![\"\"](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/635986610882123853-dsc-2492bjpg.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n\n\n\nThe Fort Worth at Singapore’s Changi naval base on Feb. 16, more than a month after a major machinery accident. As of mid-May the ship is still at Changi awaiting repairs.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Photo Credit: Christopher P. Cavas\/Staff<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n But that success came to a crashing halt Jan. 12 while the ship was undergoing regular maintenance pierside in Singapore. While results of the mishap investigation have yet to be made public, sources indicate someone ordered the ship’s diesel engines to be turned on, overriding built-in safety features and manual instructions that specifically advised not to do so. The engines ran for more than 15 minutes, and when they were finally turned off the ship’s combining gear \u2014 the interchanges that allow gas turbines or diesels to be cross-connected to propulsion shafts \u2014 was wrecked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n Seventh Fleet commander Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin spoke with me a month later about Fort Worth’s situation. The damage assessment was not then complete, but enough information was available to indicate that while the diesels couldn’t be engaged, the ship was capable of using its gas turbines. Not an optimal situation for sure, but doable. At the time, Aucoin estimated the ship would need six to 12 \u00a0months for machinery repairs. The question then was where to fix the LCS \u2014 either at a shipyard in Singapore, in Japan, or back in the US, where the Fort Worth already was set up for an overhaul in San Diego upon its return. Options for moving the ship included running only on the gas turbines \u2014\u00a0usually used just for high-speed operations \u2014 and the bad-for-publicity choices of being towed across the Pacific or making the journey high-and-dry aboard a heavy-lift ship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “I’d like to get it fixed expeditiously,” Aucoin said Feb. 15. He would not commit, however, to a time frame for a decision simply on where to repair the ship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I visited the Fort Worth pierside at Singapore’s Changi naval base Feb. 16. There was not a lot of activity onboard \u2014 crew members were carrying out regular maintenance, but as might be expected things were generally quiet. The steady pace of operations of the previous year had been replaced by a sense of ennui, waiting for word on what was next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The plan to forward-base LCSs in Singapore has been in place for several years and remains a work in progress. The complex scheme to provide logistics, material support and repair facilities was tested during the first LCS deployment in 2013 and refined for the Fort Worth’s cruise. A year ago, Navy officials were routinely speaking of having four LCSs operating from Singapore by 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n One must presume that contingency plans to repair LCSs that broke down or were damaged were considered, drawn up and approved long before the LCS Freedom began its 2013 deployment. Such plans would need to be approved by multiple stakeholders \u2014 among them US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor; 7th Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan; Commander Surface Forces and LCS Squadron 1 in San Diego; Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington; not to mention Pacific Command in Pearl and the chief of naval operations in the Pentagon. Numerous lower-level activities and commands also should have had a hand in the planning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No one claims the decisions were simple or easy \u2014 there is a lot to consider, from cost to politics to legal questions on top of all the hardware issues. But it’s clear that when the Fort Worth was hurt\u00a0Jan. 12 the Navy’s decision-making apparatus was unprepared and unable to come to a quick and clear consensus. Only on April 13 did the service announce the ship would travel under its own power to San Diego. It’s still at Changi as of mid-May, and apparently won’t be leaving at least until late June. It’ll likely be mid- or late-summer before it even arrives in California to begin repairs, and late 2017 or even 2018 before it’s again ready for service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That’s just unacceptable. Whatever the reasons, today’s Navy leadership needs to take a lesson from 1945 and get it in gear. Assess the situation, consider the alternatives and make a decision. Ineffective management has just delivered a real blow to the LCS program just as it was starting to roll.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The US Navy’s leadership needs a lesson form 1945 on how to make decisions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":116197,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_yoast_wpseo_meta-robots-noindex":"","_yoast_wpseo_meta-robots-nofollow":"","_yoast_wpseo_canonical":"","_acf":"","_yoast_wpseo_primary_category":66,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","_smg_distribution_targets":[]},"categories":[66,33,17],"tags":[],"coauthors":[1026],"class_list":["post-60257","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-commentary","category-home","category-opinion"],"acf":{"subheadline":"","legacy_arc_id":"2UHLTJAVT5H6XDGZDE74GLHZSA","arc_canonical_url":"\/opinion\/commentary\/2016\/05\/15\/us-navy-just-make-a-decision\/","remove_feature_photo":false,"is_sponsored":false,"subtype":"","redirect_url":"","disable_inline_ads":false,"native_logo_pretext":"Presented By:"},"yoast_head":"\n