The key is to develop, mass-produce, and transfer Shahed-like drones to Ukrainian forces, enabling them to overwhelm and strike Russian targets in occupied Ukraine at the scale and frequency required to help defeat the invasion.

The Shahed-136 is an Iranian-developed suicide drone that Tehran transferred to Russia, along with its smaller cousin, the Shahed-131. It is a propeller-driven, carbon-fiber airframe that typically relies on satellite guidance, can carry a warhead of up to 40 kilograms, and has a range of around 1,000 kilometers. Most of its components are Western-made, commercially available and not particularly complex, keeping production costs low, reportedly $20,000 to $30,000 per drone.

Perhaps due to this simplicity, Western militaries have mostly overlooked such systems — but that is a mistake.

Essentially a propeller-driven cruise missile, the Shahed-136 serves a similar role as Tomahawk cruise missiles, primarily striking operational or strategic targets from standoff distance. While Tomahawks have superior range, speed, and warhead size, they cost up to $2 million each, roughly 100 times more than a Shahed. Using massed attacks of low cost Shaheds in conjunction with cruise missiles, Russia has overwhelmed Ukrainian air defenses and forced Ukraine to expend scarce interceptor missiles.

Russia has used Shaheds to strike bridges, fuel-storage facilities, and even frontline targets, but they have likely done the most damage by striking electrical sub-stations. While Ukraine is reportedly downing between half to three-fourths of incoming Shaheds, many still get through. Reportedly, Moscow is seeking to secure hundreds or even thousands more.

While the United States is bolstering Ukraine’s air defenses, defense alone is insufficient. Kyiv needs a Shahed-like capability to strike Russian military targets well behind the frontlines, especially bases in Crimea, which are mostly outside the range of the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb.

With such drones, Ukraine could attack targets such as ports, airbases, and supply nodes beyond the range of its currently fielded weapons. Examples include Sevastopol Naval Base, the port of Berdyansk, Russia’s logistics hubs in Luhansk and Dzhankoi, and the Saki, Belbek, and Gvardeyskoye airbases in Crimea. Hitting these targets would diminish Russian combat power, disrupt command and control, impede logistics, and force the redeployment of finite air defense assets. Put simply, it’ll help Ukraine win the war faster.

Indeed, Ukraine has already conducted sporadic drone strikes on Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and elsewhere using what appear to be long-range suicide drones. The Ukrainian military has attacked Sevastopol naval base and Belbek airbase in Crimea several times, and strikes on the Engels-2 and Dyagilevo airbases damaged multiple aircraft. While Kyiv lacks enough drones for a major air campaign, these operations provide proof of concept and should be scaled up dramatically.

Unfortunately, the U.S. military does not appear to field systems, at least in large quantities, directly analogous to the Shahed-136. Washington has provided Kyiv with the Switchblade-300 loitering munition and plans to send the larger Switchblade-600, but these systems have much smaller warheads and shorter ranges. The Gray Eagle, a system U.S. senators are pushing the Biden administration to provide, is roughly similar to the Turkish TB-2, which Russian air defenses have rendered largely ineffective as a strike platform since early in the war. Details of the Phoenix Ghost program are scarce, but if it were providing Ukraine the ability to conduct an extensive air campaign behind Russian lines, that fact would be readily visible in open sources.

Kyiv is working on building its own answer to the Shahed-136, but Ukraine’s defense industry has limited capacity, thanks in part to Russian attacks on factories. In fact, the CEO of a Ukrainian drone company said in October that only 20 percent of the military’s demand for drones had been met. Kyiv continues to lose drones in battle, so the shortage almost certainly persists.

However, the United States has the necessary industrial capacity to fill this gap. If industry avoids the dual pitfalls of overengineering and low production rates that have bedeviled many recent procurement programs, Ukraine could receive large quantities of drones in short order.

