WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is not seeing major delays “at this time” to its nuclear warhead modernization efforts in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, according to a top nuclear official at the department.

The Department of Defense also hopes to “shortly” see initial results from an analysis of alternatives about a potential new nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile, said Drew Walter, who is performing the duties of deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear matters.

The Pentagon is in the midst of a major modernization effort across its nuclear warheads and delivery systems. The Trump administration requested roughly $46 billion in funding for nuclear programs in fiscal 2021, with the Pentagon projecting to spent at least $87 billion on its modernization through FY25.

That last figure does not include costs from the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous branch of the Department of Energy that has oversight over America’s nuclear arsenal, and which manages the development and production of the warheads.

NNSA “took pretty vigorous action back there in March to try and reduce the spread of the virus,” said Walter, adding that since then the agency has “brought folks back, especially on key programs. I would say DoD — we helped them understand what we thought was critical from our side.”

He noted that the pandemic hit at a time when the Pantex plant in Amarillo, Texas, was between production runs, having completed work on the W76-1 and -2 variants last year, which meant it was easier to avoid production disruptions.

“So at this time I’m not seeing any indication there’s going to be, you know, huge slowdowns on the warhead side — though, you know, small perturbations are certainly possible,” Walter said at a May 19 event hosted by the Mitchell Institute. “So overall, I haven’t heard of or seen any huge impacts.”

Meanwhile, the department continues to move forward with its analysis on the SLCM-N, a new nuclear sub-launched cruise missile that came out of the 2019 Nuclear Posture Review.

“Initial results are coming back shortly to help inform the [FY22 presidential budget request] build. We probably won’t complete for some time after that, the [analysis of alternatives], but the initial results will help inform where we should be going,” Walter said.

“We’ll have to review what the plans are and decide what warhead should be leveraged for it, whether that’s something different or something we already have, or something we modified from what we already had,” he continued. “So we’ll see. We’ll see more in the future, and there’ll be discussions this fall about where and how it slots into the larger schedules.”

In February, a department official told Defense News on condition of anonymity that the Pentagon is still sorting how much money the program might cost, but pointed to the estimated price tag for the Long Range Standoff Weapon — or LRSO, a new air-launched cruise missile — as a rough estimate. That weapon is projected to cost the Defense Department about $8-9 billion on top of a similar amount for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which is charged with developing the warhead.

The official added that the range will likely be somewhat longer than that of a conventional Tomahawk weapon, which has a range of about 1,250–2,500 kilometers. If everything goes well with the program — including approval in Congress — the weapon could be ready for deployment in seven to 10 years.

In a scathing op-ed in The National Interest, former senator and Navy Secretary Jim Webb, who served as a Marine in Vietnam, blasted Gen. David Berger’s plan — described in his planning guidance issued last summer — as too narrowly focused on a single mission: raids on islands in the South China and East China seas.

But in response to a question on Webb’s op-ed at a small roundtable of reporters, Berger rejected the criticism, saying that while he welcomes “informed debate,” the Marines must pace the China threat and that any force designed to take on China would be applicable all over the globe.

“Any informed debate is always helpful when you are going through a refocusing of your force,” Berger said. “I welcome the criticism, as long as it is informed. The central role of the Marine Corps is to be a [ready force]; the 9-1-1 force; the force that has to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready. That has not, and will not, change.

“That said, we have threats now on the horizon that we need to prepare for, or we will be overmatched and we won’t allow that to happen.”

While Berger defended his plan, the editorial from such a respected Marine alumnus raises the possibility of deeper cultural resistance to some of the sweeping changes the commandant is proposing. But several experts who spoke with Defense News said that Berger’s reorientation of the force was overdue and that resistance aside, the Marine Corps has no choice but to adapt to an adversary with a robust array of guided munitions.

To be sure, cuts such as the reduction from 24 infantry battalions to 21 slightly smaller infantry battalions, elimination of nearly all artillery batteries in exchange for a boom in rocket and missile batteries, and the complete elimination of tanks from the Marine Corps would fundamentally reshape the force.

In his editorial, Webb called out proposed cuts to field artillery and tanks, as well as cuts to infantry and reserve strength, and corresponding cuts to aviation, as permanent and potentially dangerous.

“The proposal was based on extensive wargaming, in which the new Commandant has great confidence,” Webb wrote. “But it is axiomatic that experimental war games (like staff studies) can be biased through subtle control of the methodology decided upon by those who design the war game.

“There is no greater danger in military strategy than shaping a nation’s force structure to respond to one specific set of contingencies, giving an adversary the ability to adjust and adapt beforehand. Nor would it serve the country’s long-term interests for the Marine Corps to careen from two decades of overemphasis in the Middle East to a fixation with narrow naval scenarios in places like the South China Sea.”

But Berger vehemently disagreed with Webb’s conclusion that his guidance would leave the force too narrowly focused.

“Are we too narrowly focused? I would argue absolutely not,” Berger said. “We’re pacing, in terms of capability, against a very rapidly developing adversary so that we’re never overmatched.

“But that’s not geographically constrained; that’s not nationally constrained. The Navy and Marine Corps operates around the world and I am very confident that will continue. The force that we end up with, you can apply that force to any mission set. It will be very capable.”

Subordinate service?

Underpinning much of Webb’s criticism is the notion that the Marine Corps would lose its identity as a separate service and would again become a subordinate service of the Navy, tied to the Navy’s requirements.

Berger’s plan “could permanently reduce the long-standing mission of global readiness that for more than a century has been the essential reason for its existence as a separate service,” Webb wrote. “Its long-term impact would undo the value of the Marine Corps as the one-stop guarantor of a homogeneous tactical readiness that can ‘go anywhere, fight anybody, and win.’

“And after the centuries it took to establish the Marine Corps as a fully separate military service, it could reduce its present role by making it again subordinate to the funding and operational requirements of the Navy.”

That’s a criticism the Navy’s top officer is attuned to. In the same roundtable, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday told reporters that the changes the Marine Corps wants to make – which includes having the Navy invest in smaller amphibious vessels that can more readily evade detection inside Chinese weapon range – must be worked through together.

