, but he noted that generating a more robust regional presence is something for NATO members to consider. And while there is precedent for countries joining NATO as a bloc, he warned that there are risks associated with that approach.

“If one nation does a reversal in terms of its democratic stability, its reforms, it could impede the other’s integration. The two countries have to both be making demonstrable and substantive progress in meeting the alliance’s political, economic and military standards,” Brzezinski said.

On the broader question of whether Ukraine and Georgia, currently embroiled in conflict as they are, should be able to join the alliance, Brzezinski espouses a view that “if you say we’ll never let a country into NATO that’s being attacked by Russia, that’s just an invitation to Russia to initiate hostilities.”

But the analyst acknowledges those ongoing conflicts are a “factor” that NATO members should consider.

Kuleba acknowledged the problem, saying that Zelenskiy is “committed” to ending the conflict in Ukraine. But, Kuleba noted, “until Russia changes its approach, its position, we can jump out of our skin; but we cannot do it on our own.”

Rachel Ellehuus, a former principal director for European and NATO policy in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, is skeptical that NATO will invite in two nations embroiled in conflict with Russia. But she sees another model that could apply to both Ukraine and Georgia, where the two nations are tied closely to European institutions without formally joining them.

“The obvious models to follow here are the Nordics. In the case of Sweden and Finland, neither is a member of NATO, but it is hard to envision a conflict in Northern Europe that does not involve them and/or where their immediate neighbors would not come to their aid,” said Ellehuus, who now works as the deputy director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“The Nordics have even taken steps recently to enhance these heretofore informal arrangements, such as establishing emergency hotlines among them and concluding formal access agreements. Likewise, Norway and Iceland are not members of the EU but are, with a few exceptions, very much aligned with EU standards, laws, etc.”

By Wednesday morning, Iran’s strike against U.S. bases in Iraq had failed to ignite a full-out war because no Americans were hurt. The attack followed the killing of Quds Force leader Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. drone strike, which Washington officials have tried to frame as an act of self-defense.

President Donald Trump seemed intent on taking the apparent de-escalation to the bank as a foreign policy victory during a midweek White House address. But he wanted concessions from Europe.

The work week ended Friday with officials in Brussels having rebuffed Trump on one demand outright — that Europe should abandon the Iran nuclear deal — while buying time on another: a greater role for NATO in “the Middle East process,” as the president phrased it.

Coming out of an emergency session of foreign ministers, European Union chief diplomat Josep Borrell told reporters Friday evening that the bloc would strive to uphold the nuclear accord with Iran so long as the country returns to its obligations.

“It is clear that we are in a completely different position from the United States,” Borrell said.

At the same time, he allowed that differences between the remaining treaty parties could at some point become so irreconcilable that the accord would die and United Nations sanctions against Iran would go back into effect.

The United States withdrew from the deal in May 2018, fulfilling a Trump campaign promise of nixing what he considered an ineffective attempt at denying Iran nuclear weapons. The Europeans, most notably France, the United Kingdom and Germany, have held on to the pact’s promise, arguing its provisions for keeping close tabs on Tehran’s atomic activities are the most certain means for preventing nuclear proliferation.

Iran for its part has abandoned several of its commitments under the pact. Following the Soleimani killing on Jan. 3, the regime announced it would no longer adhere to a limit of installed centrifuges needed for enriching uranium.

While that step may seem like a keen escalation, it could quickly be reversed, especially because Iran has upheld the monitoring and verification regime included in the deal, said Kelsey Davenport, an analyst with the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

With oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency still apparently intact, “any dash to the bomb would be quickly detected,” Davenport argued.

“Europeans view the nuclear deal as a significant foreign policy achievement,” she said. At the same time, Europeans could come to rethink their stance if Iran continues to test the limits, she added.

Besides the Iran deal, the suddenly fragile ground for cooperation with Iraq in the fight against the Islamic State group is occupying the minds of European leaders. That is because Baghdad seems poised to throw foreign troops — stationed there to push back ISIS and train local forces — out of the country following the American drone strike that also killed an Iraqi militia leader.

“Iraq is our most important concern,” Borrell said, noting that EU members have built “an association” with Baghdad that permeates not only security cooperation but also economic ties.

