{"id":32693,"date":"2020-07-03T12:00:01","date_gmt":"2020-07-03T12:00:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2020\/07\/03\/europe-must-take-on-its-own-defense-responsibilities\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T22:42:06","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T22:42:06","slug":"europe-must-take-on-its-own-defense-responsibilities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2020\/07\/03\/europe-must-take-on-its-own-defense-responsibilities\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe must take on its own defense responsibilities"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As they look at the state of their coronavirus-hit economies and U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s poor standing in opinion polls<\/a>, many European leaders may be tempted to put on hold any plans to meet NATO\u2019s target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. But Europeans need to wake up. Trump is not a reliable ally, and the damage he has done to the trans-Atlantic partnership<\/a> is likely to linger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump\u2019s hostility to NATO has been obvious since he called into question its Article 5 mutual defense guarantee during his last presidential campaign. We now know, according to former national security adviser John Bolton\u2019s tell-all memoir, that Trump was ready to pull the U.S. out of NATO at its 2018 summit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent weeks Trump announced without warning that the U.S. will withdraw<\/a> 9,500 \u2014 more than one quarter \u2014 of the 34,500 troops it has stationed in Germany because the German government is not spending enough on defense. Then at a Washington press conference with Polish President Andrzej Duda, Trump said a large number of NATO countries were \u201cdelinquent\u201d and declared that Europe was taking \u201ctremendous advantage of the United States on trade.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump may not understand how NATO works or the value to the U.S. of having troops in Germany, but it is true that the U.S. carries a disproportionately large share of the financial burden of defending Europe. During his presidency, Barack Obama also accused Europe of being \u201ccomplacent\u201d about its own defense \u2014 though he was rather more diplomatic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The permanent stationing of American troops in Germany is a \u201cdisplay of our continued commitment to NATO and our collective resolve to support European security,\u201d according to a statement issued by U.S. Army Europe, based in Wiesbaden. (Tony Sweeney\/U.S. Army)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Only a handful of European NATO members have met the alliance\u2019s target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense over the past 20 years, while the U.S. has consistently exceeded it, spending 3.1-4.9 percent. But Europe\u2019s problem is not just the amount it spends on defense, but the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of its spending: Europeans get far too many systems and far too little military capability for their money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Commission\u2019s 2017 fact sheet<\/a> on European defense reported that European Union member states operated 178 different major weapons systems; the U.S. had only 30. EU member states have 17 different types of main battle tank; the U.S. has one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This proliferation of weapons systems leads to high unit costs for short production runs, and a lack of interoperability. And European spending is not directed to ensuring that troops can fight when needed. The European members of NATO have almost 1.9 million active-duty troops, while the U.S. has 1.3 million and Russia about 900,000. But very few of the European forces can be deployed in a crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Politically and economically, this is a bad time to try to get European politicians to think seriously about increasing and rationalizing defense spending. The EU\u2019s economic forecast<\/a> for spring 2020 foresees a contraction in real GDP of 7.4 percent this year, albeit followed by an increase of 6.1 percent in 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some of Europe\u2019s biggest investors in defense are in NATO but not in the EU. The U.K. accounted for 16 percent of defense spending in Europe in 2019, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. But despite some early promise, Britain seems to have lost interest in any institutionalized cooperation with the EU on foreign and security policy. Relations between the EU and NATO member Turkey, which accounted for another 7 percent of European defense spending last year, have rarely been worse.<\/p>\n\n\n\t