“We have to think about this together,” Gilday said. “In his planning guidance the commandant asks the question: ‘How does the Marine Corps best support the Navy?’ We can’t let either service fully determine what the answer to that question is.”

Gilday said the long-awaited, much-delayed integrated Navy and Marine Corps force structure assessment was going to delve deeper into the issues of how the Navy and Marine Corps will fight together and that it would remain relevant throughout the globe.

“The force structure assessment that’s ongoing, should finish up in the fall, it’s not just what we’re going to fight with or what we’re going to operate with, it’s how we’re going to fight and how we are going to operate,” Gilday said. “And as the commandant said, although the Indo-Pacific gets most of the attention because that is where the pacing threat lies – and in some places I think we are pacing China — it’s a fighting and operating concept that we are developing together that is applicable anywhere.

“We’ve got a global navy with global responsibilities. We have to be fairly adaptable with the force we’re putting together so that it can meet any adversary on any terms and fight and win.”

The Marines can and should maintain a separate identity, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and retired submarine officer, and added that the Corps’ plan, which includes spreading Marines throughout the fleet and not just on amphibious ships, didn’t mean Marines will just be sailors now.

“Marines are still going to be separate from the Navy,” Clark said. “I think the integration that Berger is talking about is getting the Marine Corps more distributed through the Navy so they are not just on the [large amphibious ships], but it’s not about making Marines a part of the crew.”

There is, however, some risk that the Marines’ needs could be subordinated to the Navy’s under the current budgeting construct.

The Marine Corps, which gets its budget as a slice of the larger Department of the Navy budget, should get more budgeting autonomy going forward to maintain the Marine Corps’ independence as a separate service, Clark said.

“The Marine Corps is leaning toward the idea of getting rid of land-based squadrons, basically lopping off the second half of the F-35B buy,” Clark explained. “Well, that would save a lot of money, but it would technically be the Navy’s money now. But if it were Marine money and they chose to do that, they’d be able to put the savings toward new vehicles, unmanned vessels and electronic warfare systems, which is what Berger wants to do.”

Overdue change?

Webb’s view of the plan is that in moving toward the future, the Marines are relying on unproven assumptions and that passing the responsibility for certain missions — tanks will be the role of the Army, for example — to other services that may not be available creates a fragile system that could be undone in wartime.

“Depending on how limited one views the future responsibilities of the Marine Corps, this plan is erected on a fragile house of cards: that future Marine Corps operational commitments should be shaped by the reduction of front-line infantry battalions, whose casualties in any sustained engagement would quickly require replacements that may not be available if the battlespace expands; by subjecting Marine Corps commitments to the needs of the Navy; and by an unproved reliance on the augmentation of combat units such as aviation assets and tanks from other services that may not be available and who will not have trained with the Marine Corps,” Webb wrote.

But for many observers, Berger’s pivot of the Marine Corps back to its role as an arm of naval combat is long overdue.

“I thought Webb’s article was well written and well-argued from a point of view that I think is exactly wrong,” said Bob Work, former deputy defense secretary and a retired Marine colonel.

“People who say this is just for one contingency are not paying attention to what is happening,” he continued. “We’re going from 30 firing batteries to 26, but we’re going from [23] cannon and [seven] rocket to five cannon and 21 rocket. And why is that important? Because rockets and missiles have so much more range and applicability to any fight.

“Berger has a key understanding of the evolving military technical trends. He has a key understanding of the weaknesses of the Marine Corps in going up against an adversary that has technical parity with us. He has a good understanding of the budget and what he has to do within that budget.”

Jerry Hendrix, an analyst with Telemus Group and a retired Navy captain, said his view is that the force that Berger wants to build is adaptable to circumstances around the world and in line with the military’s desire to fight in a more spread-out way to avoid losing too many units to a concentrated strike with guided munitions.

“What they’re looking for in changes to naval force structure — more smaller craft that can move Marines and their equipment around archipelagic waters — that seems to be narrowly focused on the Western Pacific,” Hendrix said. “And yet those same vessels have broad application in virtually every region of the world except perhaps the Arctic.

“The Marines’ new look has application in the Black Sea as well as in the Baltic, as well as in the Mediterranean and the Arabian gulf. And while it’s designed against a pacing threat that is China, because of its ability to disaggregate its force and distribute it, then re-aggregate it in a coherent way, it has application in many different regions of the world where the United States has dominant interests.”

Webb is widely respected in the Marine and national security community, Hendrix said, but that the changes Berger wants to make are necessary and overdue.

“Jim Webb is the conservative here, saying, ‘The past has lessons to teach us and I suspect we’re making a mistake by leaving those lessons behind as we head down this new path.’

“The question here is, if you accept that the Marine Corps has been essentially frozen in more or less its current form for 70 years, at what point do you move ahead, even incrementally? And I think that time has more than come. More than a quarter of the nation’s history has flowed by since Inchon, and the Marine Corps looks remarkably the same.”

Four medium-sized U.S. Navy vessels depart from a port along the United States’ coast. There’s no crew aboard any of them.

About 15 nautical miles off the coast, the four vessels rendezvous, autonomously arranging themselves in a line. Using custom mechanisms, they attach to each other to form a train, except they’re in the water and there’s no railroad to guide them. In this configuration the vessels travel 6,500 nautical miles across the open ocean to Southeast Asia. But as they approach their destination, they disconnect, splitting up as each unmanned ship goes its own way to conduct independent operations, such as collecting data with a variety of onboard sensors.

Once those operations are complete, the four reunite, form a train and make the return journey home.

This is the Sea Train, and it may not be as far-fetched as it sounds. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is investing in several technologies to make it a reality.

“The goal of the Sea Train program is to be able to develop and demonstrate long-range deployment capabilities for a distributed fleet of medium-sized tactical unmanned vessels,” said Andrew Nuss, DARPA’s program manager for Sea Train. “So we’re really focusing on ways to enable extended transoceanic transit and long-range naval operations, and the way that we’re looking to do that is by taking advantage of some of the efficiencies that we can gain in a system of connected vessels — that’s where the name ‘Sea Train’ comes from.”