That is, presumably, where Trump wants the European NATO members to step up.

The alliance already manages a training mission in Iraq, but NATO could do more, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged in a news conference on Thursday when asked about the U.S. president’s push.

But he demurred on details, hinting only that NATO has the requisite command structure for larger missions. “We already do a lot,” Stoltenberg said, referring to the alliance’s fight against ISIS. “I welcome the fact that now we are looking into what more we can do.”

His comments come as nations contributing forces to the counterterrorism fight in Iraq try to make sense of their military commitments among a changing playing field.

German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stressed in comments to reporters this week that the Iraqi government’s invitation is a cornerstone of the German parliament’s mandate to send any troops at all. Amid the uncertainty, dozens of Bundeswehr soldiers have already left the country, though officials have said the armed forces are ready to return to normal operations when circumstances allow it.

“Stoltenberg is trying to buy time,” Christian Mölling, an analyst with the Berlin-based German Council on Foreign Relations, told Defense News when asked about what more NATO could do in Iraq. “The idea of forcing a decision now as everybody is thinking about leaving, even if only temporarily, would be dead on arrival in the capitals.”

At the same time, the White House likely will continue to press for European answers on relieving U.S. troops in the region, he added.

“Today, I am going to ask NATO to become much more involved in the Middle East process,” Trump said in his national address. The president also called for “the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia and China” to “break away from the remnants of the Iran deal, or JCPOA, and we must all work together toward making a deal with Iran that makes the world a safer and more peaceful place.”

While it’s unclear what he meant by “Middle East process,” it appears Trump wants NATO to have a greater presence in the region. An alliance spokesperson said Trump had a phone call Wednesday with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in which Trump “asked the secretary general for NATO to become more involved in the Middle East.”

The two men “agreed that NATO could contribute more to regional stability and the fight against international terrorism,” per the NATO readout of the call. “They also agreed to stay in close contact on the issue.”

For that to happen, analysts agree Trump has his work cut out for him in convincing skeptical allies to invest more in a region that is far from the North Atlantic.

Broadly speaking, alliance members are more concerned with Russia than the Middle East. They have supported American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan largely out of a desire to be seen as supporting Washington. But that becomes even more complicated given Trump’s tense relationship with the alliance; he has spent his presidency describing NATO as outdated and lambasting allies for what he consider a lack of burden-sharing and defense spending.

“Trump has little credibility to be asking NATO to do more, having mostly bashed the organization for years,” said Erik Brattberg, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Europe Program. “While some NATO leaders, like [French President Emmanuel Macron], have called for a stronger NATO role in the Middle East and North Africa, most leaders are skeptical. At the recent NATO meeting in London, alliance leaders made clear their primary focus is deterring Russia, not deploying in the Middle East.”

Jim Townsend, a former Pentagon official now with the Center for a New American Security, was more blunt, saying Trump’s comments show administration officials “still don’t get what NATO does.”

“They crap on NATO and allies, and then when they need friends they turn to NATO, even when what they need help doing should be done by others,” Townsend said. “I can’t imagine what they think NATO is going to do.”

Chris Skaluba, a former Defense Department official who now works at the Atlantic Council, warned the killing of Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani last week in a U.S. airstrike likely makes Europeans more hesitant to get involved in the region.

“The Suleimani killing has really upset them, in the sense that they didn’t get the heads up for something that was clearly going to be a major escalation,” Skaluba said. “There is a general unhappiness with what has happened, aimed at the Trump administration. So I don’t think the Europeans are necessarily waiting around hoping Washington will call and ask for help.”

Added Brattberg: “Trump’s unilateral handling of the Iran situation and the recent escalation means that Europeans are even less likely to want to get involved militarily in the Middle East. If Trump pulls out of Iraq or Syria, it will be virtually impossible for Europeans to keep troops in those places.”

That means the administration is going to need a strong diplomatic strategy if it wants NATO to line up with a harder line against Iran, especially if it means deploying more European forces to the region only days after a number of nations announced they were suspending operations in Iraq over safety concerns.

