{"id":36324,"date":"2019-03-28T19:21:39","date_gmt":"2019-03-28T19:21:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2019\/03\/28\/natos-growing-membership-demonization-of-putin-drive-anti-western-policies\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T22:54:48","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T22:54:48","slug":"natos-growing-membership-demonization-of-putin-drive-anti-western-policies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2019\/03\/28\/natos-growing-membership-demonization-of-putin-drive-anti-western-policies\/","title":{"rendered":"NATO\u2019s growing membership, demonization of Putin drive anti-Western policies"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This is the second of a two-part commentary on a Russian perspective of NATO, and the future of Russian-Western relations. <\/i>Click here for part one.<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin tried to pursue a flexible and moderate policy. In the early years, his foreign policy course was as pro-Western as possible under the circumstances. But his pro-Western policy pursued during 2000-2003 was unappreciated by the United States, which regarded Moscow\u2019s policy as evidence that it was well on its way to becoming a U.S. satellite. Washington drew the conclusion that Russia would always have to accept, unconditionally, any and every decision made by the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contrary to the popular but simplistic Western narrative, the collapse of Russia\u2019s pro-Western foreign policy course in the 1990s had nothing to do with \u201cRussian grievances against the West.\u201d The real reason involved a fairly rational assessment of the pros and cons of various foreign policy alternatives by the Russian political elite and the public in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To summarize, NATO enlargement was instrumental to the collapse of Russia\u2019s pro-Western foreign policy course in the 1990s. And the year 2003 saw another wave of NATO enlargement: The alliance admitted the three Baltic states. It also launched efforts to secure Ukraine\u2019s and Georgia\u2019s accession at some point in the future. To that end, the West energetically supported the \u201ccolor revolutions\u201d in the two countries in 2003 and 2004. By doing so, it turned Ukraine into a nuclear time bomb in Russian-Western relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, President Putin continues to pursue a moderate, centrist and evasive foreign policy in an effort to preserve what little common ground still remains between Russia and the West. Despite saber-rattling by Russian hawks, he decided against a full-scale invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The Western mainstream, however, paints Putin as the devil incarnate and the leader of the world\u2019s autocrats, hellbent on \u201cundermining global democracy\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That demonization of Putin ignores fundamental problems in Russian-Western relations and pretends that all would be well between Russia and the West were it not for Putin\u2019s personal role. It also feeds into the mass, Western delusion that these problems can be resolved or ameliorated once Putin is out of the way. It is, after all, crystal clear that the main goal of the successive waves of Western sanctions against Russia is the deposal of Putin and a regime change in Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\t