Russia’s Defence Ministry announced the Sarmat “was successfully test-launched from a silo at the Plesetsk state testing cosmodrome” in northwestern Russia. The test “confirmed” the missile’s “design characteristics” during “all phases of its flight,” the ministry declared, adding that its “practice warheads arrived at the designated area at the Kura proving ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula.”

Although Russia has conducted three Sarmat ejection tests since December 2017, this latest test was the missile’s first flight test.

The Sarmat is a three-stage, silo-based, liquid-fuel, heavy ICBM with a reported range of 18,000 kilometers. Dubbed “Satan II” by NATO, the missile is a Russian-built replacement of the Soviet-era SS-18 “Satan” ICBM, which is reaching the end of its life cycle. The Sarmat reportedly can carry a 10-ton payload consisting of 10-plus multiple independent reentry vehicles along with penetration aids used to evade missile defenses. Moscow says the new missile can also carry several Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles.

The Sarmat has reportedly been under development since the 2000s but gained notoriety after being publicly touted during a March 2018 address by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader boasted that the Sarmat would be impervious to existing or potential missile defenses thanks to its short boost phase and extremely long range, which would allow the missile to travel over the North or South poles.

Missiles are often their most vulnerable during the boost phase, and most American missile sensors normally focus on threats traveling over the North Pole rather than the South Pole. Regardless, existing U.S. missile defense capabilities are focused on rogue states such as North Korea and stand no chance of defending against a massive Russian nuclear attack against the American homeland, reinforcing the need for a robust and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Moscow claims serial production of the Sarmat will commence this fall, and that the missile will begin combat duty with Russia’s 62nd Missile Division in Uzhur, Krasnoyarsk Krai, before year’s end, although that timeline is likely unrealistic.

The test itself was “routine” and “not a surprise,” as Pentagon press secretary John Kirby noted. Indeed, Sarmat’s flight tests have been delayed for years, making this test long overdue. That, however, did not stop Putin from calling the test a “momentous event,” vowing the missile “will be a wakeup call for those who are trying to threaten” Russia.

That provocative language follows several instances of nuclear saber-rattling by Putin both before and after Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

Putin’s behavior stands in stark contrast with the Biden administration’s decision to postpone and then cancel a March 3 launch of an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM. The administration had already notified Russia and provided a notification for civilian air traffic. Kirby attempted to justify the postponement as an effort to ensure U.S. actions were not “misunderstood or misconstrued,” saying the decision demonstrated Washington is “a responsible nuclear power.”

Putin, however, may interpret such concessions by Washington as weakness and an indication that his nuclear saber-rattling is working.

Asked about the Minuteman III test during a March hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, recommended “that we maintain our normal set of operations.” Richard emphasized he needs these tests to “maintain confidence and reliability” in the 50-year-old Minuteman III, which faces growing reliability concerns as it nears the end of its service life. Another test is slated for later this year, which the administration should conduct as planned. That will remind Putin that the United States has the means to respond to a nuclear attack.

More broadly, the Sarmat test — not to mention China’s rapid nuclear expansion — underscores the need to modernize America’s own nuclear triad, including by urgently replacing the Minuteman III with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, otherwise known as the LGM-35A Sentinel.

As Global Strike Command’s then-chief warned last year, Washington has “no margin left” to delay replacement of the Minuteman III, which entered service in 1970. Its service life was originally meant to last just 10 years but has been repeatedly extended. A further extension would not only be cost-inefficient but would risk eroding the reliability and credibility of the land-based leg of the triad.

Fortunately, the Biden administration’s fiscal 2023 budget request included $3.6 billion for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program. The administration’s forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review should similarly endorse the GBSD. Congress, for its part, should provide all necessary funding to ensure the GBSD’s on-time delivery by 2029.

ICBMs represent a vital component of America’s nuclear deterrent. They are the most responsive leg thanks to their high state of readiness, while their geographic dispersion complicates adversary targeting, forcing Russia or China to expend a mass number of nuclear-tipped missiles rather than simply concentrating on a few U.S. command centers, submarine ports and bomber bases. ICBMs also provide a hedge against any potential advancements in anti-submarine warfare that could threaten the survivability of the sea-based leg. Those characteristics of a modernized ICBM leg of the nuclear triad help deter adversaries from launching a nuclear attack in the first place, preventing nuclear war and making Americans safer.

Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, where Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power and John Hardie is research manager and a research analyst.

America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles are the foundation of nuclear deterrence, but they have been in service since the 1970s — more than 40 years longer than intended — and must be modernized to remain effective.