“It’s not good enough for the president to say he wants Europe more involved,” Skaluba said. “The U.S. is going to have to present a framework for what that [might] look like, be specific of what it wants and then do the hard diplomacy to convince nations to get on board. A lot of that takes place capital to capital and secretary to secretary. Once you have momentum among key allies, you can bring it to NATO and push NATO to broad action.”

However, Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, said the president’s goal of expanding Europe’s involvement in Mideast security is “really important.”

“There’s been some divisions because of differences of opinion over the JCPOA,” said Thornberry, the ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee. “So that’s done now. To be effective when it comes to Iran, we need to have our European and other rallies with us — NATO, being together, our Middle Eastern friends and allies being together. I think that can make for a much more effective policy.”

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo “has a lot of work to do with NATO allies on: OK, now that JCPOA is over, how are we going to be together, whether its sanctions or other sorts of economic, diplomatic pressures on Iran to give up their nuclear program truly, but also address the other issues?” Thornberry added.

Should the administration manage to wrangle the alliance, questions remain about what NATO members are willing to do. Brattberg expects the alliance’s role will “continue to be limited to small-scale training operations,” such as the mission associated with combating the Islamic State group.

Skaluba, for his part, doesn’t see “any prospects for NATO to do anything immediately in terms of sending troops, but I do suspect if this becomes a sustained sort of conflict, you will see NATO, or at least individual nations, more involved than they are right now.” But he also said NATO plays an important role as a “forum” for discussing the region.

“It’s a readymade place where 29 allies, particularly the big ones, have a venue to get together and talk about what is happening and try to figure out best actions for both NATO and individual members,” he said. “So I do think it’s a forum for consultation on Iran and the Middle East. Using it that way makes a ton of sense.”

During a recent visit to Washington, Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist shared his thoughts on the security situation in the region and what the next few years may bring.

You signed the trilateral agreement with the U.S. and Finland roughly 18 months ago. What has come out of it so far?

It’s a strong platform for the cooperation that we have now and that we’ll have in the future. What we have seen during this time is that we have exercised together, shared information and we are in a development process where we build stability in our part of Europe. It’s very important [to have] U.S. presence in northern Europe because of the security situation and because of what we can see has happened in Russia. We have a history of Russian aggression against Europe, annexation of Crimea, ongoing war in Ukraine and upgrading of Russian military capabilities, and also behavior on the Baltic sea that from time to time we see as provocative.

Finland and Sweden are two nonaligned countries, but we cooperate inside the NATO partnership and we also cooperate directly with different countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis. We both see that the trans-Atlantic link is very important for the stability and threshold in our part of Europe.

Are exercises the biggest deliverable from the agreement?

It’s a combination. Exercises and training is one thing. And exercise and cooperation to create interoperability, possibility of interoperability. When you are planning for exercises like this, you also share information. We have also our own relationship, our own materiel, so there are many things that [impact] each other, so we cannot talk only about one topic.

You mentioned information sharing, which has been a challenge for U.S. partners and allies in the past. How would you characterize info sharing among the three nations?

I think we have a good relationship. From the Swedish side, we have high-level competence about our region, and what has happened in that region. So I think that can be also something that is very interesting for the United States. The information is also connected to what [we are doing].

What is your assessment of Russia right now? Same as the last few years, getting calmer or becoming more aggressive?

I can only see that they are ready to use military power to fulfill political goals. That’s No. 1. I also see a development, all these years, that they invest more and more in military capabilities. And I can also see that they exercise and operate in more and more complex levels. And they have an interest in the Arctic region and operate there with their resources they have in the Navy.

What is your impression of the security situation in the Baltics?

I think it’s very, very important for the Baltic states that the [NATO] Enhanced Forward Presence is represented there and working there. I think it’s very important for them, the U.S. participation in these countries. And I think that they also feel the pressure around different sorts of information operations from the Russian side. The threshold is very important for them and it’s very important for all the region because we are all in the same geographical area, and if something happens in the wrong place, it affects all of us.

Many of the nations in the region have talked about a constant barrage of cyberattacks. Where is Sweden on its cyber capabilities?