Iran builds Shaheds from commercially available components to simplify design, accelerate production, and reduce costs — and U.S. industry should do the same. While sophisticated seekers, guidance systems, and engines would improve the functionality of the drones, what Ukraine needs is a “good enough” solution delivered quickly at scale, not an exquisite solution delivered after the war ends.

Iranian factories have a production rate of 150 Shahed-136s per month, according to a Ukrainian military-affiliated source. But Ukraine needs thousands of similar weapons. If Washington moves quickly and keeps the design simple, it should be able to meet this need, enabling Ukraine to use masses of drones in each attack, compared to Russia’s current rate of only two or three dozen per salvo.

As the United States rediscovers its role as the arsenal of democracy, the Biden administration should provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs now, not look for optimal solutions that will take years to develop. Necessity is the mother of invention, and what Kyiv needs now is a way to strike Russian forces throughout occupied Ukraine with large quantities of relatively inexpensive munitions. That’s exactly what a mass-produced U.S. version of the Shahed-136 would provide.

Ryan Brobst is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

As the largest ground war since World War II rages on NATO’s borders—a war to which the United States has already committed $15 billion in security assistance to Ukraine at the time of writing—our own once unparalleled defense industrial base is lagging in the global competition for the adoption of emerging technologies.

Yet, scores of emerging national-security-focused technology companies are quietly strengthening Ukraine’s ability to navigate the operational environment, for far fewer dollars than governments are expending in the same pursuit.

Congress must ensure that our warfighters gain the most value possible from government and private sector technology development. Unfortunately, it is still challenging for companies to work with DoD due to years of unrealized reform proposals.

This issue is becoming acute. Existing DoD systems and process do not allow the Department to take full advantage of advancements derived from private investment in startups outside of the traditional defense supplier ecosystem. DoD must become a better buyer and customer of commercial products; one that understands industry incentives and market drivers.

I recently traveled to California to discuss and learn what DoD’s current roadblocks mean for our national defense with key stakeholders, including the Silicon Valley Defense Group, a nonprofit that connects the founders, capital and ideas that are driving promising techno-security developments with DoD. Like SVDG, I am invigorated by the bipartisan support for exploring how dual-use technologies and private capital will advance a broad mandate for defense innovation.

I am committed to finding solutions—the U.S. remains the most innovative country in the world, powered by its private sector, yet DoD is not taking advantage of the incredible innovation ecosystem at its disposal. And what has become abundantly clear in recent years, is that it will never do so unless Congress holds the Department accountable through consistent oversight. It is imperative that the 118th Congress step up and take the lead, leveraging its unique authorities and critical oversight mission to drive the development of cross-cutting relationships between startups, investors, and the defense ecosystem.

Silicon Valley’s earliest focus was on pioneering defense technology, and Congress must reinvigorate this partnership to meet 21st-century challenges. To this end, I propose three areas of focus for the 118th Congress to rebuild a “Defense Valley” that supports and promotes innovation to advance our national defense.

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution

PPBE is the framework and methodology by which DoD allocates resources, resulting in an annual defense budget request. Developed 60-plus years ago when DoD could still largely dictate technology markets and trends, today it is woefully anachronistic.

A new model is required; one that marries agility with reimagined incentive structures for risk-tolerance, innovation, creativity, and fiscal responsibility. I am encouraged by the thoughtful appointments to the newly-formed Commission on PPBE Reform, and I eagerly await its findings and recommendations, particularly in such areas as the ‘color’ of money, and ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ funding, all of which are inflexible, outdated components of a process that no longer serves DoD’s need for agility and speed.

Small Business Innovation Research Program

The SBIR program is a conceptually useful but practically challenged acquisition mechanism for procuring innovative technologies. Despite being promoted as “America’s Seed Fund,” the program is not designed for startups that want to scale rapidly.

Restrictions, like limiting entrants to companies with less than 50% VC equity-ownership, create a high barrier to entry for startups that have already relinquished ownership stakes as they pass through rounds of funding. Further, some companies are granted multiple awards without commercializing or scaling into programs of record—compounding the program’s challenges.