The effort to modernize our ICBMs was first initiated under President Barack Obama. The Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and subsequent analyses concluded that maintaining all three triad legs was in the United States’ national security interest, leading to modernization efforts.

And it continues to be a top priority of the Biden administration.

In 2017, then-Vice President Joe Biden said: “A nuclear deterrent has been the bedrock of our national defense since World War II. And so long as other countries possess nuclear weapons that could be used against us, we too must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attacks against ourselves and our allies.”

And in March 2021, now-President Biden reiterated his position, noting that his administration remains committed to “ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.”

A safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal requires modern systems that are capable of operating against 21st century threats. Our adversaries understand this: Russia and China have spent the last two decades modernizing their nuclear deterrent systems, including investing in new missiles, airplanes and submarines. Earlier this year, satellite images revealed new nuclear missile silo fields in China — the size and scope representing an unprecedented nuclear buildup. In the annual report on military and security developments in China, known as the “China Military Power Report,” the Department of Defense estimated that China will have 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030.

The U.S. is modernizing its capabilities as well. During the 111th and 112th sessions of Congress, I served as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over Department of Defense and Department of Energy policy related to strategic deterrence, strategic stability, nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. During the modernization debate, I reached across the aisle to work with ranking member Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., to support these critical programs.

These programs were continued in the Trump administration and supported across multiple congresses. Bipartisanship will remain essential to modernization efforts in the U.S.

Continuing triad modernization programs is one of the Defense Department’s highest priorities. As then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter observed in 2016, “most of our nuclear weapon delivery systems have already been extended decades beyond their original expected service lives. So it’s not a choice between replacing these platforms or keeping, it’s really a choice between replacing them or losing them. That would mean losing confidence in our ability to deter, which we can’t afford in today’s volatile security environment.”

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin also highlighted the essential nature of a robust nuclear deterrent capability: “Our nuclear deterrent has served a vital purpose in U.S. National Security Strategy for the past 70 years and continues to be an essential component of our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States, our allies, and our partners.”

Polling conducted this fall by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies shows that 91% of respondents, both Republicans and Democrats, believe that modernizing the United States’ nuclear deterrence system should be a priority for the Department of Defense. A full 80% say that replacing ICBMs with modern technology would make them feel safer. Those are strong numbers and demonstrate the bipartisan support for modernization.

In my book, “Death of the Senate,” I relay that the best Senate I served in was in 2001 when it was evenly divided 50-50, and then went to 51-49 when Sen. Jim Jeffords became an independent. As a former member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a concerned observer of the current state of play of global nuclear efforts and aspirations, my deepest hope is that a center will reemerge in the Senate to get the best possible results for the American people. Past, not-so-distant history shows it is possible.

Modernizing our nuclear triad is an opportunity to live up to the expectations of our constituents on a critically important issue that will help ensure a safer nation for future generations. I encourage my former colleagues in the Senate to find a partner across the aisle and work to get things done.

Former Sen. Ben Nelson, D-Neb., is a partner at the Nebraska-based Heartland Strategy Group. He served on the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired its Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and was a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Prior to that, he was Nebraska’s governor from 1990-1998.

Rep. John Garamendi, D-Calif., and a skeptic of nuclear spending on the House Armed Services Committee, confirmed he plans to offer nuclear-themed amendments when the annual defense bill receives House floor consideration later this month. One aims to pause the Air Force’s nascent Ground Based Strategic Deterrent in favor of maintaining the missile it would replace, the Minuteman III; another would zero out funds for the GBSD’s warhead, the W87-1.

“The bottom line is that we could pause the entire GBSD program and push forward into the future a $100 billion expense,” Garamendi, who chairs the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee, told Defense News.

With the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review due early next year, Garamendi said the amendments are part of his “strategy to raise the issues, to gather the data, test the arguments against the opposition … and create an occasional success.”

“The amendments signal to the administration there is a level of support and concern about each of these nuclear issues,” he added.

For the land-based missile, the stakes are high for Northrop Grumman, which received a $13.3 billion contract last year to develop GBSD. Last month, Northrop executives cut the ribbon on a $1.4 billion facility in Colorado Springs dedicated to GBSD and other strategic weapons programs.

Northrop CEO Kathy Warden expressed confidence in the program during a July 29 earnings call, saying the program would continue to fuel the company’s space segment and “continue to grow into next year and 2023. So it has a long ramp, if you will.”

For the W87-1, whose plutonium cores, or pits, are to be produced in part by the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility in South Carolina, at stake are jobs and billions of federal dollars to upgrade buildings or construct new factories. It’s all intertwined with shaky plans launched by the Trump administration to have Savannah River and Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico produce a combined 80 pits per year by 2030.