We are working on that. We have 100,000 activities toward Sweden in the cyber arena each year. That comes from private persons, that comes from organizations and also state actors. It’s authorities, companies, governmental organizations. We [are developing] the organization to defend ourselves. We have a decision in parliament that in the defense forces [we] should develop active cyber.

But more and more we train ourselves to follow all this information operations and disinformation operations, and we are now preparing to build up an authority for local defense, a state authority for local defense.

How much of that mission falls under the Ministry of Defence?

It’s not decided yet. We are only prepared for that. It has not been decided in which ministry that will be responsible. Everything about cyber in defense is under our ministry. We have reactivated conscription service, and some conscripts will do their service in cyber defense.

American officials have raised a number of concerns about the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation program, or PESCO, in particular over how it could impact NATO planning and non-EU firms. As a non-NATO country, how do you look at PESCO?

I think that around PESCO we have a very clear position: We say that we do not want any discrimination of companies that are owned by, for example, the U.S. or U.K. interests. We have those sort of companies in Sweden, and we try to fight for regulations that do not discriminate. There is no final solution about how to deal with this in the European Union, but we have our position and we try to get some sort of respect for it. So we are in that process now, but we have no suggestion that we can agree upon, all of us.

How effective are you finding PESCO?

It’s a possibility for different countries and companies to cooperate around material projects that can be useful inside the European Union. I think that can be, from a point of view, good and interesting, but then you need rules. You [should] not have any discrimination of companies that work in different countries for many, many years, and are rooted in these countries and also are part of their defense industry, with direct connection to their own forces in that country.

So from our perspective, we will have no discrimination around this. We are in an early stage. If you want to go somewhere, you must start somewhere, so it is a process we can develop in the coming years.

What are your thoughts on the idea of an EU military force?

We have a agreement between NATO and the EU that we are going to cooperate around hybrid and cyber, and we should be complementary to each other. And I think that is a good agreement, so we have to work from that position. We are not competitors.

Do you think everyone in the EU agrees with that? The idea seems to pop up consistently.

That is the agreement that we have. Form time to time it is popping up that the European Union should build some sort armed forces, but it is not what we have said in the agreement between the countries. So in an open arena you can have your ideas, you can express them. But that is not the same as the organization accepting it. You see these sort of ideas from time to time, but what is agreed upon is that we have to cooperate and be complementary to each other.

While the U.S. National Defense Strategy identifies both Russia and China as competitors, the actions and statements of defense officials show a prioritization of dealing with China. Does it make you nervous that the U.S. is shifting focus eastward?

I think we need to handle both of these challenges. I think Russia will not change. It’s very important to uphold the European Union sanctions because of what is happening in Crimea, and to be clear when we see upgrading of their military capability and their activities, I think this is something we have to handle for many years now. So I don’t see any major change in anything. The weapon systems they have equipped last year and in the coming years, it is weapon systems they can use for many, many years in the future. So I think they are upgrading their military capabilities in our part of Europe, and I think what we are doing now with a deeper cooperation between the countries in Scandinavia and the Baltic states and Poland the United States, Great Britain, it is a way to balance and a way to also make the threshold higher. So we must continue with what we are doing today.

But are you worried that the U.S. will shift attention and resources away from Europe and toward the Pacific?

What I know is that there are deliverances from the U.S. side to Europe. New bases there. So today there is deliverance to Europe. From my perspective, I don’t see any debate about if the U.S. is not ready to support Europe because what we see until now and also we see in the plans for the future, we see deliverances. You can always discuss different sort of levels and everything, but I see the relationship with the Pentagon, the armed forces of the United States — we see deliverances.

Looking to 2020, are there any major milestones or issues for Swedish defense on which you need to keep an eye?

I think it’s very important for us to get an agreement and decision about defense, a defense decision, for 2021 until 2025. We have also a big amount of money for that. So I think we can have a defense decision that guarantees developing new military capability between 2021 and 2025, and we will be better in 2025 than we were in 2020, and in 2020 we are better than we were in 2015. So we are in a trend of upgrading military capability, and we are ready to invest in that.

What are those investment priorities?