According to DARPA, the current security environment has incentivized the Navy and the Marine Corps to move from a small number of exquisite, large manned platforms to a more distributed fleet structure comprised of smaller vessels, including unmanned platforms that can conduct surveillance and engage in electronic warfare and offensive operations.

While these unmanned vessels are smaller and more agile than their large, manned companions, they are limited by the increased wave-making resistance that plagues smaller vessels. And due to their size, they simply can’t carry enough fuel to make the long-range journeys envisioned by DARPA without refueling.

By connecting the vessels — physically or in a formation — the agency hopes the Sea Train can reduce that wave resistance and enable long-range missions.

In February, the agency released a broad agency announcement to find possible vendors. Citing agency practice, Nuss declined to share how many proposals were submitted, although he did say there was significant interest in the announcement. The agency completed its review of any submissions and expects to issue contracts by the end of the fiscal year.

Sea Train is expected to consist of two 18-month periods, where contractors will work to develop and test technologies that could enable the Sea Train concept. The program will culminate with model testing in scaled ocean conditions.

If successful, DARPA hopes to see the technologies adopted by the Navy for its unmanned platforms.

“What we’re looking to do is be able to reduce the risk in this unique deployment approach,” Ness said. “And then be able to just deliver that set of solutions to the Navy in the future, to be able to demonstrate to them that there is, potentially, a new way to deploy these vessels, to be able to provide far more operational range without the risk of relying on actual refueling or in-port refueling.”

And while DARPA’s effort is focused on medium-sized unmanned vessels — anywhere from 12 to 50 meters in length — the lessons learned could be applied to larger or smaller vessels, manned or unmanned.

The Navy is opting to buy a final 24 F/A-18E/Fs in fiscal 2021, slashing a planned purchase of at least 36 Super Hornets that would have spanned FY22 through FY24. The move will save $4.5 billion, which the service plans to redirect to its sixth-generation fighter program, known as Next Generation Air Dominance, or F/A-XX.

However, the decision may not be as clear cut — or final — as budget documents make it seem.

The Navy is at the very start of the NGAD development process, having completed an analysis of alternatives in June 2019, as well as broad requirements and guidance for a concept of operations. The effort is now in the concept development phase, during which defense companies explore ideas “that balance advanced air dominance capabilities and long-term affordability/sustainment,” said Navy spokesman Capt. Danny Hernandez.

But with an economic downturn potentially leading to even more pressure on the defense budget, the Navy may not have the funds to proceed with NGAD as a clean-sheet fighter jet.

“Although the Navy would like to start developing the next generation of aircraft … I just don’t think — and increasingly people in the department are thinking — there’s not going to be the money to devote to this next generation of fighter,” said Bryan Clark, an analyst with the Hudson Institute and a retired naval officer.

“I think they are going to fall back to looking at F/A-XX as a modification or an evolution of the F-35,” he said. “Instead of the other half of the air wing being some new aircraft, you’ll have a combination of F-35Cs and then some modified version of the F-35 or a modified Super Hornet.”

Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and an analyst with the Telemus Group, said the service’s enthusiasm for F/A-XX is a sign of a continued preference for manned aviation as well as a desire to shut out any hope of fielding a long-range, penetrating strike drone.

“I’ve always been in favor of extending the Hornet production line because it is solid and stable,” Hendrix said. “But the extension was based on the proviso that we’re extending in order to get to an unmanned combat aerial vehicle. If it was an extension to get to the next manned fighter … we’re missing the idea of what the future competitive environment, or really the present competitive environment, is all about.”

A tightrope of risk

The Navy has grappled in prior years with the question of whether to cease production of the Super Hornet in favor of a future fighter, and it is an argument that lawmakers are wary of.

The Navy first planned to stop buying the F/A-18 in its FY15 budget — a decision made to fund the transition to the F-35. But technical issues and delays pushed out the fielding of the Navy’s F-35C takeoff-and-landing model for aircraft carriers to 2018, leaving the service dependent on a fleet of aging, battle-worn F/A-18s in need of a service-life extension. The Navy ended up listing the F/A-18 on its unfunded priorities list, and Congress followed by funding enough Super Hornets to keep Boeing’s line running.

“If we go back a few years and we look at what happened when we thought we were going to plant the F-35, we let the F-18 slide down,” Rep. Donald Norcross, D-N.J., said in a March 10 hearing. Norcross is the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.

The process of standing up the F-35C was much slower than expected, and the Navy ended up buying additional F/A-18s to bridge the capability gap, he said. “Yet, here we are getting ready to curtail 36 Super Hornets because we are expecting, you know, the F/A-XX to come online,” he added.

Asked how he could be confident that F/A-XX would stay on schedule, Rear Adm. Gregory Harris, the Navy’s director of air warfare, said he could provide lawmakers a more detailed defense of the Navy’s Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems in a classified setting.

“We’re working closely with the Air Force to ensure the systems that we put on that have the [technology readiness level] that gives us confidence that we can achieve that aircraft on time in the early 2030s to replace the F/A-18E/F as it reaches the end of its service life,” Harris said.

Missouri Rep. Vicky Hartzler, the subcommittee’s top Republican, pointed out that the Navy already has a fighter shortfall of about 49 aircraft, with additional F/A-18s being pulled from the operational fleet into a service-life extension period that will take at least a year.

“I feel like this is too much operational risk,” she said. “If you add all those up, this is a severe shortage that we are experiencing, and if you don’t account for the attrition rate, actually in combat we would have a very large gap there potentially.”

James Geurts, the Navy’s assistant secretary for research, development and acquisition, said there is always risk when transitioning from legacy to new aircraft, but that improved mission-capable rates and a steady flow of jets moving through upgrades will help balance the shortfall.