The obstacles for Garamendi and likeminded Democrats are not only Republicans but centrist Democrats who have previously opposed plans to derail GBSD. Republicans renewed their defense of the program and the Savannah River site when Garamendi targeted them with amendments during HASC’s markup of the defense authorization bill.

Skeptics have argued modernization plans are dangerously escalatory, exceed what’s necessary for a credible nuclear deterrent and waste money that would be better spent on domestic programs. Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., and Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., proposed a bill earlier this year to divert $1 billion from the GBSD program to fight the coronavirus.

Garamendi likes to point to the parochial politics in play, knocking GBSD as perhaps “the biggest jobs program in Wyoming” (one of the states that hosts missile fields) and the Savannah River site as “the permanent jobs program for South Carolina.”

He argued Los Alamos alone could produce the needed pits for GBSD and that the $11 billion cost to convert Savannah River into a pit plant is a waste.

Modernization’s supporters are likely to highlight to the Defense Department’s projection that extending the Minuteman III through 2075 would cost $38 billion more than developing the GBSD. Those supporters will also likely cite reports that China is expanding its own nuclear arsenal. Additionally, the proposed budget from the Biden administration itself fully funds an upgrade.

The latter group is already gathering ammunition for a possible floor fight to argue GBSD should continue apace. Reps. Liz Cheney, R-Wyo., and Mike Turner, R-Ohio, together elicited a letter from the National Nuclear Security Administration affirming that even though Savannah River is five years off schedule, it won’t harm W87-1 production for the GBSD.

NNSA chief Jill Hruby said in the Aug. 25 letter that it’s “still achievable” for Los Alamos to make 30 pits per year by 2026 ― a “considerable time margin” before the first W87-1 is due to be produced in 2030. To boot, GBSD will initially use W87-0 warheads recycled from the 50-year-old Minuteman III.

“However, it is acknowledged that this approach does carry risk in that any currently unanticipated, long-term disruptions to manufacturing at [Los Alamos] would impact W87-1 deliveries until the second pit manufacturing capability at the Savannah River Site becomes available,” Hruby’s letter read.

Republicans are banking on getting Democratic support of the sort that’s materialized in the past. Last year in committee, Khanna’s proposal to slash funding for GBSD was defeated in a bipartisan 44-12 vote. And this year, Rep. Joe Wilson, who represents the Savannah River site’s home district, pointed to the site’s backing from neighboring Rep. Jim Clyburn, who is the House’s No. 3 Democrat.

“I’m really grateful that I actually represent the Savannah River site along with my colleague Congressman Jim Clyburn, who was a strong supporter of plutonium production at the Savannah River site,” Wilson said during a debate with Garamendi at the HASC markup.

“The two-site solution for plutonium pit production has had bipartisan support,” Wilson added. “Nuclear modernization has been supported across the last three administrations, including the Biden administration, and the prior two. Not a single Biden administration official has come out against the two-sites for plutonium pit production.”

Republicans — who are currently waging a fight to regain control of the House — see Garamendi’s potential amendments as an opening to portray Democrats in Republican-leaning districts as weak on China, a Republican staffer said, adding: “He’s putting many of his caucus in a bad spot.”

For his part, Garamendi acknowledged the Democrat-run Rules Committee, which is set to screen proposed amendments to the defense bill later this month, might seek to avoid the tricky politics involved and end up blocking his from floor consideration.

“Of course that’s a possibility. In fact, it’s a probability,” Garamendi said. “I’m in the process of trying to educate as many members of Congress as I possibly can about the nuclear arms that we are pursuing at a cost of at least $200 billion a year, and it’s extraordinarily dangerous.”

Assuming full-chamber passage later this month, the defense authorization bill will head to negotiations with the Senate. That work typically takes place during the congressional summer recess, but the administration’s late submission of its federal budget proposal pushed it back several months.

The authorization bill has managed to withstand partisan infighting and pass out of Congress annually for more than five decades. Extending that streak this year will require a legislative rush to craft a final bill sometime this fall, alongside other nonmilitary budget and policy priorities.

While stripped of its nuclear payload for the launch, the ICBM contained conventional explosives aboard a Hi-Fidelity Joint Test Assembly re-entry vehicle, which successfully detonated above the water’s surface near Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, some 4,200 miles from the launch site.

“Today’s test launch is just one example of how our nation’s ICBM fleet demonstrates operational readiness and reliability of the weapon system. It also allows us to showcase the amazing level of competence and capability of our Airmen,” Col. Omar Colbert, Commander of the 576th Flight Test Squadron, said.

