{"id":32351,"date":"2021-03-15T15:00:00","date_gmt":"2021-03-15T15:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2021\/03\/15\/a-bridge-fund-cant-solve-the-pentagons-emerging-tech-problem\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T22:39:00","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T22:39:00","slug":"a-bridge-fund-cant-solve-the-pentagons-emerging-tech-problem","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2021\/03\/15\/a-bridge-fund-cant-solve-the-pentagons-emerging-tech-problem\/","title":{"rendered":"A bridge fund can\u2019t solve the Pentagon\u2019s emerging tech problem"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Over the last five years, the Pentagon organized a charm offensive to attract new entrants into its technology base<\/a>. With the lure of quick contracts and follow-on potential, thousands of entrepreneurs have been enticed into seeking defense work. This enthusiasm risks being short-lived without more examples of small contracts leading to larger procurements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The oft-cited problem is the multiyear process<\/a> for lining up funds, first for a more substantial prototype and then for a program of record. The Pentagon\u2019s prototyping guide<\/a> clearly diagnosed the problem: \u201cWhen the initiation of a prototyping project is stymied or the developed prototype never makes it past the \u2018valley of death<\/a>\u2019 due to inappropriate or unavailable funds, the transformative effect of prototyping can be lost.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Department of Defense is at great risk of losing its competitive edge due to funding issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One solution proposed recently by several authoritative figures is to use a \u201cbridge fund\u201d where defense leaders could allocate short-term funds to innovative projects while long-term funding is hammered out. For example, the Silicon Valley Defense Group recommended<\/a> establishing a \u201cstand-alone innovation fund that is designed to help critical innovation companies bridge the \u2018valley of death.\u2019<\/a> \u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are good reasons, however, to doubt the effectiveness of a bridge fund.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, bridge funds have come and gone in the past. An early example goes back to the 1950s, when an \u201cemergency\u201d research and development fund<\/a> allocated billions of dollars to support tech transition. There have been many since. Two recently defunct funds are the rapid prototyping fund<\/a> and the rapid innovation fund. While the latter boasted some success, the Pentagon did not request<\/a> continued funding for it in the fiscal 2021 budget.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, a bridge fund itself does not solve the root problem of program planning. Program sponsors still need to firm up requirements and request follow-on funds for fielding. A bridge fund might support a next-level prototype but will do little to ensure that long-term procurement funding is in place to scale the solution. In FY21, the DoD requested more than $28 billion in relatively flexible prototyping accounts, yet still fails to solve this problem. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, a centrally managed fund is unlikely to be timely. The selection process will likely take months as proposals are routed through multiple levels to reach decision-makers. As an example, the signoff authority for the rapid prototyping fund was the secretary of defense. During that period, programs are unable to appropriately plan, given the uncertainty of being selected. This lag may inadvertently drive the \u201cvalley of death\u201d to the right rather than bridging it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fourth, a project may need to rely on the bridge fund for multiple years if the selection cycle does not align well to annual budget-planning timelines. Recall that the planning, programming, budget and execution, or PPBE, process drives a two- or three-year lag. Until the funding cycle catches up, some projects might become bridge fund \u201caddicts\u201d while others receive no funding at all. This could result in a diffusion of the funds that minimizes its overall impact. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most importantly, Congress has historically been suspicious of large funds without a clear plan and predicted outcomes. The bridge fund, as many envision it, would need to be quite large, making it even more unpalatable to congressional appropriators. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To mitigate these problems, a bridge fund should:<\/p>\n\n\n\n