“We’re taking risk until the late 2020s. I think 2029 is when we will get to the full fighter inventory, and so we had to take some risk as we balance that,” he said.

The most likely scenario is that, as the Navy presses forward with its plan to curtail funding for F/A-18s, Congress will simply continue buying more of them, Hendrix said.

But one unanswered question is whether lawmakers will also intervene to force the Navy to consider a wider range of aviation options that could give the carrier air wing longer legs.

“I’m hopeful that there will be a broader conversation, led by Congress and the administration, perhaps together, to say: ‘We are looking at the future security environment. We are looking at the Chinese threat. We are looking at what’s happening in Taiwan, what’s happening [in] Hong Kong and within the first island chain, and we really need to have this new capability of long-range, penetrating strike,’ ” Hendrix said.

“What I do realize is that because the Navy is very conservative right now in how it’s approaching its procurement programs, the Navy will not be the one to say we need this mission.”

No matter what the Navy decides, it could impact its procurement of the MQ-25 unmanned tanker drone currently under development by Boeing. Hendrix sees the MQ-25 program as a likely bill payer, particularly if the service continues to buy Hornets.

“What was the reason for the MQ-25? It was to take the strain off from the Hornets,” which were being used to refuel other F/A-18s and burning through their service lives faster than anticipated, Hendrix said. “When you reopen the Hornet production line and you add 120-something new Hornets, you actually took that strain off the Hornet fleet. So there really isn’t a requirement now for a recovery tanker.”

Clark agrees that the Navy should develop a long-range unmanned combat aircraft but is unlikely to do so.

But should the Navy choose not to proceed with an F/A-XX program, Clark believes the service could funnel some of that money into modifying the MQ-25 to supplement strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities, and could even end buy more MQ-25s than planned.

“The MQ-25 program, once it gets fielded and proven out, I could see the Navy expanding it,” he said. “I think the operational and programmatic pressures have driven the Navy to embrace the MQ-25, and because it’s a complement to the manned aircraft, it’s generated less resentment among the manned aviation community.”

The Pentagon’s annual report on China’ military strength from 2019 describes the A2/AD strategy as a means to “dissuade, deter, or, if required, defeat third-party intervention against a large-scale, theater-wide campaign” mounted by China’s People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. In short, it appears Beijing’s aim is to prevent American and allied military forces from operating freely in the A2/AD airspace and maritime “bubble” around China’s coastline.

China has in recent years worked to extend the range of this bubble beyond the so-called first island chain and into the Western Pacific. The key to this effort is not just longer-range missiles, but also a growing number of space-based sensors.

The U.S.-based Union of Concerned Scientists reported that as of 2016, China had 192 satellites in orbit, a number that has since increased, with nearly all of these belonging to organizations or companies with close ties to the government and having dual roles to for civilian and military use.

Some of China’s satellites include several payloads that are almost certainly for military purposes, such as electro-optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar and electronic intelligence technology. The country also uses a constellation of Naval Ocean Surveillance System satellites providing persistent coverage of water surrounding China. These capabilities can also support targeting for China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, and with sufficient numbers and integration, they could provide real-time target triangulation data to build up a robust picture of a target’s location to ultimately generate a targeting approach.

Meet the DF-21D

The long-range, conventionally armed ballistic missile DF-21D is meant for attacking moving ships at sea, most notably the U.S. Navy’s showpiece nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The theory behind its creation is that a missile speeding down to sea level on a ballistic trajectory at speeds of Mach 5 or higher would prove extremely difficult to counter.

The road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile system is mounted on a wheeled transporter erector launcher to improve survivability against enemy counter-strikes. Said to have a range of about 780 nautical miles, the DF-21D is a version of the DF-21 family of two-stage, solid-fueled, single-warhead conventional or nuclear medium-range ballistic missiles in use by the PLA Rocket Force.

And this is a photo of the PL-20 (inset) which will likely be carried by the Shenyang J-16 (pictures) although it has also been seen on the older Xi’an JH-7 fighter-bomber pic.twitter.com/mhqSPKw3yR

— Mike Yeo 杨启铭 (@TheBaseLeg) June 1, 2020

The U.S. Defense Department suggests that the DF-21D reached initial operating capability with the PLA in 2010, with the system thought to employ maneuverable reentry vehicles with a terminal guidance system assisted by China’s network of satellites, such as the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1 and Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 that provide targeting data in the form of radar and visual imaging, respectively.

There are, however, questions about the missile’s effectiveness. China has reportedly tested the DF-21D against fixed land targets, but it’s unknown whether it was tested against a moving target. This makes it difficult to accurately assess the capability of the weapon, particularly from a maturity and efficacy standpoint. It also brings into question whether China’s sensor technology can generate the kind of real-time, highly precise data required to enable the DF-21D to accurately target an aircraft carrier maneuvering at 30 knots.

But the missile and its sensor net could be used to keep watch on and provide deterrence at maritime chokepoints among the first island chain, specifically the Miyako Strait between Okinawa, Japan, and Taiwan as well as the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. This would theoretically reduce the demand on a less-than-mature sensor net and kill chain to limited geographic areas through which potential targets would have to sail.

Considering the limited combat radius of carrier-borne aircraft without large-scale support from aerial refueling tankers, the ability to keep an American carrier battle group at arm’s length may be all that China’s A2/AD capability requires.

An attack with anti-ship ballistic missiles can be used in conjunction with other anti-ship missiles and timed to simultaneously arrive at a target. Such an attack could be mounted from longer-range anti-ship missiles like the YJ-12 and YJ-18. Both are Chinese improvements of Russian designs, derived from the Kh-31 air-to-surface missile and the 3M-54 Klub cruise missiles, respectively.

Both are capable of supersonic speeds, with the anti-ship YJ-18A variant attaining its maximum speed of about Mach 2 in its terminal attack phase following subsonic cruise. The YJ-12 can fly at speeds of between Mach 2 and Mach 4, depending on launch and cruise altitudes.