Acquisition mechanisms reforms have a role to play in fueling defense innovation but must be implemented in ways that further that outcome. To that end, I recommend: eliminating the 50% restriction on institutional investment equity-ownership to compete for SBIR grants; exploring effective incentives for companies to focus on progressing and scaling from the early-stage research and development SBIR grants they receive; and aligning incentives between public and private stakeholders to explore a new program to access and scale private sector R&D for DoD purposes, but specifically focused on high-growth startups.

Defense Innovation Unit

Created in 2015 and called “America’s most promising effort to bridge the divide between pressing national security requirements and commercial technology,” DIU is tasked with accelerating DoD commercial technology adoption through partnership with cutting-edge startups.

Born as an experiment, DIU has succeeded beyond expectations, beginning over 175 projects, and transitioning capabilities from 48% of those projects across DoD. Leveraging relationships in Silicon Valley and other tech and VC hubs across the country, DIU realized over $100 billion in R&D for critical emerging technologies—proving the viability and efficacy of its “Fast Follower Strategy” for DoD and American taxpayers. But DIU’s funding profile in recent years does not match its proven successes nor its recent Congressional validation.

Moreover, whereas DIU once reported to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef)—signaling its importance to the Department’s success—it now sits under the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, a component focused on prototyping versus scaling, thus significantly decreasing its organizational effectiveness.

Between manpower shortages, degraded contracting authorities, and indefensibly low funding, DIU is not positioned to make the difference on which our national security depends. To that end, I recommend: realigning DIU to report directly to the SecDef; correcting the unsatisfactory FY23 President’s Budget request; and ensuring that DIU receives stable and adequate future funding befitting of its critical role.

The Pentagon has proven that the only way it will begin to adopt the necessary best practices in acquisition and procurement is if Congress meaningfully holds it accountable for doing so. The 118th Congress must act to empower DoD decision makers prepare for long-term strategic competition.

The sooner Washington realizes that the U.S. is losing its competitive edge against China and that “business-as-usual” will unequivocally lead to defeat, the sooner we can course correct.

Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., is vice ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee.

With up to 95% of maritime accidents due to human error, autonomous vessels offer the tantalizing possibility of greatly reduced risk to ship owners, as well as significant cost efficiencies from reduced wage costs, estimated at 30%, and greater fuel efficiency.

Navies are also seeing the significant benefits in terms of cost efficiencies, increased operational capacities and reduced risk to human sailors. The computer-based technology will necessarily entail an even greater reliance on algorithms, data, sensors and linked devices, which will create a host of new cyber vulnerabilities.

In a paper developed in the framework of a research project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Marie Curie fellowship, we examine the myriad legal and policy implications of autonomous vessels in international shipping.

One of the initial findings to come out of the research, however, relates not to security or tech or law, but to gender. As an institution dedicated to overcoming gender bias, the EU seeks for all its researchers to be aware of gender issues in their research, and to take steps to ensure gender-sensitive methods and outcomes.

Why is ‘unmanned’ so entrenched?

A majority of literature in this field from all sources — whether academic, governmental or other — tends to use the gender-biased terms “manned” and “unmanned.”

The term “unmanned” is entrenched in a number of frequently used acronyms and abbreviations; for example, UMV — or unmanned maritime vehicles — and the U.S. Navy’s multiple projects in this area for large unmanned surface vehicles, medium unmanned surface vehicles and extra large unmanned undersea vehicles.

As one article succinctly points out: “It may be that the 19th century sailing vessel was a male dominated and defined world, yet women are assuredly part of this rich history.” And it is rapidly increasing.

In the U.S. Navy, women represent 19% of officers and 20% of enlisted personnel, and they serve in every rank from seaman to admiral, and in every job from naval aviator to deep-sea diver. In a similar vein, in 2019 women were approximately 10% of the British Royal Navy’s workforce, and in that year the Royal Navy was named as one of the U.K.’s top employers for women.