I think we need a bigger organization, we need more soldiers in the Army, for example. We also have technological challenges [around cyber], and soon we enter a new generation of Gripen, deliverances of new submarines, deliverance of the Patriot system. We need to have more conscripts, we need to develop the brigades in the Swedish Armed Forces, we need to invest more in the island of Gotland.

Gotland has been a focus for a few years. How is that development going?

We’ve taken the first step. We have inaugurated a regiment there, and it’s a mechanized company, a tank company, air defense capabilities. I think we need to invest more and develop that. That’s very important because the island of Gotland is very central from a military [perspective].

On the sidelines of the Halifax International Security Forum last month, the chief of the Polish armed forces, Gen. Rajmund Andrzejczak, discussed the military’s recently completed modernization plans and defense ties with the U.S.

Poland also intends to host the Defender 2020 exercise in spring 2020, one of the largest deployments of U.S. forces to Europe since the Cold War. Approximately 37,000 of combined U.S. and allied troops are expected to participate.

The head of the Polish Ministry of Defence recently signed a new technical modernization plan. What are some of its goals? What kinds of equipment does Poland hope to develop under that plan and what opportunities does it present to industry?

The first priority of course will be air defense systems — Patriot batteries for preventing the airstrikes as well as the missiles. We have some challenges with IBCS [a Northrop Grumman-made command and control system, dubbed the Integrated Battle Command System], as well as the radars [Polish radars developed by PIT-RADWAR SA — part of the government-owned Polish Armaments Group], so there’s more technical discussion needed. But the decision was absolutely made, and there’s no question it’s a very high priority to secure critical infrastructure and military formations in high intensity conflict.

The second biggest project is the F-35. So we have 32 airplanes — that’s our assessments of what we need, and additional F-16 squadrons for the transition. We really want to cancel all the former Russian airplanes, [including] the MiG-29 and Sukhoi-22. The HiMARS, the long-range artillery systems, up to the 300 kilometers, is very high in the priorities.

So that’s the capability approach, but another very important priority is heavily investing in our national industry. And for a couple of years, we lived in a completely different dimension, being engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also decreasing numbers of our troops. Russia disappeared from the radar. So we lost not only certain numbers of equipment but also industrial capability. It takes time, and it could be painful, so I’m saying it clearly: If you really want to rebuild, it will take years, money, experts ― and, of course, everything is operating in a non-permissive environment.

But we have to balance between critical capabilities produced in Poland ― like small arms, rifles or pistols and individual equipment ― and the slim chance for sales overseas. With the F-35, it’s balancing between investing in the national industry and pumping energy into the Polish economy. So our modernization program is not only about certain capability we’re going to the shop and buying, but also rebuilding and investing.

What I really like is we changed our approach, and there’s strong support from the Ministry of Defence’s R&D department. And we have some areas that are absolutely incredible: Small-class UAVs, and Poland has these radars that are high quality.

On the idea of phasing out Russian equipment, is Poland still using an array of capabilities bought from Russia in the past?

Tanks, T-72s…

Do some of those defense relationships still exist because of a need for spare parts, maybe?

We’re trying to avoid buying [Russian equipment]. Like helicopters, the Mi-24, we’re looking for a completely different markets like Ukraine. To be independent in these areas is absolutely critical. But talking about scale, we still have 500 T-72s, half of them modernized up to PT-91 version, which is the Polish upgrade version of a T-72. So we say we need good-enough equipment, and we would like to rebuild our reserve divisions, and this type of equipment will be absolutely perfect for those divisions.

So there is a balance between cancelling Soviet equipment and still keeping certain areas. Those are two big systems you cannot change in one day.

There was, in September, a U.S.-Polish joint declaration on advancing defense cooperation. That was chiefly about basing and force posture, but was there any component concerning defense industrial cooperation?

That was about the U.S. presence in Poland. Discussions and social media are focused on the numbers of [U.S.] troops and tanks, and we’re increasing numbers of troops, but from a military perspective, the infrastructure is much more important. Maybe it doesn’t sound sexy, but military mobility, combat training centers and storage for ammunition and equipment are much more important than numbers. We need infrastructure for a brigade combat team, for divisional headquarters, for intelligence assets, UAS systems, for special forces and especially for training. The training command center will also be a place for integration in a crisis, if required. We don’t want to have U.S. soldiers going back to Germany for training, right? It doesn’t make any sense. We will then have, you know, joint combined training with Poland and American troops, and of course any other allies.