Both can also reach long ranges. The YJ-12 is widely believed to have a range of between 108 and 216 nautical miles, while the YJ-18 is believed to possess a range of 290 nautical miles. The YJ-12 can be launched from wheeled transporter erector launchers as well as from vertical launch cells on ships like the Type 052D or Type 055 destroyers. The YJ-12 can also be launched from aircraft, like the Xian H-6 bomber, the JH-7 fighter bomber and possibly the Shenyang J-11/15/16, Chinese derivatives of the Russian Sukhoi Flanker family.

Is a new long-range air-to-air missile on its way?

China’s indigenous Flanker derivatives are also expected to the primary carrier platform for a new long-range air-to-air missile reportedly in development.

Expected to be used to target an adversary’s high-value airborne assets such airborne early warning and control systems and tanker aircraft, the missile has been given the temporary designation “PL-XX.” Observers believe the eventual in-service designation will be PL-20.

The new missile was first observed in 2016 carried by a Shenyang J-16 multi-role fighter, however it almost certainly was an inert mock-up. It was seen earlier this year on a Xian JH-7 fighter-bomber.

By comparing the known sizes of the parent aircraft and its hardpoints, it’s been estimated the missile is about 5.8 metres (20 feet) long and about 300 milometers (1 foot) in diameter, which is significantly larger than typical medium-range air-to-air missiles, like the American AIM-120. Four rear-mounted fins bestow maneuverability and control for the missile.

There is little verifiable information about the new missile’s performance; however, a public schematic of how China would use the weapon shows the ramjet or solid fuel-powered missile can attain a straight-line range of 300 kilometers (188 miles).

After launch, most likely with preliminary targeting data provided by a friendly airborne early warning and control aircraft, the missile would fly a parabolic trajectory on its way to its target, attaining an altitude of approximately 100,000 feet from a launch altitude of 50,000 feet, before plunging toward the target.

A mixture of GPS, inertial navigation systems and space-based radars are expected to provide launch and mid-course guidance, before an active electronically scanned array radar takes over at the terminal phase.

If China succeeds in putting such a weapon into service, the PLA Air Force will then be able to compel an adversary’s vital force-multiplier aircraft to operate farther away, or risk being shot down. This would reduce their effectiveness and that of the tactical aircraft they are supporting in the event of a conflict.

Modly and his predecessor, Richard Spencer, had been excited by the prospect of fielding smaller, more risk-worthy carriers that could reduce the chance of China or Russia landing a major punch in a conflict simply by sinking or disabling a single ship, such as a Nimitz- or Ford-class aircraft carrier with thousands of sailors and tens of billions of dollars of hardware aboard.

But very soon after Modly’s spectacular departure, former acting Secretary James McPherson canceled the study until further notice. Still, as the effort to move to a smaller carrier seems frozen — as it has been for decades every time someone suggested it — the Navy is forging ahead with preparing its big-deck boats — the amphibious assault ships — for operating with the Marine Corp’s F-35B. The Corps’ F-35 fighter jet is a short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variant.

The Navy recently inked a $200 million contract with BAE Systems to upgrade the amphibious assault ship Boxer to be able to operate with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the fifth landing helicopter assault ship to be so amended.

“The USS Boxer [dry-dock availability] will complete a combination of maintenance, modernization, and repair of the following systems: Hull structure, propulsion, electrical plant, auxiliary systems, and communications and combat systems, as well as alterations to prepare the ship for operations with the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),” according to a statement from Naval Sea Systems command.

But the idea of smaller carriers is one the Navy has been flirting with more recently. Last fall, the Navy packed 13 F-35Bs on the amphibious assault ship America. Then-Navy Secretary Spencer later said the ship could hold up to 20.

“I will tell you, we are augmenting the aircraft carrier with our ideas, such as this lightning carrier,” Spencer said at the Brookings Institution think tank. “Twenty F-35 Bravos on a large-deck amphib. My cost performance there is tremendous. Does it have the same punch? No, it doesn’t, but it does have a very interesting sting to it.”

The Boxer, which is an older class of big-deck amphib, could likely pack about 15 F-35Bs if it were dedicated for the purpose, according to Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

The idea of a lighter carrier is also one that has intrigued Defense Secretary Mark Esper. In an interview with Defense News that coincided with the fiscal 21 budget rollout, Esper raised the possibility that lighter carriers were still on the agenda.

“There are various ways to do carriers,” Esper said. “So we can talk numbers or we can talk the sizes of carriers, right? There’s been discussion in the past about: Do you keep building big carriers, or do you go to smaller carriers, lightning carriers? Acting Secretary Modly and I have talked about that.

“I think this gets into the future fleet designs we look at. That will be one element that we look at.”

‘What’s the objective?’

The Navy has shied away from lighter carriers for decades because, as expensive as the carriers are, they generate more sorties for less money than it would cost a comparable number of smaller carriers to generate.

But the utility of a smaller carrier that still has a mean bite was recently demonstrated when a COVID-19 outbreak on the carrier Theodore Roosevelt sidelined the flat top in Guam in the middle of its deployment. The Navy directed the America to the South China Sea to provide presence there to dissuade China from taking advantage of the Roosevelt’s misfortune.

That was a win for the idea of a smaller carrier, said Seth Cropsey, director of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute.

“The ability of the America to be on scene when the Roosevelt was not was a good thing,” he said. “Look I don’t think anyone is going to argue that it replaces a Ford-class carrier, but the idea of a more distributed force is a sensible one.

“I’m not saying that the Navy should stop building Ford-class carriers; I’m saying they should be including smaller carriers.”

The reason is pretty simple, Cropsey said: China’s missiles.

“I think there is definitely a strategic reason to do it: It’s called the DF-21 and DF-24, and China’a ability to fill the sky with missiles over the South China Sea. The Navy gets it, but implementing the idea and turning into tangible programs is the problem.”

The first step for the Navy is to figure out what it wants to achieve when it comes to countering China, he said.

“My strong opinion [is] that the issue is compounded by the lack of a strategic concept,” Cropsey said. “What’s the plan? What’s the objective? Once the Navy is able to articulate that, questions such as the ones being asked about [smaller carriers] will resolve themselves much more easily.”