The data demonstrate that existing simplistic assumptions and social stereotypes such as “men at sea and women on land” are no longer sustainable, and such single-dimensional, gendered approaches that only men can be expected to crew a seagoing vessel do not reflect the reality. In this framework, and in line with the United Nation’s sustainable development goal No. 5 for gender equality, to recognize the contributions and achievements of non-men in this historically male-dominated sector, this article submits that the gender neutral terms “uncrewed,” “crewless” and “autonomous” ought to be preferred in publications, whether from media, academia, government or nongovernmental organizations.

Is ‘autonomous’ the same as ‘uncrewed’?

It is important to note that “autonomous” and “uncrewed” are not equivalent terms. A vessel may be uncrewed but not autonomous, for example, if it is remotely controlled. The International Maritime Organization’s “four degrees of autonomy” framework reflects this distinction where a “Degree Three” ship is remotely controlled from another location with no seafarers onboard; whereas a “Degree Four” ship is fully autonomous and “the operating system of the ship is able to make decisions and determine actions by itself.”

Usage of the gender-neutral term “uncrewed” is emerging in some recent literature; for example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office report to Congress titled “Uncrewed Maritime Systems: Navy Should Improve Its Approach to Maximize Early Investments.” While the IMO’s regulatory scoping exercise adopted and predominantly used the neutral term “Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships,” the term “unmanned” still appears several times in the report. This development in the usage of gender-neutral terminology is promising and should be replicated by other governmental agencies and commentaries as well as in other fields such as aviation and space.

The issue of gender-biased language is something that the land-based terminology in this field appears to have avoided to a large extent — we do not talk about “unmanned cars,” for example. In the field of aviation, the term “drone” has been commonly adopted, and it has been used in some commentary in the maritime context.

The gender-biased terms “unmanned aerial vehicle” and “unmanned aerial system” are also used. In the realm of space travel, since the early 21st century NASA has “used and prescribed non-gender-specific terms, preferring such descriptors as human, piloted, and crewed for the former, and unpiloted and uncrewed for the latter.” Despite this conscious shift in terminology by the world-leading U.S. space agency, gender-biased terms are still frequently seen in commentary: for example, “manned space missions.”

Titanic task of changing terms

One reason for the continued use of this archaic terminology is embedded in legal instruments such as the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea. For example, Article 29 defines warships as vessels that are “manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” This gendered terminology goes beyond just the seagoing crews; UNCLOS articles 62 and 119 refer to fishermen only, excluding the contribution of thousands of women to the fishing sector worldwide.

This is not to imply that the titanic task of updating the UNCLOS should be undertaken with the primary focus on updating the terminology into a more gender-neutral one. Instead, it suggests that the long-standing, ongoing debate surrounding the vital need to update UNCLOS to meet more contemporary needs and challenges, such as outdated definitions, technological advancements, etc., should consider including the update on its gendered terminology in the discussion agenda as well.

And while gender-biased terminology like this in international law ought to be amended, until it actually happens, it should not create an obstacle to others to update terminology in their discussions, commentaries and reports.

This article was developed as part of the project titled “Hybrid threats to Indonesia’s Maritime Security — an assessment of cyber and cyber-physical vulnerabilities in the world’s busiest shipping lanes,” and received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 101029232.

Adam Fenton is a Marie Curie research fellow at Coventry University’s Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations. Ioannis Chapsos is the research lead in maritime security at the center.

Wanted: Volunteers for immediate overseas assignment. Knowledge of French or another European language preferred; Willingness and ability to qualify as a parachutist necessary; Likelihood of a dangerous mission guaranteed.

Without any further instructions, the messages attracted a mix of individuals some of the the most creative and dangerous missions of WWII. Known as the Jedburghs, the small special purpose teams were a WWII phenomenon born out of the British Army and Sir Winston Churchill’s affinity for “ungentlemanly warfare.”