There are airfields all over eastern Europe that the United States wants to build, seemingly to send a signal to Russia that if U.S. aviation was ever used in a conflict it wouldn’t have to go all the way back to Germany to be refueled because it could stop in Romania. What kind of signal do you think it sends east that the U.S. is making these investments?

The level of determination is absolutely high, our approach to the security is serious. So, we don’t want to ignite anything, I don’t want to go too far. But from a Polish perspective, engaging Russians, they respect only hard assets and numbers and power. So we have to build this infrastructure just as an option. And when we see the exercises, Zapad, and Russia’s activity in the cyber domain, I would say, wake up. It’s real, it’s not for training. We don’t want to to be surprised.

What is the status of the Patriot sales and the Wisla medium range air and missile defense program?

In Poland, we are trying to change our acquisitions systems. We didn’t realize it would cost so much money, so we are looking for an economical approach, and the minister of defense recently announced a new agency with the PGZ, which is our armament group. They’re trying to build a new organization to be more effective, because it’s not an issue of money ― we have enough money ― it’s about using it properly.

The general staff is responsible for planning and programming so we have to see ahead for 15 years and define the capability that we need, and then a minister of defense is responsible for building the acquisition systems.

What is the scenario that you’re looking to the MoD to address and build to?

We still have scenarios on the map right now for conventional use, for the hybrid crisis, for a purely Polish approach and the NATO scenario. But what I decided is probably the future is much more complex, and we started a much wider discussion, and I set up a micro, special think tank. So I’m sending my requirements and there’s a connection of different civilian experts. So we’re discussing, first, demographic issues because we see a decline in the number of Polish citizens as a big risk ― millions less by 2050. So it means a completely different approach to recruitment, but also robotics ― not because it sounds sexy, or it looks nice, but because there’ll be [fewer workers].

So that’s my approach, parallel to classical planning and programming the acquisition programs, and the assessed environment. The second area for my think tank is urbanization and understanding cities. If military equipment is going to operate in a mega city, it requires an understanding of food, energy services, water, sanitation, 5G [communications networking] and so on ― and of course, climate change and new technologies. We’re using [NATO’s] Allied Command Transformation as well, and we’re discussing bilaterally with our friends, especially the Baltic states.

You’re doing a lot of deep thinking about long-term problems, but how big of an impact in the near term do you see with Russia and its actions in Crimea? What are your immediate concerns?

Readiness, readiness and readiness again. We have what we have, and I have to organize properly for two scenarios. I have to add 22,000 troops in two years.

What’s most important is the ability to protect small, effective elements as quick as possible. So, last year, we had a number of experimental exercises and that’s what I’m thinking about. So, we don’t expect the Russian tanks tomorrow.

We reported recently there were two letters of request from Poland to the U.S. to purchase Javelin man-portable anti-tank systems, and also C-130 transport aircraft. How does that fit into the current concept of operations?

The Javelins, because there’s still a lack of enough anti-tank equipment, when you consider credible numbers of Russian tanks. We still have Spikes [an Israeli fire-and-forget anti-tank and anti-personnel missile], which are very effective, but they are much more sophisticated, and it requires simulators, training. For a big army, internal defense or short training, you need fire-and-forget, so the Javelins will be balancing and filling the gap into [short] range systems, for special forces and internal defense. The C-130, the big challenge is with transportation. Everybody’s suffering and we would really appreciate if there were some Hercules’ available. Poland is not only at home base. We have in Lebanon, a contingent [for a United Nations peace mission]. We have a NATO initiative, European Union and bilateral operations.

If you have missions, like my operation commander does, in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, transportation is critical. We made a decision in the past and now we’re suffering. The [EADS CASA C-295], which is really a small class, is still good enough, but Hercules is really a big horse.

Big picture question: As the U.S. invests in infrastructure in Poland, how much does Poland look to what’s happening in South Korea right now, where the U.S. is renegotiating the cost for its continued presence? Does Poland say, “This could be us?”