Defense officials were careful to stress that the test was routine, taking months to plan rather than a response to tensions in the region or around the world. Overall, officials said the Air Force periodically tests the Minuteman 3 to demonstrate the weapons system’s capability and gather data. The Defense Department, Energy Department, and US Strategic Air Command use the data collected to further force development.

“Test launches are not a response or reaction to world events or regional tensions,” said Lt. Col. Aaron Boudreau, Task Force commander said. “The launch calendars are built five years in advance, and planning for each individual launch begins six months to a year prior to launch.”

Conducting the launch were airmen from the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB, 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, and 91st Missile Wing at Minot. These airmen fall under Air Force Global Strike Command, headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, Shreveport, Louisiana. AFGSC is not only responsible for the nation’s ICBM fleet but also its strategic bomber fleet of B-52, B-1, and B-2 wings, effectively housing two of the three nuclear triad’s “legs.”

“The U.S. nuclear enterprise is the cornerstone of the security structure of the free world,” Colbert said in the release.

According to the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, the first iteration of the Minuteman ICBM became operational in the early 1960s. Since then, it has gone through a series of improvements leading to the Minuteman 3 becoming active in the early 1970s.

Despite nearly 60 years of reliable service, the Minuteman series of ICBMs is slated for replacement beginning in 2029, when the Air Force expects an “initial capability” of its replacement, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, to be online.

Until then, the Air Force states it is committed to ensuring that the Minuteman 3 remains a viable deterrent, which is due primarily to the commitment and competence of the Airmen who operate and maintain the weapons platform.

“We’re honored to conduct this mission in conjunction with the 576th Flight Test Squadron and extremely proud to represent the numerous men and women that support the nuclear deterrence mission,” Boudreau said.

Alongside early fighting over the defense top line, which is expected to be flat in President Joe Biden’s budget proposal this spring, Democrats have offered bills and urged the president to cut programs like the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile, while Republicans are publicly pressing to continue programs that mostly began during the Obama administration.

The Biden administration is expected to conduct a broad nuclear posture review that would examine plans to modernize the nuclear triad — an effort estimated to cost $1.7 trillion over 30 years. A separate Pentagon review is reportedly underway on the new W76-2 submarine-launched, low-yield nuclear warhead, which Democrats have mounted an effort to kill.

Calls from progressive lawmakers for Biden to pause the Air Force’s Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, a new intercontinental ballistic missile, saw new GOP pushback on Monday. The Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman a $13.3 billion contract in September to develop GBSD.

Speaking at the conservative Heritage Foundation, the top Republican on the Senate Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Sen. Deb Fischer, warned against freezing any nuclear modernization activities while the Biden administration conducts its expected nuclear posture review.

“We shouldn’t be conducting [a review] to pause nuclear modernization. That should not happen,” the Nebraska lawmaker said. “Modernization already is just-in-time, if not late-to-need, and so we don’t have the luxury of pausing or delaying these important programs.”

Though flat spending is predicted between the defense budget proposal for fiscal 2022 and the $741 billion defense budget for fiscal 2021, Fischer suggested nuclear weapons shouldn’t take a hit. She pointed to testimony from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin that the military’s No. 1 priority is the nuclear deterrent.

“If you prioritize something, that’s the first thing you fund,” she said. “Nuclear modernization is not cheap, but it’s necessary.”

Fischer called for increasing the budget of the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration to produce more replacement plutonium pits for aging nuclear weapons. NNSA’s budget won a $3 billion budget increase from Congress last year after a major debate within the Trump administration.

Among Democrats who have expressed concerns about nuclear modernization costs, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., has noted that America’s nuclear arsenal would tower over China’s, even if Beijing doubles its arsenal. At a March 5 event, Smith said he places priority on nuclear command-and-command systems and plutonium pit production.

“I just wish we would do a serious look at whether or not we can achieve the necessary level of deterrence for less money like China has,” Smith said.

“We have to defend ourselves against nuclear attack. It is the core and most important mission, completely agreed, but then [modernization advocates] leap from that to ‘therefore, we have to spend $1.5 trillion on nuclear weapons,’ ” Smith said. “Is that really necessary to have a deterrent?”

One powerful Democrat who voiced support for nuclear triad modernization is Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I. “We have to modernize the triad and maintain the triad, in my view, for strategic reasons that have been successful for about 70 years,” he told reporters last month.

Talking up nuclear triad modernization in a call with reporters on Monday, HASC ranking member Mike Rogers, R-Ala., said he expects Austin to recommend Biden continue the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program. Rogers also projected that Smith would try to scrap it, but fail.

“He’s done that pretty much every year as long as I can remember, but I know he won’t have any votes on our side and most of the Democrat members will be with us on that too,” Rogers said. “I have confidence that GBSD is going to move forward in a timely manner. I don’t see it stopping.”