The multi-national teams were trained in irregular warfare, maintained extensive foreign language skills, and excelled at subterfuge, sabotage and surveillance. Jedburghs were sent deep into Nazi-held territory to disrupt the German war effort by waging unconventional warfare. As a concept, they provide an example of how an unconventional take on cross-functional partnerships can affect a war zone and operate effectively in politically sensitive environments.

The Jedburgh legacy lives on within 1st Special Forces Command who recently revamped the concept as four-person operational detachments. Today’s Jedburgh program should serve as the model for a new type of multi-domain collaboration: the pairing of the Cyber Mission Force and Special Operations Forces, or the integration of lethal and non-lethal assets, to tackle some of the most vexing challenges associated with strategic competition.

While CMF and SOF capabilities are already employed together in the military’s Special Mission Unit concept, integrated Cyber-SOF assets are needed at scale if the US wants to compete with the persistent threat of Russia and the pacing threat of China.

Getting Out in Front of Conflict

In 2018, U.S. cyber strategy shifted from one of restraint to engagement when U.S. Cyber Command obtained additional authorities under the National Defense Authorization Act. A cornerstone of the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (the next update is expected soon) is the 2018 Defend Forward policy and USCYBERCOM’s hunt forward initiative

Hunt Forward Operations are executed by teams from the Cyber National Mission Force, the offensive arm of USCYBERCOM, who engage with allies at their invitation to identify malicious cyber activity and observe adversary tradecraft and tools “in the wild.” Hunt Forward teams are therefore proactive measures that protect partner and U.S. networks. However, in addition to being a geographic concept, Hunt Forward is also temporal, as a teams’ activity enables an understanding of malicious cyber activity before it reaches US networks – much like the presence of SOF teams around the globe.

As a policy, Defend Forward is similarly temporal – it bridges short term tactical goals with over-the-horizon capabilities, as defined in ongoing counter-terrorism efforts – or capabilities and accesses developed in and through cyberspace today, that will enable the US to maintain the initiative and security of tomorrow. General Paul A. Nakasone, the commander of USCYBERCOM, describes the policy’s enabling activities as those that force an adversary to focus on defending their own assets, thereby inhibiting the adversary’s ability to go on the offensive.

The concept should sound familiar – especially after two decades of counter-terrorism operations – as it mirrors SOF activities: engage with the enemy, far from the US homeland, and constantly apply pressure to prevent the conditions necessary for an attack on the homeland – or strategic insecurity – from occurring.

In other words, the best defense is the continuous and relentless application of offense or, what some researchers call, “initiative persistence.” Thus far, HFOs have paid off, with a few dozen successfully completed missions across at least 14 countries.

Collaboration for Multi-Domain Operations

As Nakasone recently explained, Hunt Forward missions include sharing threat indicators, providing warning, sharing personnel, and providing insight with a host nation’s forces. In this sense, the CNMF teams serve a function much like that of the SOF teams tasked with Security Force Assistance, where training between the host nation and US service members is designed as a skill and information exchange.

However, Hunt Forward could expand to include more components of the Irregular Warfare portfolio, including Stability Operations. Cross-functional teams are used in a variety of military contexts, and the integration of SOF operators into elements of the CNMF, or vice versa, should be considered a crucial next step for the strategy of integrated deterrence.

Within the joint force, the concept of integrating operational skill sets is used to counter irregular threats through a balanced approach for strategic advantage. And integration also brings a premier skill to a team that would otherwise lack the capability. For example, SOF teams consistently embed Air Force Close Combat Controllers to support small units of action because of their exquisite Joint Terminal Attack Controllers capabilities.

The Air Force JTACs are revered among SOF as the premier enabler for controlling terminal attacks – ground force commanders consider them to be both a force multiplier, by providing critical fire control measures, and a risk mitigator for coordinating airstrikes. While the other services encourage their own small units to organically develop the JTAC capability internally, the skill is often assigned as a secondary job or additional duty and therefore fails to deliver the same performance as a fully qualified Air Force CCT.

