{"id":62631,"date":"2022-11-03T12:45:00","date_gmt":"2022-11-03T12:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2022\/11\/03\/enhance-raw-material-security-through-international-cooperation\/"},"modified":"2026-08-18T20:51:28","modified_gmt":"2026-08-18T20:51:28","slug":"enhance-raw-material-security-through-international-cooperation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/one.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/commentary\/2022\/11\/03\/enhance-raw-material-security-through-international-cooperation\/","title":{"rendered":"Enhance raw material security through international cooperation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

A disinformation campaign<\/a> targeted a company planning to build mineral processing facilities in Texas last summer. A Chinese cyber group called DragonBridge developed fake social media profiles and posted images of angry protestors calling on Texans to rally against a new rare earth element-mining and -processing plant to be built nearby.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That campaign failed, but it demonstrates some of the threats that will likely continue to affect the mineral supply chains in the United States and elsewhere. With closer multinational cooperation, the U.S. and its allies and partners could reduce vulnerabilities emanating from the dependency on China, and other potentially unstable mineral sources, and counter hybrid attacks on domestic production lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rare earth elements and materials used in lithium-ion batteries are among the 50 materials deemed critical or strategic to the U.S.<\/a> They are used in aeronautics, military surveillance systems and satellite communications, and they are critical for clean energy technologies like electric vehicles. Most are sourced from overseas \u2014 China, Australia, Canada, Russia, Africa or Central Asia \u2014 but it is China that dominates extraction and processing<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2017-2020, 76% of rare earth elements<\/a> imported into the United States came from China. In Europe, it was 98%. Worse, the U.S. and its European allies lack processing facilities<\/a>, so what is mined in the United States has been shipped to China for refining.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This kind of foreign dependence is risky. Supplies from China, or from other countries that have tumultuous domestic security situations, may be unreliable. Supplies could unexpectedly decline or be deliberately cut off for political, strategic or security reasons \u2014 or simple economic factors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prices fluctuate, too, influenced by heavy subsidies, government export controls or illegal market activities. A disruption to mineral exports would harm the U.S. and its allies\u2019 defense industries\u2019 ability to produce, repair or modernize their equipment. This is no longer speculative: Deliveries of the F-35 fighter jets were stopped in 2022 due to sourcing of cobalt<\/a>. China has already used its near monopoly on rare earth elements as a political weapon against Japan<\/a> (in 2010) and more subtly in the trade war<\/a> with the United States in 2019. Meanwhile, China has also adopted or prepared laws increasing export controls<\/a> and giving priority to its own industries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instability in other countries could shift material supply as well. The war in Ukraine<\/a> and the resulting punitive sanctions against Russia have affected access to Russia\u2019s raw materials and led to wider material market volatility.<\/p>\n\n\n\t