Rogers affirmed that panel Republicans would be unified against any cuts to the sea-launched cruise missile when the defense policy bill is marked up in committee some time this summer.

“We’ll hold the line. I’m sure there’ll be a big debate,” Rogers said. “We’ve got some people who, as long as there are TV cameras in the room, are going to run their mouths, but I think we have the votes.”

In an interview with Defense News on Monday, the Montana lawmaker said he’s open to targeted, not across-the-board cuts, and he reiterated his support for modernizing intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are partially based at his state’s Malmstrom Air Force Base ― and support for the “incredible deterrent” that ICBMs provide.

The Air Force plans for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent being built by Northrop Grumman to replace the Minuteman III ICBM. But some Democrats and arms control advocates have pushed to cut the program amid the Pentagon’s estimate that it will cost $100 billion to build.

“So we’ll be getting briefings moving forward about the threat and the deterrent levels of those ICBMs,” Tester said. “As of right now, I think it’s important that we move forward with the GBSD because I believe there’s still an important deterrent.”

Tester outlined his budget priorities and talked about his emphasis on oversight.

“The bottom line is we can always look for ways to get better bang for the buck, and I do think we need to listen to the military and hold them accountable, just like we need to hold accountable the contractors out there,” he said. “I’m open to making the system work better and more efficiently, but I never want to give up the oversight and the accountability.”

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

What are your priorities as you take over as chairman?

My priorities are what any American wants, and that is really to make sure that our defense is adequate to keep this country safe. Oftentimes I get into questions about whether [the next defense budget] is going to be 3 percent or 5 percent more, or 3 percent or 5 percent less. The way I look at the budget is making sure the military gets what it needs, and the military needs what it gets. So I’m going to be doing my best, and it’s a massive budget, but I’m going to do my best to make sure how we’re spending money and the taxpayer is getting the biggest bang for the buck and this country is kept safe.

If I had two personal [priorities], I think we need to continue to focus on research because research is really, really important; and then I would say cyber is going to be really important to any sort of conflict we’re going to be fighting.

With this year’s budget, the U.S. is dealing with a price tag associated with the response to COVID-19, and that’s going to put pressure on the federal budget. Progressives, including Sen. Bernie Sanders, last year pushed for an across-the-board defense cut, whereas Sen. Jack Reed has talked about reshuffling priorities within the defense budget. And then you have some Republicans who’d like to see a 3-5 percent increase. What’s your feeling on an across-the-board cut?

I don’t support across-the-board cuts. I think that’s not what we’re sent here to do. You’re sent here to use your brain, use a little common sense and do what’s best. I am going to be talking to Jack this week about these and other issues. I fall much more toward where you describe Jack Reed, which is: Figure out what your priorities are and fund them.

Cyber is one of your priorities; and by research, I take it you’re talking about emerging technologies. What’s impacting your thinking there?

I just think [warfare is] going to become more and more advanced and more and more complicated, and we need to try to get ahead of the curve on what our adversaries are doing. If you talk to folks who have been around a while, we’re usually good at fighting the last war, but we don’t really plan very well for for the next one. I hope we don’t have to fight the next one, but I think cyber is going to be a big part of any sort of threats against us ― or potential offensive measures that we might take.

We hear authorizers talk a lot about tweaking the acquisition process to make it easier for emerging technologies to get into the hands of troops, but last week there was a think tank report about reforming the defense appropriations process and budgeting process, the PPBE. What are your thoughts on flexible budgeting for the Pentagon?

We need to work with the Pentagon to make sure we give them the flexibility that they need, but we need to have intense oversight ― on all monies, but this is a massive budget ― to make sure that they’re utilizing those dollars in a way that Congress intended. I don’t know anything about the PPBE and that story, and I don’t know what they mean by acquisition reform, but if that means holding accountable the people you’re buying stuff from, then count me in on that too.

The bottom line is we can always look for ways to get a better bang for the buck, and I do think we need to listen to the military and hold them accountable, just like we need to hold accountable the contractors out there. I’m open to making the system work better and more efficiently, but I never want to give up the oversight and the accountability.

You’re known as a strong support of the ICBM mission, but some of your fellow Democrats argue the ICBM replacement — the GBSD program — is too expensive. Instead of a wholesale reduction of that leg of the nuclear triad, would you be in favor of a proposal from arms control advocates to do a service-life extension of the Minuteman III as a compromise?