How will these systems deploy? How will they be supported overseas? Who will support them? Can the systems be made sufficiently reliable to operate alone and unafraid on the open ocean for weeks at a time? Will the systems be able to communicate in denied environments?

As the Navy goes all-in on its unmanned future, with billions of dollars of investments planed, how the service answers those questions will be crucial to the success or failure of its unmanned pivot.

Many of those issues fall to the Navy’s program manager for unmanned maritime systems, Capt. Pete Small. As the Navy puzzles out some very basic questions, it must also ponder some big organizational changes to maximize the potential of the platforms once they arrive.

“Our infrastructure now is highly optimized around large, very capable, highly manned warships,” Small said at the C4ISRNET Conference in May. “We spend a lot of time and effort preparing them for deployment, and we deploy them overseas for months at a time. They are almost perfectly reliable: We generally send them on a mission, they do it and come back almost without fail.

“For these distributed and smaller platforms, we’re going to have to shift that infrastructure — how we prepare, deploy, transit over and sustain these smaller platforms in theater.”

That question is critical because it will affect the requirements for how the systems are designed at the outset. In the case of the medium and large unmanned surface vessels under development, just how big and how rugged they need to be would depend on how the Navy plans to use them.

“All the scenarios we’re discussing are far forward,” Small said. “Far from the shores of the continental United States. So there is absolutely a transit somewhere — a long transit — to get these platforms where they need to be. We’ve got to come through that in a range of ways.

“For the medium and large [unmanned surface vessel] USV, in setting up the specifications and establishing what the requirements should be for unmanned surface vessels, crossing an ocean is a critical part of those missions.”

Making these platforms cost-effective is almost the entire point of their development, but questions such as “Should we design the vessel to be able to make an Atlantic or Pacific crossing?” can mean a big price difference.

“With a medium USV, we’re kind of on the edge of whether it’s big enough to cross the ocean by itself, and we’re learning, you know, how big does it need [to be],” Small said.

“You may be able to make it smaller and cheaper to get it to do the job you want it to do ultimately, but if it has to cross the ocean to get there, that might be the overall driving requirement, not the end mission requirement. If you are going to heavy-lift them and bring them over in bulk, well that’s a new concept and we have to figure out how we’re going to do that,” he added.

“What ships are we going to use to do that? Where do we operate from overseas? There’s a range of options in each case, but in general we’re going to have to transition from a system more optimized around our manned fleet infrastructure to a more distributed mix of large, highly manned platforms to smaller unmanned platforms.”

Relocatable support

The introduction of entirely new platforms that operate without humans onboard mean that the Navy must think about how to support them downrange, Small said.

“We’re going to need to talk about things like tenders, heavy lift ships and forward-operating bases, things like that,” he said.

The idea of an unmanned vessel tender for the medium USV, which the Navy intends to use as a far-forward distributed sensor, is likely the best solution, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a retired submarine officer.

“I think it’s likely that they’ll be heavy-lifted into the theater, not because they can’t make it themselves but because in general it would be less wear and tear on the vessels,” he said. “You want that support to be relocatable as opposed to a group of guys working out of a building ashore. The whole purpose of them is to be flexible; and because they’re small, that would, in theory, give you lots of options as to remote locations you could operate from.”

The tender could be adapted from an existing platform in the sealift fleet for now, and ultimately procured as new later, Clark said, adding that the ship would need cranes and a platform near the waterline to support the medium USV and perhaps the planned extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle as well.

Additionally, the vessels should be stationed where the Navy has long-standing relationships, like Singapore, Souda Bay, Greece, Britain and the like, as well as where they are likely to operate.

The Marine Corps’ transition from a heavy force concentrated on large amphibious ships to a lighter force distributed around smaller ships and lighter amphibs may free up some platforms for porting unmanned vessels around the globe.

“As we change the deployment schemes for amphibious ships, that may afford the opportunity to have amphibs with well decks that are not full of Marines’ equipment but with unmanned vessels,” he said.

Reliability

For Small, the questions that are most immediate are how to make the systems dependable.

“We plan to send these systems out to sailors who are at the forefront of the fight, and we need these systems to work every time and be reliable,” he said. “So, reliability is a fundamental issue associated with autonomous vehicles.”

Questions have been raised about things as basic as whether the Navy can get a marine diesel engine to run for days and potentially weeks without being touched by humans. But Small said that’s not what he spends a lot of time worrying about.

“For me, I think there is plenty of technology there and it will get better. I’m less concerned with, ‘Will the engine run long enough?’ and more concerned with the reliability of the system as a whole,” he said. “The autonomy running that vessel is a key aspect of the overall reliability of the system. So there’s a code and software aspect to this, but there is also the interface between that code and the hull, mechanical and electrical systems that we have on ships.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the human ability to detect subtle changes in the equipment they operate that is the toughest to replicate, Small said.

“It’s about self-awareness and the ability to self-diagnose problems and changing conditions associated with that equipment and react to those changing conditions,” he explained. “That’s either by alerting an operator or having an autonomous response that allows the mission to continue.

“A sailor would sense a vibration; a sailor would hear abnormal noise; a sailor would see something getting warmer, do the diagnostics and take actions. … There’s as strong a relationship between that and the overall reliability of those physical systems themselves.”

A study spearheaded by Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s internal think tank, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, recommended the Navy invest in as many as 50 extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles, or XLUUV, to massively boost the number of eyes the military has under the sea. That effort would be a fraction of the cost of Virginia-class attack submarines.

The study also recommends adding between two and three extra attack submarines over the 2016 force structure assessment that called for 355 ships, but the bulk of the new money will go toward unmanned systems.

The study, which envisions the fleet of 2045, is the same one that recommended the Navy drop to nine carriers from the current 11, and add dozens of large and medium-sized unmanned vessels to rapidly boost capacity for less money than it would cost to invest in a comparable fleet of larger manned vessels.