Working Smarter, Not Harder

Similarly, cyber work role qualification and certification, much like the JTACs, is something SOF doesn’t have to develop or provide internally and, conversely, the CNMF doesn’t have to develop or provide its own version of special warfare training. Instead, creating the concept for Cyber-SOF tactical teams is – like the Jedburghs and embedded JTACs – a joint solution to the joint problem of an increasingly hostile cyberspace.

Without question, the cultures of SOF and CMF units may seem wildly different but, in reality, they are quite similar: both hold expertise in high regard, train consistently for ongoing and continuous global operations, and understand the strategic and cumulative effect of their teams’ operations. Additionally, CNMF and SOF units are postured to respond quickly to shifting global priorities and to an attack on the homeland or allied nation.

While an integrated concept will take time to develop and implement, there are areas in which immediate coordination is needed and possible: 1) close-access requirements for high sensitivity network and infrastructure access, 2) language and cultural fluency in forward deployed regions, and 3) foreign partner training.

Because the Cyber Mission Force and Special Operations Forces are two of the most exquisite tools of national power the US has, there is bound to be resistance to coordination but, failing to collaborate and integrate will produce redundant efforts instead of a unified strategy that efficiently leverages US assets to affect global and national security.

Using the blueprint of the multi-functional Jedburghs and the lessons learned from the embedded JTACs – models known to work effectively – a joint Cyber-SOF effort could better thwart attacks from peer adversaries like China, and provide another layer of proactive defense to the strategy of integrated deterrence.

Nicholas Dockery is a Special Forces Officer and a General Wayne Downing Scholar. He is pursuing a Masters in Public Policy at the Jackson School for Global Affairs, Yale University. Captain Maggie Smith, PhD, is a US Army cyber officer assigned to the Army Cyber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy where she is a scientific researcher, an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences, and an affiliated faculty of the Modern War Institute. She is also the director of the Competition in Cyberspace Project.

The importance of GPS as a military tool was underscored by Kremlin media in November as troops were massing along the Ukraine border. After Russia demonstrated it could destroy a satellite in space, a television commentator known to be an unofficial mouthpiece of President Vladimir Putin said the nation could “blind NATO” by shooting down all GPS satellites.

Despite this, Russian interference with GPS in Ukraine has not been nearly as aggressive as many observers had expected.

Experts within the GPS/positioning, navigation, and timing communities have proposed a number of possible reasons for this. Here are the most prevalent, all of which are based entirely on publicly available information:

Russia’s electronic warfare capability isn’t as good as it was thought to be. Russian forces have a fearsome reputation when it comes to electronic warfare. And they go out of their way to reinforce this. At one point, the state-owned news agency Sputnik proclaimed Russian EW capabilities “render aircraft carriers useless.”

The popular wisdom is that they have developed and maintained this capability as a response to superior technology used by Western forces. Electronic warfare can be an inexpensive way to level the playing field.

Since Russian forces have been surprisingly less capable than expected in other aspects of the Ukraine conflict, some think this may be true with their ability to interfere with GPS.

Most observers discount this suggestion, though.

They point out that Russian forces regularly jam GPS signals in northern Norway from locations far across the border. And that in some cases this jamming has been so precise, signals in a nearby frequency band from Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system have been unaffected.

Russia has clearly demonstrated impressive abilities to spoof GPS over wide areas. Users in downtown Moscow often find their equipment falsely reporting they are at an airport. The same is true in many coastal areas, the Black Sea and other locations where senior government officials are to be found.

A 2016 Moscow Times headline read “The Kremlin eats GPS for Breakfast.” The general consensus in the community is that there has been a lot of evidence to support that claim.

The question is then, why is the Kremlin only nibbling at GPS in Ukraine?