For the 60 of the 64 years I’ve been alive, those ICBMs have been an incredible deterrent, and I firmly believe they’re still an incredible deterrent and we still need to keep them as an incredible deterrent. But I also have never served on any of the committees that give classified briefings on the threat. So we’ll be getting briefings moving forward about the threat and the deterrent levels of those ICBMs. As of right now, I think it’s important that we move forward with the GBSD because I believe there’s still an important deterrent.

Arms control advocates think the Minuteman III can have its service life extended, whereas uniformed military officials who are responsible for the nuclear arsenal argue the opposite.

What I want to look at is not the extension of the life [of the Minuteman III], but what is the threat and are they still an effective deterrent to the threats that are coming. I was raised during the Cold War, and I know that Russia was much more of a threat in the 1960s. China is becoming more of a concern, let’s just put it that way. What role do [ICBMs] play with China? What role do they play with North Korea? What role do they play with Iran? And the same thing, by the way, with all the other military acquisitions that we’ve made: Are we right-sizing it to where the threats are coming from?

Have you talked with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin or other defense officials?

I’m trying to get around, and I spent this weekend visiting with some of the folks in the Air Force and the Army about what we have and where we’re going. I visited with Secretary Austin on his priorities about 10 days ago now, and we’re going to continue to have those conversations. We’re going to get the budget from the president probably in April, or maybe May, and we’re really going to be having a lot of conversations with them about what’s in that budget and why.

What’s your sense of the timeline? Biden administration officials say they didn’t get full cooperation from the outgoing Trump administration and that that’s caused delays. What does an April or May time frame mean for Congress passing a full federal budget?

We need to roll up our sleeves and work harder as a congress to try to get this thing done by the end of July, and by the latest September. This is just a matter of committing ourselves to getting it done. It’s a matter of looking at the budget, asking tough questions, modifying the budget where necessary, putting it up for a vote and moving forward. If in fact they’ve been delayed some, Congress needs to buck it up and get it done before the end of the fiscal year.

You came into Congress before earmarks were shelved, and now House Democrats are talking about reinstating them, but there’s not an agreement with the Senate. What do you want to see happen around earmarks?

If we’re going to reinstate earmarks, it’s got to be done in a bipartisan way, or it shouldn’t be done. Whether they’re limited to nonprofits or to so many earmarks per [lawmaker], all that is less important to me than the fact that I’ve talked to most people on the Appropriations Committee about earmarks. They like them, and they wish they were back. Most importantly, they have to be transparent so people know what the hell they’re voting on and so they can challenge those earmarks on the floor. Would I prefer they go to nonprofits? Probably, but I think I can live with them either way.

If earmarks are revived, is there a benefit to the military because it smooths the way for appropriations packages to pass on time? Getting budget deals has been such a grind.

The benefit of earmarks is that they help bring people together so we get stuff passed, and that’s been a challenge since they’ve gone away. If they’re included in a way that is transparent and can be effective, I think it could help with passage of appropriations.

U.S. nuclear policy has traditionally been siloed off from the policy development processes for a host of other capabilities and domains — space, cyber, artificial intelligence and missile defense, to name a few.

The nuclear arsenal is unique in its independent focus and separate government organizational structures, including a combatant command devoted to U.S. nuclear capabilities, plans and personnel and, since at least the Clinton administration, an independent and fairly insulated national policy review process referred to as the Nuclear Posture Review.

Indeed, nuclear policy — including force posture, modernization, launch authority and arms control — has largely developed independently of other defense policy communities.

This has to change.

New technologies and capabilities — including hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, asymmetric counterspace capabilities and cyberthreats — are increasingly capable of impacting strategic interests and affecting nuclear stability, and the firewalls between capabilities, plans and organizations for conventional operations and those dedicated to nuclear deterrence are already eroding.

The commingling of conventional and nuclear payloads on non-ballistic missile systems, the dual-use nature of situational awareness capabilities, and increasingly effective missile defense systems are blurring the threshold between conventional and nuclear conflict. Policymakers must now grapple with conventional-nuclear integration, cross-domain arms control proposals, and the possibility that escalation could occur rapidly and in nonlinear ways.

These challenges require an analytical approach that examines points of intersection between nuclear issues and other areas of defense policy — an examination of international security at the “nuclear nexus.” The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ new series aims to do just that. More than ever, many of the most significant strategic national security challenges cut across these complex issues, domains and risks, defying traditional analytical and organizational stovepipes.

For example, managing complex escalation dynamics under a nuclear shadow requires deliberate consideration of how conventional operations could impact adversary perceptions and the likelihood that they choose nuclear escalation. Responsible conventional-nuclear integration, or CNI, can raise the nuclear threshold, but it first requires a more uniform understanding of what it entails. A prudent first step would be taking stock of the current state of CNI in doctrine, concepts and exercises, as well as in Department of Defense organizations, to illuminate areas for greater integration.

