{"id":17782,"date":"2020-01-16T19:11:38","date_gmt":"2020-01-16T19:11:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2020\/01\/16\/the-us-navys-so-called-budget-salvo-demands-too-much\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T21:41:31","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T21:41:31","slug":"the-us-navys-so-called-budget-salvo-demands-too-much","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2020\/01\/16\/the-us-navys-so-called-budget-salvo-demands-too-much\/","title":{"rendered":"The US Navy\u2019s so-called budget salvo demands too much"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The latest U.S. Navy \u201cbudget salvo\u201d that demands a larger share<\/a> of the defense budget for the Navy requires some tough scrutiny. On Jan. 14, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday announced his service needs a bigger slice of the defense budget if it is to reach its goal of fielding a 355-ship fleet<\/a>. This pronouncement comes despite the Navy already having the Department of Defense\u2019s biggest service share<\/a> of the defense budget.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it is entirely expected for the top military leader of a service to be an advocate for resources, the CNO\u2019s assertions were not entirely forthright. As the administration finalizes its fiscal 2021 budget submission to Congress, such budget salvos need to be unpacked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, the CNO indicated the Navy\u2019s share of the DoD\u2019s top-line budget is now only 34 percent, a number that falls short of the 38 percent allocated to the Department of the Navy during the Reagan administration\u2019s defense buildup. Adm. Gilday continued by pointing out that \u201ca one-third, one-third, one-third\u201d budget share for each of the service departments \u201cdoes not reflect the [National Defense] Strategy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is absolutely true that a schema that allocates roughly one-third of the defense budget to each of the three military departments would be nonstrategic. It is a more important truth that the \u201cone-third, one-third, one-third\u201d service budget apportionment is a myth; that myth has been skewered by multiple independent analyses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hard analysis in a recent Mitchell Institute policy paper<\/a> pointed out that the DoD actually allocated about 28.6 percent of its FY2020 budget request (including funding for overseas contingency operations) to the Department of the Navy; 26.7 percent to the Army; and only 23 percent to the Air Force \u2014 America\u2019s \u201ckick the door down tonight\u201d force. The rest funds operations of the DoD\u2019s defense agencies and other non-service organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Air Force\u2019s 23 percent excludes $39 billion in \u201cpass-through\u201d funding in its budget for national intelligence-related and other programs that it does not control. In other words, the $39 billion is not available to buy new combat aircraft, hypersonic weapons and other Air Force next-generation capabilities needed to support the 2018 National Defense Strategy. For context, $39 billion equates to the total amount requested by the Air Force over the last four years to buy new aircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\t