{"id":21767,"date":"2022-03-10T14:37:31","date_gmt":"2022-03-10T14:37:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2022\/03\/10\/the-pentagon-must-pay-for-competition\/"},"modified":"2026-08-18T20:55:51","modified_gmt":"2026-08-18T20:55:51","slug":"the-pentagon-must-pay-for-competition","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2022\/03\/10\/the-pentagon-must-pay-for-competition\/","title":{"rendered":"The Pentagon must pay for competition"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

A recent Pentagon report<\/a> called for more arms manufacturers to bolster competition<\/a> in the shipbuilding-, aerospace- and defense-industrial base. Citing examples of the reduction of suppliers over the past 20 years for major weapons categories, the report laments the drop in tactical missile suppliers from 13 to just three; fixed-wing aircraft falling from eight companies to three; and satellites tumbling from eight contractors to four.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the sorry state of industry, it is all the more surprising that there\u2019s one glaring omission from the solution set: buying more equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, buried deep in the document is the admission that \u201copportunities for new programs can be limited.\u201d You don\u2019t say?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another gem states that \u201cconsolidation in the U.S. defense industry historically increases under budget reduction pressures.\u201d Huh, really?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given these truisms, the solutions the Pentagon proposes do not align with the full scope of the problem. All the flexible contracting authorities in the world won\u2019t be enough to solve the simple economies of scale necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And it\u2019s not as if there is no need.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. military is deep in the \u201cTerrible \u201920s<\/a>\u201d \u2014 a decade where the bulk of conventional and nuclear systems need to be updated after decades of use, technological advancements have made systems irrelevant, and general wear and tear has occurred from war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Currently, the military is facing a massive spending spike to pay for modernization bills across the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps that have been ignored, deferred or inadequately considered. This modernization crunch is the result of decades of defense investment decisions \u2014 including delayed equipment recapitalizations from the end of the Cold War, the dominance of short-term spending priorities during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the legacy of the 2011 Budget Control Act, and competing federal spending priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turns out, you can buy your way out<\/a> of some problems. Competition is one of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the track record is dismal for both the Pentagon and Capitol Hill. Take the Navy proposing in 2005<\/a> and again last year<\/a> what is essentially a \u201cone shipyard\u201d acquisition strategy for destroyers. Buying just one of these ships (or buying more and down-selecting to one builder) is a \u201cwinner take all\u201d approach between the two yards building destroyers that would permanently put one shipbuilder out of business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both times, Congress had to save the Navy from itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most recent defense policy bill calls the Navy\u2019s plan troubling for violating the current destroyer contract and delaying higher ship counts \u201cduring a period of increasing demand, particularly in countering threats from China and Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\t