Consider also the case of nuclear command and control, or NC3. Today, operating and defending the integrity of our NC3 systems requires collaboration across the Department of Defense, between U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command. Research has shown that organizational stovepipes are likely to lead to competition for resources and authority. But is the semiautonomous operation of these institutions also impeding their shared mission of defending NC3?

Effective risk mitigation requires the DoD to manage competition and ensure that separate institutions are developing interoperable technologies. Developing cross-domain concepts of operation — with clearly specified roles for the combatant commands involved in NC3′s operations — and collaboration in the management of passive space and cyber defense capabilities within nuclear institutions could help. But this only works if we are prepared to climb across siloes and embrace shared responsibilities.

Escalation management in today’s security environment also calls for attention to how new capabilities will affect traditional concepts of deterrence and stability. New hypersonic weapons, for example, present unique challenges to the status quo military balance.

But just like past instances of technology-induced strategic disruption, from the strategic bomber in the 1930s to the intercontinental ballistic missile in the mid-20th century, countries can adapt to the hypersonic era. Improving detection and tracking systems, as well as active and passive missile defenses, may help mitigate the destabilizing aspects of aerial hypersonic weapons, taking lessons from U.S. efforts to adapt to new capabilities during the Cold War. Creative, cross-domain arms control and confidence-building measures could be an important part of the solution as well.

Regardless, the days of a siloed nuclear posture review independent of all the other strategic security risks at play should come to an end. We need to more seriously consider proposals for a new approach — one that integrates decisions about nuclear policy within the broader U.S. defense strategy.

Ultimately, greater engagement between the nuclear and non-nuclear defense policy communities will be central to managing our new, contemporary security environment. Rapid technological innovation, cross-domain competition and a looming nuclear shadow require examining international security at the nuclear nexus.

Rebecca K.C. Hersman is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior adviser with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where Maxwell Simon is a program coordinator and research assistant.

The proposal was to transfer $1 billion to a pandemic preparedness fund from the next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile effort, for which Northrop Grumman is the sole competitor. Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., sponsored it. Though HASC Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., supported it, most of the committee’s Democrats did not.

“The United States does not need to be modernizing the ICBMs,” Khanna said, citing experts who see the sea- and air-based legs of the nuclear triad as sufficient. “If there is an accidental launch of an ICBM, you can’t take it back. On the other hand, you can call a submarine back, you can call an aerial bomber back.”

The language would likely have been a sticking point in negotiations with the GOP-controlled Senate Armed Services Committee. The president requested $1.5 billion for the GBSD program for fiscal 2021.

For the most part, fights over nuclear weapons reductions were left out by Democratic leaders anxious to avoid last year’s bruising partisan fights. Those fights may yet surface when members offer amendments on the House floor.

“I’ve disagreed with it, but I’m putting all of that aside for the moment,” Smith said of the president’s nuclear plans. “We had that debate last year. It came out the way it came out. It’s not going to change this year.”

HASC Republicans argued that cutting the GBSD program would undermine America’s nuclear deterrent as Russia and China beef up their arsenals. They’ve also said the nation has dedicated sufficient resources to respond to COVID-19.

“This amendment helps America’s adversaries,” said Liz Cheney, R-Wyo.

The Air Force is set to grant an award for the GBSD by the end of September. Northrop is expected to win an estimated $85 billion to design and build the missile ― after Boeing declined to move forward following Northrop’s acquisition of solid-fuel rocket motor-maker Orbital ATK.

GBSD is set to replace the Minuteman III ICBMs in the mid-2020s. The Pentagon’s top acquisition official, Ellen Lord, has said there is “no margin” to do another service life extension for the Minuteman III, which was fielded in the 1960s and has gone through only minimal upgrades over its 50 years of use.

An amendment that would have ordered a service life extension study for the Minuteman III failed on a voice vote. In addition, a proposal to delay the president’s exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, from Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, D-Hawaii, was defeated by voice vote.

An earlier version of this story erroneously said a vote on the Minuteman III service life extension study passed. This story has been updated to reflect that the vote failed.

The triad has been the foundation of U.S. national security policy for over 60 years, providing stability to America’s global military operations and diplomacy efforts. The triad — and the security umbrella it extends to our allies and partners — has fostered decades of peace and prosperity. Nuclear deterrence has successfully prevented crises from escalating to conflicts and promoted cooperation and diplomacy in resolving disputes.

Today, nuclear deterrence is more important than ever, which is why we must prioritize efforts to modernize the triad.