Russian forces use and need GPS. Proponents of this idea point to downed Russian fighter jets found to have GPS receivers taped to their dashboards.

Signals from Russia’s GLONASS system and terrestrial Chayka electronic navigation system are both available for use in Ukraine. Yet it seems likely there not enough compatible receivers for these systems to equip all Russian forces. As the world’s first global navigation satellite system, GPS receivers have become both plentiful and inexpensive. Cheap GPS receivers and some duct tape seems like an interim solution for some poorly equipped Russians.

Also, GPS signals support a wide variety of infrastructure. Telecommunications, the internet, electrical grids and machine-control systems all rely on GPS for timing. Russian forces may wish to protect Ukraine’s infrastructure for their own benefit and use. Prolonged and widespread attacks on GPS signals could cause serious infrastructure problems with long-term strategic downsides greater than any temporary tactical gains.

High-power, persistent GPS jammers are easily targeted. Any strong and consistent radio frequency transmission can be easily located and attacked. Many militaries have missiles specially designed to home in on and destroy jamming transmitters. Even without such weapons, direction-finding technology can pinpoint a transmitter enabling an artillery attack or an air or ground assault. Russian commanders may be limiting transmission power and time on air to avoid attracting hostile fire.

Ukraine is less impacted. While Ukraine is increasingly receiving and using more Western weapons, many of which use GPS, it also has huge stockpiles of Soviet-era weapons. These don’t rely on GPS and are likely unaffected by most, if not all, forms of electronic warfare. Also, Ukrainian regular and irregular forces are likely less reliant upon sophisticated command, control and communications systems used by larger militaries. Thus, GPS jamming that could hamper normal operations for the U.S. and NATO may have less impact in Ukraine.

Saving the best to use against the U.S. and NATO. Despite the location of the conflict, Ukraine is not the enemy Vladimir Putin is really worried about. His concerns focus on the U.S. and NATO. Deploying Russia’s most sophisticated and powerful electronic weapons in Ukraine would enable adversaries to study technologies and tactics. This would lead to the development of countermeasures and make the weapons less effective in future conflicts.

Better for Russia to keep its best tools and tricks for interfering with GPS in reserve, for use later against larger forces and more important targets.

Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation and serves on the U.S. National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board.

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This event took place on April 4, 2022

Defense News convened with defense community thought leaders and experts to break down the budget both on a broad scale and on a programmatic level. This virtual panel discussion provided analysis and observations on what’s shaping the budget, and what leaders in industry and government need to know for the DoD’s investment priorities.

Watch Recording:

With Guest Speakers:

• Todd Harrison, Director, Defense Budget Analysis & Aerospace Security Project, CSIS
• Mackenzie Eaglen, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute (AEI)

***

This event took place on March 25, 2022

The US Army’s massive, multi-year modernization effort is heating up, with 24 of the service’s 35 technology prototypes expected to be online and in soldiers’ hands by 2023. Acquisition and delivery of these bleeding-edge battlefield capabilities, which include next-gen ground vehicles, long-range precision fire, and enhanced network tools, is a top priority for Army leadership as competition intensifies with near-peer threats around the world. Defense News spoke with Doug Bush, newly sworn in as Army’s head of acquisition and logistics, about how his organization is delivering on modernization promises against a tumultuous geopolitical threat landscape.

Whether it was live updates from the ground, assessments of Ukrainian countermeasures, arresting satellite images of Kharkiv and Kyiv, or even discussions about how the conflict could inspire similar attacks on other nations, Defense News and Military Times reporters delivered a multitude of stories to keep readers engaged and informed by the hour.

You can see a selection of the best work below. For breaking updates and ongoing coverage, visit https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/ukraine/.

Live updates from Russia’s massive Ukraine invasion

On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his long-anticipated invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Events of the invasion have played out in real time on social media platforms. Sources on the ground in Ukraine are reporting live on Twitter, and Military Times is chronicling these accounts and will continue to provide live updates.

