{"id":35083,"date":"2018-04-12T19:56:24","date_gmt":"2018-04-12T19:56:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2018\/04\/12\/cyber-command-has-a-role-but-pentagon-leaders-struggle-to-define-it\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T18:26:44","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T18:26:44","slug":"cyber-command-has-a-role-but-pentagon-leaders-struggle-to-define-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/pentagon\/2018\/04\/12\/cyber-command-has-a-role-but-pentagon-leaders-struggle-to-define-it\/","title":{"rendered":"Cyber Command has a role, but Pentagon leaders struggle to define it"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Nearly a decade after the formation of U.S. Cyber Command senior leaders at the Department of Defense are questioning the scope of the organization\u2019s work due to the novelty of formalized military cyber operations and the dynamic cyber environment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words: where does Cyber Command\u2019s work begin and end?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe challenge associated with defining traditional military activities in the cyber domain is typically that is done by looking back historically at what are traditional types of military operations,\u201d Kenneth Rapuano, assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security and the principal cyber adviser for the Department of Defense, said during an April 12 hearing in front of a House Armed Services subcommittee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn a domain that is so novel in many respects and for which we don\u2019t have the empirical data and experience associated with military operations per se, particularly outside zones of conflict, there are some relatively ambiguous areas associated with what constitutes traditional military activities,\u201d he said. \u201cThis is something that we are looking at within the administration and we\u2019ve had a number of discussions with members and your staffs. That is an area that we\u2019re looking at in terms of understanding what the trades are and what the implications are of changing the current definition if that were to be warranted.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, just as the organization\u2019s cyber warrior cadre is set to be fully staffed, the head of Cyber Command has suggested there might need to be adjustments to its structure. Adm. Michael Rogers has said in previous congressional testimony he\u2019d like to \u201cretool\u201d the structure because the current hierarchy was based on an assessment from nearly eight years ago<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThis capability that we\u2019ve invested, that we\u2019ve built, how do we use it in a way that attempts to forestall the opponent\u2019s ability to gain advantage in the first place,\u201d Rogers told the House Armed Services Committee Wednesday. \u201cFailing that, how do we stop that activity before they have significant impact.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rogers also openly questioned, from a defensive posture perspective, if Cyber Command\u2019s forces should expand beyond operating solely inside the DoD Information Network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cOne of the questions I think we need to ask ourselves is,\u201d he said in regards to the defense industrial base and the prospect of DoD\u2019s role of partnering and defending critical infrastructure, \u201cwhat level of ability to operate outside the DoDIN would be appropriate for the cyber mission force.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This could be an entirely new scope for Cyber Command, which comes at a time lawmakers have questioned Cyber Command\u2019s role in helping to defend elements of critical infrastructure \u2013 of which 80 percent is owned by the private sector \u2013 and election systems from foreign interference<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\t