Throughout the Cold War and into the 21st century, military and political leaders have worked together to maintain a credible, safe and reliable nuclear deterrence capability. As technologies and threats evolve, so has the triad. Over the years, each leg has been modernized several times.

Currently, the Air Force is developing the B-21 long-range strike bomber, which will enter service later this decade, and the Navy is replacing its fleet of ballistic missile submarines with the Columbia class, scheduled to begin patrols in 2031.

A replacement is also needed for the Minuteman ICBM system, which first entered service in 1962 and has been upgraded and extended 40 years beyond its original service life. In 2010, after affirming the importance of maintaining a land-based leg, the Obama administration initiated the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program, a modern ICBM system that will improve reliability, lower operational costs, and respond to current and future threats.

The Air Force will soon begin work on GBSD, which will enter service in 2029. Over 10 years of planning have led to this goal, with the program’s necessity validated by two presidential administrations, six congresses and six secretaries of defense.

ICBMs are an integral part of the triad, providing complementary capabilities to the sea-based and bomber legs that enhance our overall deterrence posture. For example, land-based missiles are the most robust and stabilizing leg of the triad. Consisting of 400 active, hardened missile launch facilities on sovereign U.S. soil and dispersed over 30,000 square miles, ICBMs pose a nearly insurmountable obstacle to those who wish us harm. They prevent any rational adversary from credibly threatening or confidently planning a strike.

Failing to adequately maintain the land-based leg of the triad by fully funding the GBSD would threaten strategic stability and make remaining U.S. nuclear forces more vulnerable. America’s ICBM force is both affordable and cost-effective — it features the lowest annual sustainment and recapitalization costs compared to the other two legs. It is vital the nation maintain its nuclear force posture, which has acted as a stabilizing element of global security for decades.

Modernizing the triad is no small undertaking, and our current modernization efforts are the result of decades of careful planning and bipartisan support. Stewardship is handed down from one set of leaders to the next, and in this critical moment of transition it is imperative our current leaders keep these modernization programs on track. We strongly recommend that members of Congress support moving ahead with the GBSD program so it can join the other legs in providing effective deterrence for decades to come.

The contributors to this commentary are: Former U.S. Air Force Secretaries Sheila Widnall, Whitten Peters, James Roche, Michael Wynne, Michael Donley and Deborah Lee James, as well as former U.S. Air Force Chiefs of Staff Gen. Larry Welch, Gen. Merrill McPeak, Gen. Ronald Fogleman, Gen. Michael Ryan, Gen. John Jumper and Gen. T. Michael Moseley.

The B61-12 life-extension program consolidates and replaces the older B61-3, -4, -7 and -10 variants, while the W88 Alteration 370 is meant to replace the arming, fuzing and firing subsystem for the W88 warhead for the Trident II sub-launched ballistic missile. The two are among five major modernization programs underway at the agency.

Both had been due for production in 2020, but neither will have their first production units delivered on time, according to Charles Verdon, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s deputy administrator for defense programs. NNSA is working with the Defense Department to minimize the delays, but Congress has been informed both will be ready “roughly around the same time,” Verdon said at the at the 2019 Defense News Conference.

The issue stems from off-the-shelf parts used in both weapons. Both systems are planned to work for 20-30 years, and heavy stress testing of the parts raised questions for NNSA officials about whether the parts would survive for three decades. Rather than risk the pieces failing years in the future, officials decided to seek replacements now and delay moving forward with the program.

However, Verdon said the 18-month delay for the B61-12 might shrink in the future, as the agency gains more insight on parts procurement and integration.

Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, warned that the first production unit’s target date is likely to increase the estimated $7.6 billion cost of the program. The delay could also hinder NNSA’s ability to execute several other planned life-extension programs on time and on budget, he added.

While NNSA’s Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation in 2017 projected a total program cost of approximately $10 billion and a two-year delay to the agency’s first production-unit date, the agency maintained that the B61-12 life-extension program was on time and on budget.

“The delay to both the B6-12 and W88 ALT 370 highlights the enormous scope of work already on NNSA’s overburdened plate and the significant execution challenges facing the modernization effort,” Reif said.

The fate of another modernization program, a low-yield variant submarine weapon known as the W76-2, is expected to be determined as the House and Senate resolve their separate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act. Among a range of differences on nuclear issues, the Democratic-led House bars funding for the deployment of the W76-2, cutting the entire $19.6 million Defense Department request and $10 million Energy Department request for the program.

On Wednesday, Robert Soofer, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, pointed to support for the W76-2 from both current leaders and former Obama administration officials, predicting “trades” between the House and Senate bills.

Updated 9/5/19 to clarify the impact of the delay.