{"id":40072,"date":"2018-11-29T19:52:55","date_gmt":"2018-11-29T19:52:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2018\/11\/29\/modernizing-the-us-military-by-learning-from-the-past\/"},"modified":"2026-08-07T23:16:02","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T23:16:02","slug":"modernizing-the-us-military-by-learning-from-the-past","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2018\/11\/29\/modernizing-the-us-military-by-learning-from-the-past\/","title":{"rendered":"Modernizing the US military by learning from the past"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

\u201cInnovation\u201d and \u201cforce modernization\u201d are the Pentagon buzzwords of the day. Strategies are being developed across the Department of Defense enterprise, with these concepts as the foundational pillars. Is this a flawed idea involving competing philosophies? Can the U.S. be truly innovative if it wants to rapidly modernize its force? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the first time in decades, the United States military apparatus does not possess a clear advantage on the world stage. The flattening of the technological landscape and emergence of peer adversaries requires that the U.S. innovate to remain dominant. While technological progress<\/a> remains critical, fielding systems more rapidly is also necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new undersecretary for research and engineering, Michael Griffin, and other DoD leaders believe rapid prototyping in coordination with commercial partnerships could provide the solution. They emphasize this approach in the fiscal 2019 budget request \u2014 $90 billion in research, development, testing and engineering accounts with increases concentrated in late-stage development, prototyping and testing activities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

History shows this is not a new philosophy; rather, it is a shift from the failed approach of the recent past. Case in point, the Army invested $18 billion of taxpayer money into Future Combat Systems, or FCS. The failed modernization program never really had a chance. Its leap-ahead technological advancements were based on operational assumptions driven by embryonic technologies. Three-quarters of all technology needed to field FCS systems was considered early stage in nature. Prototypes and demonstrations were not scheduled until shortly before production was set to commence \u2014 four years and billions of dollars after research began.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The science and technology community and their industry partners failed to work with Army operators until it was too late. Army leaders were so enamored with envisioned capabilities that they ignored operational realities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only two decades prior to FCS, the \u201cBig Five\u201d programs (M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley, Patriot missile, Black Hawk and Apache) demonstrated the successful use of the currently espoused approach. Each program arguably provided 5 to 10 times the capability improvement over its contemporary system and moved through the procurement cycle efficiently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What commonalities did these programs share that contributed to their success?<\/p>\n\n\n\t