{"id":24122,"date":"2022-06-15T18:49:07","date_gmt":"2022-06-15T18:49:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2022\/06\/15\/the-defense-production-act-is-helping-rebuild-the-us-industrial-base-lets-keep-it-that-way\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T22:03:43","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T22:03:43","slug":"the-defense-production-act-is-helping-rebuild-the-us-industrial-base-lets-keep-it-that-way","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2022\/06\/15\/the-defense-production-act-is-helping-rebuild-the-us-industrial-base-lets-keep-it-that-way\/","title":{"rendered":"The Defense Production Act is helping rebuild the US industrial base. Let\u2019s keep it that way."},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Recently, the Biden administration has come under criticism for its use of a law which, until its application during the COVID-19 pandemic<\/a>, was relatively unknown. The Defense Production Act<\/a> has been on the books since 1950, but only in the past few years has its potential value been so broadly recognized, with both parties championing its use from the White House and Congress. However, recent claims that the president is abusing the DPA\u2019s power<\/a> in pursuit of partisan objectives are threatening the viability of this unique tool for rebuilding a robust, resilient and globally competitive American industrial base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sen. Patrick Toomey, R-Pa., recently noted<\/a> that Congress may need to curtail the act in light of perceived misuse by the White House. Other nonpublic sources have cited more specific restrictions considered by Congress, which would broadly apply to the DPA, even in cases where its application isn\u2019t in question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This wouldn\u2019t be the first time a perceived overreach resulted in broad-based restrictions that went beyond the offending action. And it wouldn\u2019t be the first time it happened to the DPA. In 2014, Congress amended the DPA<\/a> with several restrictions, following a changeover in control of Congress and in response to congressional frustration<\/a> with the Obama administration\u2019s use of the act to support a clean energy initiative focused on biofuels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead of limiting how the DPA could be applied, they primarily made it more difficult to use, such as eliminating the ability to delegate signature authority below the president. The result was an increase in bureaucracy and a corresponding decrease in effectiveness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Going forward, we encourage all parties to avoid any changes that impede the effective use of the DPA. To this end, we also strongly recommend an open dialogue between Congress and the Pentagon to understand and address current restrictions impeding the effective application of the DPA, and to ensure any future changes do not undermine the Defense Department\u2019s ability to effectively and rapidly address legitimate defense requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A legitimate debate may arise over the use of the DPA beyond traditional defense needs. As that debate unfolds, Congress may find that DPA authorities need to be expanded at the DoD while applying further oversight and restrictions at civilian agencies that are not as experienced with the use of this authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Over the past 70 years during which the DPA has been in effect, it has been reauthorized 53 times<\/a> through bipartisan efforts. But at no time has it been more important than today, as we seek to give American industry an opportunity to rebuild and compete globally against China. This importance has been affirmed by the White House and Congress \u2014 through bipartisan calls to increase its strategic use in rebuilding domestic supply chains, combined with substantial funding increases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both the Trump administration, through executive order 13806, and the Biden administration, through executive order 14017, have directed an all-of-government approach to assessing vulnerabilities in \u2014 and strengthening the resilience of \u2014 critical supply chains. The reports resulting from these executive orders recognize the broad and dangerous reliance on China<\/a> that is a fundamental characteristic across several industries critical to national defense, including microelectronics, batteries, and castings and forgings, among others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This dependence on our pacing competitor has arisen due to a combination of U.S. inaction and aggressive, unfair and even illegal Chinese economic practices<\/a>. The February 2022 Defense Department report<\/a> on critical supply chains specifically underscores the need to leverage the full scope of the American economy to support national defense, such as aggregating demand across industries and limiting the use of military-unique requirements in order to better leverage commercial market innovations.<\/p>\n\n\n\t