With these infrastructure investments in Poland, even if the world changes and the U.S. goes somewhere else, we will still have the infrastructure, the combat training centers, the storage, the highways, runways ― double-use. We have values, we have a responsible approach to securing the area. [The joke is] gentlemen never talk about money, but sometimes it’s good to send a signal to say ‘gentlemen, we have the money, we decided to pay 2 percent.’ Some of us are paying, some of us not. But I’m really optimistic about what I see right now.

A U.S. military official told Military Times that a U.S. naval ship had entered the Black Sea seven times in fiscal 2017, eight times in fiscal 2018, and eight times as of December 2019.

Christopher Anderson, a U.S. foreign service officer, testified before lawmakers that Trump had ordered the Black Sea patrols be canceled after seeing a report on CNN about the U.S. naval movements in the contentious waters in January.

But those patrols were never canceled and they have remained consistent under Trump’s tenure in the White House. The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Ross patrolled the Black Sea in December, making it the eighth time a U.S. warship visited the Black Sea in 2019.

“Throughout the year, U.S. 6th Fleet assets have operated in the Black Sea in support of our regional partners and allies,” Vice Adm. Lisa M. Franchetti, the commander of U.S. 6th Fleet said in news release. “Ross’ transit demonstrates our continued commitment to security and stability in the maritime domain.”

The Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship Fort McHenry entered the Black Sea in January, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Porter patrolled the Black Sea in October.

“The U.S. Navy operates ships in the Black Sea consistent with international law, as well as with the Montreux Convention. Our operations in the Black Sea are meant to enhance our combined capability and interoperability with our NATO allies and partners. Our commitment to promoting peace and stability in this region is steadfast,” Cmdr. Kyle Raines, a 6th Fleet spokesman, told Military Times in an emailed statement.

Trump was impeached by the House following a July 25 call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump is accused of withholding aid to Ukraine in exchange for dirt on political rival Joe Biden and his son Hunter Biden. As of Dec. 23, the Senate had yet to receive formal notification and as a result had yet to take up the House move.

Stars and Stripes first reported that the U.S. Navy Black Sea patrols were never canceled.

The status of the airworthiness-certification process is outlined in a recent government response to a parliamentary inquiry lodged by the far-left political party Die Linke. According to the document, Berlin is aware that the Italian government issued a so-called military-type certification in late October for the Northrop Grumman-made Global Hawk Block 40 drones, five of which will be stationed in Sigonella, Sicily, in 2020.

But officials said they have no information about the scope of an additional certificate required for actual operation of the drones alongside civilian aircraft, or whether the drones are authorized to fly in Italian airspace at all.

Operating military, unmanned aircraft safely in shared airspace remains an unsolved problem that contractors on both sides of the Atlantic are trying to address. That is why, for now, drone flights through regulated airspace require special corridors temporarily closed to all other traffic, a burdensome process especially in densely populated regions.

That will be the case for NATO’s drones traversing Germany, according to the Defence Ministry’s written response, dated Dec. 18. The aircraft are slated to use the same corridor — limited to one drone at a time — previously established for the U.S. Air Force. The service sent its own Global Hawks from Sigonella to support operations under the European Reassurance Initiative in the Baltic region, most recently during three flights in February, April and May.

Collision avoidance by way of sensors and autonomous avionics is one of the technology fields key to making large, military drones compliant with safety regulations. According to the German government, the alliance’s new aircraft are not equipped with sense-and-avoid technology, nor do they feature a “Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System,” defense officials wrote.

Andrej Hunko, point man for European policy at Die Linke in the German parliament, criticized what he called a lack of airworthiness in the new NATO Global Hawk drones. Unmanned aircraft crash “significantly more often” than manned planes, including larger variants operating at high or medium altitude, he said in a statement.

Without the use of collision-avoidance features, the alliance’s drones would crash “sooner or later,” Hunko predicted, calling on the German government to prohibit flights over Germany.

Die Linke rejects the use of all types of military drones, whereas the country’s other parties have largely supported the idea that the German military should be in the business of unmanned aviation for defense. Still, there is no consensus here on the use of armed drones.

