He knew those recommendations would help, but they wouldn\u2019t fundamentally change how the Navy looked at readiness and safety. So Couch set off to reframe the conversation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cGiven the billions of dollars we\u2019ve dumped into the readiness accounts, and literally the thousands of mishap report recommendations we\u2019ve accomplished, why aren\u2019t we getting measurably better?\u201d he wondered aloud during an interview with Defense News.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Past efforts sought to avoid a repeat of a specific mishap \u2014 a recommendation might deal with a particular command-and-control issue that went awry or alter how a piece of gear should be used under certain conditions \u2014 but Couch said the Navy needed an entirely new mindset.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So he went to work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2018, Naval Surface Force Pacific established the Human Factors Oversight Council and since then has relied on the group to measure a broad range of sailor-related data, from how much sleep each individual sailor gets each night, and therefore how fit one is to stand watch, to how much training a sailor received and how a sailor scored on proficiency tests, which informs ship assignments. The group looks at a ship\u2019s mishaps during maintenance to determine how likely they are \u2014 statistically speaking \u2014 to have a certain type of mishap during at-sea operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If recommendations alone won\u2019t stop fatal collisions, data might, the argument went.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe ended up coming up with this thing we call the six common traits of a mishap ship,\u201d said Couch, a former Navy helicopter pilot and amphibious ship captain. \u201cThe traits themselves are interesting \u2014 it\u2019s kind of a cool checklist to walk around as a leader and say: \u2018Are these things happening on my ship?\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBut perhaps more important than the traits themselves is using those variables to ground ourselves in this theory of organizational drift into failure, and then using that theory to go back and think about how we would combat that drift at the [fleet] level and at the [ship] level.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n This data-centric focus on how sailor readiness contributes to surface fleet safety comes as the commander of Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener, works to make the fatal collisions of destroyers Fitzgerald and John S. McCain a course-altering moment for the surface warfare community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt was an inflection point for us,\u201d Kitchener said. \u201cWe reset our community.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n That, the admiral explained, was done by making changes to organization, training, manning policies and maintenance prioritization \u2014 and the Navy isn\u2019t done yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe want to be defined by all the good things sailors are doing every day, not these events that we\u2019re talking about today.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In early 2017, the Navy couldn\u2019t see the abundant warning signs that the surface force, and in particular the surface ships based in Japan, was overworked and underprepared. The cruiser Antietam ran aground in Tokyo Bay<\/a>, causing $4.2 million in repairs and a 1,100-gallon oil spill. An investigation released that spring<\/a> found the incident \u201cwas preventable\u201d and \u201c[t]he primary cause of grounding was human error\u201d \u2014 specifically poor seamanship skills and mission planning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/3989031.jpg_058224.jpg\")
\u2018The perfect storm\u2019<\/h1>\n\n\n\n