The Navy awarded a $43 million contract to Boeing for the first four Orca XLUUVs in February 2019, and subsequently expanded the buy to five. The Navy plans to start buying two per year starting in 2023, according to a Congressional Research Service report from March 2020.

Together, the findings of the CAPE office’s study show what Esper has been saying publicly for months: that the U.S. Navy must get away from relying on large manned combatants to deliver capacity, and rapidly develop and field a fleet of unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles.

The Department of Defense previously declined to comment on the CAPE assessment, citing its policy not to comment on internal products that are “predecisional.”

Esper has taken a keen interest in Navy force structure, telling Defense News in March that he had directed CAPE, along with the Navy, to conduct a series of war games and exercises in the coming months to identify the path toward a lighter Navy. But, he said, any major decisions will be based around the completion of a new joint war plan for the whole department, which the secretary said should be finished this summer.

“I think once we go through this process with the future fleet — that’ll really be the new foundation, the guiding post,” Esper told Defense News. “It’ll give us the general direction we need to go, and I think that’ll be a big game changer in terms of future fleet, for structure, for the Navy and Marine Corps team.”

In recent comments at a small roundtable of reporters, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said the Navy’s latest force structure assessment, which is designed around a more closely aligned Navy and Marine Corps, would be completed by the fall.

Underwater robots

The idea behind XLUUV is to take over missions that larger submarines, such as Virginia- and Los Angeles-class attack submarines, perform now but that shouldn’t require a $3 billion hull to perform.

This is a problem that is exacerbated by an adversary that has proven itself more than willing to dump money into capacity that the U.S. Navy struggles to compete with, said Eric Wertheim, a naval analyst and author of “Combat Fleets of the World.”

“The whole project is one of those key areas, like directed energy, where the U.S. can play to its advantage of leveraging technology to offset its disadvantages when dealing with an adversary like China,” he said. “They just have the ability to throw large numbers out there, large numbers of people to man equipment with, and people are among the most expensive assets for armed forces — especially in Western countries.”

The missions that XLUUV would be most well-suited to perform are those that may be too dangerous for a larger manned boat, he said.

“You might be going into dangerous waters that otherwise you might not want to send manned personnel into,” he said. “But also, more importantly, is the kind of mission that Orca [XLUUV] would be doing, has the potential to help you deal with the kind of mentally and physically exhausting missions like anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and intelligence collection where human senses get dulled over time.”

The Navy is also developing a family of unmanned surface vessels that are intended to increase the offensive punch for less money, while increasing the number of targets the Chinese military would have to locate in a fight.

That’s a push that earned the endorsement of Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday in comments late last year.

“I know that the future fleet has to include a mix of unmanned,” Gilday said. “We can’t continue to wrap $2 billion ships around 96 missile tubes in the numbers we need to fight in a distributed way, against a potential adversary that is producing capability and platforms at a very high rate of speed. We have to change the way we are thinking.”

In his current role, he plays a major role in correcting gaps identified by a Navy cybersecurity readiness report last year that found glaring holes in the service’s cyber posture. Since taking over the IT reigns, the service has narrowed its IT focus down to three lines of effort: modernize, innovate and defend.

In an interview with C4ISRNET, Weis discussed the progress the sea service has made on its cybersecurity posture and IT environment since he became CIO, as well as new pilot programs and how the Navy is spending funds on information technology.

What progress has the Navy made since you took over as CIO?

I think the progress is in a couple of areas. One is from a “defend” perspective — really highlighting that we’re going to have to change our perspective on defend and the cultural perspective. I talk a lot about moving from this culture of security by compliance to a culture where we have security as a constant state of readiness, where we’re always assessing our own readiness from a cybersecurity perspective.

Just the raising in awareness of that has helped spark a number of efforts. One of which is the Navy has undertaken a complete re-look at the RMF [risk management framework] for how we assess risk. The RMF, I think traditionally there’s an amount of just check boxes and forms that have to be filled out and managed. And there’s a recipe that you go through to get to RMF. The intent is right. And the outcome is intended to be that we’re managing risk. The downside is it takes a really long time and what comes out of it is not a current snapshot of risk.

How has that changed?

So the Navy now has taken a wholesale re-look at the RMF process. They’re looking at security as a state of readiness versus a state of compliance. They’re refining and retuning RMF to be more responsive to reflect current state and to be able to be a more consistent indicator of risk management versus the one and done.

What other successes can you point to?

I think another that comes out of that defend idea is we have really highlighted the need for modernization. Identity is a critical element of being able to defend. Traditionally, as somebody matures in their career in the Navy, you might acquire seven or more identities as you move on to a ship and then back to an ashore duty station, and maybe you’re on a different ship. So your identity morphs. It makes it very difficult for us to offer consistency and to be able to secure you. One of the foundations of zero trust is that we know who you are — that we can say that with authority. So we’ve been able to launch an identity program.

We’ve got some strong pilots right now that are being run to prove out technology, but we’re also launching an identity program around the ability to offer ubiquitous access and have that dovetail with a zero-trust architecture. So that has been launched.

What’s an example of an identity pilot you’re working on?

We’ve got a identity management pilot that we’re doing in conjunction with Navy Enterprise Resource Planning, or ERP. The Navy’s ERP system is an SAP ERP system that was moved to the cloud last year very successfully, and we are now working to implement an identity management and access solution that integrates with that Navy ERP cloud-based solution. And we are using that pilot to prove out a suite of tools that we hope to be able to fan out and expand use of beyond just that single system.

At AFCEA West in March, you mentioned that you wanted to use software-defined networking to improve information sharing between sailors and Marines. What progress have you made on that?

We have a team that we assembled who’s working through several aspects of the modernize [line of effort]. Network and network architecture is one of them. Another strong effort is the collaboration tools around Office 365 and zero-trust elements that go with that. They have been working in conjunction with the cyber component. So what we are seeing now and what we expect to see more of are proposed architectures that we can put in place for some targeted pilots that we want to take some specific enclaves within the network and use those as areas to try out some of the software-defined networking and the other architectural concepts that we’re putting in place.