German defense officials are still reeling from their experience with a previous, ill-fated attempt to field a large drone for intelligence collection. The Eurohawk, another Global Hawk derivative, was canceled in 2013 in large part because it turned out to be uncertifiable to fly in German airspace.

It remains to be seen what types of missions the new NATO drones are expected to fly and whether the certification restrictions are serious enough to hamper their desired effectiveness. Surveillance missions outside of Europe may be no problem, but traveling to hot spots such as the Baltics and the Black Sea could reopen a safety debate that some officials were hoping to keep under the radar.

Meanwhile, NATO announced the arrival of the second aircraft of its drone fleet in Sicily last week.

“This second ferry flight across the Atlantic is another major achievement on our road to establishing a leading-edge Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability for all NATO Allies,” U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Phillip Stewart, the Alliance Ground Surveillance Force commander, was quoted as saying in a statement.

The $1.5 billion program, which includes the aircraft and Airbus-made ground stations, is slated to be fully operational in 2022 following several years of delays.

Senior defense officials from Estonia, Latvia and Finland signed the document Tuesday in Estonia’s capital, Talinn, with the idea of beginning initial preparatory work that would culminate in an eventual acquisition.

“We agreed to carry out defense-related technical research, and I believe that our cooperation will yield a positive result,” Estonian Defence Minister Jüri Luik was quoted as saying in a statement.

“We have a very positive long-term relationship with Finland in terms of procurement policy, we have bought self-propelled artillery and radar systems together,” Luik added. “Now, we want to extend this cooperation to Latvia, as all three countries share a common interest in armored vehicles.”

The two Baltic nations are NATO members, and Finland a NATO partner, plus all three countries share a border with Russia, which means they have crucial requirements to ferry troops around their respective territories for homeland defense missions.

Some Latvian officials previously expressed reservations about joint procurements in their neighborhood.

“I think there are many misperceptions on Baltic integration,” Janis Garisons, state secretary for the Latvian Ministry of Defence, told Defense News during a September visit to Washington. “I think this is a little bit of a wrong perception that there is a lot of added value in those common procurements.”

Lithuania’s vice defense minister, Giedrimas Jeglinskas, echoed his colleague’s sentiment when visiting Washington in October.

“Joint procurement, multinational procurement — I don’t think it exists that much in the world,” Jeglinskas told Defense News at the time. “Most of the programs out there are joint development. But when you talk about something like three-country procurement, it has been really hard for us to achieve.”

Lithuania this summer started taking delivery of new infantry fighting vehicles for its forces, a variant the Boxer, made by a consortium of Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. The country signed an order for 88 vehicles in 2016 at a price of roughly €386 million (U.S. $429 million).

Aaron Mehta in Washington contributed to this report.

In a letter to parliament on Friday, State Secretary for Defence Barbara Visser laid out the reasons why the Spanish company was eliminated, adding that the government will award a contract for four boats in 2022 with either Naval Group, Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems or Saab-Kockums.

The announcement comes after previous expectations that the government would pick a vendor in the spring of 2019. Since then, however, a new national defense-industry strategy has upped the expectation of including domestic naval companies in the new Walrus supply network to the greatest extent possible.

Navantia failed to make the cut on the industrial-cooperation front, according to Visser’s missive to lawmakers, known as a B-Letter in local military-acquisition speak. In other words, the Netherlands is “uncertain” cooperation with Spain would work out and that it would offer fewer touchpoints compared with the governments of the other three bidders — France, Germany and Sweden.

To some, the letter looks like the Dutch government is simply playing for time.

“I can only conclude that all relevant actors within government do not agree yet on the choice to be made,” Dick Zandee, a senior researcher with the The Hague-based Clingendael Institute, said of the missive. “After more than a year of delaying the B-Letter, I would describe this as a testimonium paupertatis.”

At the same time, he added, the government may deliberately drag three bidders further into the source selection to increase its leverage on price, schedule and risk.

“In short, a new delaying procedure — this is the essence of the B-Letter,” Zandee said.

The Dutch government arrived at the desired number of four boats based on NATO’s availability requirements, Visser wrote to lawmakers. The alliance would expect three submarines in the event of a large-scale deployment: two within 30 days and one within six months.