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2022/02/24/live-updates-from-russias-massive-ukraine-invasion/

What makes the Black Sea so strategically important?

It’s a scenario for which Russia has been laying the groundwork for years. Ukraine has been training to defend against such an event since its naval fleet was decimated in 2014 after Russia took Crimea, the peninsula that separates the Sea of Azov from the larger Black Sea. But an attack from the sea was something Ukraine was particularly vulnerable to — even if Russian forces have so far relied primarily on sending land forces across borders to attack Ukrainian cities.

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/02/25/what-makes-the-black-sea-so-strategically-important/

US ‘prepared to respond’ to cyberattacks, Biden says

WASHINGTON — President Joe Biden said the U.S. is “prepared to respond” should Russia unleash cyberattacks on American businesses and critical infrastructure, but stopped short of saying what capabilities would be brought to bear.

https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/2022/02/25/us-prepared-to-respond-to-russian-cyberattacks-says-biden/

As Russia attacks Ukraine, Taiwanese wonder what China will do

The Russian attack on Ukraine has put a spotlight on another place that could face an invasion by its larger neighbor, as some analysts draw quick comparisons to China’s threats to assert its control over self-ruled Taiwan.

https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/ukraine/2022/02/25/as-russia-attacks-ukraine-taiwanese-wonder-what-china-will-do/

Snake Island Ukrainians found alive, taken as Russian prisoners

The 13 Ukrainian border guards-turned-international-heroes that had reportedly been killed after telling a Russian warship to “go fuck yourself” instead of surrendering their post were confirmed to be alive on Sunday by the Ukrainian Navy.

https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/ukraine/2022/02/28/snake-island-ukrainians-found-alive-taken-as-russian-prisoners/

7,000 more U.S. troops in armored brigade heading to Germany amid Ukraine attack

An armored brigade is starting to make its way to Europe, as part of the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Most of the troops will come from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/02/24/7000-more-us-troops-in-armored-brigade-heading-to-germany-amid-ukraine-attack/

A graphical comparison of Russian and Ukrainian military forces

In the early morning of Feb. 24, Russia began a fresh invasion of Ukraine. Data from a recent report compares the military forces of the two countries and provides details on the Russian-backed separatist forces in Donetsk and Luhansk.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/24/a-graphical-comparison-of-russian-and-ukrainian-military-forces/

‘We need as much Stinger and anti-tank weapons as possible,’ says Ukraine’s defense minister

WASHINGTON ― Ukraine’s defense minister made a direct plea to the U.S. Congress on Thursday to send his besieged nation anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles through Poland to help it repel Russia’s military assault on Ukraine.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/24/we-need-as-much-stinger-and-anti-tank-weapons-as-possible-says-ukraines-defense-minister/

US, NATO air forces mobilize as war comes to Europe

American and NATO air forces are bolstering their stance in Eastern Europe after Russia launched its opening gambit in a far-reaching invasion of Ukraine on Thursday.

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2022/02/24/us-nato-air-forces-mobilize-as-war-comes-to-europe/

The latest example is an article from the Army Times reporting on the suicides of four members of the Texas National Guard since they were deployed months ago to the U.S.-Mexico border. The article was cited by the New York Times in its reporting on the mission and the challenges it is creating for National Guard troops.

The Army Times article dug into not only the suicides, but the political motivation behind Gov. Greg Abbott’s decision to send the National Guard to the border. Abbott has been criticized for making that decision in response to accusations from primary challenger Allen West, a former Army officer who was forced to retire after torturing an Iraqi detainee in 2003.

Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Jason Featherston, who was with the Texas National Guard until his retirement on Nov. 30, 2021, described the political considerations as “common knowledge around the office,” and detailed low morale, lack of purpose and a failure to meet soldiers’ needs during the deployment.

Sightline Media publications reach more than 300,000 print subscribers every month, with more than 11 million unique visitors to our family of websites. The full Army Times article can be read here. The New York Times article can be read here.