The idea is that we would launch those efforts to intercept the new service provider that we would onboard in conjunction with the NGEN-R request for proposals — [a $7 billion IT contract awarded last year by the Navy to Leidos, but currently under protest by GDIT] — where we have a new service provider and we’re bringing to them the “should be” architecture. The plan was that that presented an ideal opportunity to intersect that trajectory and skate to where the puck is going.

With NGEN-R potentially being delayed through some protests, we will continue to look at where we can prove that out even ahead of a potential future partner coming onboard. But those are concepts that we’re working through; the team has continued to have a cadence around that. That has spanned through the COVID-19 crisis; they haven’t stopped that work through the telework and COVID-19 crisis.

Is there a timetable for starting those pilots?

We’re adjusting based on when we expect to see a new partner come onboard and for when we want to do those things on our own ahead of that. So I think we’re having to do some readjustment between the protest work and then as well as the COVID-19 work that may intercept some of that. We’re just assessing our timeline. I would like to see it done this year. I would like to see us be in some pilots here in the second half of calendar year 2020.

Editor’s note: Weis declined to provide an example of specific pilots because they aren’t finalized.

You also mentioned in recent months that you think the Navy needs to spend smarter. What are some areas that you’re looking at in this budget cycle that have been under-prioritized in the past?

When you run some benchmarks, we probably are spending at an appropriate amount consistent with others who have mission-critical activities in the IT space. And I use the financial industry as a good benchmark in terms of criticality of their IT infrastructure. So although we may be spending at a world-class level, we’re not necessarily always getting the world-class outcomes and output. So we’re looking at where do we want to be able to lean in and shape.

One of the first areas that we’re doing right now is the logistics — the log IT systems. That’s a portfolio that spans several hundred systems across the Navy and Marine Corps. We’re working together with the business process owners and the business side of this to look at how do we optimize log IT. How do we reduce the number of systems around an aligned business process and, along the way, shape that funding to potentially optimize our spend in log IT? And then how do we free that up or reinvest in some of the network modernization and defend activities that we feel needs more prioritization?

And that’s happening now. That log IT work and assessment is happening. There’s already system consolidation that’s happening. The log IT portfolio is one that probably approaches 8 to 9 percent of the total IT spend at this point. So that’s an area where we feel like it’s a large line item and we’ll benefit from the combination of business process work together with system work.

Our war fighters are expected to defend us against current risks and dangers, and at the same time be prepared for future perils and upgrade our defensive capabilities. But when budgets are tight, we pit current security needs against future security needs. That is dangerous.

We see this playing out now with our nation’s military aircraft. We have a shortage of wings and reduced readiness because for decades we have been using up planes faster than we’ve been replacing them. Next year’s budget reveals that the Pentagon is planning to add zero F-18s to replace older planes that can no longer fly. Thus, the plane shortage will simply get worse while we wait for at least a decade for a new plane to be developed and roll off production lines. And it may be a lot longer because challenges and delays in high-tech development are difficult to predict.

Moreover, as planes get older, they cost more to operate and eventually become unsafe to fly without a major overhaul, which can be staggeringly expensive. Because we’ve allowed our fighter fleet to age, we are at a point where immediate action is necessary. Deciding to buy fewer F-18s than our Navy needs means that the current shortage of wings will only get worse. It will also weaken our capabilities for at least a decade. This is simply too great a risk!

Imagine that you wanted to upgrade your health insurance. Would you cancel your current policy to “save” money so that in 10 years you could afford a more robust health plan? Of course not. The risk exposure would be too great. Similarly, forcing the military to endure aircraft shortages for a decade creates unacceptable risks to our nation’s security.

Our military must continue developing effective and modernized tools for our war fighters. Our adversaries are working overtime to surpass us, and we cannot permit that to happen. But we also cannot afford to leave a 10-year gap in aerial defense and create a large window of opportunity for adversarial nations to seize on our weaknesses.

China has been frantically building a blue water navy that is larger than our own. They have nuclear submarines and missile technology, and have bragged of their future capacity to attack and defeat the United States. Suspending procurement of the aircraft we need over the next decade makes us increasingly vulnerable. There is simply no way to justify that, no matter how bleak the Pentagon’s ledger.

Our enemies are dedicated to finding and exploiting any weakness in our defenses. By forgoing new F-18s, we are shining a spotlight on a significant weakness. This is irresponsible and dangerous. China’s leadership is surely cheering that budget plan in Beijing.

The F-18 isn’t simply a time-tested and proven fighter. The current F-18 has incorporated some of the most advanced technologies — more rapidly in some cases than our latest high-tech F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

The F-18’s new, low-drag, conformal fuel tanks allow it to fly faster, farther, stay on target longer and sustain a heavier payload, including an impressive array of advanced weapons. It employs next-generation radars, electronic warfare technology, jammers, and computing power and data availability to improve situational awareness and give war fighters the advantage in every confrontation.

Its long-range counter-stealth capability allows it to see the enemy while remaining virtually invisible. As heavyweight boxing legend Muhammad Ali said of rival George Foreman: “Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee. His hand can’t hit what his eyes can’t see.”

Most importantly, the F-18’s airframe has been improved to almost double its serviceable lifetime at 10,000 hours — making it both mission- and cost-effective.

Simultaneously investing in the F-18 Super Hornet while developing next-generation aircraft is the only way to ensure security now and in the future. It sends a clear message to our adversaries that not only are we strong today, but we’re committed to strengthening our defense for generations to come. Continuing procurement of the F-18 also helps to keep defense budgets under control, allowing our pilots to perform missions and train at lower taxpayer cost.

By cutting funding for the F-18, the Pentagon is gambling with national security. Congress and the administration need to step up and ensure that our military is sufficiently equipped to keep America strong today and long into the future. Anything less is unacceptable.

George Landrith is the president and CEO of the Frontiers of Freedom think tank. He previously served as the vice president and general counsel to the National Legal Center for the Public Interest — now associated with the American Enterprise Institute.